CONSEQUENCES
OF THE FORCED MASS REPATRIATION
OF MIGRANT COMMUNITIES:
Recent Cases from West Africa and the Middle East

by Nicholas Van Hear

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United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
Palais des Nations
1211 Geneva 10
Switzerland

E-mail: info@unrisd.org
World Wide Web Site: www.unrisd.org

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Recent years have seen an increase in the number of occasions when migrant, expatriate or alien communities have been obliged to leave en masse the countries in which they have chosen to work or settle. The expulsion of two million Ghanaians and other West African migrants from Nigeria, reciprocal mass expulsions from Senegal and Mauritania, the expulsion of ethnic Turks from Bulgaria, the recent mass exodus from Iraq and Kuwait, and the expulsion of Yemenis from Saudi Arabia are just the better-known cases of such mass movements over the last decade.

Drawing on examples from Africa and the Middle East, the author examines the consequences of mass expulsion or exodus for the countries to which those affected return. He looks briefly at the immediate problems of reception, accommodation and dispersal; then the medium-term issues are examined: employment implications, the loss of remittances, and other economic, social and ecological consequences such as pressure on housing, prices, social services, water supply and other resources. After considering the longer term consequences of mass return, the author suggests that these may not all be negative.

Expellees and other returnees of this kind are not usually refugees, but they may find themselves in refugee-like situations. The paper examines how, if at all, they are protected and assisted by the international community, and suggests some ways in which such episodes may be better handled. Mass exodus of migrants and aliens of the kind explored in this paper has been of only peripheral concern in international forums. The episodes considered illustrate that since official interventions, national and international, rarely touch directly more than a small proportion of repatriates, close attention should be paid to migrants’ own initiatives to get home, to resettle themselves and then to find or create employment, at home or abroad. Realising the potential of the mass returns to each of these countries will only be accomplished if the right macro-level conditions can be created to assist repatriates to resettle or reintegrate themselves. Countries faced with sudden, large returnee populations may take some comfort from the experience of other countries that have found that in the longer term such mass returns do not turn out to be damaging, but can be ultimately beneficial.

The paper concludes by speculating on the future course of the mass exodus of migrant communities. The forms of mass exodus considered in this paper are a manifestation of two contemporary global trends: the restructuring of the international labour market and the recrudescence of ethnic nationalism in the context of the emergence or reconstitution of nation-states. By the restructuring of the international labour market is meant changes in the pattern of production and in its global distribution - and the consequences of such changes for migrant labour. By the recrudescence of ethnic nationalism is meant the tendency, particularly noticeable currently in parts of East and Central Europe, for the ‘homogenization’ of ethnic populations within a particular nation-state. This is likely to entail more mass movements of minorities. For this reason if for no other, the international community should heed the recent history of mass exodus of alien and minority communities as much as that of migrant workers.

The UNRISD research programme on Refugees, Returnees and Local Society is concerned with analysing mass movements from one developing country to another and devotes special attention to issues that constitute a link between the situation of refugees or returnees and the long-term development of the area where they arrived or to which they returned. Nicholas Van Hear is Crown Prince Hassan bin Talal of Jordan, Researcher in Refugee Studies at the University of Oxford.

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Dharam Ghai
Director
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INTRODUCTION

Recent years have seen an increase in the number of occasions when migrant, expatriate or alien communities have been obliged to leave en masse the countries in which they have chosen to work or settle. The expulsion of two million Ghanaians and other West African migrants from Nigeria, reciprocal mass expulsions from Senegal and Mauritania, the expulsion of ethnic Turks from Bulgaria, the recent mass exodus from Iraq and Kuwait, and the expulsion of Yemenis from Saudi Arabia are just the better-known cases of such mass movements over the last decade. Drawing on some of these examples, this paper examines the socio-economic consequences of such mass exodus for the countries to which these forced migrants return.

The paper first identifies the groups which are obliged to leave en masse. There are two main vulnerable groups: migrant workers, whose intent to stay in a host country is usually short-term, and ‘alien’ communities, who may be former migrants but are often long-settled. The paper draws attention to some of the conceptual problems surrounding this categorization. The paper then considers the form of such mass exodus, the degree of compulsion it entails, and the motivations of states for inducing or encouraging such out-movements. It explores some conceptual problems surrounding the notion of compulsion in such episodes.

Drawing on examples from Africa and the Middle East, the main body of the paper examines the consequences of mass expulsion or exodus for the countries to which those affected return. The paper looks briefly at the immediate problems of reception, accommodation and dispersal. It then examines the medium-term issues: employment implications, the loss of remittances, and other economic, social and ecological consequences such as pressure on housing, prices, social services, water supply and other resources. The longer term consequences of mass return are then addressed; the paper suggests that they may not all be negative.

Expellees and other returnees of this kind are not usually refugees, but they may find themselves in refugee-like situations. The paper examines how, if at all, they are protected and assisted by the international community, and suggests some ways in which such episodes may be better handled. It concludes by speculating on the future course of the mass exodus of migrant communities.

I. MASS EXODUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS AND ALIEN COMMUNITIES: AN OVERVIEW

1. Recent commentary on mass exodus of migrant and ‘alien’ communities

Although they have not received as much attention as other forms of involuntary migration, episodes of mass expulsion and mass exodus of migrant workers and alien communities have featured in the historical, socio-economic and international relations literatures. They have also been subject to commentary in legal and human rights forums, particularly over the last decade.

The historical perspective on mass expulsions and related involuntary population movements is rich (for an overview, see de Zayas 1988). Mass expulsion or forced transfer of religious and ethnic minorities - among them Jews and Muslims from medieval Spain, Huguenots from France in the seventeenth century, Jews from the Austrian empire in the eighteenth century, and autochthonous and settler populations in the New World of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries - have been subject to investigation by historians. In the early part of the twentieth century the collapse of European empires spawned a number of compulsory population transfers, notably that of minorities in Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey (Marrus 1985; Hirschon 1989; Poulton 1991). Both Hitler and Stalin were exponents of forcible population transfers. Hitler oversaw the relocation of ethnic Germans and the expulsion of non-Germans before and during the Second World War; Stalin oversaw forced relocations within the Soviet Union, and the post-War settlement with the Soviet Union involved the forcible relocation of Germans and of other central European ethnic populations (de Zayas 1979, 1988; Coles 1983; Marrus 1985; Bramwell 1988; Dowty 1987).

Outside Europe, the formation of new states with the demise of colonialism generated further involuntary population movements of this kind (de Zayas 1988; Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo 1989). Perhaps the two most significant comparable post-war mass involuntary displacements were those of the Arab population from Palestine with the emergence of the state of Israel, and the mass flight of Muslims and Hindus as India was partitioned (de Zayas 1988; Coles 1983; Dowty 1987; Morris 1987; Zolberg et al. 1989). North America has featured at least one major post-war episode akin to mass expulsion in the form of ‘Operation Wetback’, the mass deportation of Mexican workers from the USA in 1954 (Garcia 1980).

Comparable episodes have occurred in almost every part of the world in more recent years. Africa has seen many such episodes (see, for example Addo 1982). The expulsion of Ugandan Asians in 1972 has been extensively investigated from political and socio-economic perspectives (Twaddle 1975; Tribe 1975; Jain 1990). The forced flight of the Banyarwanda a decade later has also been examined, often by writers for advocacy groups (Clay 1984; Watson 1991). The Nigerian expulsions in the first half of the 1980s attracted considerable attention (Van Hear 1983, 1985 and 1987; Okolo 1984; Brydon 1985; Gravil 1985; Aluko 1985; Adepoju 1984 and 1986; Ricca 1989; Swindell 1990; Arhin 1991). These contributions dealt largely with political and economic aspects of the expulsions. The recent forcible population transfers between Senegal and Mauritania have been the subject of a number of studies (Horowitz 1989 and 1991; Ritmeijer 1991; Lomax and Garside 1991), as well as of scrutiny by human rights organizations (Amnesty International 1990; Human Rights Watch 1991).

The vulnerable position of the South Asian and Chinese diaspora in South-East Asia and further afield have been the subject of study, with the induced flight of ethnic Chinese from Vietnam in the late 1970s the subject of particular attention (see, for example, Tinker 1990 on South Asians; Strauch 1980 on the Chinese in Vietnam). Instability in the Middle East has generated a number of mass expulsions in addition to the forced flight of Palestinians. The war between Iran and Iraq led to several mass expulsions, migrant workers in the oil-rich states of the region have been repeatedly deported en masse, and the recent mass exodus of migrants and others from Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia is the subject of investigation by the present writer (ICIHI 1986; Van Hear 1991a, 1991b; Feen 1991). Latin America and the Caribbean have also featured such episodes; the expulsion of Salvadorans from Honduras has been investigated in detail (Anderson 1981), while the recent mass deportation of Haitian workers from the Dominican Republic awaits examination. As the make-up of central and eastern Europe becomes ever more uncertain, expulsions and other forced population transfers look likely to recur. One case, the expulsion of ethnic Turks from Bulgaria, has come under the scrutiny of human rights groups (Poulton/Minority Rights Group 1989; Zang/Helsinki Watch 1989; see also Council of Europe 1991).

Comparative studies of or approaches to such exoduses have been less in evidence. The Study on Human Rights and Massive Exoduses, initiated by the UN Commission on Human
Rights, made reference to a number of mass expulsion episodes in the decade 1970-1980 (Aga Khan 1981). The International Institute of Humanitarian Law convened a Working Group on Mass Expulsion in 1983, at which issues surrounding such episodes were considered (International Institute of Humanitarian Law 1983; Coles 1983). The Institute revisited the subject in May 1990 at a round table convened jointly with the International Organization for Migration on new developments in the movement of people; passing reference was made to mass expulsion of migrant workers or of ethnic or cultural minorities (International Institute of Humanitarian Law/IOM: 1990). Other works covering legal aspects of migratory movement have also discussed such episodes (see, in particular, part three of Goodwin-Gill 1978; IBHI 1988). Mass exodus of migrant and alien communities was considered at some length by the Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues (ICIHI), whose report *Refugees: Dynamics of Displacement*, covered mass expulsions in a chapter written by the present author (ICIHI 1986). The ICIHI set up a working group on mass expulsions in 1984 and later produced a report, to which this writer also contributed (Van Hear 1987), and which covered historical, legal and socio-economic aspects of such episodes (Independent Bureau for Humanitarian Issues 1988).

By incorporating into this literature some research by the writer on recent episodes of mass exodus and mass repatriation in West Africa and the Middle East, this paper aims to lay the foundations for the comparative study that is needed. The paper focuses on the medium- and longer term consequences of such episodes, an area which has hitherto been under-researched.

2. **Groups vulnerable to involuntary mass exodus**

Two main groups are particularly vulnerable to expulsion or to being obliged to leave en masse: migrant workers, whose intent to stay in a host country is usually or ostensibly short-term, and ‘alien’ communities, who may be former short-term migrants, but are often long-settled. The definitions of ‘migrant’ and ‘alien’ are problematic, as indeed is the distinction between them.

The term ‘migrant worker’ encompasses very diverse types of migrant. This diversity is recognized in the new UN Convention on migrant workers (discussed below, page 61). The Convention provides a universal definition of a migrant worker as ‘a person who is to be engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is not a national’ (UN General Assembly, International Convention on the protection of the rights of all migrant workers, 1990, Article 2.1). But it goes on to identify eight types of migrant worker: ‘frontier worker’, ‘seasonal worker’, ‘seafarer’, ‘worker on an offshore installation’, ‘itinerant worker’, ‘project-tied worker’, ‘specified-employment worker’ (subdivided into three further categories), and ‘self-employed worker’ (UN Convention on migrant workers 1990, Article 2.2). The term ‘transient professional’ to describe expatriate managers, administrators, technicians and others is another category that has recently entered the vocabulary of migration, as the phenomenon becomes ever more complex (Appleyard 1991). Migrant worker communities may also include dependents - a feature recognized in the recent UN convention. Those commonly designated as ‘migrant workers’ may often also include migrant entrepreneurs, petty business people, traders, farmers, providers of services, and others who eke out a living on the margins of the economy - none of whom conform to the intuitive notion of ‘migrant worker’. This diversity has been in evidence in the two main episodes of involuntary mass exodus which are examined in this paper: the mass expulsion of Ghanaian and other migrants from Nigeria in the first half of the 1980s, and the recent mass exodus of workers and professionals from Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

Although they may originally have been short-term migrants of various kinds, ‘alien’ communities may be long-established and may have acquired rights of residence or even the
nationality of the host country (thus rendering the term ‘alien’ inappropriate), while still maintaining an orientation towards their country of origin, even several generations after settlement. One type, which have been termed ‘middleman minorities’ (Bonacich 1973; Turner and Bonacich 1980), have been repeatedly subject to expulsion. Such communities may dominate, or be prominent in, the trading and commercial sector of a country; they are also often distinguishable from the mass of the population by race, religion or nationality. Recent examples of mass exodus of such populations include the expulsion of the Asians from Uganda in the early 1970s and the mass departure of ethnic Chinese from Vietnam in the late 1970s. Not all such long-settled ‘alien’ communities are powerful traders however: some mass departures of south Asian and Chinese communities, as well as the expulsions of the Banyarwanda from Uganda and of Salvadorans from Honduras, have included farmers, labourers and others who can hardly be said to have dominated the sectors of the economies and societies in which they worked and lived. The term ‘returnee’ when applied to such people when considering countries accommodating them is also problematic. Because they may have been long-settled, and even nationals of the country which they are obliged to leave, it may be inappropriate when considering the country receiving them to speak of ‘return’ to a homeland, for the country to which they ‘return’ may be one unknown to them and their links with it may be minimal or non-existent. This may present particular problems of integration within the community receiving such ‘returnees’.

Given the diversity of people encompassed by the terms ‘migrant’ and ‘alien’ in the context of involuntary mass departure, is it possible to say anything useful about such disparate types of forced migrant? One way of dealing with this diversity is in terms of different degrees of ‘alienness’, or alienage, which may determine vulnerability or liability to expulsion en masse. Liability to expulsion or induced mass exodus may be related to the terms on which migrants entered a country - as immigrants, as settlers, as migrant workers, as traders or as refugees. Previous uprootedness may also mean increased proclivity to expulsion; refugees and long-exiled communities have featured in episodes of mass expulsion or involuntary mass departure. Liability to expulsion may also be related to the degree of integration, of which intermarriage and other social intercourse are indicators. Race often also marks ‘alienness’. Such dimensions raise the issue of what constitutes ‘membership’ of a given society.

One model that may provide assistance in this regard is suggested by Cohen (1989), refining and adapting both his own previous work (Cohen 1987) and that of Hammar (1990). He proposes a trichotomy comprising citizens, ‘denizens’ and ‘helots’, with political, cultural and economic rights diminishing from the first category to the last. The first category includes nationals by birth or naturalization, established immigrants and refugees recognized under the UN Convention. The term ‘denizens’ encompasses privileged aliens perhaps holding more than one citizenship, but with restricted political and economic rights in the country of residence or domicile; this category might include expatriate contract workers and professionals, work-permit holders, recognized asylum-applicants and other temporary entrants. The term ‘helots’ includes illegal entrants, undocumented workers, asylum-seekers and overstayers (Cohen 1989: 161-162). While the placement of some of these categories may be questioned, this model may have some utility in determining who may be vulnerable to involuntary mass departure.

These issues of definition and of societal membership are not pursued further in this paper, but will be explored in forthcoming work by the present writer (Van Hear forthcoming). The present paper concentrates on the first of the vulnerable populations identified in this section - migrant workers who are obliged to leave their countries of residence - while making reference to other kinds of resident foreigners.
3. The question of coercion

The concepts of ‘compulsion’ and of ‘expulsion’ in mass exodus are as problematic as those of ‘migrant’ and ‘alien’. As might be expected, there are degrees of compulsion under which such populations are expelled or induced to leave. Unsurprisingly, states often dispute that they are expelling people en masse. One way of looking at the issue is in terms of differing levels of obligation to leave; this paper is mainly concerned with the harder end of the spectrum, where the state is explicitly or tacitly involved.

An earlier report on mass expulsion, to which this writer contributed, suggested the following criteria or paradigm for considering episodes of mass expulsion (IBHI 1988: 4-5). First, expulsions are officially instigated or organized, with methods ranging from decree and overt use of force to more covert persecution, intimidation, discrimination and inducement of an unwanted group to leave. Second, they are sudden measures, episodes rather than continuous processes; this tends to distinguish them from deportation over longer periods, as has featured in industrialized countries in recent decades. Third, since they are directed at masses of people, expulsions are often arbitrary; they may also be discriminatory. Fourth, expulsions are largely extra-judicial, with no means of legal redress or appeal. Fifth, they are announced and implemented unilaterally, usually without consultation with the receiving state. Sixth, expulsions are often accompanied by the appropriation of expellees’ assets.

Many of the episodes of mass exodus in Africa referred to above, particularly the mass departure of West African migrants from Nigeria in the early 1980s, conform to this paradigm. However, not all of these criteria may apply to all forms of involuntary mass exodus involving migrant workers or alien communities. The mass deportation of Mexican migrants from the USA under ‘Operation Wetback’ in 1954 illustrated some of these features, although it was arguably less disorderly than are most mass expulsions. The means by which gastarbeiter and other migrant workers have been induced to leave Europe and North America since the 1970s are more in the nature of extended or continuous deportation than episodes of mass exodus; however the recent large scale deportations from Eastern Europe of labour migrants from former client states like Vietnam, Cuba, Mozambique and Angola are more akin to expulsions en masse.

Turning to recent developments in the Middle East, considered in more detail below, the mass exodus of Arab and Asian expatriates from Iraq and Kuwait was not an expulsion in the sense that it was not directly instigated by the Iraqi government. Although there was harassment and abuse of the foreign workforce while Kuwait was under Iraqi occupation, the principal reason for flight seems to have been fear of the new regime and of the war that the occupation might provoke. Conversely, the concomitant mass exodus of Yemenis from Saudi Arabia was arguably an expulsion, since the Saudi authorities suddenly changed the rules governing the migrants’ right to stay, as well as allegedly harassing, detaining and even torturing some of them, and thereby induced them to leave; the support of the government of Yemen for Iraq was the thinly veiled motivation for the expulsion. The mass departure of Palestinians, Jordanians and others from Kuwait after the ending of the Iraqi occupation was also akin to an expulsion, since flight was induced by harassment and torture, or fear of these in the early stages, and by denial of access to work, education and health care later on.

A broad but contentious distinction might be drawn between mass exodus of migrants or aliens that is officially induced and exodus that is motivated by fear or insecurity on the part of those leaving. This distinction is contentious because the dividing line between the two kinds of
motivation may be such an uncertain one. The issue of motivation for inducing mass exodus is explored further in the next section.

4. Motivations for mass exodus

Economic grounds are commonly uppermost in official justifications for inducing migrant or alien populations to leave. The governments of countries that are experiencing economic difficulties are prone to instigate mass expulsions. Economic malaise was the background to the Honduran authorities’ moves against Salvadoran immigrants in 1968-69, the expulsion of aliens from Ghana in 1969-70, the expulsion of the Asian community from Uganda in 1972, the mass flight of ethnic Chinese from Vietnam in 1978-79, the expulsion of the Banyarwanda from Uganda in 1982-83, the expulsion of West African migrants from Nigeria in 1983-85, and the expulsion of North African migrants from Libya in 1985. In different measures, worsening balance of payments, capital flight, industrial decline, growing unemployment, scarcity of land, food shortages and rising prices were features of the economic distress in the countries inducing mass exodus. The aftermath of war and a series of natural disasters were additional factors in Vietnam, while a slump in oil earnings was the principal economic determinant in Nigeria and Libya. Governments have sought to divert attention from these problems by tapping popular currents of resentment of foreigners and xenophobia.

While economic grounds are the justification most commonly cited by governments for expulsions, political motivations are often at least as significant and often more so. Earlier work on this issue suggested four interrelated sets of political motives for mass expulsions, featuring both domestic and international considerations (IBHI 1988: 42-43). First, expulsions are often motivated by the political pressures generated by the economic strains outlined above; outsiders are blamed for a country’s ills in a classic ‘scapegoat’ strategy. Second, expulsions have been instigated during periods of political instability - after independence, during or after war, in the run-up to elections, during periods of nationalist upsurge, or after a change of regime. Third, expulsions are associated with official anxiety about internal or external security. Fourth, expulsions may be used as instruments of foreign policy in the course of international disputes. Expulsions commonly involve a combination of these political motivations, which like the economic motives may be overt or covert.

In many cases, the majority of those obliged to leave in a mass exodus may not have been specifically targeted by overt or covert official action. The motivations of those leaving have therefore to be taken into account. As was suggested in the previous section, it is often fear of persecution, harassment or the confiscation of assets that precipitates departure, rather than the perpetration of such activity; it is the calculation that a reasonable life is no longer possible under such conditions. Like refugee movements, exodus of migrants and alien communities may well be in anticipation of persecution, harassment or intimidation or of instability, civil conflict or war. Such was the case in many of the episodes cited above, and was certainly so in the West African and Middle Eastern cases which are examined in greater detail below.

5. Consequences of mass exodus

Unlike other forms of repatriation, the types of expulsion and exodus under review are sudden episodes, allowing little preparation by countries receiving returnees. The immediate problems of reception, accommodation and dispersal may be difficult and expensive to deal with. Reception centres and transit camps often have to be set up and emergency food, water, sanitation and medical attention provided. Local infrastructure may come under serious pressure.
Administrative costs are incurred when returnees are registered and screened. Such expenditure and redeployment diverts resources from more productive uses in countries that are often already beset by serious economic difficulties.

At the same time, there are factors which may ameliorate the short- and medium-term impact of mass returns. Perhaps the most important factor is that unlike other forms of forced migration, those affected usually end up in their homeland and can draw on its resources in ways that other forced migrants may not. Several recent cases of mass return highlight the importance of the extended family and other kin in facilitating the rapid accommodation and integration of returnees, although this is not without costs to the relatives or communities accommodating them.

There are four main medium-term socio-economic impacts of mass return: the implications for the labour market and employment; the impact on prices and local markets; the loss of remittances and hence of potential sources of investment; and the impact on local resources - infrastructure, housing, social and welfare services, and the environment. These spheres are, of course, interrelated.

Increased unemployment, downward pressure on wages and competition with existing small businesses are among the impacts of mass return on labour markets, the more so when, as is often the case, returnees are predominantly of working age. The disruption of the local economy in areas where returnees may congregate is almost inevitable as markets are destabilized and food prices rise rapidly. Upward pressures on the prices of goods, rents and services are among the other features which may cause resentment against returnees. The loss of remittances from migrant workers has important impacts on the economy at large and on dependents in particular. States may rely on remittances for a large proportion of their foreign exchange earnings. The loss of these and of earnings formerly remitted through unofficial channels may deprive the economy of important sources of investment - although remittances are frequently used for purposes, such as house-building or consumption, which are regarded as ‘non-productive’. Their loss also hits dependents previously reliant on remittances; not only may such persons now have to contribute to the upkeep of returnee kin, but they may be obliged to turn to other family members, relatives or the state for assistance, often drawing on already scarce and stretched resources.

Other economic, social and ecological consequences of mass return include increased pressure on housing, on health, education and social services, and on land, water supply and other resources. It is not just the impact of the increased scale of demands on resources and services, but also the suddenness or surges of demand that may be significant. Again there may be some ameliorative factors. If returnees are of working age, the increased demands may be partly offset by increased tax revenues; conversely, if returnees include large numbers of children and elderly the demands on housing, health care, education and social and welfare services will obviously be the greater.

Assistance to reintegrate returnees has taken two forms. What might be called ‘interventionist’ or ‘targetted’ approaches involve measures undertaken by the state or outside agencies specifically directed at returnees; they usually include some form of subsidy, such as employment creation, lenient credit terms for small businesses, or the provision of farm implements and tools. What might be termed ‘market’ or ‘macro’- approaches involve measures applied to the whole population or economy rather than to returnees in particular, with the idea of encouraging growth and employment in general. This is an analytic distinction, since in practice ‘interventionist’ approaches are often market-oriented and ‘market’ approaches are often interventionist. The two approaches are often combined, as in programmes to mitigate the effects
on vulnerable groups of structural adjustment programmes. Such assistance seldom reaches the majority of returnees, most of whom have to fend for themselves. The ways in which they do so require further research, but some forms of returnees’ activities to rebuild their lives are explored in part two.

The longer term consequences of mass return, and of efforts at reintegrating returnees, have hitherto been underexplored. Little is known about the fate of returnees in the longer term, after initial publicity about a mass expulsion or exodus has faded. Because returnees are frequently dispersed, they may not be as visible as other forced migrants, such as refugees in camps. Their impact on the society and economy of the country of return may be diffuse. Yet the longer term consequences of mass returns may be crucial to the potential development of a country receiving returning nationals. The consequences of such episodes for countries receiving returnees may not all be negative. The return of migrants may indeed be beneficial because their skills, energy and enterprise may be utilized productively in home industries and agriculture rather than contributing to economic growth abroad. This argument is pursued further in part two.

II. MASS EXODUS AND MASS RETURN IN WEST AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

The paper now explores in greater detail some of the issues raised in part one with reference to the two great episodes of migrant worker mass exodus over the last decade - those that occurred in West Africa in the early 1980s and in the Middle East in the early 1990s.

1. The mass expulsions from Nigeria, 1983-1985

In the 1970s Nigeria’s booming economy, underwritten by large oil earnings, attracted large numbers of immigrants from other West African countries. The majority of these immigrants were Ghanaians who had left their country as it lurched towards economic collapse. The immigrants to Nigeria also included nationals of Niger and Chad, seeking escape from drought, famine and poverty in the Sahel. The ratification of a protocol on the free movement of persons by members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1979-1980 increased this migratory flow. The protocol allowed immigrants to enter and stay in other member states without a visa for up to 90 days. Working was technically not allowed, but many migrants found employment and overstayed the 90-day period. Economic contraction in the wake of a slump in world oil prices drove the Nigerian government to reconsider this laissez-faire immigration policy. Nigeria’s oil earnings were halved between 1980 and 1982. Austerity measures introduced from early in 1982 led to large-scale layoffs of workers and widespread unemployment. Economic deterioration generated increasing social distress and political strain. It was against this background that the government of President Shehu Shagari announced in January 1983 that all illegal immigrants should leave Nigeria. Estimates vary, but up to two million people are thought to have been eventually obliged to leave, of whom about half were Ghanaians. Most left in a period of about two weeks, under conditions of great distress; many were subjected to harassment and lost assets and belongings (Van Hear 1983, 1985, 1987; Okolo 1984; Brydon, 1985; Gravil 1985; Aluko 1985; Adepoju 1984, 1986; Ricca 1989; Swindell 1990; Arhin 1991).

A further expulsion was carried out in May 1985. After ousting the Shagari government, the military regime which succeeded it introduced further austerity measures in a bid to rescue the
ailing economy; this led to still greater redundancies and unemployment. The government claimed that immigrants were taking jobs to the disadvantage of Nigerians, and blamed them for heavy involvement in crime. Issuing a further quit order, the authorities claimed that 700,000 illegal immigrants were affected, largely those who had returned since 1983 or who had escaped expulsion in that year. In the event, around 250,000 people were thought to have been expelled (Van Hear 1985, 1987; Adepoju 1986; Ricca 1989; Swindell 1990; Arhin 1991).

2. The mass exodus of migrant workers and professionals from Kuwait, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, 1990-1991

It is thought that the oil boom of the 1970s had attracted more than five million foreign workers to the oil-producing countries of the Middle East by the mid-1980s. Perhaps two thirds of these expatriates were drawn from other Arab countries - principally Egyptians, other North Africans, Yemenis, Jordanians and displaced Palestinians. Most of the remainder were from South and South-East Asia. Expatriate workers in Iraq and Kuwait may have accounted for more than one third of the total in the region (Owen 1985; Birks, Seccombe and Sinclair 1988; Amjad 1989; UN Food and Agriculture Organization 1990). This pattern of migration was profoundly disrupted by the mass exodus following the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq on 2 August 1990. By the end of 1990 perhaps two million foreign nationals had left their countries of residence and work as tensions rose in the region (see table 1 for the approximate composition of this exodus). Further outflows of foreign nationals occurred in 1991 (Van Hear 1991a, 1991b; Graham-Brown 1991).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Kuwait (1)</th>
<th>Kuwait (2)</th>
<th>Iraq (1)</th>
<th>Iraq (2)</th>
<th>Evacuees/Returnees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
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<td>35</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>50</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>750–800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan/Palestine</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>300 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>35–200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50–130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>130</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>180–200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>90–142</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>73–101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td>64–90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>30–55</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>16 (5)</td>
<td></td>
<td>8–16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>6 (6)</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: (1) Migrant workers or economically active foreigners. (2) Dependents. (3) The People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen and the Yemen Arab Republic were unified in 1990 to form the Republic of Yemen. The figures cited in this table and elsewhere in this paper combine those for the two former republics. There were said to be about one million Yemenis in Saudi Arabia towards the end of the 1980s, but there was controversy about this figure (see Findlay 1987), and thus of the number of returnees in 1990-91. The most commonly cited figures were 800,000 returnees from Saudi Arabia and 30,000 via Jordan. (4) There were estimated to be 605,000 Jordanians/Palestinians in the six Gulf Cooperation Council countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) on the eve of the Gulf crisis. 300,000 Jordanians and Palestinians moved to Jordan, mostly from Kuwait, with about 10 per cent from Saudi Arabia. In addition there were said to be 54,000 returnees to the Occupied Territories, of whom 26,000 had been working in Kuwait and the remainder in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states (UN ESCWA 1991; UNDP November 1991). (5) Total number of workers, mainly in Iraq. (6) Total number of workers reported to be in Iraq and Kuwait. 

Sources: ILO, US General Accounting Office, IOM, UN ESCWA, UNDP.
Most of those leaving Kuwait and Iraq passed through Jordan; by the end of 1990 more than a million people had entered the country, the great majority en route to other destinations. Returnees and those staying in Jordan - including Palestinians with Jordanian documents - numbered up to 250,000 (Van Hear 1991a, 1991b; US General Accounting Office 1991). Perhaps half of the 865,000 third country nationals passing through Jordan were Egyptians; others were migrants from India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the Philippines and Sudan. Most of the 60,000 evacuees who left through Turkey were from Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Vietnam and Eastern Europe, together with some 5,000 Turkish nationals. Some 100,000 people entered Iran, of whom 70,000 were Iranians or Kuaitis and most of the remainder Pakistanis. Of 60,000 people who left Iraq for Syria, about 50,000 were Syrians. Many of these involuntary migrants lost assets and belongings and reported harassment en route.

While international attention was focused on the plight of migrants moving from Iraq and Kuwait and their evacuation to their countries of origin, the Gulf crisis was generating another, largely unnoticed mass exodus as Yemenis left Saudi Arabia in what amounted to a mass expulsion by the authorities of that country (Van Hear 1991a, 1991b). From mid-August 1990, increasing numbers of Yemenis began to leave Saudi Arabia as a result of tensions between the two countries arising partly from what the Saudis saw as the support of the government of Yemen for Iraq. Then, in September, the Saudi authorities made far-reaching changes to the rules governing work and residence permits for the estimated one million Yemenis in the kingdom. The changes removed any of the exemptions enjoyed by Yemeni migrants and put pressure on them to leave. There was evidence of widespread arbitrary arrest, detention and torture of Yemenis since the Gulf crisis had erupted, and of widespread harassment by the Saudi authorities, both prior to the exodus and en route (Amnesty International November 1990). Such action no doubt induced many more Yemenis to leave, adding weight to the view that the exodus was more in the nature of a mass expulsion than a simple deportation of illegal immigrants. By the end of 1990 it was estimated that 800,000 of them may have returned to Yemen (CAFOD et al. 1991; Overseas Development Institute 1991; UN Development Programme May 1991).

A further wave of displacement of foreign nationals took place after the ending of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. Flight of Palestinians from Kuwait took place against the background of violence against the Palestinian community by Kuwaiti militia groups avenging alleged collaboration. Reports of harassment, killings and torture mounted, implicating sections of the restored al-Sabah regime. Internationally criticized trials of alleged collaborators increased the insecurity of Jordanians and Palestinians in the emirate and induced many more to leave (Amnesty International March, April 1991; UN ESCWA 1991).

Palestinians in the emirate before August 1990 were thought to have numbered up to 400,000. Large numbers of Palestinian residents - perhaps half the pre-August 1990 population - left before and during the war for Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and the Occupied Territories in the first wave of flight described above. But there were in addition substantial numbers of Palestinians long-settled in Kuwait who could not make claims on these destinations for refuge. These may have numbered 60,000 and included those from the Gaza strip with Egyptian travel documents, but whom the Egyptian authorities would not allow to enter Egypt; they also included many whose documents had expired (Van Hear 1991a, 1991b; Graham-Brown 1991).

The movement from Kuwait of large numbers of Jordanians and Palestinians gathered momentum from mid-1991. While persecution of Palestinians in the emirate had abated, continuing denial of access to employment, education or health services precipitated this exodus,
which took the total number of ‘returnees’ to Jordan since August 1990 to up to 300,000 (Van Hear 1991a, 1991b; Graham-Brown 1991).

In a draft report looking at the impact of the Gulf crisis on developing countries, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) estimated that 3.5 million migrant workers returned home as a result of the crisis; this figure presumably includes professionals and long-settled expatriates such as the Palestinians in Kuwait. Given the high ratio of dependents at home to migrants abroad, the UNDP estimated that 18 million people could have been directly affected by the exodus (UNDP November 1991). This estimate seems unduly high. It seems more likely that the total number of returnees numbered a little over two million, and some of these appeared to have re-migrated quickly to seek employment abroad again. If the same ratio of migrants to dependents at home is assumed, the number of those directly affected could have totalled 10 million.

3. Mass exodus in West Africa and the Middle East compared

There are illuminating points of comparison between these two major cases from West Africa and the Middle East. The first point of comparison concerns the numbers and types of migrants and aliens affected. Both cases involved similar numbers of migrants. Most of those expelled from Nigeria were technically ‘irregular’ or undocumented migrants, as were arguably those obliged to leave Saudi Arabia, where Yemenis had enjoyed largely unhindered movement and residence. Undocumented workers were probably less significant in Kuwait and Iraq, where labour recruitment was more regulated, although there were significant numbers of persons rendered stateless or ‘undocumented’ in the course of the conflict and its aftermath. More longer term residents were displaced in the course of the mass displacements in the Middle East than in the West African episode.

The second point of comparison concerns the form of induced mass exodus. The two major cases illustrate different levels of compulsion to leave. In Nigeria the expulsion was by decree, coupled with intimidation of foreign nationals. The exodus of Yemenis from Saudi Arabia took the form of coerced departure; a change in immigration, work and residence procedures amounted to a scarcely veiled mass expulsion. The mass departures from Kuwait and other Gulf states were provoked first by fear of war; later by intimidation, torture and killings of foreign nationals; and still later by the denial of employment and of access to education, health and other services. Flight from Iraq was largely induced by fear of war and by its after-effects, although the departure of Egyptians, already under way before the conflict, was more a case of coerced exodus.

The third point of comparison relates to the spatial impact of the mass displacement. In both cases migrant workers were induced or obliged to leave the economically dominant centres of a region for its periphery. In both cases several countries were affected by the mass exodus, which was thus multilateral rather than bilateral in its effects. However the regional impact of the Nigerian expulsion was more limited than the multi-regional impact of the exodus from the Gulf, which affected the Middle East, Northeast Africa, and South and South East Asia.

A fourth area of comparison relates to the consequences of the mass displacements and the way in which they were handled. It is to these aspects that the paper now turns.
4. Consequences of the mass return for Ghana

(i) Economic impact of the mass return

The statistics should be treated with caution, but the return of one million expellees from Nigeria to Ghana in 1983 would have increased the country’s population by about 10 per cent (World Bank 1985). The proportion of the Ghanaian population reckoned to be ‘economically active’ - that is, farmers and traders as well as wage and salary earners - was thought at that time to be about 45 per cent (ILO 1990b). If so, since most of the returnees were of working age the increase in the economically active (or potentially active) population could have been around 20 per cent, a serious blow to an economy which had been severely debilitated by more than a decade of decline and where unemployment was already at record levels. (See Tabatabai 1988 for a re-estimation of the figures for Ghana’s total population and workforce, and the impact on them of international migration.)

As with population and workforce figures, estimates of the scale of remittances by Ghanaians in Nigeria are very difficult to make, not least because so little was remitted through official channels. The World Bank estimated annual receipts of workers’ remittances in the early 1980s at just $1 million and the International Monetary Fund at even less (World Bank 1983, 1984, 1985; IMF 1990). Given the extremely adverse exchange rate in Ghana at the time, this figure might conceivably have reflected official receipts, but the real level of remittances must have been much higher if one million migrants were working in Nigeria alone. Perhaps a more realistic (guess) estimate is that if each Ghanaian resident in Nigeria had remitted just five niara a week, this could have amounted to a weekly inflow to Ghana of the equivalent of $7.5 million in the early 1980s (Gravil 1985). This would have given a total of $390 million a year, a figure which tallies with another rough estimate that remittances from Nigeria could have amounted to $300-500 million annually in the late 1970s (Tabatabai 1988). While it should again be stressed that little of this inflow would have passed through the official banking system, and thus would have been of limited benefit to the Ghanaian exchequer, the remittances could have represented an important inflow of private income and capital into the economy. Their loss, coupled with the immediate impact on the labour market of the mass return, was another serious blow for Ghana’s ailing economy. However the return of labour power and the influx of unknown amounts of capital may ultimately have been beneficial, as will be argued below.

(ii) Measures to assist and reintegrate returnees

The immediate government response to the mass return of Ghanaians was to set up a task force or emergency committee, encompassing representatives of relevant ministries, to oversee returnees’ repatriation, their registration, the mobilization and distribution of relief, and transport to home areas. A National Co-ordination Committee was later made responsible for oversight of these activities. Following calls by the Ghanaian authorities for international assistance, the international community was represented on this committee by the UN Resident Representative (Brydon 1985; Ricca 1989; Arhin 1991).

Ghana received about $20 million in cash and kind towards the emergency from 24 governments, seven international relief agencies, the European Community and the UN system; the equivalent of $90,000 was generated by Ghanaian organizations and individuals. The UN Economic and Social Council undertook to channel nearly $190 million to Ghana in 1983, $50 million of which was directed to emergency assistance and the remainder for recovery-related aid, directed not only towards returnees but to the population at large (ICIHI 1986; Ricca 1989).
The medium-term reintegration of returnees was subsumed within Ghana’s programme to recover from its dire economic straits. Reintegration came under the aegis of the National Mobilisation Programme, set up before the mass exodus from Nigeria in a bid to galvanize stagnant sectors of the economy. This programme appeared to absorb the task forces and committees set up in the immediate wake of the crisis. In line with the thinking of Ghana’s overall economic recovery programme, resettlement in rural areas rather than towns was encouraged. The committee which oversaw the NMP appealed to chiefs to release land to repatriates to farm, a call which appears to have been heeded. Associations and co-operatives of returnees were allocated tools, equipment and food aid to help them set up. Others formed themselves into associations to undertake infrastructural repairs, or were drafted into work parties to assist with the cocoa harvest or with the rehabilitation of farmland ravaged by bush fires. Members of these work parties were paid partly in kind, from food aid, and partly in cash - albeit a very modest wage. Some funds went into rural industries such as agricultural repair work or crafts, in which returnees were employed. Still others returned to former employers in Ghana (Ricca 1989; Arhin 1991).

Of course, reintegration was not wholly smooth nor without problems. Of returnees of working age, 30 per cent were estimated to be still without work a year after their return (Ricca 1989). There were outbreaks of unrest among returnees, who were reported to be among those agitating against some of the measures required by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank under the Economic Recovery Programme, a structural adjustment package requiring painful reforms (World Bank 1984a; ICIHI 1986). There was also reported to be rivalry and wasteful duplication between the associations and co-operatives set up by or for returnees and other local arms of the ruling regime (Ricca 1989).

Scrutiny of official initiatives to assist returnees should not eclipse the paramount importance of their self-organized activity in re-integrating into Ghana’s economy and society, with little or no official assistance. About 30 per cent of returnees are estimated to have made their own way home (Ricca 1989). According to one survey conducted in central Ghana, 30 per cent of returnees said they had received no official assistance at all, and 60 per cent of those who found work said they had done so without official assistance (Ricca 1989, citing Agyeman 1984).

Mention has already been made of the self-organization of returnees seen in the associations and co-operatives formed - however short-lived - to engage in agricultural, infrastructural or other activity. A further form of self-organized activity was return to Nigeria to former workplaces or to seek new work. It is difficult to judge how many took up once more this ‘escape’ or ‘exit’ option. One commentator suggested that ‘a large majority’ returned to Nigeria (Adepoju 1984: 433). But judging by the scale of subsequent repeat expulsions in 1984 and 1985 - perhaps 250,000 people - re-emigrants are unlikely to have exceeded 150,000; those who escaped expulsion the first time around accounted for the remainder in the subsequent rounds of expulsion.

(iii) The longer term impact

The absorption of the returnee issue into the general effort towards economic recovery, a trend evident early during the returnee emergency, gathered momentum as Ghana’s economic direction conformed increasingly to World Bank- and IMF-inspired structural adjustment policies (World Bank 1984a). The expulsion was indeed among the factors that swung international donors behind Ghana and prompted them to finance its plans for economic rehabilitation and recovery. While donors had previously been reluctant to commit aid to Ghana because of the politically unstable condition of the country and the ideological complexion of the Rawlings regime, substantial assistance was pledged at the end of 1983 at a donors’ meeting in Paris. In the same
year the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund began to release to Ghana substantial credits tied to structural adjustment reforms (World Bank 1984a; ICIHI 1986).

One consequence of the absorption of returnee reintegration into overall economic recovery efforts was that few records of the subsequent fate and contribution of returnees were kept; the Ministry of Labour kept no details of the placement of returnees, nor did the Ministry of Education keep records of the many returnee teachers (Arhin 1991). Nevertheless, it has been suggested that by 1985, two years after the first mass expulsion, 450,000 returnees were engaged in agricultural work, and teaching and health posts vacant before 1983 had been filled (Ricca 1989). The large increase in agricultural labour power, coinciding with better rains, is thought to have boosted food crop production, revived Ghana’s ailing cocoa output, and may well have assisted the country’s economic recovery in the second half of the 1980s. These improvements may in turn have helped to convince donors to continue backing Ghana’s Economic Recovery Programme.

Five years after the first mass return of expellees, Ghana was in much better economic shape than at the time of the expulsion. While there were many other contributory factors, some of the credit for this recovery was arguably due to the returnees. According to World Bank and IMF figures, Ghana staged a substantial turnaround in its fortunes between the early and the later 1980s. Gross Domestic Product per capita, grew a modest 1.4 per cent in 1985-1988, a rate more impressive when set against the decline of 4.1 per cent in 1980-1984 (World Bank 1990). Commonly cited Ghana government figures indicate annual growth in GDP of more than five per cent in the second half of the 1980s, until 1990 when growth slowed to 3.3 per cent (Kapur et al. 1991). These figures should be interpreted with caution. Adopted as a model reforming economy by the World Bank and the IMF in the 1980s, Ghana continued to receive large amounts of assistance in the form of credits from these and other institutions; there are question marks over the basis, the costs and the sustainability of the recovery (see, for example, Toye 1992). Nevertheless, it is generally accepted that there was a recovery in Ghana’s economy from the mid 1980s. While it is very difficult to determine to what extent the mass return of migrants contributed to the improvements in the Ghanaian economy, at the very least it may be said that they were not a net burden. Since it is likely that they would have contributed substantially to Ghana’s labour-scarce rural economy (Tabatabai 1988), it is reasonable to argue that returnees helped to bump-start the revival of agriculture and the economy more widely in the second half of the 1980s.

5. Consequences of the mass return precipitated by the Gulf crisis

(i) The evacuation and relief operations in Jordan, Iran, Turkey and Syria in 1990

While the numbers of migrants involved in the Middle East mass displacements of 1990 were about the same as those in West Africa in 1983, the process of repatriation was altogether more complex. The far greater distances to be travelled by returnees meant that countries of transit were more heavily involved than in the West African case.

The majority of evacuees in the first wave of mass exodus in 1990 made their own way home with minimal assistance. About 350,000 migrants - termed ‘third country nationals’ - were repatriated by their governments (US General Accounting Office 1991). By the end of the year, nearly 156,000 foreign residents in Iraq and Kuwait had been evacuated under the airlift overseen by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), mainly from Jordan, but also from Iraq itself, Turkey and Iran (IOM 1990-1991a, 1990-1991b).
The repatriation of evacuees from Jordan and other countries to which they fled was a considerable achievement by the governments and international agencies involved. That the number in camps in Jordan was reduced from 110,000 at its peak to less than 35,000 by mid-September 1990 is evidence of the effectiveness of the evacuation effort by land and air. By early December 1990 very few people were left in the camps in Jordan (UNDRO 1990a). After initial confusion as thousands of migrants made for the Jordanian border with Iraq, a relatively effective relief operation was set in motion. After early problems, co-ordination appears to have been effective between the Jordanian authorities, the international agencies and the non-governmental organizations (UNDRO 1990a, 1990b; UN Office October 1990; US General Accounting Office 1991).

The first arrivals were largely accommodated through the generosity of Jordanian citizens; large quantities of food were distributed to evacuees in Amman and other centres (interviews, Amman, April 1991). Shortly after the initial influx, an inter-ministerial committee was set up by the Jordanian government to oversee the relief effort. When it became clear that Jordan alone could not cope with the crisis, the government appealed to the international community for assistance. The UN Secretary General designated the Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator (UNDRO) as the co-ordinating agency for the international relief operation; co-ordination was overseen by the UN Development Programme’s resident representative, who doubled as UN resident co-ordinator in Jordan. Other international organizations involved at an early stage included the International Committee of the Red Cross, which worked at camps on the border between Iraq and Jordan; the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which concentrated on refugees and others of concern under its mandate; the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), which assisted evacuees at transit sites, cooperating with the World Health Organization (WHO) in the health sector; the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), which with its resources in the region was able to provide logistical support; and the World Food Programme (WFP), which utilized its stocks in Jordan and established buffer facilities for use in other countries. The League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in conjunction with the Jordanian Red Crescent, and a wide range of local and international non-governmental organizations provided assistance in the reception camps and elsewhere. An inter-agency committee bringing together Jordanian government and international agency representatives sat regularly to review the relief effort. By most accounts this worked well (see, for example, US General Accounting Office 1991; UNDRO 1990a, 1990b).

Smaller scale relief operations were mounted in Iran, Syria and Turkey. The government of Iran provided transport within its borders, and was assisted by UNDRO, the UNDP and the IOM. The Syrian authorities set up a ministerial committee to co-ordinate the reception of returnees and third country arrivals. The Turkish government and Turkish Red Crescent Society co-ordinated with UNDRO, the UNDP, the IOM and the European Community in the relief and repatriation of evacuees (US General Accounting Office 1991; UN Office 1990; IOM 1990-1991a, 1990-1991b).

The reception facilities in Jordan, Iran, Turkey and Syria were wound down when the numbers of new arrivals dwindled (the reception of the second wave of mainly Palestinian returnees to Jordan in 1991 is considered in the section on Jordan, below). Attention in countries receiving returnees then turned to the impact of their repatriation and to measures to integrate them.

(ii) The impact of the mass return of migrant workers

Individual migrants and their families sustained substantial losses as a result of their involuntary mass departure. The principal losses were unpaid wages; end-of-service benefits;
remittances not transferred; savings lost as bank accounts were destroyed or rendered inaccessible; personal belongings stolen, lost or left behind; and property or assets which were inaccessible (ILO 1991b). In addition, migrants who managed to bring with them cash denominated in Kuwaiti dinars found the money impossible to redeem. Kin and communities receiving returnees found themselves doubly affected - first, by the sudden removal of remittances they routinely received, and second, because they now had also to support new arrivals.

More widely, the exodus had a profound effect on the societies and economies of countries surrounding the arena of conflict and beyond. The following attempts to draw together some early estimates of the scale of this impact, with the caveat that some of these estimates vary widely (see table 2). The impact of the exodus on Jordan is difficult to disentangle from other effects of the crisis, and from the already severely straitened position Jordan was in before the crisis broke. In addition to the estimated 865,000 third country nationals who passed through the country, there were up to 300,000 Jordanian returnees, including Palestinians with Jordanian documents. Their return meant a substantial loss in the remittances on which the Jordanian economy depended. The total is difficult to calculate, with estimates of the remittances forgone varying between $150 million and $769 million (CAFOD et al. 1991; UNDP November 1991). Even the lower estimate accounts for a substantial proportion of Jordan’s total remittances, which were estimated at $627 million in 1989, when they represented 10 per cent of GNP (IMF 1990; World Bank 1991; UN ESCWA 1991). The returnees may have added perhaps 8 per cent to Jordan’s population and 10 per cent to its labour force (ODI 1991; CAFOD et al. 1991; UNDP November 1991; UN ESCWA 1991). The impact of returnees on Jordan is considered in more detail below.

Yemen was also very severely affected by its mass return. If the estimate of 800,000 returnees is accurate, Yemen would have absorbed a 7 per cent increase to its population within three months. (For a discussion of the number of Yemeni migrants abroad, see Findlay 1987). The return may have added 15 per cent to the labour force (ODI 1991). The earnings of Yemeni workers abroad are thought to have accounted for more than half of Yemen’s legal foreign receipts, as well as a large volume that did not pass through official channels. The remittances lost have been estimated at $400 million yearly (CAFOD et al. 1991; UNDP November 1991); this represents 90 per cent of total remittances in 1989 and 5.5 per cent of GNP for that year (IMF 1990; World Bank 1991). It appears that most returnees were absorbed into their communities of origin, or into the homes of relatives. But a substantial number - perhaps 20 per cent - had been away for decades or had even been born abroad and had no such destinations to make for; they were reported to have squatted in make-shift shanty settlements concentrated particularly around the port of Hodeidah (Yemen Times, 24 July 1991; Van Hear 1991a, 1991b).

Egypt may have received about half a million returnees; other Egyptian evacuees relocated elsewhere. Loss of remittances from Iraq and Kuwait were estimated by the Egyptian authorities at up to $1 billion for 1990-1991 (Africa Economic Digest, 3 and 17 September 1990; ILO 1991a); total remittances for 1989 were estimated at $4.25-4.5 billion (IMF 1990; World Bank 1991). While this loss - perhaps 3 per cent of 1989 GNP - and the impact on unemployment would have been substantial, these effects may have been offset by new sources of employment abroad. Egyptian returnees were reported to have been finding work in Saudi Arabia, which began to reshape its foreign workforce of some 2.5 million, as Asian workers left and Yemeni, Jordanian, Sudanese and Palestinian workers and professionals were made unwelcome or expelled as a result of what was perceived as their leaders’ support for Iraq (Financial Times, 25 September 1990). Some Egyptians were also reported to have been returning to Kuwait. Returnee migrants may also have found work as labourers or settlers on Libya’s ‘Great Man-made River’ scheme, a large-scale
irrigation project. Late in 1990 an agreement was reached between the two countries to settle Egyptian farming families on the scheme (CAABU Bulletin, January, December 1991).

### Table 2: Estimates of workers’ remittances forgone as a result of the Gulf crisis, compared with worldwide remittances in 1989 (millions of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Remittances lost</th>
<th>Total worldwide remittances (1989)</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>4,254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>150–1,400</td>
<td>627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>150–500</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupied Territories</td>
<td>80–146</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>2,662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>100–160</td>
<td>758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>100–200</td>
<td>2,010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>100–120</td>
<td>356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>40–60</td>
<td>360</td>
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<tr>
<td>Viet Nam</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>80</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** The basis for these estimates varies widely. Estimates for some countries relate solely to remittances forgone from Iraq and Kuwait, while others include losses from other Gulf states. The figure for Yemen relates mainly to remittances forgone from Saudi Arabia. The higher figure for the Occupied Territories includes remittances from Saudi Arabia, estimated at $44 million, and from other Gulf states, estimated at $29 million. The higher figures for Jordan and Lebanon include other financial assets lost or held in Kuwait or Iraq. The figures for Sudan and Viet Nam include repatriation costs.


Life for Palestinians in the territories occupied by Israel was certainly much harder than before the crisis broke. About 54,000 Palestinians are reported to have returned from Gulf states to the Occupied Territories, or to have been stranded there; of these 26,000 were said to have been working in Kuwait (UNDP November 1991). Many families relied heavily on remittances from relatives working in Kuwait. Estimates of remittances and other contributions forgone vary greatly, from $80 million to $146 million a year (The Economist, 22 September 1990; CAFOD et al. 1991; UNDP November 1991). The precarious position of Palestinian households was further exacerbated by the replacement of Palestinian workers by newly arrived Soviet Jews, who made up 90 per cent of the record 200,000 immigrants to Israel in 1990 (Cohen 1990). Unemployment among the 300,000-strong workforce in the Occupied Territories is thought to have risen to about 30 per cent by early 1991 (UNDP November 1991). By the beginning of 1991, some Palestinians were beginning to see the latest migration as a ‘third wave’ of Palestinian displacement, equivalent in its personal and socio-economic impact to the displacements of 1948 and 1967.

Elsewhere within the region and beyond the impact of mass repatriation was also severe. The return of large, though unquantified numbers of Sudanese (estimates range between 35,000 and 200,000) will have had a significant effect on that beleaguered country (ILO 1990a; ODI 1991). Estimates of the losses in remittances to Lebanon together with other assets lost vary between $150 million and $500 million, a heavy blow to a country edging towards stability after years of civil war (Mission Permanente du Liban 1990; ILO 1990a; UNDP November 1991).
The Asian countries to which migrants returned were hard hit. While a number were assisted in the repatriation of their nationals, the loss of remittances from former migrants will have been keenly felt, particularly when set against the background of other economic difficulties.

The Indian government claimed that annual remittances of $200 million could have been lost as a result of the exodus of its 180,000 nationals (the highest non-Arab total) from Iraq and Kuwait (ILO 1991b). India also bore the cost of flying home its returnees. Set against total remittances, estimated for 1989 at $2.66 billion (IMF 1990), and against GNP, the impact on the Indian economy as a whole will have been relatively small. But the impact was highly uneven regionally. Most of the returnees were from the two states of Gujarat and Kerala; in the latter, remittances may have accounted for 15 per cent of the state’s income (ODI 1991; see also Saith 1991).

Remittances from the 90-100,000 Bangladeshis formerly in Kuwait and Iraq were thought to have totalled $100-160 million a year (CAFOD et al. 1991; ILO 1990a), a sizable proportion of total remittances, estimated at $758 million in 1989 (IMF 1990). The remittances forgone by Pakistan have been estimated at between $100 and $200 million (CAFOD et al. 1991; ILO 1990a), up to 10 per cent of total remittances, estimated at $2.01 billion in 1989 (IMF 1990). However, as in India, the impact on the whole economy will have been significant but relatively small. Sri Lanka was probably worst off among the South Asian countries as a result of its mass return. Its 100,000 nationals in Kuwait were thought to send home $100-120 million annually (ODI 1991; IOM May 1991), up to one third of total remittances, estimated at $356 million in 1989, and 1.6 per cent of GNP in that year (IMF 1990; World Bank 1991). Sri Lanka was already suffering from 30 per cent inflation before the impact of oil price increases resulting from the crisis, 20 per cent unemployment, and the displacement of a million people as a result of civil war (ODI 1991; CAFOD et al. 1991; IOM May 1991).

Remittances from Kuwait to the Philippines were estimated to have totalled $40-60 million a year (ILO 1990a); total remittances in 1989 were estimated at $360 million (IMF 1990; World Bank 1991). Again, relative to the total economy these losses were small. But together with repatriation costs they were incurred when the Philippines was wilting under the impact of an earthquake and floods, political unrest, and a large foreign debt, estimated at $29 billion in 1989 (World Bank 1991). Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea and Viet Nam were among the other Asian countries suffering substantial losses in remittances among the other consequences of the Gulf conflict. The losses of Viet Nam were estimated to have totalled $379 million, mainly from remittances forgone and repatriation costs; this made Viet Nam, with Sri Lanka, the most seriously affected outside the Middle East by the impact of mass repatriation (UNDP November 1991).

(iii) Measures to assist the integration of returnees

The double impact of the loss of remittances from migrants and new calls on domestic resources to assist repatriates made measures to integrate them urgent. But while the repatriation of most migrants was achieved relatively successfully and rapidly, given the circumstances, integration into their societies and economies of return proved more problematical.

Programmes set up to assist the reintegration of returnees had limited impact. Unsurprisingly, most returnees have had to fend for themselves. Many returnees expressed their desire to seek employment abroad once again, either in the Middle East or in new destinations (Abella 1991).
Among three Asian countries investigated by the International Organization for Migration in April 1991, the Bangladesh government was found to be the most interventionist in its efforts to assist returnees. It set up a crisis management committee to oversee the repatriation and the welfare of returnees. Returnees were registered on arrival and provided with medical attention and transport. Information gathered during registration included past employment, assets left behind and arrears of pay due. A task force comprising representatives of relevant ministries was set up to oversee employment projects for returnees. A scheme to promote self-employment among 8,000 returnees was initiated, financed partly by their own savings and partly by international donations. It was hoped that this scheme - overseen by the Bangladesh Small and Cottage Industries Corporation - could be extended to encompass most of the 64,000 returnees, but it was estimated that the scheme would cost at least $250 million. There was also concern that the self-employment schemes should not be focused on returnees alone, but should be accessible to all potential small-scale entrepreneurs. However, with the restoration of the Kuwaiti government, the Bangladeshi government refocused its efforts on migrants’ return to the Gulf to retrieve assets and jobs, or on their remigration to other destinations. Indeed, 90 per cent of returnees surveyed were reported to wish to go abroad to work again (IOM May 1991).

The desire once again to seek employment abroad was echoed in other countries. According to surveys conducted among returnees to the Philippines, who were mostly female and employed in Kuwait’s service sector, more than half wished to seek employment abroad once again - even after their experiences during the exodus from the Gulf (Battistella 1991). No special institutions were set up by the government to assist in the integration of returnees; the existing Philippines Overseas Employment Administration and the Overseas Workers Welfare Association were charged with registering and assisting them. Placement of returnees in the newly industrializing countries of the Asia-Pacific area was sought by the authorities (IOM May 1991).

Surveys in Sri Lanka revealed a similar desire among returnees - again mainly female and largely employed as housemaids - to go back to the Middle East or to find other work abroad. As in the Philippines, existing bodies were called upon to assist returnees, principally the Bureau of Foreign Employment, which was responsible for overseeing Sri Lankan labour migration. The Bureau established reception centres and provided medical attention and transport. The principal intervention appeared to be training undertaken with a view to sending returnees abroad again. The government pressed for mechanisms to ensure that host countries recognized the need for proper recruitment systems, contracts and minimum wages, outward and return passage money, and guarantees against premature termination of employment (IOM May 1991). An employment-generating project for returnees was reported to have begun in Sri Lanka with the assistance of the ILO, UNDP and the Canadian International Development Agency (ILO 1991b, 1991a). But only four per cent of returnees were said to have sought assistance from the government to pursue self-employment (IOM May 1991).

The governments of these and other countries receiving large numbers of returnees approached the international community for assistance to offset the costs of the return of their nationals from the Gulf and pressed for compensation for losses their nationals had incurred. At meetings hosted by the International Labour Organisation late in 1990, representatives of Arab and Asian governments and labour organizations proposed that migrants’ losses should be registered with the ILO and that a fund should be set up to provide compensation and assist with resettlement. Missions were sent to Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, the Indian state of Kerala, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Yemen with a view to setting up resettlement and re-employment projects (ILO 1991a, 1991b). The UNDP subsequently undertook to channel funds through existing ILO-supported projects to
strengthen their capacity to reintegrate returnees in Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Vietnam (UNDP May 1991).

In the longer term, the UNDP undertook to address returnees’ needs through what it called ‘an integrated, five-year initiative for the reintegration of returnees and for sustainable human development’ (UNDP May 1991: 11). A recovery programme was drawn up with the assistance of the ILO, the IOM and other concerned agencies. The reintegration and recovery issue was approached at both regional and country levels. The regional proposal undertook to design ‘coherent job creation programmes’ comprising a familiar package of measures: training and retraining; development of small- and medium-scale enterprises; upgrading of the informal sector; encouragement of labour intensive work, particularly in infrastructure; promotion of cooperatives and similar organizations; and the targeting of specific groups such as women and youth. But the programme’s principal purpose appeared to be information-gathering and dissemination on the supply and demand of labour in the two regions (UNDP November 1991).

The country level proposals were based largely on needs expressed by the governments involved. These estimates varied greatly in scale and were under review by donors late in 1991 (UNDP November 1991). Some of the country level proposals were subsumed within measures to assist other vulnerable groups more widely. In Egypt, for example, a World Bank- and UNDP-supported programme to assist groups adversely affected by structural adjustment policies was reformulated to include migrants returning from Iraq and Kuwait (World Bank 1991a; UNDP May 1991). Efforts in Yemen to integrate returnees were also subsumed within a $245 million multi-sectoral Emergency Recovery Programme drawn up jointly by the World Bank, the UNDP, other UN agencies and the government, and launched initially with $60 million in credits and grants. The proposed programme aimed at improving and expanding infrastructure to meet new demands generated by the mass return, improving the supply of food and consumption goods, and creating employment opportunities for returnees. There were also proposals for projects in Jordan, the Occupied Territories, Sudan and Vietnam (UNDP November 1991).

Most of these proposals still awaited funding early in 1992, more than a year after the mass returns they were designed to ameliorate. The prospect of multilateral assistance appeared to have evaporated and it was left to individual governments to raise funds for the projects bilaterally.

Progress on the other main issue exercising countries receiving returnees -the issues of compensation for their returning nationals - was likewise slow. Under resolutions passed after Iraq’s defeat, the UN Security Council undertook to set up a fund to pay compensation for loss, damage or injury to foreign governments, nationals and corporations resulting from Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait. Early in August 1991, one year after the invasion, the governing body of the UN Compensation Commission sat in Geneva to develop mechanisms and set guidelines to compensate individuals for losses sustained as a result of the Gulf crisis (UN Security Council August 1991; Le Monde, 15 August 1991; UNDP November 1991). Part of the reparations programme in which Iraq was obliged to participate under UN resolutions, the compensation was to be financed by 30 per cent of the proceeds from UN-supervised Iraqi oil sales. Under the scheme individuals, including migrant workers, were to be able to claim $2,500 on presentation of documentation indicating the date of departure from Iraq or Kuwait; larger amounts could be claimed by those who could prove injury, death of a family member, medical expenses and transport costs incurred, or loss of assets, housing or personal property. Small claims were to be given priority. Up to two million claimants were anticipated in all, which it was thought could result in claims totalling $5 billion (UN Security Council August and October 1991).
Welcome though this might have been for migrants who had suffered losses, quick settlement was most unlikely. Those seeking compensation were to make their claims through the government of their country of origin or nationality, although the Commission recognized that some groups, like the Palestinians, could not pursue this course and might claim though UN or other international organizations. Both courses were likely to be extremely time-consuming. More important, since Iraq refused to comply with UN conditions for oil sales, as of early 1992 there were no means to finance any compensation.

Settlement of this issue, together with the accelerated release of foreign nationals’ assets held in Kuwait and Iraq, could release substantial private funds to returnees. Such an injection of capital could prove crucial for the beleaguered economies to which migrants have returned and may well assist the recovery of those economies rather more effectively than the interventions proposed by the UNDP and other international agencies.

6. The impact of the mass return on Jordan

Jordan’s position was different in several important respects from other countries that received displaced people during the crisis. As was described above, it was obliged to be the country of transit for ‘third country’ displaced migrant workers and professionals en route to their home countries. In addition to temporarily accommodating these evacuees, Jordan had to cope with up to 300,000 of its own nationals or document-holders from Kuwait, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states.

Without diminishing the serious impact of mass return on other countries of the region and beyond, the impact on Jordan of the latter influx was particularly severe. First, unlike those returning to other countries, who were mainly of working age, the returnees to Jordan included a large proportion of dependents, putting strain on both private and public sources of welfare services: return of students in particular put severe pressure on Jordan’s educational system. Second, many of the ‘returnees’, although carrying Jordanian documents, had been away for most of their lives or had even been born and brought up abroad; according to one estimate, 90 per cent of the ‘returnees’ had been away for more then ten years, 43 per cent for more than 20 years, and nearly a quarter had migrated before the early 1960s (UN ESCWA 1991). This meant that they had limited direct experience of or links with Jordan (they shared this feature with many of the returnees to Yemen); indeed, the term ‘returnee’ is a misnomer for many of those displaced, since they could not be said to be returning to a homeland that they knew. Third, unlike other countries, Jordan had to cope with several waves or surges of return, the two peaks being in the period after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and in the period after the restoration of the al-Sabah regime in 1991. Fourth, while Jordan was far from unique in being beset by economic difficulties before the mass return, in 1990 it already accommodated the highest ratio of refugees to indigenous population in the world - nearly one in four of Jordan’s population of four million were recognized as refugees (US Committee for Refugees 1991). Some of these issues are amplified in the remainder of this section which draws on a research visit by the author to Jordan in April 1991 and on some preliminary surveys and observations of the returnee population.

(i) The socio-economic character of the returnees

The ‘returnees’ to Jordan were not a homogenous group. They held various forms of citizenship or nationality, and therefore of claims to rights of residence, work and access to social services (Graham-Brown 1991). They also varied in terms of occupation and socio-economic status, ranging from bank managers and professionals, to labourers and impoverished widows (UN
ESCWA 1991; Committee for aiding Jordanian and Palestinian expatriates 1991). They were more heterogeneous than most of the other returnee populations from the Middle East.

This diversity was reflected in the range of ages of the returnee population. As was indicated above, unlike other returnees, Arab and Asian, who were predominantly of working age, a large proportion of the returnees to Jordan were dependents. This is not surprising given that the Jordanians and Palestinians in Kuwait formed a foreign resident community rather than a population of adult migrant workers without their families. A survey conducted in April 1991 by Jordan’s National Centre for Educational Research and Development (NCERD) encompassing 42,500 students - and representing in all 16,500 families and 100,000 persons - found that 44 per cent of returnees were under 15 years of age (NCERD 1991; see also UN ESCWA 1991). These findings are supported by ILO estimates of the proportion of economically active and dependent persons among Jordanians and Egyptians in Kuwait and Iraq before the invasion: there were said to be a total of 115,000 economically active persons, as against 422,000 family members. The corresponding figures for the Egyptian migrant population were 1,030,000 and 85,000, and for nationals of the Philippines 48,000 and 7,000 (ILO 1991b; see table 1, above). The proportion of family members among the mid-1991 wave of returnees was as high or higher (Graham-Brown 1991).

Contrary to popular perception which ascribed wealth to all returning expatriates, substantial numbers were poor. The NCERD survey found that one third of returnee families fell below what was considered the poverty line (NCERD 1991). Another survey found that 10 per cent of returnees were in poverty, and 35 per cent were said to have no savings to draw upon. The remaining 55 per cent of returnees had varying amounts of savings in Kuwaiti banks, but many were unable to retrieve these savings or were exhausting them. Widows formerly dependent on pension entitlements derived from their husbands’ work in Kuwait were said to be among the most destitute of the returnees (Committee for aiding expatriates 1991). Those who arrived in 1991 were probably still worse off. While some in the first wave of flight had access to property in Jordan, this was much less the case for those who left Kuwait after the al-Sabah restoration.

(ii) Accommodation of returnees and immediate assistance

The accommodation of returning Jordanian nationals and document-holders in 1990 was partly ameliorated by the fact that perhaps 20 per cent were on holiday in Jordan visiting relatives at the time of the invasion of Kuwait (UN ESCWA 1991); they were thus involuntarily stranded people, rather than forced repatriates. Meeting the immediate needs of other and later returnees drew largely upon private resources, with assistance from charitable organizations, several of which turned their attention from third country nationals to Jordanian ‘returnees’ once the immediate crisis of 1990 was over. Many returnees stayed with relatives; some were able to rent accommodation, but others were accommodated in mosques or churches, or were obliged to sleep on balconies or in cars (Committee for aiding expatriates 1991).

A Committee for aiding Jordanian and Palestinian expatriates was set up under the umbrella of the General Union of Voluntary Societies (GUVS) to assist returnees with their immediate needs. Comprising largely returnees themselves, the committee attempted to register the circumstances of returnees, raised funds for them, periodically distributed small amounts of cash, loans and aid packages to them, and made representations to the government on their behalf. The GUVS office was daily crowded with large numbers of people requesting help. Other local and international voluntary bodies also offered assistance.
Immediate government assistance took the form of admitting more than 50,000 pupils to already overcrowded schools, providing health care, granting exemptions from import duty and postponing some taxes - all of which must have put pressure on already strained resources and revenues (Committee for aiding expatriates 1991; *Jordan Times*, 24 April 1991). Subsequently, a committee drawing on senior officials of the relevant ministries was set up; it was assigned the responsibility of dealing with the immediate and longer term problems generated by the mass return (UN ESCWA 1991).

(iii) Impact of returnees on the labour market

About a quarter of the 300,000 people estimated to have returned to Jordan in 1990-1991 were thought to have been of working age. Although this was a low proportion of people of working age compared with other returnee populations, the return is thought to have increased the number of Jordan’s unemployed by about 50 per cent. Unemployment was already rising before the Gulf crisis, as the economy contracted. Before the crisis, the Jordanian labour force was thought to number 630,000 (excluding foreign workers), of whom 106,000 were unemployed, giving an unemployment rate of just under 17 per cent. After the war, with the port of Aqaba at a standstill as a result of the embargo and the loss of markets abroad (particularly that of Iraq), the impact of the recession on employment accelerated. Unemployed returnees were thought to number 58,000, adding a further eight per cent to the unemployment rate; other estimates suggest a higher rate of up to 30 per cent (UN ESCWA 1991; UNDP November 1991).

Some returnees found jobs rapidly, although many in occupations for which they were overqualified, such as in hotels, restaurants and the service sector. Some returning professionals, such as doctors and engineers, managed to set up their own businesses. But there was insufficient suitable employment in Jordan to absorb large numbers of well-qualified and skilled people (UN ESCWA 1991).

Government initiatives to deal with the impact of the returnees on the labour market appear to have taken two main directions. First, it was suggested that a development and employment fund, launched in 1990 to encourage small businesses and to supplement income of the poor, should be extended to cover needy returnees. Second, it was argued that the employment of foreign nationals might be reduced by tightening up on the immigration of foreign workers into Jordan (UN ESCWA 1991).

The first initiative, involving measures like job creation and the encouragement of small businesses, was limited by the scarce resources available. Jordan was among the first of the countries affected to make representations to the ILO for assistance, pursuing this at two meetings of labour ministers in Geneva and Bangkok. But, as of the end of 1991, Jordan had received no such assistance, largely, it was believed, because of the country’s perceived stand during the Gulf crisis.

The second approach, that of ‘indigenizing’ employment by tightening immigration control, reflected Jordan’s position as both an importer and an exporter of labour. Jordan’s borders with Egypt and Syria have only been loosely controlled, and there has been substantial labour migration from these countries, particularly in the second half of the 1970s and early 1980s when foreign labour was needed in Jordan (Smadi et al. 1986). As elsewhere, these migrant workers accepted lower wages and poorer conditions than would Jordanians. As unemployment rose, however, pressure increased to conserve employment for Jordanians; this was exacerbated by the return of expatriates.
In recent years, the absolute number of foreign workers in Jordan appears to have increased marginally, while the proportion of them in the total workforce has declined. In 1984 there were just over 153,500 foreign workers in Jordan, accounting for about 35 per cent of the total workforce; at the beginning of that year foreign workers were obliged to secure an annual work permit before taking up a vacancy (Smadi et al. 1986). In May 1991 there were said to be 165,000 foreign workers in Jordan, adding about 25 per cent to the indigenous labour force in Jordan (UN ESCWA 1991); about a quarter of the foreigners were reported not to hold valid work permits (Jordan Times, 1 and 4 May 1991). The requirement for foreigners to hold work permits may in future be more strictly applied (UN ESCWA 1991). If implemented, the strategy of reducing dependence on foreign labour would have further consequences for the pattern of migration in the Middle East, and would be yet another dimension of the complex displacements set in motion by the Gulf crisis.

(iv) Impact on social services and resources

After the loss of remittances and its effect on employment, the most significant impact of the mass return was increased pressure on educational services. The education system was already in the process of reform when it had to absorb another 57,000 pupils (bin Talal 1991; UNRWA April 1991). The NCERD survey found that 80 per cent of returnee students were enrolled in government schools, 12.5 per cent in private schools, and 7.5 per cent in UNRWA schools (NCERD 1991).

One curious feature of the impact of the mass return was the lack of large scale extra calls on UNRWA’s resources, for it is likely that at least some of the returnees would have had claims on UNRWA for its services. UNRWA noted an increase of just 2,500 in take-up of its school places. However there was greater demand for UNRWA’s health services. Visits to UNRWA clinics were said to have doubled. Not all of the take-up was by returnees, but it reflected the greater impoverishment of those formerly dependent on remittances from Kuwait, who were now having to look after returning relatives as well as themselves (UNRWA 1991).

The mass return also had impacts on food supply and prices, housing and water supply. The return put strain on the supply of foodstuffs subsidized by the government. Rents were reported to have been pushed high by the influx of Jordanian returnees and later by relatively well-off Iraqis seeking refuge in Jordan. The mass return exacerbated an already serious and chronic water shortage; almost all of the returnees were reported to have concentrated in and around Amman, Zarqa and Irbid, bringing the population of that area to nearly two million and the demand for water to beyond the capacity to supply it (Graham-Brown 1991; UN ESCWA 1991; UNDP November 1991).

(v) Longer term potential benefits of the mass return

Although the short- and medium-term consequences have been negative and disruptive, there may be some benefits for Jordan of the mass return. First, it has meant that large numbers of professional and skilled people will enter Jordan’s labour market, which is likely ultimately to be beneficial even if they cannot all be absorbed at once. The NCERD survey found that 15 per cent of the returnees held university degrees, including substantial numbers with qualifications in engineering, medicine and health (NCERD 1991). The Jordanian and Palestinian communities in Gulf states are thought to have had a higher level of education than the Jordanian national average, with more than 50 per cent having pursued secondary education and beyond (UN ESCWA 1991).
Second, the return has meant that there has been an inflow of resources into Jordan (UN ESCWA 1991). After the al-Sabah restoration, the Kuwaiti authorities eventually began to lift restrictions on the repatriation of deposits in Kuwaiti banks. One estimate put Jordanian and Palestinian assets and bank holdings in Kuwait at $2.9 billion (UNDP November 1991). Even if this is a wild overestimate, the inflow of capital into Jordan was still likely to be substantial. If all capital had been released at once the inflationary impact could have been severe; in the event bureaucratic obstacles to the release of these funds may have been a blessing in disguise, at the macro-economic level at least, if not for the individuals concerned.

Whether the incoming funds will be used to invest in long-term employment-generating production or rather in so-called less productive uses such as building remains to be seen. Returnees were reported late in April to have bought up shares on the stock exchange as short-term investments. The Trade Ministry claimed to be dealing with 70 enquiries daily from returnees about investment opportunities (Jordan Times 25 and 29 April 1991). The NCERD survey found that nearly one fifth of the returnees sampled wished to invest in small to medium-scale businesses - mainly commercial, but also industrial and agricultural ventures (NCERD 1991).

This private investment, if realized, is likely to have a much greater impact on the reintegration of returnees - and ultimately on the Jordanian economy as a whole - than would the intervention of the international agencies proposed so far. But substantial investment of this kind depends on the building of sufficient confidence among those returnees with capital (UN ESCWA 1991) - and that in turn depends greatly on developments in the wider regional political and economic arena.

III. CONCLUSION: POLICY AND PROSPECTS

This paper concludes by attempting to relate the two episodes of mass exodus and repatriation examined in part two to the characterization advanced in part one. It summarizes some of the main features of the West African and Middle Eastern cases, and then turns to the policy options and machinery currently available to deal with such events. The paper concludes with some speculation on the future course of such episodes.

1. Features of recent involuntary mass repatriation in West Africa and the Middle East

The cases examined illustrate that the immediate impact of a mass return on a country receiving returnees is determined not just by the scale of a return but by its timing. Such mass returns are sudden and they are usually unanticipated. They tend to occur in surges and it is this feature that may put so much strain on the resources of countries that receive returnees. Where surges of arrivals are repeated, as was the case in Jordan, the impact may be the more keenly felt.

The cases reviewed bear out the observation made in part one that the terms ‘migrant’ and ‘alien’ may obscure great differences among the populations described by them. The composition of some of the returnee populations reviewed reflects a diversity which is glossed over by the use of such terminology. Such populations may include people of widely diverse occupations and socio-economic backgrounds. They may include a wide range of age groups. They may include both short-term sojourners and people who have been abroad so long that they have lost any material links with their countries of origin - and for whom the term ‘returnee’ is thus invalid. Such factors obviously shape the impact of mass repatriations on countries receiving ‘returnees’. They should also shape policies designed to assist or integrate them.
While immediate assistance has been targeted towards returnees, medium-term assistance has often been directed through programmes with a wider, macro-level purpose, such as those designed to ameliorate the socio-economic effects on vulnerable groups of structural adjustment programmes. This was the case in Ghana in the 1980s, and is planned to be the case in Egypt, Jordan, Yemen and other countries in the 1990s. This approach has the advantage of equity, avoiding suggestions of preferential treatment for returnees, and of congruence with overall development objectives (whatever one might think of such objectives). But it also carries the danger, in terms of funding, that no additional resources are made available to cover additional needs generated by returnees; this danger is compounded by the mistaken view - perhaps a case of wishful thinking - that once ‘returnees’ are back in their country of origin or nationality all problems are resolved. Incidentally, aggregating returnees within the general population also makes measurement of their medium to long term contribution and fate very difficult - and thus also makes research on returnees difficult to carry out.

The episodes explored also illustrate that since official interventions, national and international, rarely touch directly more than a small proportion of repatriates, close attention should be paid to migrants’ own initiatives to get home, to resettle themselves and then to find or create employment, at home or abroad. Most returnees fall outside the assistance net. In the episodes examined above, the majority of returnees made their own way home and relied on their own or relatives’ resources to resettle. Only a minority were able or wished to benefit from the interventions of state or outside agencies to find or create employment.

One of the principal forms of returnees’ self-organized activity has been to seek employment abroad again - taking up once more what Galbraith has called ‘escape from the equilibrium of poverty’ (Galbraith 1979: 103). Both West African returnees and those who returned from Kuwait and Iraq have taken up the ‘exit’ or ‘escape’ option again in substantial numbers. Many Ghanaian expellees returned to Nigeria, as evidenced by the subsequent repeat expulsion in 1985, although it should be noted that this involved smaller numbers than the 1983 exodus. Many Egyptian, South Asian and Filipino migrants have opted for return to their former countries of work, have sought new opportunities, or have expressed the wish to do so.

Countries faced with sudden, large returnee populations may take some comfort from the experience of other countries that have found that in the longer term such mass returns do not turn out to be damaging, but can be ultimately beneficial. Several of the countries affected by mass returns in 1990-1991 might draw useful - and perhaps heartening - lessons from Ghana’s experience in the early 1980s, where the mass return of about a million migrants appears to have been followed by a positive turnaround in the country’s economy. Could countries experiencing mass repatriations in the 1990s hope for a similar outcome, given that the returns are on about the same scale? The return to Yemen was about the same size and was as sudden as that to Ghana; the country appears to have absorbed most of its returnees, in much the same way as they were absorbed in Ghana in 1983. While Yemen’s economy was in a parlous state and many returnees remained in severe straits, the mass return could eventually turn to the country’s advantage. The mass return to Jordan was proportionately about the same as that to Ghana, but it was differently composed and was more drawn out than in the Ghanaian case. While Jordan’s economy was in poor shape before the crisis, it was not in such dire straits as was that of Ghana in the early 1980s; the return to Jordan of skilled people and substantial capital - of which there is already some evidence - could eventually be beneficial. Egypt’s mass return, though large, was both absolutely and relatively less than that to Ghana, and many Egyptian migrants were able to find work abroad again quite quickly. The immediate impact of mass return on other Arab and Asian countries may
be very severe - particularly on countries like Sri Lanka - but they may also eventually be able to
draw some comfort from the Ghanaian case.

Realising the potential of the mass returns to each of these countries will only be
accomplished if the right macro-level conditions can be created to assist repatriates to resettle or
reintegrate themselves. It is in this area that the contribution of the international community would
be most usefully addressed, a contribution arguably more effective than the design of employment-
generating projects and other measures that benefit only limited numbers of returnees.

Finally, the ‘knock-on’ effects of mass repatriations of this kind should be noted. As
reflections of deteriorating international relations or of regional instability, mass expulsions tend to
provoke retaliation. Such action may take place some time after the initial episode; thus Ghana’s
expulsion of Nigerians and others in the late 1960s was cited in connection with the Nigerian
expulsions of the early 1980s. A mass repatriation may also have an impact on the foreign
population of the country receiving new arrivals. Thus Jordan appeared in 1991 to be reconsidering
its relatively relaxed policy towards its foreign workforce after receiving returnees totalling twice
their number. If implemented, this would illustrate the ripple effect of mass displacement: the
arrival of one group of displaced people can lead to the displacement of other groups with a less
than secure position in the country of arrival.

2. Involuntary mass exodus of migrants and aliens: the international response

As increased mobility worldwide has shifted rapidly up the international agenda, concern
has concomitantly grown about categories of forced migrant who fall outside the current refugee or
migration ‘regime’ - that is, the configuration of international organizations and legislation charged
with protecting and assisting involuntarily displaced people. The issue of those displaced within
their own countries has recently been addressed (see, for example, Keely 1991). Migrant workers
and alien communities obliged to flee their countries of work or residence have not received
commensurate attention. Mass exodus of migrants and aliens of the kind explored in this paper has
been of only peripheral concern in international forums and has not won the attention it deserves
from those proposing reform of the forced migration ‘regime’.

As has been observed before (ICIHI 1986: 94; IBHI 1988: 73), the international community
has had no institutional arrangements to deal specifically with mass expulsions, nor has any
international instrument been developed to prevent or regulate their implementation; the same
applies to the related forms of mass exodus considered in this paper. However, there have recently
been developments which may lead to the resolution of some of these shortcomings in the
international forced migration ‘regime’. This section reviews the legal and organizational
arrangements that have impinged on episodes of mass exodus, and explores whether recent
measures to improve those arrangements will be successful.

(i) Legal aspects

The expulsion of nationals is illegal under international law; it amounts to the creation of
refugees. States have the right to expel foreigners, but opinions differ as to whether mass expulsion
is lawful or not. There are certainly constraints in international law on the exercise of the power of
expulsion. During such episodes states are required to allow due process of law and due regard to
human rights; because they almost inevitably violate such principles, mass expulsions are arguably
illegal under international law. Mass expulsion is implicitly prohibited under the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and a number of more recent instruments specifically prohibit it,
although these instruments are constrained by problems of definition and ratification (Goodwin-Gill 1978; ICIHI 1986; IBHI 1988).

In the event of a mass exodus, the assumption is that the state of nationality bears responsibility for protection, reception and assistance of people obliged to leave (IBHI 1988). However, protection of certain categories of people is governed by specific instruments; in particular, special rules apply to refugees, stateless persons and situations of armed conflict. Migrant workers come under various conventions and resolutions of the International Labour Organisation, some of which make passing reference to mass expulsion; for example, the Migrant Workers’ Convention of 1975 (No. 143) refers to rights of appeal in the event of threatened expulsion.

Significant further progress appears to have been made recently regarding the protection of migrant workers. An International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, supplementing and extending existing ILO conventions and under consideration since the early 1980s, was passed by the UN General Assembly in December 1990 (UN General Assembly 1990). Article 22 of the new convention refers explicitly to mass expulsion: ‘Migrant workers and members of their families shall not be subject to measures of collective expulsion’ (UN General Assembly 1990, Article 22.1). However the convention concedes the legality of individual expulsion, given due process of law (Article 22.2). A number of other provisions, including the right to transfer earnings, savings, personal effects and belongings at the end of a stay (Article 32), are also relevant to those caught up in involuntary mass departures.

While this convention represents an advance in the principle of protection for migrant workers in relation to forced mass exodus (and the upholding and extension of other rights), there remain many hurdles of ratification and implementation to be overcome (Hune and Niessen 1991; World Council of Churches 1991). Furthermore, while the convention addresses the prevention or containment of involuntary mass exodus, further attention needs to be paid to the legal basis of mechanisms of compensation for individuals and countries affected by such episodes.

(ii) Organizational aspects

As is apparent from part two of this paper, a wide range of international organizations can become involved in episodes of mass exodus. Until recently, the Office of the UN Disaster Relief Co-ordinator (UNDRO) has been the only UN body charged exclusively with disaster management, and has been called upon in a number of episodes of mass exodus, even though it has been concerned primarily with natural disasters (ICIHI 1986). UNDRO has had memoranda of understanding with other international agencies and local representation through the resident representatives of the UN Development Programme (IBHI 1988). The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) may become involved in situations of armed conflict involving mass exodus. The UNHCR has intervened in cases where refugees are involved, and the ILO in episodes involving migrant workers. Among the other agencies that have intervened in such episodes are the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Food Programme, the World Health Organization, the International Organization for Migration, the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and numerous other non-governmental organizations. However, as in other humanitarian emergencies, practice has lacked consistency and co-ordination (IBHI 1988).

Co-ordination could theoretically derive from committees or other organs established by the UN General Assembly or the Security Council, although the record is not encouraging. A more
positive source of co-ordination has been the Office of the UN Secretary General itself, whose appointment of ‘special representatives’, and more recently ‘executive delegates’, to cover particular emergencies is now established practice. Regional organizations, some of which have mechanisms of dispute resolution, might be a source of independent or complementary activity to prevent, ameliorate or relieve the effects of mass exodus (IBHI 1988).

Longstanding disquiet at the lack of co-ordination among components of the international emergency system eventually generated a call by the UN Economic and Social Council for ‘a United Nations system-wide review to assess the experience and capacity of various organizations in the co-ordination of assistance to all refugees, displaced persons and returnees, and the full spectrum of their needs’ (UN Economic and Social Council 1990). After considerable debate (see for example Cuenod 1991; Urquhart and Childers 1990; Childers and Urquhart 1991), a Department of Humanitarian Affairs was set up within the UN to strengthen and co-ordinate the organizations that deal with emergencies (UN General Assembly 1991). Headed by an Under-Secretary-General, the DHA was allocated substantial resources earmarked for rapid disbursement in the event of humanitarian crises, and began functioning early in 1992.

The debate that led to the establishment of the DHA acknowledged the need for a system that encompassed people who fall outside the international refugee or migration ‘regime’; however in the course of the discussion little attention was paid to the categories of forced migrant that have been considered in this paper. One discussant briefly considered what he called ‘externally displaced persons’ and ‘returnees’ to their countries of origin, but did not consider mass exodus of migrants or aliens explicitly (Cuenod 1991: 34 and 36). Another contribution mentioned ‘people missed in UN mandates’ (Childers and Urquhart 1991: 48-50), but confined remarks largely to internally displaced persons. A reformed international emergency system should explicitly include migrants and alien communities obliged to leave en masse, if for no other reason than that their numbers are likely to increase, as is argued in the final section.

It is also important that the new system extends continuity of co-ordination to reintegration and rehabilitation in the receiving countries, functions which have until recently been largely the province of the UNDP, the IOM, the ILO and non-government organizations. As the cases examined above show, it is during this stage that international interest in an episode of mass exodus tends to wane, often with serious consequences for the countries and people affected. Other calls for emergency assistance may well be pressing, but a long-term view is needed to implement reintegration of those who have returned to their country of origin or nationality; failure to do so may merely store up problems for the future. Hopefully the new Department of Humanitarian Affairs will be able to incorporate such a long-term view. Given that such national and international interventions as are implemented touch only a minority of returnees, as was argued above, longer term assistance might be best deployed in helping to create the conditions for returnees to resettle or reintegrate themselves.

3. Future mass exodus of migrant workers and alien communities

The forms of mass exodus considered in this paper are a manifestation of two contemporary global trends: the restructuring of the international labour market and the recrudescence of ethnic nationalism in the context of the emergence or reconstitution of nation-states. By the restructuring of the international labour market is meant changes in the pattern of production and in its global distribution - and the consequences of such changes for migrant labour. By the recrudescence of ethnic nationalism is meant the tendency, particularly noticeable currently in parts of East and
Central Europe, for the ‘homogenization’ of ethnic populations within a particular nation-state - with sombre implications for minorities and ‘alien’ communities.

Changes in patterns of production may mean that demand for migrant labour as conventionally conceived may decline - even in relatively new poles of attraction like the Middle East and the Asian newly-industrializing countries - in favour of new types of migrant, such as the ‘transient professionals’ and entrepreneurs identified in recent commentary on migration trends (see for example, Appleyard 1991). If so, further shake-outs of migrant labour may be expected, which, when combined with political instability or configurations of the circumstances outlined earlier in this paper, may result in forced exodus en masse. There have also been spatial shifts in the international division of labour as new or reconstituted regional political economies have emerged in Europe, North America, East Asia and elsewhere. These shifts have been reflected in changes in migrant labour patterns (Appleyard 1991; Abella 1991), which may also result in the forms of mass exodus examined above. If, as appears to be the trend, regulation of migration is in future attempted at the regional level - as is conceived by the European Community, for example - future migrant worker mass exodus may be manifest less from individual nation-states than from the regional groupings that have emerged in recent years.

This paper has concentrated on the mass exodus of migrant workers and to a lesser extent on that of resident foreigners. In previous commentary on the expulsion of alien communities, the present writer suggested:

While it would be unwise to suggest that no more expulsions of ethnic ‘middleman minorities’ [or of other alien communities] are likely, it may be the case that the achievement of independence by most countries, and their subsequent consolidation, removes one of the pretexts for such episodes: ‘alien’ minorities are now less likely to be expelled in the name of ‘nation-building’ (IBHI 1988: 57).

In view of recent developments in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, this prediction has proved premature. The world appears to be on the verge of a new wave of nation-state building - or at least of nation-state reconstitution. This is likely to entail more mass movements of minorities as the populations of new or reconstituted nation-states are ‘homogenized’ under the impetus of resurgent nationalism. For this reason if for no other, the international community should heed the recent history of mass exodus of alien and minority communities as much as that of migrant workers.
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