The Gendered Impacts of Liberalization: Towards “Embedded Liberalism”?  

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Introduction

In the last two decades economic policies have reflected a drive for accelerated global economic integration (“globalization”), which is usually associated with greater economic liberalization, both internationally and within national economies. Components of the liberalization agenda have included trade and financial liberalization, deflationary macroeconomic policies, fiscal restraint, privatization of state-owned enterprises, labour market liberalization, and the introduction of market principles (“quasi markets”) into public management and the provisioning of public services. While the orthodox prescriptions may have ended hyperinflation, the costs of doing so are now widely perceived to have been unacceptable, in terms of falling wages, rising poverty, sharp declines in employment and rising inequality, not to mention the shifting of the burden of social reproduction onto households and families, in particular women and girls who shoulder a disproportionate share of the unpaid care work that is necessary for household reproduction.1

In the late 1980s, as a response to mounting criticisms and public protests, global policy pronouncements became less assertive about the imperative of cutting social spending, more apologetic about the imposition of user fees on public services, and began to acknowledge that social policy could have a positive role to play in the development process.

The 1990s were marked by financial crises which wreaked havoc with the real economies and livelihoods of people in countries as diverse as Mexico, the Republic of Korea and Russia. The 1997 Asian financial crisis was a defining moment which prompted the Group of Seven (G7) to request the World Bank to formulate “social principles” and “good practice of social policy” as a guide to policy makers worldwide (Holzmann and Jorgensen 2000:2). Some of the subsequent work on social protection within the World Bank was reflected in its World Development Report:
"Attacking Poverty" (World Bank 2000), which identified “social risk management” (SRM) as the most sustainable basis for coping with risk and reducing the vulnerability of the poor. In the SRM approach, which was subsequently adopted by other multilateral lending agencies, the state was expected to provide “risk management instruments where the private sector fails”, in addition to social safety nets for risk-coping for the most vulnerable (Holzmann and Jorgensen 2000:18, my emphasis). The continuities with the earlier generation of residual safety nets were unmistakable, re-confirming that social security should no longer reside solely with the state and shifting a greater share of the responsibility for its provision to the market and to families and individuals who now had to make their own provisions against risk.

The post-Washington consensus thus seemed to embrace some of the concerns that had been hitherto voiced by critics, such as poverty reduction, social protection and “good governance”, yet without abandoning the neoliberal basics centred on economic liberalization, fiscal restraint, and a nimble state that facilitates the integration of people into the market. Indeed, there seems to be widespread adherence today to the view that if neoliberal globalization (that is, economic liberalization, both domestic and external) is to stay on course, then it must be “tamed” or “embedded” (Ruggie 2003) through social policies and anti-poverty programmes which have mushroomed across a wide range of countries over the past decade or so.

The concept of “embedded liberalism”, as we explain later, was initially coined by Ruggie (1982) to refer to the institutional arrangements put in place after the Second World War in many Western capitalist countries, to share the costs of open markets, through social protection and other forms of intervention (such as wage restraint by trade unions in return for employment creation on the part of capital). The notion drew on Karl Polanyi’s (1957) ground-breaking analysis of the “double movement” in the early years of industrialization in Britain—how the social disruptions brought about by unregulated market forces, or the “disembedding” of markets from society, gave rise to the need for a “counter-movement” to bring markets under societal control. These concepts feature regularly in the writings of those concerned about the social ramifications of deregulated markets in the present era (Standing 1999a, Ruggie 2003), but they are rarely used to draw attention to the gender dimensions of liberalized markets and the quest for re-embedding them (Kabeer 2007).
This volume seeks to address this lacuna by providing a gendered account of liberalization policies and their impacts, beginning in Part One with the rural economies of sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and Latin America and moving on to the urban informal economies in Part Two. Part Three provides a detailed account of some of the current efforts being made in a variety of countries to respond to the social dislocations caused by economic liberalization, by putting in place social assistance and anti-poverty measures. Here the chapters pose two cross-cutting questions. First, what assumptions about women’s and men’s roles and gender relations underpin these efforts? And second, how are these programmes in turn entrenching and/or disrupting existing gender relations and inequalities?

**Agrarian Restructuring**

The economic crisis of the early 1980s was diagnosed by the international financial institutions to stem from heavy state involvement in the economy. The agricultural sector, it was argued, was a prime victim of state-directed economic regimes marked by “urban bias”: the heavy drainage of agricultural surplus through forced indirect taxation depressed farming incomes and led to the poor performance of the agricultural sector. The “distortions” introduced by state policy were to be corrected by letting market forces determine product and input prices and the terms of trade between agriculture and the rest of the economy, while tenure insecurity was to be tackled through land titling (World Bank 1989). These standard measures, it was argued, would restore agricultural export growth and improve rural incomes and livelihoods. At the same time, cutbacks in public expenditure outlays on agricultural input subsidies, marketing boards, and research and extension services were prescribed and justified on the grounds that state expenditure needed to be significantly lowered and that the benefits were, in any case, either being captured by big farmers or squandered by state officials.

There followed two decades of extensive experimentation with the liberalization of the agricultural sector, through the removal of guaranteed prices and export crop controls, the dismantling or cutting back on public provisioning to farmers (marketing, credit, inputs, infrastructure and other services), and the boost given to corporate farming for export. The three chapters in Part One of this volume—chapter 2 on sub-Saharan Africa by Ann Whitehead, chapter 3 on India by Cecile Jackson and
Growth, poverty and inequality

In both sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia a high proportion of the economically active population (63 and 57 per cent, respectively) continue to be engaged in agriculture, and agriculture constitutes a significant proportion (27 per cent in 2000) of the gross domestic product (GDP). Latin America, by contrast, is far more urbanized with close to one-fifth (21 per cent) of the economically active population engaged in agriculture and the sector contributing no more than one-tenth of the GDP, although the sector’s contribution to export earnings (at 44 per cent) is not far behind sub-Saharan Africa’s (at 52 per cent) (see table 1.1 in Appendix).

After two decades of experimentation with liberalization policies, overall growth rates in most African economies remain low (with some fluctuations, and the exception of recent growth spurts due to rising commodity prices), and the impact on poverty at best patchy, if not negligible. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s as liberalization progressed, sub-Saharan Africa witnessed the steady decline of its agricultural exports as a share of world agricultural trade, while the problems surrounding food production and security remained unresolved.

What has liberalization actually involved in countries such as Tanzania and Malawi? In the early stages, guaranteed prices were removed for food crops, and the state marketing boards which governed production and trade in major agricultural products, and provided subsidies, inputs and pan-territorial pricing, were weakened if not dismantled. Later in the liberalization process, the removal of export crop controls exposed farmers to both the fluctuations in world commodity prices, and competition with producers in other parts of the world enjoying more favourable production regimes. Adding to this battery of policies for the agricultural sector, have been policy
incentives for the promotion of high-value horticultural export products (cut flowers, vegetables) often through medium and large-scale enterprises (in countries like Kenya, Uganda, Zimbabwe, South Africa) and tourism, and the imposition of user fees on public health and education services. All of these policies and responses to them have had gender differentiated features and outcomes to which we turn below.

In many places private traders and private systems of credit provision have not emerged to fill the gap left by state withdrawal, and where they have they do not often reach farmers in remote areas (given the cost), nor do private sources of credit easily reach poor farmers. Deteriorating household food security in Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe in the late 1990s were attributed to the loss of subsidies for fertilizers and seeds and of rural credit, and the erosion of agricultural marketing services, especially in remote areas (Abalu and Hassin 1999). The situation of cashew farmers in Tanzania and Mozambique, described in some detail by Whitehead, clearly illustrates how farming households have had to adjust to the fluctuations of world commodity prices over a short period.

The liberalization of the agricultural sector in India, which came later (in 1991) than the reforms in sub-Saharan Africa, entailed some similar policy elements but interwoven with national specificities. The Indian reforms have stressed reduced state provision of extension services, institutional credit, irrigation and price support systems. At the same time the removal of quantitative restrictions and the opening up to global trade has exposed some major agricultural products (tea, coffee, cotton and rice) to global prices which were falling steadily between 1995 and 2001 (Patnaik 2003). Millions of foodgrain producers too were facing competition from exceptionally low-priced foreign grain (Patnaik 2003).

Agricultural growth rates in the 1990s were sluggish (around 2 per cent per annum), especially when compared with the strong growth record of the Indian economy as a whole. Public investment in agriculture (on irrigation and flood control) has been low and declining, and there is general stagnation in agriculture and in agricultural employment. While the record on poverty remains contested, there is consensus that inequality has increased (across regions, across rural-urban divides, and across occupational categories), and that food security is a serious issue for some segments of the rural population. A comparison of food consumption data (for 1993–1994 and 1999–2000) confirms worsening nutritional standards over the decade, in the midst of a highly controversial government effort to reform the Public Distribution
System (PDS) which provided subsidized food items to the population. The 1990s saw swift increases in issue prices (price at which government sells grain) to match the rises in the procurement price (price at which government purchases grain); and targeting was introduced which narrowed access to subsidized food items. As a result of these measures, sales from PDS declined and government food stocks have mounted. Critics fear that targeting has led to the exclusion of a large number of people suffering from food deficits, who are not classified as “poor” according to the criteria introduced for determining eligibility to PDS.

For much of Latin America, during the 1980s—the first reform decade—the growth rate veered widely; this crisis-ridden period also saw an overall increase in poverty, from 41 to 48 per cent of all households. During the 1990s agricultural growth averaged only 2.2 per cent. Poverty indices improved, but only at a laggardingly pace, so that Latin America entered the new millennium with a higher proportion of poor and indigent rural people than in 1980. At the same time, the economic reforms have reinforced the existing inequalities across regions, producers and products. The sectors that have experienced dynamism and growth are the non-traditional export crops (NTEC) (livestock, fruits and vegetables, oil seeds) and those that have stagnated are traditional export crops (coffee, sugar, cotton). The NTECs are produced by agribusiness firms, as well as by the more modern and capital-intensive farmers with links to agro-industry and export markets. These units have been an important source of employment in several countries, including Brazil, Chile and Mexico. Traditional export crops are generally produced by small farmers. As noted above in relation to sub-Saharan Africa, the pro-market reforms have effectively meant the dismantling of public support for precisely those regions, products and producers that are less competitive but important for fighting poverty.

Given the poor record of these policies the proponents of reform have increasingly accepted that agriculture’s response to liberalization has been disappointing (World Bank 1994). It has also been shown that the notion of “urban bias” has in fact obscured more than it has illuminated the problems in developing country agriculture by reducing the problem to one simple cause outside the sector itself (namely, government policy bias) while ignoring the resource transfers into agriculture (Karshenas 2004). In other words, while agricultural prices may have been artificially depressed due to an overvalued exchange rate and export taxes, this was to
varying degrees redressed through positive resource transfers into the sector via public investment, subsidized credit and agricultural services (Spoor 2002).

The gendered impacts of liberalization

Assessing the gendered impacts of liberalization policies is difficult, especially given the already mentioned gaps and deficiencies in existing surveys and data bases. National agricultural statistics, for example, as well as international data bases that are constructed by the FAO (using national sources) provide ample data on crops and production methods. But as Whitehead notes, these are inadequate for a gender analysis because they say very little about the people (women, men) who are growing and producing these crops, and their relationships to each other. This means that information about women who are own-account farmers, but not heads of their households, is particularly sparse—a phenomenon that is widespread in many African rural economies.

National labour force surveys are supposed to cover the population residing in rural areas and to provide data on their economic activities. While efforts have been made over the past three decades to capture more adequately women’s economic activities, and while recent surveys provide more accurate estimates of women’s work, the nature of women’s work—the fact that much of it is seasonal, unpaid (“family labour”), subsistence based, and small-scale (tending a garden or small number of animals, processing of crops)—means that it is likely to remain undercounted. Hence, making comparisons of women’s economic activity rates over time is highly problematic. With respect to Latin American labour force data, for example, Deere questions the evidence emerging from these surveys, which points to rural women’s concentration in non-agricultural occupations. Her contention is that women’s agricultural activities, both seasonal wage work and own-account farming, continue to be underenumerated in these large-scale surveys.

Assets, labour and social provisioning: A gendered analysis

Understanding the gendered impacts of liberalization in the agrarian economy requires simultaneous attention to at least three sets of interconnected institutions that shape women’s and men’s capacities to seize opportunities opened up by liberalization policies and to cope with the risks and fall-outs of those same policies.
We refer to these three institutional arenas in a stylized fashion as assets, labour and social provisioning, and further suggest that all three are gendered.

**Assets:** The chapter by Whitehead, in particular, elaborates the gender differentiated constraints to women’s and men’s access to capital and land, with reference to the rural economies of sub-Saharan Africa. Her analysis questions the rather simplistic view in some policy and advocacy circles that attributes in a blanket fashion rural women’s poverty to their lack of access to land. Although in some cases women’s smaller land bases are due to their inferior property rights under customary practices, this is not the case everywhere. She emphasizes the great variation in the claims that women can make to land—as wives and as widows—and the strength of those claims in many settings, although in some contexts women’s strong claims to land have weakened as a result of severe land scarcity and competition (for example, Uganda). In some areas of sub-Saharan Africa marked by severe land scarcity, an inability to access land constitutes a constraint on women’s farming; in other areas, women smallholders experience other constraints (inadequate access to labour and other inputs). Although women farm much less land than do men, this is not always because women are prevented from accessing land, but because they lack capital to hire labour, purchase inputs and access marketing channels.

The issue of land scarcity and the constraints it imposes on women’s land claims also emerges from Jackson and Rao’s chapter on India, where land is increasingly scarce and commoditized and where the average size of per capita land holding has declined over the 1990s (see table 3.3 in chapter 3). In India, they claim, growing land scarcity has intensified male competition and created additional constraints to women’s usufruct, trusteeship and ownership rights. Some Indian states, such as Haryana, have seen the rising popularity of widow remarriage to her husband’s brother, cousin or other agnatic relative, sometimes under compulsion, in order to keep the land within the family. The pressure to keep land within the community, especially marginalized communities (tribals), has also undermined women’s inheritance rights, on the pretext that if women are allowed to inherit, then non-tribal men would marry them in order to acquire the land.

While women’s access to land seems to have become more constrained in India, the reverse seems to be happening as far as their access to capital/credit is concerned. The provision of microcredit to women in India (and other countries of South Asia) has been hailed as one of the main advances of the past two decades—
one of the demands made in the Beijing Platform for Action that seems to have received a positive response. While the provision of microcredit has not eradicated poverty or produced successful female entrepreneurs across the board, it is generating some positive outcomes. It has, for example, provided some options for women’s self-employment and assisted household reproduction. It has also enhanced women’s self-assertiveness and thus produced some shifts in conjugal and gender relations. This may, in turn, be one of the reasons for the reported increase in intrahousehold tensions and conflicts among women recipients of microcredit (Goetz and Sengupta 1996). However, at a broader level, the provision of microcredit for women may indeed be paving the way to a two-tier system in which women have excellent credit access but only to small amounts (to help household reproduction), while men access bank loans which are large enough for significant investments, as our authors suggest.

Labour markets are understood here very broadly to include both formal and informal wage labour markets as well as quasi labour markets where workers sell a product or service, but within a set of dependent relationships that limit their authority over the employment arrangement (such as subcontracted production, and different forms of self-employment which are essentially disguised forms of wage labour) (Heintz 2008). A cross-cutting argument that emerges from the chapters in Part One is that livelihood strategies in agrarian economies are increasingly diversified to include not only wage labour in agriculture (on both small farms and large-scale corporate units), but also non-farm work. This should not come as a surprise after what was said above about land scarcity and falling per capita land availability.

One striking feature of agrarian change and industrialization in contemporary developing societies to which many observers have drawn attention is the growing prevalence of what is sometimes refereed to as livelihood diversification, defined as “the process by which rural families construct a diverse portfolio of activities and social support capabilities in their struggle for survival and in order to improve their standard of living” (Ellis 1998:4; Bryceson 1999). Diversification captures several different economic processes and its blanket use to describe all forms of non-farm employment is misleading. It is particularly important, from the point of view of thinking about poverty, to distinguish between diversification as a survival strategy (which it very often is) and diversification that feeds into a process of accumulation. The fact that “poorer countries today confront more formidable barriers to comprehensive industrialization—and a fortiori to the generation of comparable
levels of industrial employment—than did the advanced industrial countries in the past” (Bernstein 2004:204), is an important part of what drives this process. For vast sections of the population, both female and male, this means a constant search for income through wage work and “self-employment” (often thinly disguised forms of wage work) away from the village. Thus, work on the household plot (if there is one) becomes articulated with other forms of work (paid or unpaid, formal or informal, industrial or services) beyond the agricultural sector and indeed very often beyond the confines of the village (Breman 1996).

Clearly women have become more visible in the agricultural labour force, as casual and seasonal wage workers in some regions and countries. While such work is not adequately captured in labour force surveys to allow detailed analysis of the numbers involved, their wages, and changes in both dimensions over time, the evidence analysed by Deere for Latin America suggests that corporate farming of NTECs has increased absolute employment opportunities for women in agriculture, given the highly labour-intensive nature of production and packing (compared to traditional agricultural exports such as coffee and bananas). The promotion of corporate farming for export has been happening on a much smaller scale in sub-Saharan Africa (although Kenya, South Africa and Zimbabwe may be exceptions) and India, where women’s agricultural employment remains largely confined to more traditional farming enterprises and small holder agriculture where they work as casual and daily labourers (ganyu labour in Malawi, seasonal harvest workers across India), often paid on a piece rate basis and receiving far lower wages than men.

Interestingly though, “traditional” gender stratifications have reproduced themselves within the “modern” corporate farming enterprises, with women largely confined to the more seasonal and repetitive tasks while men assume the few permanent positions. The occupational segregation by gender contributes to lower wages for women. As generations of political economists and sociologists have argued, contrary to the abstract market of neoclassical textbooks, real markets are political (and social) constructs infused with social norms and regulations. This also means that wages and conditions of work can change if workers are able to organize in pursuit of their interests. Deere, for example, reports that by the 1990s conditions of work and wages of workers in the largely female-dominated flower industry in Colombia had improved and the gender wage gap significantly narrowed, largely due to the pressure exerted by workers’ organizations and non-governmental organizations.
It is also worth underlining that, while wages in the horticultural export sector may be unfavourable by international standards, they are often far better than those prevailing elsewhere in the rural economy (for data on Kenya, see Heintz 2008).

The other important issue that arises from our three chapters, especially the one on sub-Saharan Africa, is that women and men are positioned very differently in relation to the changes in economic behaviour, which liberalization both requires and brings about. The entry costs to different kinds of non-farm income-generating activities are a major fact affecting men’s and women’s locations in these economies. Women’s constrained access to capital and other resources (hired labour or unpaid labour of others), along with gender biases in markets and the social norms and social networks that shape them, have the effect of clustering women in low-entry and low-return off-farm activities, which yield little surplus for investing back in agriculture or the off-farm activity itself. Whitehead also raises a critically important point which may further limit women’s access to high-return activities, and this concerns the nature of their skills. In rural areas the skills individuals acquire are largely through “informal education and invisible training” which take place in the household or community and segregate women and men into different activities. These activities are rewarded at different levels—not so much a reflection of the intrinsic complexity of the tasks involved, but rather according to who has them, with women’s skills often accruing less reward by virtue of their being female tasks.

Social provisioning: In the rural areas of many developing countries, the contribution of the state to social provisioning tends to be much less significant than in urban areas (which have more political visibility), and in any case far from comprehensive. In the rural economies under consideration, providing care for the young, old and sick, attending to the physical and emotional needs of other household members, preparing food, cleaning and mending clothes, utensils and homes, fetching water and firewood, are all time-consuming responsibilities which are overwhelmingly assigned to women and girls. This constitutes the bedrock of social provisioning that sustains and reproduces the household over time. As Jackson and Rao rightly remind us, livelihood research pays lip service to these activities but there are still too few studies which collect data on this “invisible” part of the rural economy, alongside descriptions and analyses of employment and farm production. Within some strands of mainstream research on employment (Anker et al. 2003; Melkas and Anker 2003) it is now recognized that women’s participation in the paid
workforce (its duration, continuity and degree of formality), and in rural economies their ability to respond to market opportunities and incentives (Collier 1989), have much to do with how households and societies arrange the provision of unpaid care.

It is also encouraging that increasing numbers of developing countries are now undertaking time use surveys (sometimes also called time budget surveys). These surveys aim to provide information on what activities people do over a given time period (generally a day or a week) as well as how much time they spend on each of the different specified activities (Budlender 2007). While differing in scope and purpose, one of the common aims of these surveys has been to provide better information on the work done by different categories of people (male and female, in particular), and to highlight the time spent on unpaid activities that are generally either underrecorded in other surveys or not recorded at all (Budlender 2007). Such progress notwithstanding, it is still not feasible to answer the important question often posed in feminist research as to what happens to women’s unpaid care burdens under the impact of liberalization policies with rigorous data. There are very few developing countries that have more than one time use survey (with comparable methodologies) to allow comparisons of unpaid care burdens to be made over time so as to assess the impacts of liberalization policies. It is often through in-depth case studies and ethnographic research that researchers have been able to tackle this difficult question.

**Feminization of agriculture?**

So to conclude this sub-section, has agriculture become feminized over the past two decades as a result of liberalization? Feminization of agriculture, as some of our authors underline, is an ambiguous term and needs to be unpacked. Does it refer to the increasing rates of participation by women in the agricultural labour force (either as own-account farmers or wage labourers)—relative to women’s participation in other sectors (industry, services), or relative to men? Or does it refer to a rise in the share of the agricultural labour force that is female (because of higher female activity rates in agriculture, or because men’s share is declining)? Or alternatively, does feminization of agriculture refer to the deterioration in the quality of agricultural work in some regards, that is, its casualization?

For Latin America, Deere contends that several overlapping processes over the past 30 years have contributed to changes in the gender division of labour among smallholders, sometimes described as a tendency towards the “feminization of
agriculture”. The leading cause has been the emergence of a class of impoverished and dispossessed smallholders, a process which gained momentum in the 1960s and 1970s, and is generally associated with men becoming landless or land-poor labourers. Male participation in temporary wage labour, particularly when it involves seasonal migration, has everywhere been associated with higher female participation in agriculture. During the liberalization era, women’s participation in agriculture appears to have changed: they are no longer merely “secondary” workers. Women are emerging as farm managers, providing the bulk of family farm labour and taking on extra tasks as men migrate in search of alternative sources of income. By withdrawing direct state support to domestic food production, agricultural reform has galvanized this process. In addition, the export boom associated with NTEC has intensified the demand for female labour in the agricultural wage labour market, both absolutely and relative to men.

The feminization of agriculture in India has taken a different form. Between 1972/1973 and 1999/2000, the proportion of rural workers in agriculture declined from 84 to 76 per cent. This was largely due to male workers moving out of agriculture entirely, while women substantially remained. Since 1987/1988, whatever absorption there was of women into the non-agricultural sector has slowed down, and since the economic reform programme began in 1991, the deceleration has been dramatic. Indeed, rural women’s employment at the all-India level has shown remarkable stability over the years. In 1961, nearly 90 per cent of all rural women workers were in agriculture; in 1994 the figure was 86 per cent, a marginal drop, and reached 83.5 per cent in 2005. Women comprise an increasingly important proportion of the casual labour force in rural areas, as men withdraw from agriculture into other occupations. Some analysts therefore claim that rural India has also been witnessing a feminization of agriculture (Agarwal 2003). But feminization of agricultural wage labour—often fieldwork of the most laborious, worst paid and lowest-status kind—is not the same as the feminization of farm management. As far as India is concerned, there is little evidence that farm management is being assumed by women.

The Informalization of Labour

Industrial growth has historically been the *sine qua non* of massive poverty reduction by absorbing the labour force that is released from agriculture. In developing
countries, industrial and manufacturing growth has remained anemic in recent decades, with the exception of East Asia (Byres 2003). Indeed, one of the remarkable features of structural change in contemporary developing countries has been the disproportionate shift of the labour force from agriculture to services (rather than to industry), which is ominous, as much of this can be thinly disguised survival strategies indicative of a desperate effort to turn to anything that might be available (which happens to fall under the “services” rubric) (Byres 2003). Global competition facilitated through trade liberalization, and state reluctance, or incapacity, to play a catalytic role in the provision of infrastructure and technical support to domestic firms are partly to blame for the low rates of growth and the lack of structural transformation that many developing countries have been witnessing. At the same time, the informal economy has been growing, composed of various forms of self-employment as well as informal wage work (in formal or informal enterprises), deeply segmented by gender, class, ethnicity and other social markers. Some countries have witnessed significant out-migration of their working-age population, both female and male, to neighbouring countries and further afield in search of paid work. This is, in turn, reshaping care arrangements and social reproduction regimes in communities and countries of origin as well as those of destination.

This is the context within which the four chapters in Part Two of this volume are located. Dzodzi Tsikata in chapter 5 and Jayati Ghosh in chapter 6 explore the changing prospects and conditions of women’s paid work within the urban economies of sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, respectively. While liberalization policies have taken hold in different moments, under different political and economic conditions, and entailed very different outcomes in these two (themselves highly heterogeneous) regions, the informalization of labour, the marginalization of employment from the policy agenda, and the persistent gender stratifications of paid work and unpaid work are some of the common themes that emerge from their analyses. In chapter 7, Martha Altar Chen elaborates further the informal economy by exposing its heterogeneity, its gendered structures and its significance beyond developing regions, followed by an assessment of the different political and policy responses currently being advocated to deal with the problem of “informality”. Paid work, whether formal or informal, does not produce growth and social development on its own. The other essential ingredient, often overseen and taken for granted by policy actors, is the care and reproduction of human beings. In chapter 8, Nicola Yeates draws attention to the regulations and
restrictions that govern the flow of people not blessed with elite membership across borders in an age when finance capital has been “freed” from all restrictions. The specific issue she explores is how the cross-border migration of women from the countries of the “periphery” to the “core” is reshaping care regimes in both contexts and in turn reproducing (old) global patterns of inequality more broadly.

**Industrial development: The role of markets and states**

Asia, or more accurately northeast Asia, had seen high-capacity developmental states guide the economy, dominated by big business and intermediated by the banking system. “The normative glue that held the system together”, as Meredith Jung-En Woo (2007:xii) has put it, “was a social compact peculiar to capitalist Northeast Asia, obligating private corporations, in return for munificent financial and fiscal support from the state, to provide for societal full employment”. States in Southeast Asia (Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand), most commentators agree, worked along less interventionist lines, with less impressive outcomes in terms of industrial growth, employment generation and poverty reduction (but were nevertheless touted by the World Bank as models for emulation) (Jomo 2003). In both contexts production of manufactured goods for export, which was highly female-dominated, played an important role in financing industrial and technological imports (in the 1960s and 1970s in northeast Asia, and from the 1980s onwards in southeast Asia). However, as the Malaysian political economist Jomo Sundaram underlines, export promotion has to be distinguished from open economic policies that are being advocated by the international financial and trade institutions (and the affluent developed countries that largely control them) to developing country governments.

The East Asian miracle is said to have been principally due to export-led growth. But as various studies suggest, while exports tend to rise with trade liberalization in the short term, imports also tend to rise strongly, especially if the domestic currency appreciates in real terms. Thus, trade liberalization tends to limit or only weakly supplement domestic effective demand. Hence, while increased international trade may enhance growth, the added stimulus tends to be much less than presumed by proponents of trade liberalization. Despite efficiency gains from trade liberalization, increased exports do not necessarily
ensure stronger domestic economic growth, that is, export-led growth. The experiences of the SEA3 [Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand] as well as Hong Kong and Singapore more closely approximate this imagined export-led growth model than those of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan PoC. The latter appear to have promoted exports very actively while also protecting domestic markets, at least temporarily, to develop domestic industrial and technological capabilities in order to compete internationally. This strategy of temporary effective protection conditional upon export promotion . . . can hardly be equated with trade liberalization (Jomo 2003:19).

This comparison of diverse experiences within Asia reminds us of the difficulties that many developing countries are currently experiencing in nurturing their industrial capabilities without the protection that pioneer and successful countries were able to give to their “infant industries”. In sub-Saharan Africa, as in other developing regions, many countries have seen their nascent industries collapse under pressure from cheap manufactured imports. Tsikata refers to the phenomenon of “de-industrialization” in the region (Mkandawire and Soludo 1999), with new primary commodity exports not doing well enough to make up for the loss of those industries.

A recent study of small manufacturing firm clusters in Nigeria documents the crippling competition to which these units are exposed as a result of the country’s World Trade Organization undertaking to achieve substantial trade liberalization by 2000, which resulted in the elimination of long-standing bans on textile and footwear imports between 1997 and 2000. This, added to the already mounting problems of over-competition and quality adulteration has been disastrous for the textile clusters, where “masters and weavers alike are hemorrhaging out of the business” (Meagher 2007:493). At the same time, the collapse of regional and federal government services (including policing, education and electricity) has left firms vulnerable to extortion from officials and criminals, unable to attract good quality apprentices, and suffering from technical regression (Meagher 2007). In countries like Ghana, manufacturing employment has fallen, and much of the foreign direct investment (FDI) flows, as Tsikata points out, have been in the area of extractive industries.
While the effects of global integration on workers in the South have been regarded, by trade economists at least, to have been positive for developing countries, the available evidence is ambiguous (Ghosh 2003). For the vast majority of developing countries, manufacturing employment has actually stagnated or declined over the past decade, while the growth in manufacturing activities and employment has been confined to a handful of countries: China, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and Chile. The rapid surge in imports associated with trade liberalization is responsible for manufacturing’s poor performance elsewhere, as cheap, newly deregulated imported goods have displaced those made by small-scale, employment-intensive domestic producers unable to compete in international markets. Job losses from import competition have been significant in some developing countries and have not been compensated for by the opening up of export employment (Ghosh 2003).

**Formal and informal employment**

A very significant change of recent decades in developing countries has been the stagnation in formal employment and a substantial rise in the proportion of people who are engaged in what is often referred to as informal work. In much of sub-Saharan Africa (with the exception of South Africa) and South Asia, and in such Latin American countries as Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru only a fraction of the workforce, predominantly male, has ever been engaged in formal employment (often state employees and workers in strategic/protected industries). But in countries such as Argentina and Chile whose labour markets had come to resemble those of the industrialized world, factories have closed, public sector employment has been cut, real wages have fallen, and increasing numbers of households have become dependent on the informal and unregulated economy (Pearson 2004).

This trend was unforeseen. In the 1960s and 1970s, it was assumed that the worldwide development of the modern economy would shrink and absorb informal activity, as had happened historically in the industrialized countries. The subsequent extensive growth of the informal economy has reversed such expectations; instead, the global economy has shown a tendency to encourage precarious forms of work which do not bring in sufficient earnings to meet subsistence. In spite of this deepening phenomenon, work and employment currently receive relatively little attention internationally; this is even the case within the poverty reduction agenda of
the last decade. Indeed, employment hardly features in the Millennium Development Goals.

What exactly do we mean by “informal employment”? As the chapters in Part Two explain, over the past decade or so increasing emphasis has been placed on the need to shift definitions of labour informality from the enterprise-based understanding which underpinned the notion of “informal sector” widely used in the 1970s (equating informality with the small size of the enterprise) to one based on labour relations (whether workers are socially protected and whether minimum wage legislation applies to them). This pressure was eventually endorsed by the International Labour Organization (ILO 2002), which defined the “informal economy” to include labour relations that are not governed by formal economic regulations and/or basic legal and social protections.

Moreover, while it was often assumed that informal work was linked to low rates of economic growth, the relation between the two seems to be more complex. Based on data for 20 counties with reliable data, Heintz and Pollin (2003) show that, while there is an overall inverse relationship between labour informalization and economic growth (confirming the countercyclical nature of informal work), informal employment has been growing not only in contexts of low economic growth but also where rates of growth have been modest. The letter suggests that informal forms of paid work are not just “lingering vestiges of backwardness” or a by-product of economic stagnation. In fact in some contexts the very growth of global production networks made possible by the expansion of FDI has generated informal production processes as multinational firms have sought out “low cost and ‘flexible’ labour relations in their production-level operations” (Heintz and Pollin 2003:4).

Hence, “informal employment” often captures very different kinds of work, some more akin to survivalist strategies with low returns that people resort to when economies stagnate, while other kinds of informal work (piece-rate, wage work) are integrated with and contribute to processes of accumulation on a national or global scale (as is the case with industrial outworkers for example). As Chen’s chapter further explains, within informal labour markets, there is a marked segmentation in terms of average earnings across the different employment statuses, and it is difficult to move up these segments due to structural barriers (state, market and social) and/or cumulative disadvantage. Informal employment tends to be a greater source of employment for women than for men in all developing regions, except North Africa
(ILO 2002), with women’s hourly earnings typically falling below those of men in identical employment categories, especially in the case of own-account workers. Many workers, especially women, remain trapped in the lower-earning and more risky segments. Relatively high shares of informal employers are men and relatively high shares of industrial outworkers are women.

A large part of the informal economy in countries of sub-Saharan Africa, covered by Tsikata, is composed of low-return self employment in the services sector, such as food traders and processors, traders in imported items, and domestic, health and sanitation workers, while employment in manufacturing and construction has shrunk. Under the impact of public sector reforms in several countries of the region, even hitherto well-paid public sector workers have been forced to make regular forays into the informal economy to complement their diminishing real wages, as illustrated by the case study of Cameroon cited in Tsikata’s chapter. For many observers of long-term change in the region the growth of trade in goods and services, very often at the level of self-subsistence, is a sign of economic stagnation and crisis.

While in several Asian countries, especially in South Asia, survivalist strategies are also prevalent, these are nevertheless interlaced with other forms of informal work, notably, subcontracted work that is linked to national and global production systems. Participation in these global production chains raises a range of different issues and concerns. These include, for example, concerns about workers’ health related to work intensification (that is, having to complete an unrealistic number of tasks within a limited time frame which engenders self-exploitation and burn-out), safety of workers and their family members when work is carried out in homes, problems of irregular and delayed payments, low wages that fall below the national minimum wage (if one exists), and the absence of social protection mechanisms (Harriss-White 2000). Besides these issues of quality, there are also broader questions about the quantity of employment that is being generated even in the more dynamic Asian economies which are often seen as a part of the world that has benefited from liberalization and globalization.

The latter concerns are triggered by evidence showing the deceleration or even absolute declines in manufacturing employment in many countries of Asia despite the modest or even high growth rates (Ghosh 2003). As Ghosh elaborates in her contribution to this volume, in general, employment generation has not kept pace with population increase and has expressed itself in higher rates of unemployment and
underemployment, as well as declining labour force participation (not fully accounted for by increasing involvement in education). She further highlights the deterioration in the quality of employment, manifested through the decline in regular work and the rise in either casual contracts or self-employment in adverse conditions. We discuss some of these issues further below, given that they manifest themselves clearly in the case of female employment.

**Feminization of labour**

Over the past three decades women’s economic activity rates have been rising in most parts of the world. There are exceptions to this general global trend, notably in the transitional economies which are part of Eastern Europe as well as Central and Western Asia, where there have been notable reversals, and in the Middle East and North Africa, where they remain very low. But the general trend is towards increasing female visibility in the economic domain. In some countries women’s activity rates are nearing men’s.

Women, however, continue to be concentrated in jobs with low pay and authority levels, placing limits on their overall access to income, status and power. Recent research finds that despite some improvements in the 1990s, levels of gender segregation in labour markets remain high throughout the world (Anker 1998; Anker et al. 2003). Women tend to congregate in relatively low-paid and low-status work at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy, and also to have little job security.

The ambivalent nature of women’s entry into paid work is perhaps captured most strikingly by the double meaning implied in the phrase, “feminization of the labour force” (Standing 1999b). While women’s access to paid work has increased in most countries in the last two decades, and women have gained access to the cash economy, the terms and conditions of much of the work on offer have deteriorated. As was noted above, the growth of informal work across the world, along with the casualization of formal sector employment, has allowed employers to lower labour costs and to sidestep social security obligations and labour laws. For many workers, both female and male, the outcome has been an increasing precariousness of jobs, and greater insecurity of livelihoods.

Besides gender inequalities in paid work, there is also the related issue of inequalities in the provision of unpaid care work, a disproportionate share of which invariably falls onto women and girls in all societies. While increasing numbers of
women have entered the traditionally masculine domain of paid work, there does not seem to be much change in the opposite direction: men’s contribution to the provision of unpaid care is remarkably low across countries, age groups and income groups (or social class) (Budlender forthcoming). The burden is particularly high in the developing countries where infrastructure (for example, piped water, heating) is less developed, public welfare services often rudimentary and inaccessible, and where poorer women cannot afford to purchase market substitutes (such as processed food items) or hire-in labour to substitute for their own time.

This does not mean that women from low-income households in poor countries do not need or want paid forms of work (to support their households and to have a degree of economic independence)—they clearly do and this is most evident from the large numbers who move across regions and even countries in search of paid work. While migrant women may be leaving behind family members and delegating care to others (often other women), they are at the same time providing care to individuals in more affluent societies, often working as undocumented domestic or care workers in people’s homes, or as paid employees in a variety of care-related institutions. A parallel process is at work when highly trained nurses and medical staff from low-income countries of Africa and Asia (trained and educated in the best public institutions and with public funding) migrate to affluent countries where their skills are in short supply. Through an analysis of the ways in which these variegated migrant streams are inextricably caught up in the social reorganization of care, the chapter by Yeates explores the ways in which inequalities of class, gender, and ethnicity are (re)constituted on a global scale.

For both analytical and policy purposes women’s involvement in paid work cannot be seen in isolation from the social arrangements that are in place for the provision of care. The latter is often a domain marked by intense inequalities between women and men within households and families, across social class, and indeed between North and South as the analysis of “global care chains” (Hochschild 2000) has sought to illustrate (see also Kabeer 2007).

Defeminization of labour?

Some advocates of trade liberalization argue that women in the South have emerged as winners in the new manufacturing employment scenario. While there is some truth to this statement, the picture is not straightforward. Where export-oriented
manufacturing industries have grown (including in China, Malaysia, Bangladesh, Mexico and Thailand), women have been disproportionately absorbed into their workforces (Razavi et al. 2004). Moreover, while the working conditions and terms of pay in many of these factories are poor by international standards, they are usually better than in the urban and rural informal economy (Kabeer and Mahmud 2004), with largely positive implications for women’s economic security and sense of autonomy (Kabeer 1995). However, these positive considerations concerning expanding female employment opportunities need to be qualified.

In the first place, there has been a strong tendency in industries with a largely female workforce, especially garment manufacturing, towards deregulation and subcontracting; this often leads to the extensive use of homeworkers, one of the most invisible groups in the informal economy. Moreover, as these industries have upgraded, matured and needed a higher skilled workforce, there has been a widespread “defeminization” of their labour forces (UNDESA 1999). This is now increasingly the case in countries like Mexico, which was one of the pioneers of export manufacturing in Latin America (Brachet-Marquez and de Oliveira 2004), as well as in several Asian economies where the phenomenon has been well documented.

These qualifications, though important, are not meant to underestimate some of the positive spin-offs these jobs may have brought forth, giving women their first discretionary income, new social contacts beyond the confines of kinship and neighbourhood, the chance to postpone marriage at a young age, maybe save for a better future, invest in their children’s education, or have a greater say in how household resources are allocated. This may not have ended women’s subordination and dependence on male protection, but it has given some women at least the tools with which to whittle away at the pillars of patriarchy. Moreover, as Ghosh (this volume) points out, if there is adequate compensation and assistance for retraining and mobility across activities and sectors, then something more durable and valuable would have been gained.

Social Policy Responses

In response to widespread discontent with the liberalization agenda, more attention is now being given to social policies and governance issues that undergird the economy. There is the view in some policy circles that if globalization (often used as a
shorthand for liberalization of the economy) is to stay on course, then it must be “tamed” or “embedded” through social policies and political reforms (ILO 2004; Ruggie 2003).

The thesis of “embedded liberalism”, first put forward by the American political scientist John Ruggie in 1982, was that after the Second World War the Western capitalist countries struck variations of “a grand social bargain” whereby all sectors of individual states agreed to open markets and to contain and share the social costs of adjustments that open markets inevitably produce, through social protection and other forms of intervention. Recalling Polanyi’s notion of the “disembedding” of economic life from social life, “embedded liberalism” underlined the ways in which the liberalism of freer trade was re-embedded in society through a commitment to an interventionist programme of governmental action (Polanyi 1957).

Are we seeing something similar happening today? Have the excesses of the “high neoliberalism” of the 1980s given rise to a wider appreciation of the social underpinnings that are necessary for markets to function? Judging by the policy pronouncements of diverse development actors, if the 1980s were about abstracting “the economic” from “the social”, then the 1990s and beyond signal a rediscovery of “the social” (Mkandawire 2004), and a welcome, if belated, engagement with it (Molyneux 2002).

The four chapters in Part Three of this volume provide valuable insights into some of the policy efforts that are being made to respond to the discontent associated with liberalization policies. The chapters cover a diverse set of countries and policy efforts. Chapter 9 by Ching Kwan Lee begins with an analysis of the “un-making” of Chinese labour in the era of market reform and considers the Chinese government’s efforts to shore up worker discontent and protests by putting in place contribution-based social insurance programmes for health care, unemployment and pensions. The next two chapters turn to the Latin America region where social assistance conditional cash transfer programmes have mushroomed over the past decade or so, often as an emergency response to financial and economic crisis. In chapter 10, Agustin Escobar Latapí and Mercedes González de la Rocha provide a detailed analysis of the Mexican Oportunidades programme based on their five-year in-depth ethnographic research conducted in rural, semi-urban and urban settlements in the country, while in chapter 11, Constanza Tabbush takes a hard look at the Argentine public employment programme Plan Jefas and its replacement programme, Plan Familias, which closely
resembles *Oportunidades*. Public employment programmes have a long history in India, and in chapter 12, Smita Gupta describes the difficult road to getting India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Act on the statute books, and the even more contested efforts of turning the legal guarantee to work into a real right for women and men across the country.

**Social insurance and problems of exclusion**

In a recent paper, Townsend (2007) has eloquently defended social insurance as a key component of social security—one that has gradually evolved in the currently institutionalized welfare states, and can be expanded and strengthened in developing countries. Broadly universal social insurance programmes are supposed to collect (flat-rate or proportional) contributions on income from employment of all insured persons and employers in exchange for benefits for those insured and their dependents. This is currently the largest item of social security expenditure in the member states of the European Union, and Townsend provides convincing arguments for building up and strengthening social insurance programmes in developing countries as the most effective way of fighting poverty and realizing meaningful social rights.

Enrolment in social insurance programmes is very often employment based, and a fundamental problem in the traditional design of these programmes is the close link of the provision of health care or pensions to formal employment. Coverage has thus tended to be limited, even in middle-income countries due to the large size of the informal economy and the high rate of evasion of contributions by those in both informal and formal workplaces—problems that have been aggravated in recent decades as informalization of labour has intensified. For these reasons, even though social insurance schemes facilitate resource mobilization via contributions, they may not be the most effective vehicle for extending coverage to the majority of the population who work in largely informalized labour markets. Although some women who are outside the workforce or who work informally may be able to obtain indirect entitlements to health care or a pension, if their husbands are formally employed, their rights will be dependent on the marriage contract. In several Latin American countries, for example, wives are covered through their husband’s health insurance for maternity but not for sickness (Mesa-Lago forthcoming). Moreover, in cases of divorce, abandonment or death of their spouse, women sometimes lose their coverage.
Social sector reform in China is taking place alongside a fundamental restructur ing of the labour force marked by massive unemployment in the state industrial sector and large-scale migration of the rural workforce into industrial cities where export-oriented factories are located. Under the pre-reform system women enjoyed very high employment rates, and hence direct entitlements as workers to some form of health insurance and pension via their enterprises. Additionally, as spouses of workers, they had the right to have 50 per cent of their medical expenses reimbursed. However, as Lee shows, women have constituted a disproportionate share of those laid off from the state enterprises and a disproportionate share of the long-term unemployed.

It is interesting that the Chinese authorities have decided to build up pension and health coverage through contribution-based social insurance. The Labour Law requires that all enterprises, regardless of ownership category, and all employees, including migrant workers, participate in this contributory system. Moreover, contributions are deposited into two kinds of accounts: a social pooling account and an individual account, the proportions of which are decided by the provincial government. A retiree’s pension will therefore have both pay-as-you-go and contributory components. But, understandably, coverage has been limited, especially in the non-state sector, and only a small proportion of migrants seem to be covered. In the case of health care too, the overall drift of the reform is to shift the burden of medical care from the state onto employers and employees.

If coverage in social insurance programmes remains employment-based and individualized with little subsidy from the state, then women’s labour market disadvantages are likely to feed into their weaker claims on health care and pensions. If, on the other hand, the government steps in with financial subsidies to compensate those with lower contributions and those outside the workforce, then the potential for a more egalitarian welfare system will be enhanced. This is the path taken by the National Health Insurance of the Republic of Korea, which has expanded its coverage since the late 1970s, and which can claim to be universalistic since the latest wave of reforms undertaken in 2000 (Kwon and Tchoe 2005).

**Social assistance programmes making a difference?**

In recent years social assistance programmes in the form of conditional cash transfers have been implemented across Latin America. *Bolsa Familia* in Brazil and
**Oportunidades** (Progresa before 1997) in Mexico are two of the most cited programmes of their kind, not least because of their extensive coverage of the population living below the poverty line in the two respective countries.

**Oportunidades** is a conditional cash transfer programme that, in return for cash stipends given to female heads of poor households, requires that children attend school, family members go for regular health check-ups, and that mothers attend hygiene and nutrition information sessions. While it is a targeted programme that identifies beneficiaries based on a means test, its actual reach is more extensive than the narrow targeting associated with “safety net” type programmes.

As a human development intervention, the programme has had a number of important achievements which are well documented in the chapter by Escobar Latapi and González de la Rocha: school attendance rates have increased and drop-out rates have declined (especially for girls); gender gaps in educational achievements have narrowed; improvements in child nutrition (height and weight increases) have also been registered. Interestingly from the point of view of this volume, the programme has shown sensitivity to gender issues by making the cash transfers directly to mothers in the selected households (motivated by the literature which finds that resources controlled by women are more likely to be allocated to child health and nutrition than resources allocated to men) and by providing larger education stipends for girls than boys (from grade seven onwards). **Oportunidades** is also widely praised for its openness to external evaluations and reviews, as well as its efforts to shun the political patronage that is so endemic to social programmes (Molyneux 2006).

There are nevertheless elements in the design and implementation of the programme that have received critical appraisal in recent years. First, with respect to targeting, the International Food Policy Research Institute’s qualitative research (based on focus group discussions and semi-structured interviews) finds extensive discontent among communities in relation to the beneficiary selection process (Adato 2000). The beneficiaries, the non-beneficiaries, the doctors and the *promotoras* (voluntary workers) describe non-beneficiaries’s resentment over their exclusion from the programme as well as their lack of understanding of the basis for the differentiation (questioning its accuracy and fairness), leading to social tensions, occasional direct conflict and social divisions that affect participation in community activities (Adato 2000:vii).
Second, Escobar Latapi and González de la Rocha contend that while school enrolment rates have improved, the quality of public education remains poor in the poor communities and that the reform of the public education system is a most pending issue in Mexico. This raises a broader concern which critics have raised about conditional cash transfers, namely that while cash stipends may enhance poor people’s access to education and health services (by enabling parents to purchase school uniforms and books, for example), they do little to strengthen the supply and quality of public health and education services, especially in poor areas and communities, which are often in a dire situation after years of neglect and underfunding.

The gendered implications, as well as gendered assumptions underpinning the programme, have also received extensive attention in recent years. On the one hand, there is the evidence, cited in the contribution to this volume, which supports the programme’s claims of enhancing women’s self-esteem and financial security as a result of the cash stipends. Escobar Latapi and González de la Rocha also make the observation that the programme has given women more opportunities to leave the house, to access new public spaces, and to communicate with other women, producing positive impacts on personal empowerment—an observation that has been documented by other evaluations as well (Adato et al. 2000).

Others, however, have drawn attention to some of the more contentious aspects of the programme. One issue that is considered problematic is the requirement that mothers contribute a set amount of hours of community work, such as cleaning schools and health centres—which non-beneficiaries are not expected to do—in addition to the commitments they have to make to taking their children for regular health checks and attending workshops on health and hygiene—the “co-responsibilities” (Molyneux 2006, Chant 2008). Escobar Latapi and González de la Rocha agree that some women find these burdens “overbearing” and some poor households are excluded from the programme because they are unable to fulfill the work requirements.

More significantly perhaps, attention has been drawn to the ways in which women in such programmes seem to be “primarily positioned as a means to secure programme objectives; they are a conduit of policy, in the sense that resources channelled through them are expected to translate into greater improvements in the well-being of children and the family as a whole” (Molyneux 2006:439). Escobar
Latapí and González de la Rocha contend that women may be doing so but as “willing agents furthering their socially bounded responsibilities through the programme, even if sometimes at a cost to their own interests, than as reluctant instruments fulfilling programme objectives” (this volume, emphasis mine). It would therefore seem fair to conclude that while *Oportunidades* is assisting women in meeting their “practical interests” (Molyneux 1985), we cannot assume that the programme has been designed to do more than that for women *qua women*, for example by giving them a more secure footing in the labour market, greater economic security, and a stronger fall-back position in case of abandonment, separation or divorce. This, however, does not deny the unintended ways in which some women beneficiaries may be enhancing their own “strategic interests” (Molyneux 1985) as a result of participation in the programme by subverting the programme design to meet their own projects and goals. Indeed, Escobar Latapí and González de la Rocha (this volume) argue that even if those designing the programme did not intend to use the women’s meetings for anything more than giving lessons on how to improve family hygiene, women themselves have “appropriated the spaces” offered by the programme for other purposes, such as getting away from home, meeting other women, and sometimes organizing to make demands on state authorities.

The importance of providing opportunities for women to enhance their labour market skills and facilitate their entry into the formal work force emerges forcefully from Tabbush’s analysis of the Argentine public works programme, *Plan Jefas*, and its replacement, *Plan Familias*. The origins of *Plan Jefas* can be traced to the economic crisis of 2001 with its highly adverse employment consequences. The programme targets unemployed heads of households (regardless of gender: *Plan Jefas y Jefes*) who are responsible for a child under 18 years of age or caring for a disabled child or a pregnant spouse, and participation is limited to one person per household. The programme’s conditionality is in terms of hours of paid work (rather than ensuring children’s schooling and nutrition, as in *Oportunidades*). Ironically though, the work conditionality seems to have been an afterthought to the original design, given the large number of applicants and the budgetary constraints imposed on the programme. Beneficiaries are offered a monthly stipend of 150 pesos in return for 20 hours of paid work per week—a seemingly “masculine” requirement. Yet contrary to expectations close to 71 per cent of programme beneficiaries have been women, from households marked by high dependency ratios, low levels of income and education,
and poor housing conditions—perhaps a reflection of the small size of the cash stipend. Interestingly though, while the programme intended to target unemployed heads of households, a significant proportion of both female and male beneficiaries reported being economically inactive before joining the programme. The only factor precluding participation in the Plan Jefas is social security contributions attached to formal employment—a conditionality that may inadvertently promote informal and precarious forms of work. Tabbush cites the tension that is currently being experienced between the national campaign to register and formalize domestic workers and the willingness of some such workers to remain informally employed in order to continue receiving the Plan Jefas stipends.

Evaluations suggest that while the programme’s impact on levels of poverty has been ambiguous, it has been successful in reducing indigence (extreme poverty), and unemployment (a person registering under the programme is automatically counted as “employed”). Furthermore, Plan Jefas seems to have been effective in reducing social tensions produced by the crisis, not only by providing a safety valve through the provision of work/cash but also by facilitating alliances between different social actors, including the unemployment movement, state officials, NGOs and faith-based organizations.

Turning to the gender aspects of the programme, the evidence analysed by Tabbush clearly suggests that despite women’s numerical preponderance in the programme, higher numbers of men than women graduated from the programme into formal work opportunities (given their prior labour market skills and experiences, and the fact that recent growth patterns in Argentina have created more work opportunities for men, evident in the dynamism of the construction sector). Yet the picture is more complicated than this single finding would suggest, and since 2005 not only do a larger proportion of female programme beneficiaries appear to find employment, but the paid work that they find seems to be more stable. Significantly, even though women participants have been incorporated into the labour market at a much lower rate than their male counterparts, many of those who are entering the work force had no recent experience of formal sector work and seem to be therefore “slowly cultivating links with the formal labour market” (Tabbush, this volume). Evidence from qualitative research suggests that the acquisition of new skills and the greater probability of finding formal employment is something that female participants in the programme strongly value (Tcherneva and Wray 2007).
Flying in the face of these limited achievements, the government of Argentina with financial and ideational support from various external agencies, most notably the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, is currently replacing Plan Jefas with another conditional cash transfer programme, Plan Familias, aimed at enhancing children’s welfare by making cash stipends targeted at their mothers, dependent on children’s school enrolment and nutritional levels. Women beneficiaries of Plan Jefas who have two children or more, low levels of education, and little prior work experience are considered to be “not employable” and thus encouraged to move to Plan Familias, while those Jefas beneficiaries who have higher educational levels and some work experience are to move to Seguro, which reproduces the Jefas’ work rationale and continues to prioritize re-insertion into formal paid work. Plan Familias, however, has no work options and gives no consideration to educational and childcare facilities for young children under five years of age—an area with weak state provision in Argentina, but which has significant implications for the autonomy and labour market success of women with young children.

There is an unmistakable gender sub-text to the two-tier system of social assistance that is being constructed in Argentina, with training/labour market entry largely targeted to men, and the more “assistentialist” family- and child-oriented programmes aimed at women, reminiscent of Fraser and Gordon’s (1994) analysis of social insurance and social assistance programmes in the United States. Moreover, while Oportunidades was instrumental in expanding health and education coverage in Mexico, the benefits of reproducing the same form of conditionality in a context which has already achieved almost universal health and education coverage, though with marked variations in the quality of that provision, as is the case in Argentina, seems doubtful. Despite donor claims to have learned from past mistakes of using “one-size-fits-all” policy blueprints (World Bank 2003), the current donor enthusiasm for transferring “successful” blueprints, of which Oportunidades is a shining example, from one country to another, regardless of context and history, suggests that “one-size-fits-all” solutions are alive and well in international policy circles.

If mass unemployment in the context of the 2001 financial and economic crisis was the stimulus to Plan Jefas in Argentina, then extensive rural distress, analysed in the chapter by Jackson and Rao, is what spurred the historic passage of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act in India in 2004—an employment guarantee as part of a constitutional right to work. Gupta’s detailed analysis traces the political
obstacles that have stood in the way of turning this act into a real guarantee whereby each and every adult citizen in India—regardless of gender, caste or region—can enjoy access to gainful employment. Perhaps the most disabling feature of the scheme from a gender perspective is the guarantee of 100 days of work per rural household. This dilutes adult entitlements regardless of gender; but given the rural power equations and inequalities, it risks putting women at the end of the queue, although reservation of one-third of all works for women may help reverse such gender bias. Benefits are further diluted by the low wages that are on offer, and by linking wages to unrealistically high productivity norms, which in the case of works requiring hard manual labour puts women in a particularly disadvantageous position (not to mention the risks that such intense manual labour places on the labouring poor of both genders who are already nutritionally vulnerable). Moreover, worksites facilities are highly inadequate, especially in the provision of childcare—a most disabling factor from women workers’ point of view.

Clearly, what is on offer falls short of a full-fledged “right to work”. At least five basic features of a meaningful “right to work” are missing, which include full coverage of all urban and rural areas; individual entitlements; unlimited days for which work is guaranteed; an assured decent living wage; and the inclusion of non-manual work to address the needs of the elderly, the disabled and, in many instances, women. And yet as Gupta concludes, the act is far more than what the government planned to enact and thus even as it is by no means a full-fledged employment guarantee, it is an indisputable defeat of fiscal orthodoxy.

**Concluding Remarks: Towards “Embedded Liberalism”?**

Economic liberalization has never been smooth or uncontested, and there have always been spaces for policy experimentation and heterodoxy, whether with respect to macroeconomic policies or social policies. Where policy makers have followed orthodox prescriptions—whether under pressure from Washington or of their own volition—the outcomes have been disappointing, even in the estimate of their designers. Rural livelihoods have become more insecure (as well as more diversified) in contexts where cutbacks in state support to domestic agriculture have coincided with increasing exposure to competition from large subsidized producers. At a time
when global commodity markets have been volatile, large numbers of people have been trapped in poverty, hunger and even famine. Insecurity is also etched into the growth of informal economies across the world, where “flexibility” has come to mean a weakening of labour standards rather than creating a better balance between paid work (production) and unpaid care work (social reproduction). With weak public health and welfare programmes, fragile infrastructure and thin social protection mechanisms, the provision of unpaid care by women and girls has been intensified—to intolerable degrees in sub-Saharan Africa, where the HIV/AIDS epidemic is taking a staggering toll of lives.

At the same time taking on paid work has become ever more necessary for all household members—whether male or female, young or old—to make ends meet in increasingly commercialized contexts. However it is important to underline that the economic policy agenda that has been so deeply adverse to many women and men around the world has also provided new opportunities to some social groups, including some low-income women. Jobs in export-oriented manufacturing firms and capitalist farms producing “high value” agricultural export crops around the world, no matter how fragile and short-lived, and how low the pay and unfavourable the conditions of work, have benefited some women. For the vast majority of women, however, gender equality will remain a distant dream as long as the market calculus remains the principal arbiter of policy.

“Re-embedding” the economy, and doing so in a way that facilitates a more harmonious integration between the twin goals of production and social reproduction, requires the strengthening of publicly accountable systems of mutual assurance against entitlement failure. This means investing in areas that orthodox prescriptions cannot countenance: well-functioning and accessible public health, education, and care services, labour standards and rights that protect women’s employment and conditions of work, and investment in public provision of a range of complementary services (clean water, sanitation, electricity, paved streets) to support the care economy. To have substantive rights and entitlements implies access to an accountable process where access to a resource is not at the arbitrary discretion of a public official, dependent on the favour of a patron or the goodwill of a husband, or the price-fixing power of a monopoly supplier (Elson 2002). Genuine empowerment is about having meaningful institutional alternatives to dependence on familial and conjugal relations, on markets and employers, and on public and non-state actors
when the terms of any of these relations become unacceptable. It means decent jobs with employment rights, and fair allowances for lifecycle contingencies such as old age, ill-health, disability and periods of intense care. It also means a more equal sharing of unpaid care between men and women, and thus a redefinition of full-time work.

It is clear that states in many different contexts are putting in place social programmes to address the adverse outcomes of liberalization policies. The full potential of these positive moves, however, is vitiated by the fact that debate over economic development and macroeconomic policy, has fallen off the agenda instead of forming an integral part of the current policy rethinking. The social distress and inequalities that are being unleashed by current economic policies are far more extensive than the remedies, however well-intentioned and important, that are being suggested and experimented with. Such prescriptions thus risk replicating the by now well-rehearsed limitations of minimal safety nets in the era of structural adjustment. In the context of liberalized trade (which reduces import and export taxes), and the pressures from mobile capital (which reduce corporate taxes, capital gains and income taxes) it is very difficult for governments to raise the kind of revenues needed to finance public services and transfers that can meet the casualties of economic policies. In sum, there is a lack of affinity and complementarity between “social policies” and “economic policies”, a failure to re-think “economic” policies through a social perspective (Elson 2004), so that “economic” policies and “social” policies can work in tandem (Mkandawire 2004).
Table 1.1 Economically active population in agriculture, agricultural value added and agricultural exports, regional averages and some country examples (1980–2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Proportion of economically active population in agriculture (1)</th>
<th>Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)(2)</th>
<th>Agricultural exports (% of merchandise exports)(2)</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
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</table>

Note: Regional averages for each variable have been calculated from countries with available data for at least two of the periods considered. Agricultural exports comprise exports of food and of agricultural raw materials.


Notes

1 In the 1970s and 1980s “reproduction” was a key concept in feminist scholarship to emphasize that women’s unpaid work was decisive in reproducing the labour force and society, and in facilitating capitalist accumulation. While this concept is still used, the emphasis has shifted to “care” which is now seen as the core of domestic activities (Anttonen 2005). While women spend a large number of hours on a variety of household tasks (though the time devoted to such tasks has been falling in the more developed countries), it is caring for others that is the main factor that limits women’s participation in activities outside the household, including paid work. For elaboration of these issues, see Razavi (2007).

2 This meant that farmers in remote areas were offered the same prices as those close to urban markets.

3 For further elaboration of this point, see Whitehead and Tsikata (2003) and Razavi (2003).

4 Women’s inheritance rights are sanctioned by law in India—at least for Hindu and Muslim women (although, according to the Muslim Shari’a Act, daughters only inherit half the share of their brother’s). But women’s legal rights are not reflected in on-the-ground realities.

5 See Chang (2002) for an elaboration of this argument.

6 There is some debate as to whether women substituted men in existing jobs, or were recruited to fill in new jobs. Given the persistent gender segmentations (both
horizontal and vertical) in labour markets, the latter is probably the dominant trend, while some substitution may have happened in some specific sectors and occupations.

7 Indeed the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade contained a variety of safeguards, exemptions and restrictions, such as preferential trading agreements, emergency safeguards and others which were designed to facilitate and protect a variety of domestic social policies.

8 It is important to underline, as Townsend does, that social security in most Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development countries began as fragmented, means-tested social assistance. It evolved into a predominantly social insurance based system with universal coverage because of mass protests against social assistance, due to the latter’s discriminatory selection of beneficiaries, meagre level of benefits and poor coverage of those theoretically entitled to assistance.

References


