Transnational Civil Society Movements

The State of Anticorruption Efforts

Nelson J.V.B. Querijero and Ronnie V. Amorado
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This paper has been produced in collaboration with the IBON Foundation Inc., a research-education-information institution based in the Philippines. Its main concern is the collation of socioeconomic data and analysis, and the dissemination of this information to the different sectors of Philippine society and the international community as its contribution to the effort of people’s empowerment through education and advocacy support.

IBON conducts researches on socioeconomic issues, maintains a databank, provides media support services, has an active non-formal education programme for the grassroots sectors, produces audiovisual materials, is involved in the formal education sector, and facilitates local and international publishing. It makes all these services accessible to the international community through international cooperation and networking. For more information, visit the Web site, www.ibon.org.

**Acronyms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>BPI</td>
<td>Bribe Payers’ Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPI</td>
<td>Corruption Perceptions Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>civil society organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>IACC</td>
<td>International Anti-Corruption Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAP</td>
<td>International Association of Prosecutors</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Chamber of Commerce</td>
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<td>IICG</td>
<td>International Initiative on Corruption and Governance</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>research and development</td>
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Summary/ Résumé/ Resumen

Summary
Over the past several years there has been increasingly heated debate on issues of global concern, such as corruption. Corruption as a local and national problem has jumped out of these arenas and permeated the international arena as a result of transnational civil society actors. Global civil society organizations (CSOs) provide much of the impetus for the debate on corruption. A growing body of literature focusing on the emergence and mechanisms employed by transnational CSOs is emerging and provides a veritable mine of how they formulate alternative world views.

The paper reviews the anticorruption efforts pursued by transnational CSOs, what these organizations are, their structures and how they are evolving. It seeks to capture the activities and functions of the movement and the kind of methods they employ to achieve their goals. The paper identifies the following areas of tension: (i) issues of legitimacy and representation among transnational CSOs; (ii) the grey areas in the notion of global civil society; (iii) the North-South divide; (iv) the composition and membership of transnational civil society movements; (v) the movements’ increasing use of new technology; and (vi) fallibility as an emerging concern of civil society. From these tensions arises an agenda for further research and advocacy, which includes (i) rethinking civil society, state and market boundaries, especially in the promotion of global transnational movements; (ii) legitimization of global civil society; (iii) internal assessments; (iv) problem of transnationalization; and (v) “downstreaming” of transnational movements.

The paper concludes that anticorruption movements appear to be adequate in terms of programmes, strategies and techniques. What remains to be established is the capacity of these movements to create long-term impact of reducing country-level corruption. However, civil society groups adopt different paths in their campaigns against corruption. They appear effective in forging broad alliances and coalitions with state and market institutions, thereby diluting conventional civil society boundaries.

This offers a new challenge since corruption is an issue that trespasses on different boundaries and arenas. To mount a serious anticorruption campaign thus compels social actors to go beyond the conventions of civil society, state and market boundaries. The boundaries do not just imply physical and organizational parameters, but also and, more importantly, the adjustment of approaches and strategies.

This paper was prepared under the UNRISD project on Global Civil Society Movements: Dynamics in International Campaigns and National Implementation. The project is led by Kléber Ghimire, with assistance from Anita Tombez, Murat Yilmaz, Britta Sadoun and Santiago Daroca. The project is funded by a grant from the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), IBON Foundation Inc. and the UNRISD core budget.

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Résumé
De plus en plus depuis quelques années, des sujets de préoccupation mondiale, tels que la corruption, donnent lieu à un débat passionné. Des acteurs de la société civile transnationale ont fait de la corruption un problème non plus seulement local et national mais aussi international. Le débat sur la corruption doit beaucoup de son dynamisme à des organisations de la société civile (OSC) mondiale. La littérature, de plus en plus abondante, consacrée à
l’émergence d’OSC transnationales et à leurs modes d’action, constitue une véritable mine de renseignements sur l’autre vision du monde qu’elles proposent.

Les auteurs s’intéressent aux efforts anticorruption déployés par les OSC transnationales, à la nature de ces organisations, à leurs structures et à la façon dont elles évoluent. Ils cherchent à définir les activités et fonctions du mouvement et le type de méthodes qu’elles emploient pour atteindre leurs objectifs. Ils recensent les domaines de tension suivants: (i) les questions de légitimité et de représentation entre les OSC transnationales; (ii) les zones floues que comporte la notion de société civile mondiale; (iii) la fracture Nord-Sud; (iv) la composition et les membres des mouvements de la société civile transnationale; (v) leur recours croissant aux nouvelles technologies; et (vi) la faillibilité comme préoccupation naissante de la société civile. De ces tensions se dégage un programme de recherche et de sensibilisation auquel figurent notamment: (i) la nécessité de repenser les frontières entre la société civile, l’Etat et le marché, en particulier dans la promotion des mouvements transnationaux mondiaux; (ii) la légitimation de la société civile mondiale; (iii) les évaluations internes; (iv) le problème du transnationalisme; et (v) les activités en aval des mouvements transnationaux.

Les auteurs concluent que les mouvements anticorruption semblent avoir des stratégies, des techniques et des programmes satisfaisants. Ce qu’il reste à établir, c’est la capacité de ces mouvements à faire reculer durablement la corruption au niveau national. Cependant, les groupes de la société civile suivent des voies différentes dans leurs campagnes contre la corruption. Elles se révèlent efficaces pour conclure de vastes alliances et coalitions avec les institutions de l’Etat et du marché et à estomper ainsi les frontières classiques qui délimitent la société civile.

Avec la corruption, qui franchit diverses frontières et gagne des domaines différents, elles sont confrontées à un nouveau défi. L’organisation d’une bonne campagne anticorruption oblige les acteurs sociaux à dépasser les conventions de la société civile, les frontières de l’Etat et du marché. Ces frontières ne supposent pas seulement l’existence de paramètres physiques et organisationnels, mais aussi et surtout une adaptation des approches et des stratégies.

Ce document a été établi dans le cadre du projet de l’UNRISD sur Les mouvements de la société civile mondiale: Dynamique des campagnes internationales et réalisation au niveau national. Le projet est dirigé par Kléber Ghimire, avec l’aide d’Anita Tombez, Murat Yilmaz, Britta Sadoun et Santiago Daroca. Il est financé par un don de la Direction suisse du développement et de la coopération (DDC), la fondation IBON et le budget général de l’UNRISD.


**Resumen**

En los últimos años se ha suscitado un candente debate sobre cuestiones de interés mundial, como la corrupción. La corrupción como problema local o nacional ha abandonado tales ámbitos y trascendido al escenario internacional como resultado de la tarea que han desempeñado diversos actores transnacionales de la sociedad civil. Las organizaciones internacionales de la sociedad civil (OSC) proporcionaron un gran impulso al debate sobre la corrupción. Cada vez es mayor el número de estudios que analizan el surgimiento de OSC transnacionales y los mecanismos que éstas emplean, material que constituye una verdadera mina de información sobre la forma en que estas organizaciones formulan visiones alternativas sobre el mundo.

En este documento se examinan los esfuerzos anticorrupción que llevan adelante las OSC transnacionales; se analiza lo qué son estas organizaciones, sus estructuras y cómo están
evolucionando. Se pretende dar a conocer las actividades y funciones de estos movimientos y el tipo de métodos que emplean para alcanzar sus metas. En este documento se identifican las siguientes áreas de tensión: (i) problemas de legitimidad y representación entre las OSC transnacionales, (ii) las zonas grises presentes en la noción de sociedad civil mundial, (iii) la división norte-sur, (iv) la composición y membresía de los movimientos internacionales de la sociedad civil, (v) el creciente uso de la tecnología por parte de los movimientos y (vi) la falibilidad como preocupación emergente de la sociedad civil. De estas tensiones surge una gama de temas que requieren mayor investigación y promoción, a saber: (i) la reconsideración de los límites entre la sociedad civil, el Estado y el mercado, en particular en cuanto a la promoción de los movimientos transnacionales, (ii) la legitimación de la sociedad civil mundial, (iii) evaluaciones internas, (iv) el problema de la transnacionalización y (v) la relación entre los movimientos transnacionales y el ámbito nacional.

En el trabajo se concluye que los movimientos contra la corrupción parecen resultar adecuados en cuanto a programas, estrategias y técnicas. Lo que queda por resolver es la capacidad de estos movimientos para tener una repercusión a largo plazo que contribuya a reducir la corrupción a nivel nacional. Sin embargo, los grupos de la sociedad civil siguen diferentes rutas en su lucha contra la corrupción. Parecen resultar eficaces en la conformación de amplias alianzas y coaliciones con las instituciones del Estado y del mercado, diluyendo de esta forma los límites convencionales de la sociedad civil.

Esta situación brinda un nuevo desafío, ya que la corrupción es un problema que traspasa límites y escenarios de diferente índole. La consolidación de una campaña anticorrupción sería obliga pues a los actores sociales a trascender las convenciones de los límites entre la sociedad civil, el Estado y el mercado. Los límites no implican meros parámetros físicos y organizativos sino también, y de mayor importancia, el ajuste de enfoques y estrategias.

Este trabajo fue realizado en el marco del proyecto de UNRISD sobre Movimientos internacionales de la sociedad civil: Dinámica de las campañas internacionales y ejecución en el ámbito nacional. El proyecto es conducido por Kléber Ghimire, con la asistencia de Anita Tombez, Murat Yilmaz, Britta Sadoun y Santiago Daroca. El proyecto ha sido financiado mediante una donación de la Agencia Suiza para el Desarrollo y la Cooperación, la fundación IBON y el presupuesto principal de UNRISD.

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I. Introduction

Over the past several years, there has been a tremendous outpouring of passion on issues affecting global concerns. Among these is the issue of corruption. Corruption as a local and national problem has jumped out of these arenas and permeated the international arena as a result of transnational civil society actors. These global civil society organizations (CSOs) provide much of the impetus for the ensuing debate on corruption. A growing body of literature focusing on the emergence and mechanisms employed by such transnational CSOs is emerging and provides a veritable mine of how they provide alternative world views.

This paper attempts to bring to light some issues on the burgeoning debate about corruption as it enters the transnational CSOs’ fight. In undertaking a state-of-the-art paper on corruption, a documentary review of most sources as it relates to the broad range of information on the Internet was conducted. The paper also reflects the use of information and communication technologies as a mechanism of the CSOs in the fight against corruption.

The paper seeks, among other aspects, to provide a rendition of anticorruption efforts as espoused by transnational CSOs, what these organizations are, their structures and how they are evolving. It seeks to capture the activities and functions of the movement and the kind of methods they employ to achieve their goals. Finally, the paper seeks to delve into the tension and dynamics of the movement. The paper begins with revisiting the concept of corruption as it has been raised by scholars. The Philippine case is discussed and the broad social formations and the array of anticorruption efforts are presented with a view to providing a local context. This is followed by a discussion about the engagement of civil society’s participation in the anticorruption effort, emphasizing that while state and market organizations/actors do fight against corruption, the resonance of the fight seems to be carried by the transnational CSOs. The paper further brings to light several dominant Northern organizations that are linked to the liberal democratic tradition, while also presenting a Southern voice linked to the people’s democratic movement. Emergent themes on the tension and dynamics linked with the civil society movements are presented as well.

Revisiting the notions of corruption

To many, corruption is an age-old problem. It probably dates back to as early as Biblical times, when the serpent induced and deceived Adam and Eve into eating the forbidden fruit in the Garden of Paradise. The deception of the serpent suggests the apparent distortion and seeming bribery that deviate from the integrity and purity of humanity (Amorado 2003:5).

In ancient times, the Greeks referred to corruption as “luô, stasis, metabolê and diapthora, which imply the loss of form and the process of change that such loss entails” (Saxonhouse 2000:12). The precursor of corruption emanated from the Greek corruzione and the Latin corruptus, which mean the “deterioration of government and in the quality of governance” (Machiavelli and Polybius in Hirschman 1997, cited in Saxonhouse 2000:4). “Since then, corruption has evolved into the concept of deviating from the purity and integrity of governance and government” (Amorado 2003:5).

Noted Filipino sociologist and journalist, Randolf S. David, clearly defines corruption in accord with the ancient notion, which explains the social metaphor of corrupting the virtues of people and institutions:

I’ve sometimes wondered why corruption is the word used for acts of dishonesty committed by people in positions of trust. Corruption means debasement, decay, deterioration, weakening. These terms are usually applied to metal and, in particular, to living matter. So, what is it that decays, deteriorates, or weakens in corrupt people?...I think that what corruption

1 Several portions also appear in Amorado (2005). Also, see Amorado (2003a).
signifies when applied to human behavior is the weakening of instincts—in this case, the instinct for honesty. On this simple instinct depend many of our social institutions. Instincts are sources of energy, and corruption is energy in decline (Philippine Daily Inquirer 2004:A15).

In an apparent affirmation of David’s notion, the Oxford English Dictionary defines corruption as the “perversion or destruction of integrity in the discharge of public duties by bribery or favour” (ADB 2000; Saxonhouse 2000) and the Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines it as “inducement to wrong by improper or unlawful means” (ADB 2000). This also supports Angeles (1999:3), who views corruption as an “infraction or violation of the mandated and institutional norms of duty and responsibility for personal and private gain”.

At present, most of the definitions hold corruption as the abuse of power for private gain and enrichment. Other concepts evolve as derivatives of this notion. For instance, corruption is seen as a behavior that digresses from the formally prescribed duties of a public role because of private and pecuniary gains (Nye 1967 and Scott 1972 in Saxonhouse 2000:4–5). It is also the use of public office where an official, who is entrusted by the public to carry out a task, engages in some sort of malfeasance for personal enrichment (Bardhan 1997 in Saxonhouse 2000:5).

For others, corruption is the abuse of official power for private gain (Kaufmann and Siegelbaum 1997) or the misuse of power by any government official or other person in a position of power and influence for material reward or personal gain.² Oftentimes, the abuse or misuse entails a behaviour of impropriety on the part of the officials, in which they improperly or unlawfully enrich themselves and those close to them.

In public office, corruption is defined as “a dysfunctional and pathological condition in the bureaucracy that negates the accomplishment of its constitutional mandate of promoting public interest” (Sosmeña 1995:14). It is a purposive behaviour, which may be a deviation from an expected norm, but is undertaken nevertheless with a view to attain material or other rewards.

But while it puts the public sector at the centre of the corruption discourse, the World Bank is also aware of corruption in the private sector. It has recognized that as a “frequent source of bribes for public officials, the private sector shares the responsibility for corruption” (World Bank 2000:6). Batalla (2000:8) concurs when he denotes the “misuse or abuse of office for private gain both in government and the private sector”. He further states that the “use of public office has been identified with gaining and maintaining economic, political and social power” and identifies a wide range of corrupt practices and illicit behavior to include bribery, extortion, fraud, nepotism, graft, speed money, pilferage, theft, embezzlement, falsification of records, kickbacks, influence peddling and campaign contributions.

The Asian Development Bank (ADB), for its part, emphasizes the misuse of public or private office for personal gain, defining corruption as

\[
\text{a behavior on the part of officials in the public and private sectors, in which they improperly and unlawfully enrich themselves and those close to them, or induce others to do so, by misusing the position in which they are placed}^3
\]

(ADB 2000:5).

This definition highlights the important role of the private sector in seriously reinforcing the problem of corruption.

In all of these definitions, government is seen as a major arena of corrupt and corruptible behaviour. This notion also extends to the civil society and private sector, because their own

² Klitgaard et al. (1995); World Bank (2000); Ti (2003).
³ Kaufmann (1997) speaks of kleptocracy when government officials and employees use the resources of the government to enrich themselves and their associates, when corruption is state-sanctioned and has become pervasive and corrosive.
systematic or institutionalized corruption will eventually affect their relationships and transactions with government. “When corruption becomes endemic, it will respect no borders and spread like a virus” (Moratalla et al. 1999:15). Indeed, like termites that destroy from the inside, and like a metastatic cancer that infects and rapidly spreads to the others (Alatas 1991; Coronel 1998), corruption will breed and intricately contribute to and pervade, among other problems in society, such as poverty, criminality, drug addiction, diseases, calamities and even wars. Corruption, therefore, cannot be isolated from other social problems (Amorado 2005).

To cite other definitions of corruption: a “behavior of public officials which deviates from accepted norms in order to serve private ends” (Huntington 1968 in Coronel 1998:10); “the practice of using the power of office for making private gain in breach of laws and regulations nominally in force” (Andreski 1968 in Coronel 1998:10) and as something that is “systematically and actively supported by members of the organization through their direct participation in the corrupt act by covering for it and in the sharing of the rewards generated through the process” (Alfiler 1986:28; Lim and Amorado 2002:13).

Why is corruption in the news today? Why has it generated more media exposure than before? Since the expansion of civil society, there has been a balancing act vis-à-vis the other two sectors of society. This, combined with the activism that anticorruption organizations bring to their campaigns, has led to a growing visibility of corruption-related issues. Together with the call for good governance, which emphasizes transparency and accountability, awareness of public sector corruption became a major unifying agenda for civil society actors. At a national level, it is the shock at seeing public officials squandering huge amounts of public money on private gain, while a large part of the population in the country lives in poverty. At the international level, it is the revulsion in not being able to effectively channel development assistance to nation-states. Corruption, too, is seen as a deterrent to having a fairer economic environment. Now, corrupt practices in the market sector, as well as in civil society and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are being exposed.

The state of corruption in the Philippines

The Philippines is notorious for its domestic corruption. In 2004, it was the eleventh most corrupt country out of 146 countries surveyed by the Berlin-based organization Transparency International (TI). In 2005, it was also the third most corrupt country in Southeast Asia and the second most corrupt in the eastern part of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Growth Area. Even worse, in a recent survey of 102 countries cited by the ADB, the Philippines was identified as the second most corrupt country after Bangladesh, which is the poorest country in the world today (Philippine Daily Inquirer, 20 January 2005).4

The Philippines’ ranking on TI’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) declined between 2000 and 2003 despite the impeachment of former President Joseph Estrada, who was identified as one of the 10 most corrupt presidents and state leaders in the world (TI 2004a:13) (see figure 1 and table 1).

While the Philippines held the position of the eleventh most corrupt country in the world from 2000 to 2003, it slightly improved its CPI score from 2.5 in 2003 to 2.6 in 2004. By contrast, the status of several countries in the same category as the Philippines, such as Albania, Argentina, Ethiopia and Pakistan, worsened in 2003. Only Gambia and Tanzania improved, and the Philippines and Zambia held on to their places. This meant that at least the Philippines’ position had not worsened.

4 See the Philippine Daily Inquirer, 20 January 2005.
The perception is not without basis. Common estimates reveal that 1 per cent to 10 per cent of the Philippines’ national annual income from the gross national product as well 20 per cent to 30 per cent of the national annual budget in the General Appropriations Act are lost to corruption. The accumulated figure is said to be sufficient to substantially cover the country’s foreign debt (Philippine Daily Inquirer 2002c).

In 2001, a significant portion of the procurement budget—amounting to approximately $38.2 million (21 billion pesos) of the approximately $190 million (104 billion peso) total allocation—was lost to illegal commissions and kickbacks. The amount is equivalent to a quarter of the budget for education, half of the budgets for public works and interior and local governments, and far above the allocation levels for health, transportation and communication, justice, environment, labour, social welfare, agriculture and agrarian reform (Philippine Daily Inquirer 2002b).

Corruption is endemic in what are seen to be the most corrupt agencies in the Philippine government: customs, internal revenue (taxation), public works, land transportation, national police and education, among others (Social Weather Stations 1996–2004). Many also believe that the accumulated cost of corruption for the past 20 years could have significantly paid, if not exceeded, the country’s foreign debt (Office of the Ombudsman 1997; World Bank 2000).

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Figure 1: CPIs of the Philippines, 1980–2004

Source: TI 2004b.
The extent of corruption is so serious that two of the 10 most corrupt leaders identified are Philippine presidents (see table 2). The private sector is not exempt either, as recent surveys reveal that two out of three companies admit to bribing the government in their transactions (Philippine Daily Inquirer 2002a).

<table>
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<td>Algeria</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: With a rank of 102 and a score of 2.6, the Philippines was the eleventh most corrupt among 146 countries in 2004.

The state of corruption in the Philippines, as a case in point, provides the context for the extent of the problem of domestic corruption as well as the milieu for advocacy by CSOs. It is important to note that the Philippines is known worldwide because of its very strong and vibrant civil society movement. The non-violent People Power Revolutions in 1986 and 2001 have become models in democratic movements in other countries. But despite the strong influence that the Philippine civil society groups have on the country’s national affairs, they have never really made a dent in corruption.

The seeming constraint of civil society advocacy in the Philippines in addressing domestic corruption reveals its lack of capacity to elevate the movement to the global transnational arena. However, the CSOs are not totally at fault. Because of the massive corruption at the domestic level, the arena for anticorruption campaigns needs to be localized, which explains in part why the level of advocacy is rarely global. Issues such as the debt problem have clearer global implications because of the involvement of bilateral and multilateral debtor countries. To bring corruption on to the international agenda, it is necessary to examine its global dimensions. In light of globalization, these include issues such as money laundering and bribery among multinational and transnational corporations.

At this point, it is important to recognize that the link between the domestic initiatives and global movements is largely constrained by the ability, or inability, of the CSOs to impact the combat against corruption at the local level. There is much to be done to address domestic corruption, including linking with global social movements. The lack of an effective connection is not a sufficient excuse. A global movement offers more pressure for governments to seriously address the issue of corruption in their respective countries.

**The array of anticorruption efforts**

The state, market and CSOs mount an array of initiatives to combat the massive and systemic corruption not only in the government and the private sector, but also within the ranks of CSOs. These initiatives emerge as a set of interventions in a continuum of applied persuasion and pressure. Interestingly, this continuum also largely defines the distinct space or niche by which anticorruption initiatives can be located, depending on their strategies and techniques. Four major approaches emerge as part of the anticorruption continuum: (i) conscientization and promotion; (ii) deterrence and prevention; (iii) detection and investigation; and (iv) prosecution and conviction. Such approaches are also inherent in the loci of anticorruption efforts—that is, local, national, regional and global—and similarly permeate various modes of intervention such as research, seminars, conferences and training, technology development, research and development (R&D), communications and public relations, constituency building and coalition building (see below).
Arenas of anticorruption initiatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels</th>
<th>Conscientization and promotion</th>
<th>Prevention and deterrence</th>
<th>Detection and investigation</th>
<th>Prosecution and conviction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Research</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seminars/conferences/training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Public monitoring</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D/technology development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications/public relations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constituency building/coalition building</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While a particular approach dominates the method and strategy of any organization, it also overlaps with other approaches. Thus, the involvement of many organizations and sectors in anticorruption, including civil society, is never insulated from other approaches and their respective modes. In fact, due to the gravity and immensity of the problem of corruption, no one approach or mode of intervention can lay claim to being the only anticorruption initiative. This leads to the blurring of boundaries among civil society, state and market forces. While it shakes these boundaries, the blurring offers new challenges of strategic collaboration, cooperation and complementation—virtues that are often relegated to the background in the classic civil society framework of critical attitude against the state and market institutions (see table 3).

While distinct and at times overlapping, these approaches complement one another in important ways. As they provide the arena for civil society interventions to combat corruption, these approaches also define the parameters of the extent of participation of civil society actors.

Because of the immensity of domestic corruption in the Philippines, anticorruption initiatives are plenty. The initiatives, however, are not held only by CSOs; the composition is broad-based, with representation from all three sectors, including from state and the market. This demonstrates the limitations of pure civil society articulation and advocacy not only in the national domestic arena, but also in the global transnational movement.

Most of the civil society involvement in anticorruption in the Philippines is very strong in the conscientization-promotion and prevention-deterrence arenas, and to some extent in the detection-investigation arena. Most of the government anticorruption programmes lean toward the right of the continuum of the detection-investigation and prosecution-conviction arena. This is logical since only the state is mandated to prosecute cases of corruption and convict grafters. At the regional level, anticorruption CSOs call for more action toward the left side of the continuum; and even more so at the transnational level, since it is only in actively campaigning and raising awareness of the issue that there is enough room to manoeuvre.

The continuum also permeates several important areas of involvement: research, seminars and conferences, systems and technology development, media and communications, and building coalitions of allies and supporters. Anticorruption holds the distinct nature of crossing sectoral and even class boundaries because of the urgency and immensity of the problem of corruption.
Table 3: Anticorruption initiatives in the Philippines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels</th>
<th>Conscientization and promotion</th>
<th>Prevention and deterrence</th>
<th>Detection and investigation</th>
<th>Prosecution and conviction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Research</td>
<td>Social Weather Stations • Ibon Foundation • Various academic institutions • TI-Philippines • Development Academy of the Philippines: Integrity Governance Indicators • Civil Service Commission: values orientation workshops</td>
<td>Social Weather Stations • Various academic institutions • Development Academy of the Philippines: Integrity Governance Indicators</td>
<td>Social Weather Stations • Various academic institutions • Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism</td>
<td>Social Weather Stations • Various academic institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seminars/conferences/training</td>
<td>• Philippine Jesuits: Ehem Anticorruption sensitivity seminars • Philippine Jesuits and Ombudsman: Ehem! Aha! Anticorruption Campaign • Ibon Foundation • IICG • TI-Philippines</td>
<td>• Makati Business Club and Transparency and Accountability Governance Consortium: Internal Revenue Allotment Watch • Consumer Watch of the Philippines: Price Watch • Philippine Jesuits and Ombudsman: Ehem! Aha! Anticorruption Campaign • Ombudsman and Civil Service Commission: Lifestyle Check Campaign</td>
<td>• Commission on Audit Participatory Auditing for Communities • Ombudsman: Court Watch • Ombudsman and Civil Service Commission: Lifestyle Check Campaign • Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption</td>
<td>• Ombudsman: Court Watch • Ombudsman: Prosecutors’ Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public monitoring</td>
<td>• Multisectoral: Plunderwatch • Multisectoral: Kilosbayan</td>
<td>• Ombudsman and Boy Scouts of the Philippines: Textbook Count • Department of Budget and Makati Business Club: Bidding and Procurement Watch • Consumer Watch of the Philippines: Price Watch • Makati Business Club and Transparency and Accountability Governance Consortium: Internal Revenue Allotment Watch</td>
<td>• Presidential Anti-Graft Commission • Ombudsman and Civil Service Commission: Lifestyle Check Campaign • Multisectoral: Plunderwatch • Multisectoral: Kilosbayan • Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption</td>
<td>• Presidential Anti-Graft Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D/technology development</td>
<td>• R&amp;D/technology innovations on bidding, procurement, bandy clocks/punch cards, computerization of electoral processes</td>
<td>• Biometrics technology (thumb-based identification system) • R&amp;D/technology innovations on bidding, procurement, bandy clocks/punch cards, computerization of electoral processes</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Continued
This phenomenon suggests some serious implications for the theoretical and practical frameworks that classical civil society views uphold. State, business/market and CSOs merge with one another as they converge at the different arenas in the anticorruption continuum.

In other words, the array and arena of anticorruption initiatives offer new opportunities of convergence between the different actors and stakeholders. If at the local level the emerging space for CSO participation requires converging and engaging with the state and market actors, the same imperative extends to the global arena. This again underscores the demystification of the classical Puritanism of CSOs in combating corruption, both at the local and global levels.

**II. Anticorruption as an Arena for Civil Society Participation**

There is an explosion of new democratic experiments that seek to claim and capture political space, and that have captured the imagination of many actors. The broadening of horizons in the field of governance began during the early 1990s. This occurred when national and international actors with increasing concerns about rights-based approaches created space for new social movements to bring to light issues of common concern. New forms of political participation that offer to expose, debate, address and, for some, resolve festering issues are a positive sign of democratic engagement. In fact, as Cornwall (2004) suggests, citizen engagement in these political spaces either provides for avenues to strengthen liberal democratic institutions, or makes it possible to re-imagine new configurations of relationships and possibilities that may extend beyond the traditional citizen-state interaction. Thus, Cornwall (2004:1) cites Fung and Wright (2003) and Hauer and Wagenaar (2003), stating that these may “encompass complex alliances of actors and networks across permeable institutional boundaries and an expanded vision of the public domain”.
The concept of new democratic spaces—which was the theme of an issue of the Institute of Development Studies Bulletin—engages in opening up the debate on two conceptions of space: (i) an “invited arena” that suggests the origin of handing out the space; and (ii) a “popular space” where citizens capture such “arenas to protest against government policies or interventions of foreign powers, to produce their own services or for solidarity and mutual aid” (Cornwall 2004:2). It is this second conception of space that this paper focuses on.

**A brief sketch of the emergence of CSOs in anticorruption efforts**

Bukovansky (2002) argues that the international realm was traditionally viewed as highly permissive with respect to bribery and other transactions that were deemed corrupt behaviour. Only with the introduction of a comprehensive governance agenda by international institutions and a broad array of NGOs, together with transgovernmental networks, has the structure and implementation of domestic institutions and laws been subjected to transnational pressure. He states that over time, there has been a shift in emphasis from focusing on the corrupting influence of transnational organizations to focusing on issues of corruption in the public sector. In fact, he surmises that this happened during the time-space where the neoliberal agenda has established the positive role of foreign investment in generating economic growth and, hence, development. Harriss-White and White (1996) concede that corruption has become an issue due to two reasons. First, there is a widespread perception that the level and pervasiveness of corruption is not only much greater than it is thought to be, but it may also be increasing; and, second, the waves of economic liberalization that started in the 1980s and the wave of democratization during the post–Cold War period of the 1990s, together with the good governance agenda, provide the impetus for renewed efforts to root out corruption. Given the three actors in the mainstream discourse of state, market and civil society, state and market actors have been at the forefront of rooting out corruption. Yet, as London (2000) reminds us, while there has been a focus on the political and economic forces in the debate about globalization, the role of civil society in shaping local, national and global affairs must not be overlooked. In his review of Barber’s *Globalizing Democracy*, he points to the new transnational civic spaces that offer possibilities for transnational citizenship anchored on global rights. On the other hand, Edwards (2003) reminds us of having entered a new era of partnership defined as new diplomacy where NGOs, international organizations and governments can come together to pursue their objectives. He further posits that the new diplomacy and complex multilateralism put civil society at the centre of international policy debates and global problem solving.

Thus, we see the rise of CSOs emanating from the post–Washington consensus era, which recognizes that a strong social and institutional infrastructure is crucial for growth and development, and where pluralistic forms of governance are being explored and the engagement of civil society is important. Finally, a re-imagination of private, public and civil society roles appears to be taking shape, as new conceptions of governance emerge from the expanding influence of profit and non-profit actors. This expanded role of civil society, as Ruggie (2003) suggests, happened as the states’ monopoly on governance was gnawed away. Thus, Macdonald as cited in McConnell (1998) states that civil society has challenged the realist view of the nation-state as the primary actor. In light of this, Ruggie (2003) opines that the role of civil society is more consequential in certain areas of norm creation and implementation and cites how CSOs have been significant players in either blocking or promoting international agreements. As an example, he points to how the Multilateral Agreement on Investment was successfully blocked by civil society players. He also cites the efforts exerted in promoting the land mines ban. According to Florini (2000), NGOs started to be heard during the mega-conferences sponsored by the United Nations beginning in the 1970s, then making their presence known and secured during the 1990s where the informal “parallel” NGO-sponsored conferences became de rigueur. Bantjes (2003) declares that these parallel summits, and more

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recent “facing off” summits, coinciding with the “official” one provided an opposing paradigm on the issue at hand.

Eigen (1998) discusses the interrelationships of the three sectors in fighting corruption and outlines how civil society could step in where the government is not able to reach, and where market forces sometimes operate with unwanted results. However, as he states, civil society could play the role of critic, catalyst or advocate of those interests that are unrepresented or underrepresented. In fact, Khan (1998) argues that the way forward is to look at corruption from its political dimension, and that it would help to critically evaluate the role of civil society in strategies to fight corruption. He further emphasizes that civil society acts as a pressure group that demands accountability and transparency—again, vocabularies of the entrenched governance discourse—from both government and business. And, in fact, while there has been a widening of efforts in the anticorruption movements by a variety of social forces, Khan says that there has been little effort in analysing the social bases of these movements.

Such civil society forces in the anticorruption movement have taken heed of Kliggaard’s (1998) advice that international cooperation can help individual countries to some degree with the will and capacity to combat corruption. In fact, McConnell (1998) cites Smith (1997), who said that transnational ties between actors in civil society are increasing and becoming denser. Smith defines the transnational social movement organizations as operating in two or more states and addressing interdependent global problems.

In fact, Robinson (1998) reminds us that corruption has become an issue of major economic and political significance. It has gained media attention and as a result, governments and specialized NGOs have launched high profile anticorruption campaigns, among others things. At the international level, there is an increased resolve by intergovernmental bodies to tackle corruption as it segues into issues of aid effectiveness in a period of financial strain and an increasing public consciousness. The World Bank (1997), after much debate, has recognized the issue squarely, stating that, with new global standards of behaviour especially toward transnational bribery both in industrial countries and in developing countries, there is a heightened awareness of the cost of corruption. Furthermore, Robinson (1998) also asserts that in a pluralistic approach to combating corruption, the creation of democratic structures and specialized agencies will only succeed once citizens organize themselves effectively. He argues that actions by organized citizens may complement institutional reforms and provide them with a proper social foundation. As stated by Johnston (1998), corruption can be stopped when citizens and organizations are willing to confront the problem directly. He advances the concept of “social empowerment”—the range of political and economic resources and alternatives available to citizens as part of the package of anticorruption measures. Thus, he states unequivocally that the anticorruption debate has devoted renewed attention to the value of a viable civil society.

While the preceding references look at the mainstream perspective of civil society engagement, Korten et al. (2002) advance the notion that the global civil society emerged as a social force to resist an assault on life and democracy by the institutions of corporate globalization. They point out that the struggle between the forces of elite globalization and the forces of global civil society is defined by a tension between two conflicting worldviews. They use the metaphor of community and empire to present opposing views: community enables the democratic impulse of equitable sharing of power and control of resources, while empire emphasizes winning against the competition in a hostile environment. They further state that the forces of community inspired by national liberation movements put resistance against corporate globalization on the agenda, and that these forces are rooted in a partnership mode which believe in creating strong democratic societies that honour life and recognize the worth and contribution of every individual. They recognize the efforts of the CSOs that first converged in 2001 at the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre as a major convocation of global civil society.
And what makes civil society distinctive? Eigen (1999) asserts that of the three actors—state, market and civil society—it is only civil society that has the mandate to prioritize the enhancement of human conditions above all else. Government has the legitimacy to deal with the overarching issue of the common good, but often lacks the global reach. On the other hand, business, while having the means to operate globally, lacks the mandate to prioritize serving the humanitarian cause. Thus, he asserts that only civil society can provide the impetus and the leadership to wage the global fight against corruption. Gyimah-Boadi (no date) documents civil society’s role in postindependence Africa and how the new political, social and economic development in Africa is creating an opportunity for civil society actors to play a role in fighting corruption.

Finally, as Kaufmann (1998) points out, there is still an unfinished agenda of civil society participation in the fight against corruption. He emphasizes that progress is far from universal. The challenge is how to make civil society more effective in its campaign against corruption. Toward this end, he advances several proposals to strengthen civil society’s role, among which are the use of data and technology to the fullest extent possible in mobilizing and applying pressure on political structures, as well as new tools and insights regarding participatory processes in awareness raising and mobilization.

**The major global civil society actors in the anticorruption movements**

The following section seeks to bring to light the diversity of players involved in the general anticorruption effort in the international arena. Foremost is the liberal democratic tradition favoured by TI and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), as opposed to the more nationalist, militant and “popular democracy” approach of the International Initiative on Corruption and Governance (IICG). Thus, this section identifies the major key players of the anticorruption movement, their structures, their activities and the methods employed.

**Transparency International**

TI is one of the dominant global CSOs and traces its origins to the concern that ‘grand corruption’ practiced by companies in exporting countries, as they ‘bought’ politicians and officials in the developing world was a threat to human rights, the environment and sustainable development and that this could be ignored no longer. Mobilizing against corruption was an idea whose time had come.⁷

The founding of TI was the result of frustration that the World Bank would not investigate corruption, as it was not within the institution’s mandate. In the early 1990s, the prevailing perspective was that corruption only happened in developing countries, and that industrial countries had a moral ascendancy over the others. Peter Eigen, with the World Bank at the time and with experience in Africa and Latin America, sought to engage World Bank staff to address the issue of corruption as it had affected aid and programme performance. By engaging like-minded individuals, the group headed by Eigen initially wanted to produce a publication to identify corrupt actions by specific businesses. This, however, was deemed ineffective, and instead coalition building, at one time a confrontational perspective, became the preferred approach.

TI was established in May 1993. The initial target was the “grand corruption” that was at the intersection of business and state and was further fuelled by one of TI’s supporters, George Moody-Stuart, who published a book exposing the methods used by exporters around the world. Thus, what appeared as “moral superiority” of the industrial world was an empty boast since the “grand corruption” perpetuated by the private sector undermined governance. The

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initial response to TI's launch was tremendous. It was like a magnet drawing numerous supporters to its fold.

TI operates based on the following principles (Eigen 2001, 1998). First, it is non-confrontational and approaches its work via coalition building. Given the experience of many CSOs that took a confrontational position to the state and even the private sector, TI's founders felt that this was going to be counter-productive. Hence, a partnership mode among the three sectors of society was considered the best approach in fighting corruption. Dialogue and involvement were the preferred mode, instead of traditional confrontation and exposure. Second, TI employs a non-partisan approach to combating corruption, with a broad participation of all sectors of society. While political parties are important actors, especially as they supposedly present alternative worldviews, to engage via a particular political party perspective would be counter-productive, especially taking into account the short-sightedness of political parties. Eschewing party lines also attracted a broader array of actors. Third, TI does not investigate or pursue individual cases of corruption. It builds upon the collaborative principle and reasons that making individual incidences of corrupt behaviour public would undermine the strategy of building and broadening the alliance. Thus, TI's national chapters provide the consultations necessary to bring all relevant players into a dialogic and solution-finding mechanism. Fourth, the organization of national chapters is used as the structural foundation of TI. By and large, TI believes that external actors should not tell national actors how to deal with individual cases. Hence, country-specific measures are implemented to fight corruption locally. TI has a decentralized structure and has established national chapters in nearly 100 countries with its headquarters in Berlin and a hub office in London. As a result, TI organizations grow in an evolutionary manner.

TI's strength comes from the national chapters, which are the essence of the underlying principles of the organization. Following the principle of coalition building, chapter membership comprises a broad array of stakeholders. It is in the national locales that the problems of corruption are embedded, thus national chapters are the best arena to focus anticorruption efforts. Individuals from the private sector, state and NGOs comprise the national chapters, which can be found throughout the world. There are also regional TI networks in South Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean. National chapters are free to decide their mandates and programmes of action, cognizant of the two principles underscored earlier—that is, a non-partisan approach to combating corruption and no investigation or exposé of individual corruption, as breaching these principles would undermine TI's credibility.

TI is governed by a board of directors and is assisted by an advisory council of 35 members from across the globe, including, among others, heads of state, academics, private business people, parliamentarians, legislators, members of the judiciary and representatives from NGOs. An annual election for members of the board of directors is held during the General Assembly meeting. TI adheres to its Charter, the Code of Conduct for TI office holders and the national chapter guidelines that define the relationship with the international movement. Although national chapters have to follow TI's two main principles, they are free to follow their own code of ethics as long as it does not contradict TI's principles. This reflects TI's belief that local chapters are the best judges of their specific needs. TI has an international secretariat, which includes research staff in London, and provides support, coordination and advice to the national chapters, while implementing the international agenda.

However, TI's prominent leaders seem to have an "old boys club" character. Many were former staff of the World Bank, the European Commission, the German technical aid agency and the United States Agency for International Development. Maybe it is precisely because of these connections that it has progressed so far. Having like-minded colleagues pushing for the anticorruption agenda has created a strong sense of camaraderie and passion against the debilitating effects of corruption in their campaigns.

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9 Also see www.transparency.org.
TI receives funding from major bilateral and multilateral international aid agencies, several major international foundations, the World Bank, and private groups and individuals. In its new strategic framework following its 10-year anniversary, it has determined to seek financial independence by diversifying its funding sources so that it can accomplish its vision statement of “a world in which government, politics, business, and civil society and the daily lives of people are free of corruption”. It seeks to strengthen the TI secretariat’s financial stability, while at the same time encouraging the national chapters to also identify and report to the public and stakeholders the source of their financial resources and the allocation of funds for their various activities. This shows that TI follows the principle of “walking the talk” in financial and resource accountability. By providing transparent transactions, it reduces the risk of conflicting interests and potential damage to its reputation. In fact, good governance frameworks assiduously follow this position of TI. By promoting high standards of accountability, transparency and integrity in the international realm and national chapters, it serves as a bellwether for best practices in governance.

TI, while best known for its annual CPI and Bribe Payers’ Index (BPI), also conducts other activities. The CPI is recognized as a leading index that ranks countries on perceived levels of corruption of public officers. On the other hand, on the supply side, the BPI looks into the propensity of exporting countries to offer bribes and ranks them accordingly. The results of such indices have placed corruption as a cornerstone on the political agenda of many nations. Another well-known activity of TI is the integrity pact, which shields public procurement from corruption by binding the procurement agency and bidders to an agreement. Thus, in a way, the national integrity system of national chapters is strengthened with possible reforms that are codified as best practices in the fight against corruption. TI also honours its champion whistleblowers—individuals and organizations—and has made, in one way or another, significant inroads in fighting corruption through its annual Integrity Awards. TI has also used the Internet through its Corruption Online Research and Information System, which is a comprehensive database on corruption and governance and serves as a portal of corruption-related materials. In this way, TI serves as a watchdog to ensure that international organizations prioritize the combating of corruption. The TI secretariat and the national chapters actively monitor implementation of conventions signed by agreed parties. In its new strategic framework crafted to pursue TI’s agenda during its second decade, programmes are mapped out for global priorities, regional and national concerns, policy and research and advocacy. Thus, TI appears to have followed multilateral aid agencies’ mode of engagement—that is, through a programmatic rather than a project approach.

TI has also taken very seriously its role in the biennial International Anti-Corruption Conference (IACC), which started in 1983. The IACC, which held its 11th session in 2003, is essentially a forum for the exchange of information on corruption and the myriad ways of combating it. Thus, serving as a physical arena, this conference attracts practitioners and academics, politicians, national and local government officers, representatives of business organizations and members of the judiciary as well as law enforcement officers, the media and a host of CSOs. As it provides face-to-face encounters, the delegates to the biennial conferences can solidify their relationships with one another and offer an opportunity for the exchange and validation of activities, strategies, and success and failures in combating corruption.

TI, which entered its second decade in 2003, has consciously engaged its national chapters and relevant stakeholders in the changing global and local contexts they face through its strategic planning exercise, which includes a road map for the future that recognizes the capacities and potential of working toward TI’s vision of a world free of corruption.

A relatively new addition to its arsenal of weapons is the expanded role given to policy and research that will inform, among others aspects, its advocacy campaign. It is envisioned that a deeper understanding of corruption and mechanisms to curb it will result in policy options.
International Association of Prosecutors (IAP)\textsuperscript{10}

Established in June 1995 as the only world association of prosecutors, the main driver of the IAP has been the growing phenomenon of transnational crimes such as money laundering, drug trafficking and fraud. Prosecutors have realized that swift action was best enhanced in a spirit of international cooperation and mutual assistance. Apart from the objective of pursuing effective, fair and impartial prosecution of crimes and protection of human rights, the IAP also actively promotes the elimination of corruption in the public sector.

Individuals involved in the movement early in its establishment were presidents of national associations of prosecutors from the North, but membership is generally open to individual lawyers who have served as prosecutors. Organizational members include associations of prosecutors or crime prevention agencies. The IAP now has a broad base of individual and organizational members from 120 countries. An executive committee, which meets twice a year, is drawn from over 20 countries from around the world.

IAP’s fourth annual conference in Beijing in 1999 addressed the theme of fraud and corruption, and the 2004 Annual Conference in Seoul acknowledged the need to recognize different systems that are somehow forged by common goals. Linkages and networks are established during the annual conferences, resulting in an exchange of information and tangible mutual legal assistance and support for the prosecution of criminal cases in developing countries. A proactive stance is taken by IAP’s working groups, which are created to follow through with the actions agreed in the conferences. Thus, expertise is shared and the working groups serve as an international source of information to its members. A best practice series underscores this work. Regional conferences are also organized where delegates from the rank of junior prosecutors are exposed to international issues.

Cognizant of the South’s financial conditions, the IAP has successfully negotiated with several Northern governments, including the Australian, Canadian, Danish, Dutch, Finnish, French, Irish, Norwegian, Swedish and the United Kingdom, as well as the Agence Intergouvernementale de la Francophonie, to support the attendance of 25 prosecutors annually.

The IAP is currently developing its international standards for prosecutors. Its publication of an electronic journal provides an additional venue for the exchange of ideas and information dissemination.

International Chamber of Commerce\textsuperscript{11}

The ICC presents itself as the voice of world business, which looks at the global economy as a force for economic growth, job creation and prosperity. It seeks to find space in expressing business views, considering that government decisions affect their operations. It boasts of being the “only truly global business organization”.\textsuperscript{12}

The ICC was founded in 1919 with the aim to serve world business via following the mechanisms of trade and investment, a liberalized economic environment that allows for open markets for goods and services and the free flow of capital. An International Court of Arbitration, which has been operating since 1923, handles international business disputes.

The ICC secretariat is based in Paris and, like the TI, it has national committees that link directly with governments in around 130 countries. Members include companies representing major industrial and service sectors. The secretariat expresses business views in the different intergovernmental organizations on issues that directly affect their business operations. The ICC has codified industry standards, though they are not limited to the domains of self-
regulation in e-commerce, customs and practice for documentary credits, codes of advertising and marketing, and codes of professional associations. Aside from lobbying, arbitration and dispute resolution, and advocating for greater liberalization and the ideals of the market economy system, the ICC also engages in business self-regulation in fighting corruption or combating commercial crime. It holds annual conferences and a biennial congress.

Similar to the IAP, the ICC is recognized and consulted by the United Nations. Early in its history, the ICC was instrumental in war reparations and debt. During the depression, it pressed for liberalization and open markets and currently is a chief exponent of the multilateral trade system even as other interest groups advocate protectionism and “managed” trade. The ICC believes that trade and its benefits are more effective than aid.

At the time of writing, there are 16 ICC commissions made up of experts from fields of specialization that are relevant to international business, including banking, financial services and taxation, intellectual property rights and international investment. These commissions serve as the nucleus of ICC’s think tank whose policy recommendations and research inform the kind of advice and business position papers that national and international commercial organizations and governments listen to.

ICC successfully operates by self-regulation. Its principles are codified; it has also crafted a set of ethical standards to support the environment and sustainable development.

Several bureaux—including the International Maritime, Counterfeiting Intelligence and Financial Investigation—have been established to tackle commercial crime and a cyber-crime unit was set up in 1998. Among its main issues of concern are bribery and corruption.

The governing body of the ICC is the World Council, which also serves as a general assembly. The delegates are business executives, who are nominated by the national councils at the biannual meetings of the council. At times, members with no national committee affiliation are invited to participate in the work of the council. The council elects a chair and vice-chair as well as the executive board, which implements ICC policies.

The Special Presidency Group, which advises the ICC chair and the executive board, is mandated to look at the strategic long-term perspective of the organization’s priorities.

**International Initiative on Corruption and Governance**

While the three aforementioned CSOs were initiated by, and comprise, Northern actors, the IICG was initiated and organized by Southern actors in 2001. And while the three previous organizations lend themselves to following the neoliberal capitalist tendencies, the IICG challenges this taken-for-granted reality and focuses on people’s governance in contrast to elite governance. It squarely faces the issues of corruption and governance as they affect developing countries, while recognizing that they also concern developed ones. However, according to the IICG, it is the South that suffers from the “pain and destruction which bribery and other forms of corruption in public sector transactions cause in our communities, as well as to our national political and economic life”.

Moreover, corruption intersects with governance, as these are relevant to Southern development concerns on development cooperation and development assistance. Thus, both issues are embedded in the social movement on debt, considering that many Southern countries are heavily indebted and may governed by corrupt dictatorships.

The IICG maintains that the roots of corruption and governance rest in how power is structured and exercised, and says that certain structures and processes in countries do not result in the democratic management of power. Thus, while clearly echoing the popular neoliberal discourse

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14 [www.peoplesgovernance.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=56&Itemid=26].
of corruption as power that is abused for personal or exclusive gain, it also emphasizes that power is in the hands of the elitist groups. The IICG, therefore, connects the issue of corruption with neocolonialism, mainly because anticorruption and governance are part of post-Washington consensus conditionalities and reflect dominant tendencies by the Northern actors who define the conditionalities. Thus, the IICG decries the continued exercise and abuse of power against the South. It emphasizes that many grassroots organizations in the South do not see an urgent need to get involved since they primarily perceive corruption and governance as part of the mechanisms and imposition of an elite and powerful North. And while admitting that Southern actors consider corruption and governance mainly as part of the national structural issues, it is due to a colonial past and reflects the dominance of undemocratic elites. The IICG deals with corruption and governance from a people’s governance perspective, and not as an elite governance one and by taking this perspective, it resists elite governance as instruments and mechanisms of new forms of subjugation. The philosophical rootedness of the IICG also spills over to issues of globalization, as enhancing and intensifying the issues of corruption and governance brought about by the neoliberal capitalist agenda. The IICG believes that the current structures and process of globalization are corrupt and immoral, and fears that they will engulf all things if people do not resist.

Structurally, the IICG comprises individuals, organizations and institutions mainly from the South that are concerned about Southern issues. There are at present three hubs in Africa, Asia and Latin America where IICG focal points are stationed. The IICG views the current discourse and actors that define the issues as untenable, and believes that people’s organizations and movements from the South, sometimes working with Northern partners, need to engage proactively in a systematic manner. Part of what they wish to accomplish is a Southern discourse on corruption and governance so that the South can have a unified perspective and action. Toward this end, the IICG calls for campaigns to unmask Northern-driven corruption as well as individuals and organizations, institutions, governments, companies and even CSOs that practise global corruption to the detriment of the South. It backs its campaign with research on specific issues and areas of concern. The IICG also calls for active critical engagement with existing anticorruption drives in the national and international arenas.

Aside from participating in the international arena/conventions organized at the World Social Forum, the IICG was given space at the 11th IACC, which is under the aegis of TI. The IICG asked TI to subsidize 10 IICG delegates, which TI refused, but in recognition of IICG’s emerging clout, granted “three speaking slots for the IICG in three workshops”. The IICG is recognized by TI as a “serious Southern-based organization working on an alternative voice in corruption and governance issues”. Prior to the 11th IACC, the IICG held a conference in Manila, the Philippines, for anticorruption advocates in Asia. Moreover, the IICG also participated in the Fifth World Trade Organization Ministerial Meeting in Cancún, Mexico, where it organized a forum on trade and corruption parallel to the civil society event, entitled Our World is Not for Sale, which was a collection of organizations and individuals working against the World Trade Organization.

III. Tensions and Dynamics

The following section teases out, in general, the tensions associated with the notion of CSO participation in the growing anticorruption movement and specifically identifies such tensions and dynamics in reference to the major anticorruption movements.

_Issues of legitimacy and representation haunt transnational CSOs_

Issues of legitimacy are impossible to ignore when talking about global civil society:. One of the major debates is how CSOs establish their legitimacy. There are two opinions on this: one is that legitimacy stems from the promotion of public interest (TI 2000). A second view, espoused by Edwards (2003), holds that legitimacy is generally understood as the right to be and to do
something in society, hence, it follows strictly from the structural-functional perspective. When an organization is deemed as lawful and recognized, it is justified in its course of action. By and large, the above-mentioned CSOs are thought to be espousing a cause, and issues of corruption result not only from a bureaucratic perspective, but also from a moral dimension as well.

On the other hand, questions have been raised about how CSOs represent the interests and demands of others. Ottaway (2004) asks how far such groups can actually represent society vis-à-vis government, and Hudson (2000) questions the right of some NGOs to speak on behalf of others. Again, by and large, it is inherent in the nature of CSOs to have a degree of credibility when they speak for their constituencies, especially at international conferences, which are generally designed to represent states and thus provide few formal channels through which popular demands can be expressed. This explains the phenomenon of parallel summits. Currently, CSO involvement in global regimes tends to operate through networks of interest groups rather than through formal representative structures (Edwards 2003). Hudson also reminds us that it is uncertain whose voices are actually heard in a non-governmental alliance or network and how differences are resolved when participants or delegates vary in strength and resources. He further emphasises the problem by asking who benefits and who suffers the cost of the movement’s achievements. Messages in a global campaign are often simplified so that they can reach a larger audience. When that happens, he asks, whose voices are heard and whose interests are ignored when issues are filtered out, in order to gain the maximum number of supporters. Considering that the four CSOs discussed above function with secretariats that supposedly draws their strength and mandates from their respective national committee/charters, how is the decision-making process of interest articulation really operational at the assembly meetings?

TI represents the abhorrence implied in the dissolution of trust for private gain. It mainly represents liberal democratic ideals of good governance and transparency in the fight against corruption. Its claim to legitimacy is in the function it seeks to fill as a broad coalition of various stakeholders in a world free of corruption. This is also where the IAP and ICC are rooted, since these two CSOs represent prosecutors and business leaders respectively.

While it can be emphasized that in their interest articulation, many CSOs remain focused on single issues, the IICG seeks to link the issue of corruption with the debt campaign, arguing that in many autocratic and corrupt developing economies, their leaders have plundered the nation’s wealth, which is untenable. The IICG would even go so far as to root corruption in the political-economic domination and link the issue with neocolonialism. Yet, the three CSOs that allied with the neoliberal democratic ideals see corruption from the viewpoint of development aid.

Finally, to close the argument, civil society, in general, does not speak with one voice, rather it is cloaked with diversity and contradictory voices and projects. It must be acknowledged that there are differences, as well as conflicts, in the agenda, which may change over time.

**The notion of global civil society**

As Edwards (2003) points out, while there is a plentitude of transnational non-governmental networks, there is no world government to speak of. This theme ties in with the first question: Who do the networks represent? In fact, he further queries that since there are only a few global citizens, would they constitute a meaningful global civil society? He reasons that some NGOs may have a tendency to focus on global concerns and issues without taking into consideration national-level processes of state and societal relations. Being blind to associational issues between the state and societal engagement may underpin the country’s ability to pursue goals of an integrated nature. He believes that for some NGOs there is a tendency to go directly to and lobby their case in Washington or Brussels, where it is easier to gain access to senior officials and obtain a response as compared with national-local interest articulation. When this happens, he says, domestic coalition building suffers.
While the four major CSOs have their national-local bodies to represent them and, hence, disprove Edwards’s idea—at least for these four cases, it could very well be said that in the long run, strong national chapters/committees will definitely be the prime movers since it is only in the local arena that redress, especially in advocating, exposing, prosecuting and providing integrity systems, could be ascertained. Current global campaign and advocacy activities merely make people conscious of misdeeds. Thus, unequivocally, we maintain that concrete actions and steps will only occur following the principle of subsidiarity.

**Northern versus Southern voices**

Clearly, as presented in our four cases, TI, IAP and ICC resonate with the voice of the North, and the IICG represents Southern interests. It could very well be said that, generally speaking, the Northern CSOs are better funded than the Southern CSO; they have also used their influence to put anticorruption on the global agenda. Given the Northern CSOs’ dominance and influence, Southern CSOs remain suspicious and wary that the dominant voices are not truly global alliances, but are rather only a way of successfully masking the North’s domination of global issues and debates. The IICG claims that TI has a relatively influential voice in international affairs that is being heeded by many Southern nations. Thus, there is a perception in the South that the anticorruption agenda is dominated and driven by Northern actors and interests, and Southern peoples remain marginalized and left to suffer. It is the constant appearance of certain NGOs in international debates, conferences and symposia that reinforces this perception.

Yet, as Hudson (2000) observes, with the growth of the CSOs’ confidence and experience in engaging with the North in the same conferences and symposia, Southern partners and beneficiaries question the legitimacy of Northern NGOs to advocate on their behalf. It may be rightly said that Northern CSOs are poorly rooted and unaccountable to Southern societies. Thus, in the final analysis, we see a practice of civic engagement that may be distorted in favour of organizations that are better funded and have greater access to decision-making bodies.

**Composition and membership of the transnational civil society movements**

There is a definite blurring of the structural boundaries between the state, market and CSOs. Membership of CSOs may very well be a veritable array of individuals and groups coming from all three sectors. Consider, too, the source of funding for the operations of the movement. It is true that TI seeks to diversify its funding sources, and its benefactors come from all three sectors, including intergovernmental bodies. Thus, strictly speaking, what has been described above should be appreciated from the perspective of CSOs as they are formed by the so-called tenets, code of conduct, ethical codes and charters of the organizations mentioned before and in which members have to acquiesce to.

**The movements’ increasing use of new technology**

The successful deployment of new technology, specifically the Internet, has made inroads in the advocacy campaigns. The breadth and extensive network that can be achieved with the use of this technology has enabled the movements to increase public awareness and media attention. It has enabled them to surpass the physical barriers and possible head-on confrontation with those who control or censor their activities. All four CSOs have maintained their Web sites. In fact, TI’s Corruption On-Line Research and Information System typifies the use of the Internet for greater advocacy, expanded information and dissemination activities. There are other organizations that host and serve individuals on corruption-related issues. The IICG also takes advantage of the Internet, however, it has not yet reached the level of TI’s breadth. Yet, for all its benefits, the Internet still complements traditional networking tactics such as holding meetings, conferences and symposia interspersed with public demonstrations that serve as physical settings for the reinforcement of bonds between fellow activists.
**Fallibility as an emerging concern of civil society**

The polemic of CSOs assumes that they are morally infallible and incorruptible. However, part of the dilution of classical civil society boundaries is the painful recognition that even CSOs are corruptible, if not corrupt. Civil society does not hold a monopoly on moral ascendancy in combating corruption in the state and market arenas. More important, it has to look in the mirror and police its ranks as members of CSOs also embezzle organizational funds, participate in ghost social and infrastructure projects, engage in partisan campaigns during elections, bribe law enforcers, contribute to election campaign finance, defraud taxes and duties due to governments and, at times, collude with state and market corruption. Corruption in the civil society arena is an equally important facet in the anticorruption discourse and global transnational movements.

As Sta. Ana (2002) contends, NGOs have fallen into the trap of rent-seeking. He cites the case of Caucus of Development NGOs of the Philippines, which gained from the issuance and auction of Peace Bonds. The Peace Bonds generated a lot of controversy as they were criticized for the “extraordinary circumstances surrounding the issuance, the huge amount and the high visibility”, even if the commission obtained from them was used to finance poverty-alleviation programmes.

**IV. Research Gaps and Areas for Further Advocacy**

Given the insights on civil society and its vast experiences and potentials in global transnational movements, several areas for further research and inquiry have emerged. These areas also imply some reforms are necessary not only at the civil society level, but also in the state and market arenas. Appropriate policy and institutional reforms can also be gleaned in these gaps.

**Rethinking civil society, state and market boundaries in the promotion of global transnational movements**

There is a need to revisit and restructure the classical civil society framework in light of the blurring boundaries between and among the actors in anticorruption. As an issue that transcends boundaries, corruption challenges the conventional “pure” civil society intervention that consists of organizations apart from, and often against, state and market institutions.

As can be gleaned from the experiences of anticorruption initiatives in the Philippines, civil society groups enter into coalitions with state and market actors to pursue a broader campaign against corruption. What results is a united front for a common cause, an emerging alliance where anticorruption provides the arena for collective intervention.

While some civil society groups maintain their polemics against state and market actors, it would be more useful in anticorruption advocacy to bond with well-meaning state and market institutions. This emerging arena, brought about by the blurring boundaries among civil society, state and market actors, should suggest new insights for global transnational movements. Further research should be able to feed new frameworks, strategies and techniques in coalitions and alliances on anticorruption.

**Legitimization of global civil society**

The tension of representation is a perennial issue not only in national domestic initiatives, but also in global transnational movements. The never-ending search for representation imperils the legitimacy of CSOs as they fight for space in the anticorruption discourse. Cause-oriented groups, sectoral organizations, the media, academia and even the church uphold and serve particular interests.
The status and experience of TI reveals the practical limits of what a transnational civil society can do. Like TI, CSOs can conduct campaigns of persuasion, advocacy and lobbying in governments. And TI’s expertise and niche in the annual CPI surveys have gained some level of legitimacy with both governments and non-governmental sectors.

The continuing search for legitimization should, therefore, be undertaken on two fronts: representation and qualification. In other words, whom do CSOs represent? And what can they offer? The second inquiry offers critical challenges for civil society actors. Apart from their polemics and watchdog roles, what concrete expertise and technical qualifications can they offer to governments? The search for legitimization poses a serious implication for the agenda of global transnational movements on anticorruption.

**Internal assessments**

Part of the issue of legitimization is the emerging reality that CSOs are susceptible to corruption. Corruption in the ranks of civil society groups has effectively undermined their moral ascendancy to claim their space in global transnational movements. If surveys on the extent of corruption among the ranks of civil society groups were to be conducted, it would be a stunning revelation on how they perpetuate, abet or reinforce global corruption. Internal assessments to address the vulnerabilities of civil society groups should be a part of the discourse in global transnational movements on anticorruption.

**Problems of transnationalization**

There is a lacuna of strong transnational movements of CSOs in the campaign against corruption. TI has emerged as the leader in this arena, but most of the CSOs have focused their movements at the domestic and national levels.

This is understandable since most of the corruption issues are limited to domestic and national boundaries, and the arena for advocacy is, therefore, localized. However, since corruption is becoming a major global concern, the arena for civil society movement should be elevated to the transnational boundary. The challenge, therefore, is to locate the link between the national issues of corruption and the global implications. For instance, due to the rapid globalization of economies, money laundering and transnational bribery have also emerged as new forms of global corruption. The Anti-Bribery Covenant espoused by TI is an excellent point of advocacy on these issues.

**Downstreaming of transnational movements**

Ideally, transnational movements should emanate from strong national- and domestic-based movements. Regional, national and local CSOs forge together to elevate their advocacy at the global arena. A transnational structure is set up as an avenue for representation and involvement among the civil society groups.

At present, the link between domestic and national movements, and the transnational movements, is suspect. For instance, while TI maintains a strong global civil society position, this does not translate at the national and local levels. Country chapters of TI have blurred boundaries because they also have members that come from state and market institutions. If the upstream and downstream link—country to global, or global to country—is not established, it is difficult for global transnational movement to assert for more space and create impact.

**V. Conclusion**

Based on the experiences of the Philippines, anticorruption movements appear to be adequate in terms of programmes, strategies and techniques. What remains to be established is the capacity of these movements to create a long-term impact on reducing corruption in the
country. However, civil society groups take a different path in the campaign against corruption, which is emerging as a more effective means in forging broader alliances and coalitions with the state and market institutions, thereby diluting the conventional civil society boundaries.

This offers a new challenge since corruption is an issue that crosses different boundaries and arenas. To mount a serious anticorruption campaign, therefore, compels social actors to go beyond the conventions of civil society, state and market boundaries. The boundaries do not just imply physical and organizational parameters, but also, and more important, the adjustment of approaches and strategies. The classic polemics among CSOs need to be reviewed in this case, if only to admit that they are also part of the problem in perpetuating corruption. The arena of global transnational movements on anticorruption further underscores these challenges as well as the gaps.

For one, the blurring boundaries among civil society, state and market actors offers a paradigm shift in the egression of global transnational civil society movements against corruption. The arena for global campaign is not reserved for “pure” civil society intervention. Other questions arise that further challenge the global transnational civil society movements. What is their mandate? Whom do they represent? What do they offer to help the campaign against corruption? More important, in light of the painful realization that civil society groups are also corruptible, if not corrupt, how can they maintain their moral ascendancy over state and market actors? The challenge, therefore, is for global transnational civil society movements to help in the campaign against corruption, not only in the state and market arenas, but also among the ranks of CSOs.

Much can be learned from the selected transnational movements. To mount a global campaign requires an elaborate global structure, massive human, material and financial resources and a clear anticorruption programme/product that offers value for government and market institutions. The CPI surveys of TI are a good case in point.

There are grey areas that offer opportunities for further research and advocacy such as: (i) the question of legitimization and representation of CSOs at the global transnational arena; (ii) the capacity to conduct internal assessments and the realization of the roles of CSOs in the perpetuation of corruption; (iii) the limits of transnationalization; and (iv) the link between global, regional, national and local civil society movements against corruption.

In the final analysis, what is paramount is the efficacy and efficiency of the global campaigns against corruption, even if this implies a serious restructuring of conventional civil society, state and market boundaries. Global transnational movements should take stock and proceed from these emerging contexts.
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