Democratization and Social Policy Development in Advanced Capitalist Societies

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In a number of works stretching back twenty five years, my co-authors and I have argued that similar social, political, and historical factors are behind the development of political democracy and generous and redistributive social policy (Stephens 1979, 1989, 1995; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992, Huber, Rueschemeyer, and Stephens 1993, 1997; Huber, Ragin, and Stephens 1993; Huber and Stephens, 1999, 2001; Stephens and Kümmel 2002, Bradley et al. 2003). While the factors leading to democracy and generous social policy are not identical, they are sufficiently similar to suggest that a relatively unified theory can explain both sets of social change. In this essay, I reconsider the development of democracy and social policy in western advanced capitalist democracies, primarily focusing on the period 1870 to 1950. I extend our previous work in three ways. For the historical development of democracy, I answer the leading critiques of Capitalist Development and Democracy and adjust our explanation of these developments accordingly. Second, most of my work with Evelyne Huber on the development of welfare states has focused on post World War II period. Here I extend our analyses of this earlier period, relying heavily on Hick's (1999) award winning book, the only work, which covers all of the countries covered here. Third, in the analysis of the development of the welfare state, I examine not only the extent to which democratization and social policy development shared common causes but also the extent to which they can be considered mutually reinforcing processes.

Following the analytic strategy of Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens, I examine the universe of cases that fits the selection criteria, which are partly analytic and partly practical as the other possible cases are covered by other authors in the UNRISD project. My analytic criteria for choosing these countries is that (1) they were developed capitalist democracies as of 1950, and (2) they were stable regimes (which we know only in retrospect). The UNRISD has also asked me to focus on "western" societies. I take this to exclude not only Japan but also Eastern Europe, which are covered in other essays. There is a second analytic reason to exclude Eastern Europe. As Ertman (1998) has pointed out, the dynamics of democratization are different in the countries, which were created out of the ashes of the imperial regimes of Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary. Thus, I exclude Finland and Austria from the analysis as well as the Eastern European states which fell under Soviet domination after World War II. For a similar reason, I exclude Ireland. I exclude Portugal, Greece, and Spain, which were not stable democracies in 1950 and are also covered in another essay. The countries included in the analysis are 10 countries in Western Europe; Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom; and the four British settler colonies; Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States.¹

The period is chosen for analytic reasons. At the initial date, none of these countries had initiated any of the social policies which are generally thought to constitute the modern welfare state. In Europe, only Switzerland was democratic by the

¹ Democratization and breakdown in Austria, Finland, Spain are covered in Stephens (1989); Austria and Spain in Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992); and Austria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, and Spain in Stephens and Kümmel (2002). Social policy development in Austria and Finland is covered in Huber and Stephens (2001).
conventional definitions of democracy. For France, Switzerland, Britain, and the British settler colonies, I do extend the analysis of democratization back into the nineteenth century since developments in that period are an essential part of the explanation of the political outcome. In the initial two sections of the essay, I present our theories of democratic development and social policy development. The third and fourth sections cover the development of democracy in Europe and the British settler colonies respectively. The fifth, sixth, and seventh sections cover the development of social policy in both regions up to 1920, in the interwar period, and the immediate post World War II period respectively.

The Theory of Democratic Development

In Capitalist Development and Democracy, we adopt a conventional definition of democracy: regular free and fair elections of representatives on the basis of universal suffrage; responsibility of the state apparatus to the elected representatives of the people; and guarantees for freedom of expression and association. We argue that the development of democracy is the product of three clusters of power: (1) the balance of class power as the most important aspect of the balance of power in civil society, (2) the nature of the state and state-society relations, or the balance of power between state and civil society, and (3) transnational structures of power, or the international economy and system of states, as they shape the first two balances and constrain political decision-making.

The central thesis of our book is that capitalist development is related to democracy because it shifts the balance of class power by weakening the power of the landlord class and strengthening subordinate classes. The working and the middle classes -- unlike other subordinate classes in history -- gain an unprecedented capacity for self-organization due to such developments as urbanization, factory production, and new forms of communication and transportation. The working class was the most consistently pro-democratic force, whereas the middle classes at took an ambiguous position. As to the role of the bourgeoisie, we dispute the claims of both liberal and Marxist political theory that democracy is the creation of the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie made important contributions to the move towards democracy by insisting on its share in political power in the form of parliamentary control of the state, but the bourgeoisie was also hostile to further democratization when its interests seemed threatened.

Ertman (1998) and Collier (1999) have presented insightful criticisms of the analyses in our book and, in Collier's case, a reanalysis of our case materials. I would like to take this opportunity primarily to refine and clarify our explanation but also to accept their criticism on some points. Collier takes us to task for exaggerating the role of the working class in the European transitions. We attribute a leading role to the working

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2 In our terminology, the bourgeoisie refers to only large capitalists, not to small capital owners and urban middle classes. Looser usages of the term often include one or both of these groups.

3 This is frequent criticism of the book. Let me be clear about our claim in this regard. We claim that the working class has been the most consistent supporter of full democracy and the most consistent agent of full democracy. We do not claim that all of the working class always supported democracy (e.g. the Communist minority in some European countries in the interwar period) or that the working class majority was always democratic (e.g. Peronism in Argentina and
class in six of the ten European countries analyzed here. Collier attributes a key, but not necessarily leading, role to the working class in seven of fourteen democratizing episodes. The disagreement is primarily methodological and conceptual rather than a disagreement on the historical facts, though in two cases there is a disagreement there also. Methodologically, Collier examines democratizing episodes, that is, France 1848 and 1875-77 are two cases, whereas we treat countries as cases with the "episodes" forming the steps toward democracy. We also privilege the last step to full democracy, unless near full male suffrage was established at an earlier date. These two methodological decisions are related, as we argue that the reason why the previous step stopped short of full democracy was the weakness of working class forces. Indeed, our explanation for why restricted democracy was much more prevalent in Latin America than in Europe in the first three quarters of the twentieth century is precisely the weakness of working class forces in that region as compared to Europe.

Conceptually, we attribute more weight to cabinet responsibility to parliament than does Collier. She is not fully consistent on this point: The establishment of universal suffrage without cabinet responsibility to parliament is treated as a democratizing episode in Denmark (1848) but not Germany (1871). The 1901 introduction of cabinet responsibility to parliament in Denmark is mentioned in the text but not listed as a major episode in her summary table (Collier 1999: 35) while the 1848 suffrage reform, which was later reversed, is treated as a major episode. The establishment of cabinet responsibility to parliament in Sweden is not mentioned in the discussion of the 1918 reform. As to the historical events, Collier's account does force me to reconsider our interpretation of one case, Britain in 1918, which I will do below.

Ertman (1998) takes us to task for another element of our argument, the role of a historically strong landed elite in the breakdown of democracy in interwar Europe. Here it appears we have not stated our argument clearly enough in the chapter of the book on advanced capitalist countries. In Ertman's view (1998: 490), our argument is identical to that of Barrington Moore (1966): In countries in Europe in which a significant body of large landholders were engaged in "labor repressive" agriculture, this landed elite allied with anti-democratic elements in the state and a politically dependent bourgeoisie. This alliance exercised a measure of ideological dominance over the middle classes and small farmers and together these groups undermined democracy in the interwar period. True enough Moore was a major inspiration for the book and we did intend to test his theory on wider range of cases. But in successive drafts (a 1987 conference paper and working paper, a 1989 journal article, and the chapter in the 1992 book), we increasingly distanced ourselves from his argument for the advanced capitalist democracies and, in the book, we further distance ourselves from him on the exact mechanism by which a large body of "landlords dependent on a large supply of cheap labor" (our reconceptualization of his "labor repressive" landlords) are inimical to democracy (Rueschmeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992: 288) One of the most robust findings in our study of the historical development of 38 countries in the advanced capitalist world, Latin America, and the Caribbean was that the existence of such a class

Garyism in Grenada) or that a large mobilized working class was a necessary condition for full democracy (see the discussion of agrarian democracies below).

In our work and in Collier's universal male suffrage is suffrage criterion for classification as a full democracy.
was very unfavorable for the development of democracy. Unlike Moore, we do not posit that these landlords must be in alliance with a "politically dependent" bourgeoisie. Indeed, one of our main criticisms of Moore is that he assumes that the bourgeoisie is normally democratic and an anti-democratic posture on the part of the bourgeoisie is something that must be explained. However, we still maintain that the presence/absence of a labor dependent landed elite is a critical, if not the critical, feature that separates the democratic survivors from the breakdown cases in interwar Europe.

The structure of the state and state-society relations are clearly relevant for the chances of democracy. The state needs to be strong and autonomous enough to ensure the rule of law and avoid being the captive of the interests of dominant groups; the state's authority to make binding decisions in a territory and the state's monopoly of coercion must be settled. However, the power of the state needs to be counterbalanced by the organizational strength of civil society to make democracy possible; the state must not be so strong and autonomous from all social forces as to overpower civil society and rule without accountability.

Recent work on democratization has revived the notion developed by de Tocqueville in his discussion of the role autonomously organized social groups in the sustaining of American democracy, namely, that a strong or dense civil society is favorable for the development and sustenance of democracy. This clearly fits well with our argument that development of organization of the middle class and working class is the most important determinant of democratic development. However, as Gramsci reminds us, in more advanced capitalist societies, a dense civil society can be a conduit for inculcation of upper class ideologies in lower classes. Indeed, Hagtvet (1980), arguing against the mass society thesis, contends that German middle classes were thoroughly organized but the values propagated by these organizations were authoritarian and militaristic.

In the quantitative literature on democracy, there is some evidence that Protestantism is related to democracy. Combining this with our observations about civil society and autonomous organization, we argued that it is sectarian Protestantism, but not state church Protestantism, which encourages democracy, primarily because it facilitates the development of associations autonomous of the state. By contrast, the Anglican and Lutheran state Churches of England, Germany, and the Nordic countries were allied to the dominant classes and preached submission to state authority. To extend this, building on Lipset and Rokkan (1967), we argued that the effect of religious cleavages and the posture of religious parties on democratic development depended on the historic alignment of church and sects with social classes and the national state.

The third power cluster involves international power relations. For the European countries analyze here by far the most decisive impact of international relations has been war, which created a need for mass support both at home for production on the front for fighting and discredited ruling groups in case of defeat. In the case of British settler colonies, it is not surprising the posture of the colonial power was a critical influence on the course of events.
The class power part of our theory of democratic development has its exact counterpart in the power resources theory of welfare state development (Stephens 1979, Korpi 1983, Esping-Andersen and Korpi 1984). According this theory, variations in working class power, as indicated by the strength of union organization, the strength of parties of the left, and the governmental role of parties of the left is the primary explanation for variations in the size and redistributive impact of welfare states across advanced industrial countries. There is copious empirical evidence to support this theory for the post World War II period (e.g. see, Hicks 1999, Huber and Stephens 2001, Swank 2002, Bradley et al. 2003) and Hicks (1999) has extended the argument to the period covered in this essay.

Wilensky (1981) presents evidence that Christian democracy also encourages the development of a generous welfare state. Not only is Catholic ideology sympathetic to market correcting policy, Christian democracy aspires to be a multi-class party mediating the differing class interests and thus attempts to appeal to, and organize, the working class in competition with the left (Van Kersbergen 1995). Esping-Andersen (1990) and Van Kersbergen (1995) argue that the Christian democratic welfare state has characteristics which distinguish it from the social democratic: It is less redistributive and it reinforces the traditional gender inequalitarian male breadwinner family.

The hypotheses about the impact of social democracy and Christian democracy on welfare state development have strong affinities with the arguments for the importance of civil society for democratic development because it is assumed that the impact of these two forces is mediated by the associational life created by these two movements; unions, parties, women's organizations, youth associations, sports leagues, choral societies, etc. That is, it is not enough to have a large working class proportion or a large Catholic proportion of the population; it must be organized to have an effect on social policy. In some variants of the argument, it is of pivotal importance that the social democratic and Christian democratic parties be in government (Huber and Stephens 2001). However, in addition, opposition parties often influence the social policy agenda and electoral competition may stimulate governing parties to co-opt some of the issues of the opposition. This is particularly true of the competition between Christian democracy and social democracy as both parties attempt to appeal to and mobilize working class voters (Huber and Stephens 2001, Wilensky 2002).

The literature on early welfare state development points to another role that working class movements have had on welfare state development: These movements were often the objects of early reformist legislation, legislation which was often opposed by working class leaders because of its cooptative design or intent or because it was too meager. Bismarck's attempt to simultaneously repress social democracy and coopt workers with social policy initiatives is the most famous example of this. This dynamic is not limited to conservative governments in authoritarian regimes, but also occurs in Catholic and liberal governments in democratic regimes.

A number of studies have shown that aspects of state structure, such as state centralization, federalism, or the number of constitutionally mandated veto points affect social spending (Wier, Orloff, and Skocpol 1988, Immergut 1992, Hicks and Misra 1993, Maioni 1998). State centralization, unitary government, unicameralism or weak
upper chambers, and absence of an executive veto have been found to be favorable to social policy innovation.

In the literature on social policy development, there are frequent references to transnational influences, but the nature of these influences is quite variable dependent on the region and time period; for example, the influence of international financial institutions in the case of contemporary Latin America and Eastern Europe and of the European Union in the case of members states and the Southern and then Eastern European accession states. In the case of the countries and time period under consideration, the two world wars are without a doubt the most important influence for much the same reason that war influenced the development of democracy in these countries: These mass mobilization wars created a need for mass support at home and on the front and they discredited ruling groups in case of defeat.

**Democratization in Western Europe**

By the definition of democracy offered above, in 1870, only one country in Europe was democratic according to these criteria. By 1920, the overwhelming majority were. Two decades later, democratic rule had crumbled again in a number of these countries. What had brought democracy about? What separated the democratic survivors from the cases of breakdown?

Moore's (1966) analysis of the role of "labor repressive" landlords in account for breakdown cases focuses heavily on the type of agricultural arrangements and labor-force control adopted by the landed aristocracy. Had Moore included the smaller European countries, his analysis would certainly have begun with the existence (or absence) of a politically powerful landed class. This, in turn, is largely a product of the pattern of concentration of landholdings itself: In all of the small countries, there were too few large estates to support the development of a politically significant class of large landowners. This factor already prevents the development of the class coalition that Moore argues is fatal for democracy. The fact that democracy broke down in the two countries which contain a large body of landholders dependent on a large supply of cheap labor, Germany and Italy, and survived in the other eight countries indicates that this factor provides a powerful explanation for the survival or demise of democracy. It should be noted, however, that large landholdings may not be ‘dominant' in a statistical sense. In Germany, the West and South, the major portion of the country in land area, were dominated by small farming, as was the North of Italy (except for the Po Valley). The critical factor here is that in all these countries there was a sufficient number of large estates to give rise to the formation of a politically powerful landed elite. In many of the small countries, by contrast, small to moderate holdings were the dominant form of land ownership and no large agrarian elite existed.

Britain stands out as one deviant case in terms of landholding. While Moore (1966) argues that the type of commercialized agriculture is the factor that explains British exceptionalism, we point to a number of other features which contributed

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5 In Stephens and Kümmel (2002), I extend this to all of interwar Europe and show that 16 of 18 cases of democracy breakdown or survival can be predicted (of rather post-dicted) on the basis of agrarian class relations.
to the outcome. It is also accurate to classify the authoritarian cases, Germany and Italy, as cases in which ‘labor-repressive’ agriculture dominated. Still, while the associations presented here are suggestive of the causes of breakdown, we must examine the individual cases in our sample to uncover what social forces produced democracy and what forces and dynamics appear to explain the relationship between landed class strength and the political outcome.

The Early Democratizers

By the eve of World War I, a handful of European countries had become democratic: Switzerland (1848) was the trailblazer followed by France (1877) and Norway (1898). In 1915, Denmark joined this group. These are all nations of smallholders, urban petty bourgeoisie, and with a significant though not nearly dominant industrial sector (and therefore significant working and capitalist classes) at the time of democratization.

The roots of Swiss democracy reach relatively far back and are grounded in Swiss social structure. From the origin of the Swiss confederation in 1291, Swiss history is punctuated with successful intervention of family farmers in political developments. Such autonomous and successful intervention on the part of small farmers only occurs in countries without a powerful landed upper class and it is certainly this characteristic of the social structure of the Swiss countryside that was responsible for early political influence of farmers. Norway was similar in this respect and in both countries, small farmers, artisanal workers and the urban middle classes were the main agents of democracy. The industrial working class, in both countries was quite small at the time of the democratic transition and played little or no role in the transition. These were agrarian democracies.

In France, the various Republican factions of the late 1860s and 1870s, which provided the final push to democracy, were supported by the working class, the petty bourgeoisie, segments of the peasantry (depending on local economic organization, the influence of the Catholic clergy and revolutionary traditions), and segments of the bourgeoisie, especially in the provinces. The events of the late Second Empire clearly build on earlier democratic advances (particularly 1848) which, though thwarted, continued to influence the course of events. In these developments, the bourgeois influence was weaker, and rebellions of the largely artisanal working class played a much larger role.

The Ascendance of the Social Democratic Labor Movement as the Primary Force Pressing Democratization

In Denmark, an alliance of the working class, small and medium farmers, and urban middle class segments as represented by the Social Democratic-Venstre

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6 It should be noted that the following discussion of the transition to democracy is based not only on the final reform establishing democracy as we have defined it but also on previous steps which resulted in suffrage extension to the majority of the working class and/or the establishment of cabinet responsibility to parliament (e.g. the 1884 suffrage extension in Britain or 1901 establishment of parliamentary government in Denmark).
coalition pressed through the 1901 introduction of parliamentary government. The driving force behind the 1915 introduction of universal suffrage were the Social Democrats and the Radikale Venstre, representing the working class, small farmers, and segments of the middle class (Miller 1968, Dybahl 1969, Christiansen 1988). It is important to note here that in Denmark and Norway (as well as Sweden), the medium farmers were ambivalent about the final suffrage extensions which resulted in the inclusion of large minorities of working class voters not previously included, and it was among segments of the urban middle classes and the small farmers and tenants that labor found its ally. So to argue that the effect of landholding patterns on political outcomes was caused simply by the authoritarian posture of large landlords and democratic posture of smallholders is inaccurate. At the same time, it is important to note that the Scandinavian peasantry was divided and even the medium and larger farmers, though not supportive of the final push to universal suffrage, generally contributed to the process of democratization by supporting earlier suffrage extensions.

In the rest of Western Europe, but particularly among the antagonists in World War I, the social dislocations caused by the war contributed to the breakthrough of democracy. The war and its outcome changed the balance of power in society, strengthening the working class and weakening the upper classes. The ruling class was discredited, particularly in the defeated countries. Labor support was necessary, at home for the production effort, on the front for the first mass mobilization, mass conscription war of this scale and duration. And, finally, the war economy and mass conscription strengthened the hand of labor in the economy, enabling it to extract concessions for the coming period of peace. One indicator of the change in class power was the swell in labor organization from an average prewar level of 11% of the labor force to a post war peak of 28% in the antagonists, which experienced the transition to democracy in this period (see Table 1). Organization more than doubled in the two nonparticipants (Sweden and the Netherlands) which experienced the same transition at this time. In all these countries (with the possible exception of Britain, see below), working class forces played a key, usually the key, role in the transition to democracy. In all cases, social democracy and affiliated unions were an important contributor and, in the Netherlands and Belgium, unions and working class leagues in the clerical parties also contributed to the pro democratic posture of those parties. But, as Therborn (1977) notes, the working class was not strong enough alone. It needed allies or unusual conjunctures of events to effect the introduction of democracy. As an indicator of this it could be pointed out that in no case did the working class parties receive electoral majorities even after the introduction of universal suffrage.

In Sweden, Belgium, and the Netherlands, it can be argued that the war only accelerated the introduction of democracy. In each country, the prodemocratic coalition - the parties and the underlying alignment of social forces - had formed before or was in the process of formation. In most cases, this coalition had been responsible for previous suffrage extensions, such as the 1907 reform in Sweden or the 1893 reform in Belgium. In these countries, the agrarian elites were too weak to be a significant political force. In Sweden, the peasantry was split on the question of universal suffrage. It was the Liberals (who were based among the urban middle classes, the dissenting religions, and the small farmers in the North and West) who joined the Social Democrats in the push for suffrage extension. The war stimulated the Conservative capitulation in Sweden,
and an interparty compromise, implemented in 1917, followed several decades of political pressure (through strikes, demonstrations, and parliamentary obstruction) by the Social Democrats and the trade unions in cooperation with segments of the middle class.

In Belgium, the Workers’ Party, after decades of struggle, including six general strikes, found support in the Social Christian wing of the Catholic party, which was based on working-class Catholics (Fitzmaurice 1983; Lorwin 1966; Therborn 1977: 12, 25). In the Netherlands, similar divisions among the religious parties and the liberals produced possibilities of alliances for the Social Democrats (Daalder 1966: 203-211). It is worth emphasizing that the accounts of the transition in both low countries make it clear that the growing importance of the working class created the pressures that moved the clerical parties toward a more democratic posture. In part, this pressure was transmitted by workers and artisans, already mobilized by self-help societies and trade unions, who joined these parties, and, in part, the pressure was a result of the efforts of these parties to compete with the Social Democrats for the loyalties of unmobilized workers.

*British Exceptionalism*

The prevailing view of suffrage extension in the British case is that segments of the British upper classes had settled into a pattern of peaceful political competition by the mid-nineteenth century, and this extended to competition for working-class votes, which resulted in the suffrage extensions of 1867 and 1884. The comparative analysis of the transition to democracy suggests that in Britain this process in itself, if it were true, would be a peculiarity. In no other case did middle-class based and largely upper-class-led parties unilaterally extend effective suffrage to substantial sections of the working class (except where suffrage was irrelevant to the actual governing of the country because of the lack of parliamentary government, as in Germany, or because of electoral corruption, as in Italy). At best, some sections of the middle classes (and in France, some segments of the bourgeoisie) allied with the working-class parties for such suffrage extensions. Both cases in which the working class was politically included without substantial pressure from the organized working class itself (Switzerland and Norway) were essentially agrarian countries in which democracy was established by a peasant/urban middle-class coalition before the working class had become a significant political actor.

On deeper examination, this view of the development of democracy in Britain appears to be flawed. The reforms were in part a response to working-class pressure beginning at least as early as the Chartist movement, the main demand of which was universal suffrage, and which was extended throughout the nineteenth century. In this regard, the British case bears some resemblance to the French case, as the final transition to democracy was in part a delayed response to earlier working-class agitation that predated the formation of late nineteenth-century social democratic parties. Nonetheless it is a peculiarity that the final political initiation of the reforms came from upper-class-led parties without a strong working-class base. Another part of the explanation lies in the late development of the Labour party itself. The Liberals and the Tories were willing to extend the right to vote to workers only because they hoped to benefit from the votes of the newly enfranchised groups. Had a substantial Labour party...
already commanded the loyalty of workers, the established parties would have certainly been reluctant to make such a move. If this argument is correct, it also suggests that the absence of a significant socialist working-class party in France in the late 1860s and 1870s may have contributed to the willingness of significant sections of the bourgeoisie to support parliamentary government based on universal male suffrage.

Full democracy was established by the reform of 1918, which established male suffrage and eliminated all but minor provisions for multiple voting. Prior to the war, Labour had supported the failed Liberal bill of 1912 and continued to press for suffrage reform subsequently. However, as Collier (1999: 97-101) argues, the 1918 bill was not the result of the extension of pre-war lib-lab cooperation, contrary to our assertion in earlier work (Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992: 97). The war produced consensus among the parties in the three party national unity government that disenfranchised workers deserved the vote for their support in the war effort at home and abroad. Thus, the 1918 suffrage reform was uncontroversial. It is often contended that the reform was of minor significance compared with the 1867 and 1884 reforms. Blewett’s (1965) careful study demonstrates that this is a mistake. Although 88% of the adult male population would have qualified to vote in 1911 were it not for complications and limitations in the registration procedures, which were biased against the working class, less than two-thirds were on the voting rolls. The importance of these restrictions can be seen from the fact that this figure rose to 95% after the 1918 reforms (Matthew, McKibbon, and Key 1976: 731). Moreover, in 1911, half a million of the eight million voters were plural voters, and needless to say not many of them were working class. The importance of the 1918 reforms is underlined by Matthew, McKibbon, and Key (1976), who demonstrate that the reform was critical in allowing Labour to displace the Liberals as the second party in an essentially two-party system.

What can be said so far concerning the development of democracy in Western Europe as has been outlined here? Therborn’s (1977) argument seems to be confirmed. He stresses the important role played by the working class, that is, by its organizational representatives, the trade unions and the socialist parties. One can add the role of artisan agitation and early craft unions in the French and British cases and the role of workers in the confessional parties in the Netherlands and Belgium in pressing those parties toward a more democratic posture. The rapid development of industrial capitalism in the second half of the last century stimulated working-class organization that first gradually, and then with the war and its outcome, decisively changed the balance of class power in the entire core of the world capitalist system. The change in the underlying class structure in the democratizers as indicated by labor-force figures is significant enough: between 1870 and 1910, the non-agricultural work force grew in these countries by one-third to one-half to an average of 61% (Mitchell 1978). The change at the level of class formation and class organization was even more significant: in no country in 1870 were the socialists a significant mass based party and the trade unions organized a miniscule proportion of the labor force; by the eve of World War I, the parties affiliated with the Second International garnered an average of 24% of the vote (despite suffrage restrictions in a number of countries) and the trade unions organized an average of 9% of the labor force (See Tables 1 and 2). In the immediate post war elections, the socialists' electoral share increased to an average of 27%, while trade union organization grew spectacularly, increasing two fold. The organized working class was also the most
consistently pro-democratic force in the period under consideration: at the onset of World War I, European labor movements, all members of the Second International, had converged on an ideology which placed the achievement of universal suffrage and parliamentary government at the center of their immediate program (Zolberg 1986). One must add to this the pro-democratic working class wings of the clerical parties in the low countries.

However, Therborn's (1977) focus on the last reforms in the process of democratization leads to an exaggeration of the role of the working class. First, in the two agrarian democracy cases (Switzerland and Norway), the role of the working class was secondary even in the final push to democracy. Second, in other cases, not only did the working class need allies in the final push, in earlier democratic reforms, multi-class alliances were responsible for the success of the reform (France, Britain, Denmark, Sweden, and Belgium).

However, as the experience of the authoritarian cases shows most clearly, none of these other social classes were as consistently pro-democratic, both across countries and through time, as the working class.7 Both the urban middle class and/or segments of the peasantry provided the mass base for authoritarianism in the breakdown cases. The bourgeoisie whose role in the introduction of democracy has been emphasized in so many accounts, from Marxist to liberal, played a positive role in only three cases, Switzerland, Britain and France. Moreover, in Britain and France, it was only segments of the class that cooperated in the push for democracy, and then only after earlier histories of popular agitation for democracy and bourgeois resistance to it. In all of the others, the bourgeoisie was one of the centers of resistance to working class political incorporation. It did make an indirect contribution to the outcome, however. In the cases discussed so far, the bourgeoisie sought entry into the corridors of power and in all cases, except for Denmark and Sweden, it supported the drive for parliamentary government. Bourgeois political forces established parliamentary government with property, tax, or income qualifications for voting - that is democracy for the propertied. This system then was opened up by successive organized groups demanding entry into the system: the peasantry, the middle class, and finally the working class. There is a certain amount of truth to the extremely crude interpretation that each group worked for its own incorporation and was ambivalent about further extensions of suffrage. The positive contributions of the bourgeoisie were to push for the introduction of parliamentary government and then to capitulate to pressures for further reforms rather than risk civil war.

The Breakdown of Democracy in Italy and Germany

Thus, the working class needed allies, its power alone was insufficient. In the cases with powerful landed upper classes dependent on cheap labor, no alliance strong enough to overcome their opposition could be constructed in the pre-war period. It was

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7 In the interwar period this generalization about the working class is harder to sustain, since the splits in the working class induced by the war and the Russian Revolution created anti-democratic minorities, above all the Communist Parties, whose political posture clearly contributed to the breakdown of democracy. All of the parties of the social democratic left, which remained by far the largest of the working class parties in every country, maintained a commitment to democracy.
only the change in the balance of class power caused by the war that allowed for the
democratic breakthrough. But, as Maier (1975) argues in his study of Germany, France,
and Italy, this surge in the strength of labor and the political left was quickly, though not
completely, rolled back. A quick glance at union membership and voting statistics
indicates that this was a general European pattern (Tables 1 and 2). Where this surge of
working-class strength was the essential ingredient in the transition to democracy, the
working class and its allies (where it had any) were unable to maintain democracy when a
new conjuncture of forces presented new problems (the depression, worker and peasant
militance, etc.) and new alliance possibilities for the upper classes moved the bourgeoisie
and the landlords from passive to active opposition to the democratic regime.

This still leaves us with something of a black box in terms of the
mechanism by which the existence of a relatively strong class of landlords actually
influenced the political structures and events between 1870 and 1939. For the pre war
period, the main function of a strong agrarian elite in this perspective is to create an
alliance option for the bourgeoisie to pursue antidemocratic politics, an option not present
in the smallholding countries. This still leaves a problem for the democratic period
because even a highly cohesive upper-class alliance must reach beyond its ranks to
influence the political developments in the era of mass politics. Two basic mechanisms
can translate the power of landlords and the more general antidemocratic impulses of both
segments of the upper classes into influences on the events of the democratic period (and
the mass politics of the period immediately before World War I). The first is conscious
action, such as funding authoritarian parties and movements, using political influence to
obstruct democratic procedures, etc.

The second mechanism is ideological hegemony, in Gramsci's sense. In
this view, in advanced capitalist societies the ruling class rules in large part through a
historically developed hegemony or ideological domination. In the state- and nation-
buidling process, traditional ruling elites produce, in a nonconspiratorial way an ideology
that legitimates its rule. As more social groups are mobilized, as civil society becomes
larger, the ruling ideology is diffused to other groups. This attempt always meets with
some success, especially in the upper middle classes and more affluent middle strata.
However, in most European countries, the labor movement insulated much of the
working class from ruling-class hegemony by building, in a very conscious fashion, a
counterhegemony through the development of a dense organizational life – the party,
trade unions, workers' education associations, sports clubs, youth and women's
organizations, the development of alternative mass media, etc. Moreover, it is important
to observe that the Catholic Church, and in Netherlands the Protestant church, did
something similar; it organized a political sub-milieu for its believers. The political
orientation of this culture was, however, quite different from that of the working-class.
At one extreme, when the church was in a minority position and under attack by the state-
buidling elites, it did insulate its believers from the ruling-class hegemony and became a
possible ally for democratic forces (as in Imperial Germany and later during the Weimar
period). At the other extreme, the Catholic sub-culture could become a conduit for
authoritarian values, as in Austria. More generally, unless they were parts of explicit
oppositional social democratic or religious oppositional blocks, the political positions of
the urban middle classes and the peasantry were heavily influenced by the ideology of the
dominant class and religious coalitions. Where a strong labor dependent landed elite was
part of the ruling class coalition, it influenced the ideology of the urban middle classes and, in particular, the peasants in a conservative direction.

This way of employing the concept of ideological hegemony can be fruitfully combined with other analyses of political mobilization in Europe (see esp. Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Rokkan 1970). As pointed out there, in Protestant smallholding countries, the peasants themselves were the agents of their mobilization, and the political platform which they created were the agrarian parties. In Protestant largeholding countries, the mobilizing agents were the landed upper classes; thus the political weight of the peasants strengthened this political bloc. In Catholic countries (or certain areas, e.g. southern Germany), the mobilizing agents were Catholic parties. For a full specification of the ideological orientation of these Catholic parties, it is necessary to bring into the analysis both the posture of the state vis-à-vis the Catholic Church in the Catholic countries and the size of the Catholic community in predominantly Protestant countries. The central tendency is clear: the ideological posture of the parties varies according to the landholding structure. Above all, in all countries with a significant landed elite this class was a key force behind the party that mobilized significant sections of the peasantry.8

One caveat must, however, be added. It is not my intention to attribute, directly or indirectly, all antidemocratic and reactionary impulses in peasant and middle-class politics to the ideological hegemony of the presence of strong labor dependent landlords. This would be clearly wrong, as the examples of the Lapua movement in Finland, Rexism in Belgium, and Action Francaise in France demonstrate. Moreover, all mass support for fascism or other forms of authoritarianism in the breakdown cases cannot be traced to this source. Rather, I want to argue that the existence of a strong agrarian elite and an allied bourgeoisie significantly increased the appeal of such reactionary ideologies in the other classes.

In Italy, active intervention by landlords and capitalists in support of authoritarian outcomes was found to be of great importance. It cannot be overemphasized how critical the role of agrarian elites’ attempts to maintain the control of rural labor were in Italy. This developed differently in the developed North and the backward South. In the North, the post-war strike wave, factory occupations, peasant organizing and victories by the Socialists in local elections alarmed the bourgeoisie and Po Valley landlords. Both groups began to fund the Fascists on a massive scale as the Fascists made violent attacks on peasant organizations, trade unions, social party offices, and local councils controlled by the left the main focus of their activity. Virtually all accounts of the development of Italian Fascism emphasize the penetration of the Po Valley as a crucial turning point in the strengthening and the transformation of the character of fascism (e.g. see Seton-Watson 1967: 505-664; Lyttelton 1973: esp. Chapter 3). As Cardozza's (1982, also see Corner 1975) detailed study of the province of Bologna demonstrates, the large, commercially oriented, landlords were the most pivotal group in influencing the direction of events in the area. Their support for authoritarianism was clearly motivated by the threat to their control of labor represented by the tremendous thrust of union organization and socialist victories in municipal elections after the war.

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8 See Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens (1992: 100-02) for a further elaboration of this argument.
These events in the North propelled Mussolini to the prime ministership in the wake of the March on Rome. With the Fascists holding only 32 of the 530 seats in Parliament, he needed to make alliances to govern. In the backward South, local landlords managed to dominate politics through clientelistic networks and the deputies from the South provided critical support for Mussolini until he could manipulate the 1924 elections to produce a huge Fascist majority which he used to consolidate power and eliminate the last trappings of democracy.

As was pointed out, in Germany on the eve of World War I, only the Social Democrats were supporters of parliamentary government and full suffrage reform at all levels of government. Consequently, it seems eminently plausible to argue that the transition to democracy was a direct result of the war. The defeat in World War I, the discrediting of the ruling class, and the temporary power vacuum on the right that this created changed the balance of class power in Germany. Labor organization surged to 30% of the labor force and the democratic parties, which now could be counted to include the catholic Zentrum and the left liberal German Democratic Party (DDP) received 77% of the vote in the National Assembly elections of January 1919. Unfortunately, the right recovered quickly; these three parties only polled 42% in the June 1920 elections and never again reached a majority during the Weimar Republic (Rokkan and Meyriat 1969: 157-158). Moreover, labor organization slid sharply backward in this same period. Without the defeat, it seems quite likely that Germany would not have become a democracy for decades, until something created a decisive shift in the balance of class forces.

The Junker landlords and most of heavy industry, primarily coal and steel, supported the authoritarian German National People's Party (DNVP) throughout the Weimar Republic. Other segments of business, export oriented industry, finance and so on, tended to support the DVP or, in the case of the most liberal segments, the DDP. This segment of business gradually moved to the right, moving to favor the exclusion of the Social Democrats from any influence and the rolling back of Sozialpolitik and other pro-labor measures. This drive to exclude the Social Democrats combined with the rise of the Nazi vote left business with two options: supporting a parliamentary government with Nazi support or an extra-parliamentary cabinet of the right, either of which would move the government in an authoritarian direction. Turner (1985: 272; also see Neebe 1981: 127-139) argues that the capitalists (including the RDI leadership) finally found their chancellor in DNVP leader Papen, whose government not only began to roll back the Weimar labor legislation and Sozialpolitik but also suspended the Prussian Landtag and drew up plans to revise the constitution in a decidedly more authoritarian direction. In all these developments, business used its money, political contacts, and media to influence events in the desired direction. There can be little question that, objectively, the Papen government was a groundbreaker for the Nazis. Papen himself was a key actor in the formation of the first Nazi-led government (a coalition with the DNVP) and a minister in that government. Thus, it is clear that objectively business intervention in the political process contributed to the breakdown of democracy.

The argument that the authoritarian posture of the middle classes and the peasantry was, in part, a product of upper class ideological hegemony is important in the
German case. Here one must explain why so many people were open to voting for the Nazis (37% in 1932) or, adding the DNVP (6% in July 1932) for authoritarian parties in general. The Nazi vote increased from only 3% in 1928. This increase came almost entirely at the expense of the conservative monarchist (DNVP) and National Liberal (DVP and DDP) blocs, whose mass base was the protestant middle classes and peasantry. The socialist/working class blocks and the Catholic blocs by and large maintained their support. I contend that the authoritarian and militaristic ideology of the ruling groups of Imperial Germany contributed to the susceptibility of every other sector of the population to the reactionary appeals of Nazism. Under the impact of the increasingly desperate economic conditions of the depression, these social groups turned from the traditional conservative authoritarianism of their old parties to the radical racist authoritarianism of the Nazis. The contrasting role played by the mechanism of ideological hegemony in the two cases, its importance in Germany as compared to Italy, is a function of the level of economic development and thus the strength of civil society.

**The British Settler Colonies**

This group of countries, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, differs from the European countries in that they were characterized by broad suffrage before they achieved self-government, either in independence or within the British Empire. Thus, the relationship with the colonial power and Britain's changing role in the international political and economic system are an essential part of the story of democratization.

By conventional definitions of democracy (including ours), United States did not become a full democracy until the late sixties when the Voting Rights Act of 1965 allowed the federal government to insure that blacks in the South could exercise the right to vote. However, given state and local control of suffrage requirements and coercive power until 1965, it is more appropriate to classify the North and West of the country as a full democracy from the Jacksonian period and the South as a constitutional oligarchy or restricted democracy, depending on the time period and state in question, until the late 1960s.

The American colonies' suffrage qualifications followed the prevailing British pattern, and the crown enforced these qualifications in the colonies (Williamson 1960:3-39, Dinkin 1977: 28-49). The main qualification in Britain was the "40 shilling freehold", that is, anyone owning land bringing in an annual income of 40 shillings could vote. Despite the similarity of suffrage requirements in Britain and the American colonies, the colonial electorate was vastly larger in proportionate terms than the British: In the colonies, the proportion of adult white males entitled to vote varied from 50 to 80%, while only 15% of adult males could vote in Britain (Williamson 1960: 38, Dinkin 1977: 46-47, 49). By far the most important reasons for this were the much greater concentration of agricultural property ownership and the higher level of industrialization and urbanization in Britain. Thus, in the Northern colonies, the suffrage was broad

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enough that these states would already qualify as restricted democracies. The social basis of this political regime was the same as in Norway and Switzerland in the period immediately before the breakthrough of universal suffrage, which like the U.S. North, were not only small holding but also experienced no or weak feudal rule and no royal absolutism. As in these countries, the diffusion of rural property insured the development of a large class of politically autonomous family farmers. In the South, the existence of a large class of black slaves and greater concentration of rural property holding resulted in a political system characterized by not only a much higher degree of political exclusion but also by a higher degree of de facto concentration of power among the politically included.

The movement from this already broad suffrage to universal white male suffrage in the North and West occurred in three phases: the revolutionary era (to the adoption of the constitution), the Jeffersonian period, and the Jacksonian period. Each phase pitted roughly the same social groups against one another. The social bases of the factions divided on class lines: Those opposed to suffrage extension were generally men of property, wealth, and prestige. Small and medium farmers, artisans, and manual laborers favored suffrage extension (Main (1961: 249-281, Williamson 1960: 82-86). Thus, full democracy was achieved in the North and West in this period. The political system of this section of the country and its social base can be characterized as an agrarian democracy, similar to Norway and Switzerland among the European cases.

The Civil War and the end of slavery brought only a temporary period of democracy to the Southern United States. The end of occupation of the South in 1877 paved the way for the installation of a new system of labor control based on the crop liens and debt peonage. Southern state governments supported the system with appropriate legislation, enforcing the crop lien system and preventing outside labor recruitment (Schwartz 1976: 7-20, also see Wiener 1978). Then a series of Supreme Court decisions beginning in 1873 and stretching to 1898 progressively cut federal jurisdiction and protection in the South and opened the legal door to disenfranchisement of blacks (Moore 1966:148, Woodward 1974:71). The sequence of events clearly shows that the disenfranchisement of blacks was ultimately rooted in the incompatibility of the new repressive system of labor control and democracy.

For the completion of American democracy, the important story of the post-World War II period is the enfranchisement of blacks, which in the last instance was the achievement of the civil rights movement (Morris 1984). Structural changes in the economy and polity allowed this movement to develop and facilitated its success. First, the need for tenant labor began to decline due to declining profitability of cotton production and then to the mechanization of Southern agriculture. Agricultural modernization in the South and industrialization in the country as a whole also created a push-pull in the labor market which led to a migration of blacks toward Northern cities and toward cities within the South. By the 1960s, almost as many blacks lived outside of the old Confederacy as inside and proportionately more blacks than whites lived in cities (Woodward 1974:192, Piven and Cloward 1971: 213-215). This increased the abilities of blacks to organize.
Second, the New Deal realignments and power shifts meant that political forces in the rest of the country became allies of Southern blacks. In a precise reversal of the post Civil War events, some Northern politicians from the party that most blacks supported (now the Democrats) began to press for civil rights for blacks. The Supreme Court, whose character had been changed by the appointments of Roosevelt and Truman, in decision after decision, beginning with a 1941 decision declaring the white primary unconstitutional through the landmark Brown vs. Board school desegregation decision of 1954 and subsequent rulings supported black civil rights and asserted the right of the federal government to intervene to redress the situation, reversing exactly the post-Civil War sequence of decisions.

In part due to the previous changes mentioned which increased blacks' capacity for self-organization, blacks began to organize and to demand political and social rights. This first made itself felt through the organizing activity and political pressure of Northern blacks. As McAdams (1982: 86) points out, the positive actions to emerge from the judiciary and the executive in the 1931 to 1954 period were frequently reactions to such activity and pressures. In the following period, the initiative shifted to Southern blacks. Organized black political pressure along with the post-New Deal political alignments and power shifts in society finally resulted in the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 which gave the federal government the responsibility of enforcing black voting rights in the South and eventually resulted in the inclusion of Southern Blacks in the electorate.

The initial development of suffrage and representative government in Canada is similar to the North and West of the United States. As they did in the case of the thirteen American colonies, the British granted representative assemblies to the Canadian colonies with suffrage requirement based on the prevailing British criteria, but as in the United States, these qualifications resulted in a vastly larger proportion of adult males with suffrage rights than they did in Britain due to the wider diffusion of agricultural property. Around 70% of adult males were qualified to vote under the property qualification.

Beginning in the 1820s, one sees the beginning of consistent pressure for representative government and suffrage extension by the liberals and their forerunners. The social bases of the democratic movements are similar to the United States. Abortive rebellions in 1837 led to the appointment of a royal commission which recommended the establishment of representative government, which was indicative of the change in British posture toward the demand for self-government since the time of the American Revolution. Britain had gone through its own process of electoral reform and, more important, with the rise of industrialism, had undergone a distinct change in economic philosophy from the mercantilism to free trade, a philosophy which made sense in light of British sea hegemony and a virtual monopoly of the market for industrial goods. Colonial expenditures were seen as a liability, since free trade between nations resulted in the maximum economic benefits for all. With this change in attitude, self government was easily achieved in 1867.
At the time of Confederation in 1867, representative government had been achieved in Canada and the franchise, generally based on ownership, tenancy, or occupancy of property or on tax assessment had been extended to 70% to 90% of adult males depending on the province. The step to full democracy came as a result of World War I. In 1917, the government extended the right to vote to all members of the armed forces and their female relatives (Brown and Cook 1974: 271-272). In 1920, suffrage was further extended to virtually all males and females.

Australia is of great interest because it is one of the few cases in which the countryside was dominated by large estates and in which democracy developed at a comparatively early stage of industrialization. For the first two and one half decades after the first white settlement in 1788, Australia, initially a penal colony, was a military dictatorship. The large sheep estates, which originated in land grants to officers and in purchases by immigrant capitalists, were manned by "assigned" convict labor. Beginning in the 1830s, a new class of pastoralist entrepreneurs, "squatters", arose. These men utilized the peripheral areas under crown ownership to run large herds of sheep with assigned convict labor on very large tracts of land, initially illegally, and then under crown license. Thus, the agricultural system was labor repressive and so it is not surprising that both sections of the landed oligarchy, though favoring self-government, demanded a restricted franchise along with the continuation of convict transportation and assignment.

Arrayed against these two upper class fractions was a variety of groups created by the convict system and the wool economy. Small holders, often ex-convicts, producing wheat and other products for the domestic market favored broader democratic rights and opposed squatter attempts to monopolize crown lands. The urban centers created by the need to transport wool and service the domestic economy contained growing classes of artisans, laborers, and various middle strata which opposed squatter demands and organized to end the transportation and assignment of convicts. Initially, the urban upper and upper middle classes; merchants, businessmen, and professionals; sided with, and even led, the anti-squatter alliance (Connolly 1981).

The key factor that prevented the development of authoritarianism was that the landed upper classes did not control the state; the colonial state was still controlled by London. Following the liberal climate of opinion in British politics in the forties, the Colonial Office moved to grant the self-government demanded by factions in the colony in a way in which the squatter oligarchy would not be allowed exclusive political influence. In 1839, the Colonial government ended assignment of convict labor and then in 1840 terminated the transportation of convicts marking the end of the labor repressive system in Australia. In the political battles of the following decade and a half, the anti-squatter alliance was strengthened by the discovery of various gold fields beginning in the 1850s, and the immigration of "diggers" many of whom had absorbed the lessons of Chartism in Britain. These developments helped insure the initial victory of the moderate liberal alliance and the introduction of a wide franchise, though not manhood suffrage, and responsible government. Subsequently, the leadership of the liberals shifted to the radicals, urban middle class politicians supported by the working and middle classes, who pressed the agenda forward advocating manhood suffrage, the
secret ballot, and a democratic Legislative Council (the upper house) as well as land reform and social reform. With this left turn, the urban upper and upper middle classes defected wholesale to the conservatives (Connolly 1981). By 1860, the liberals had succeeded in pressing through much of their agenda in all colonies except Tasmania: manhood suffrage for the Legislative Assemblies and the secret ballot had been introduced and the property qualifications for members of the legislature had been abolished (Clark 1955:374-377).

The political arrangements in the Australian colonies remained essentially the same from this period until the rise of the labor movement in the 1880s and 1890s. The Labor parties made dramatic gains in elections in all colonies in the early nineties except Tasmania which followed suit a decade later. Labor-Liberal coalitions pushed through electoral reforms which (1) introduced manhood suffrage for the lower house where it had not already been the rule, (2) abolished property qualifications for office holding, (3) introduced payment for members of parliament, (4) eliminated plural voting for property holders, and (5) in many colonies, introduced female suffrage (Clark 1955: 374-77, De Garis 1974: 239-41). With the introduction of federation in 1901, universal suffrage was adopted at the federal level.

The colonization of New Zealand did not begin until 1840 and, thus, at its initial stages its whole development; economic, social, and political; was shaped by post-mercantilist Britain, specifically, by the liberal free trade philosophy that had penetrated the Colonial Office at this time. The availability of land made it difficult to deny laborers land. The consequence was the dominance of small family farming along North American lines. True, there were a number of large sheep estates, but these employed very little labor; even the largest were populated by no more than a score of people including the owner and his family. With the addition of the goldminers in the 1860s, the social structure of New Zealand was favorable to democracy. However, the unquestionably pro-democratic forces created by these economic arrangements did not have to fight very hard for democracy. The initial constitution in 1846 authored by the Colonial Office, provided for household suffrage. In response, the colonists demanded self-government with broad suffrage (Marais 1968: 291), and the 1852 constitution contained suffrage provisions which excluded few males. The liberals proceeded to complete the process of democratization by eliminating plural voting with two laws in 1891 and 1893 (Dalzeil 1981: 109-110, Sinclair 1961: 167).

Social Policy Development 1880-1950

It is the consensus among students of welfare state development in the now advanced industrial countries that the first modern welfare state legislation, that is, legislation which departed from the poor law tradition, was Bismarck's 1883 sickness insurance legislation (see Table 3). From this point until 1950, there is a deep interplay between the history of social policy development and the history of democratic development in the European countries analyzed in this essay. In the period up to 1920, most of these countries were in the process of establishing democracy and, in a significant group of them, the same social forces which established democracy also were responsible for social policy reforms. In the interwar period, social policy developments were part of
the process of democratic stabilization and class compromise in most of the European
democratic survivors and opposition to social legislation was at least a contributing
reason to democratic eclipse in Germany and Italy. Finally, the initial post war years
witnessed the consolidation of the post war class compromise in all of these counties.
Except for Australia and the American South, the relationship between social policy
development and democratic developments is not so intimate in the British settler
colonies, but the interwar period, particularly, the depression, is pivotal in the welfare
state development in all of them, so this periodization is useful in all four of these
countries.

1880-1920

The period of rapid industrialization in Europe in the last half of the
nineteenth century created significant industrial working classes in all countries and with
it the gradual development of working class organization and concern among intellectual
and political elites for the "worker question". The first response of political elites, as we
have seen, was cooptative: Authoritarian monarchist governments in Germany and then
Austria-Hungary passed social legislation aimed at coopting workers and fending off the
growing social democratic workers' movements. The response of the Catholic Church to
the growing working class and the rise of the atheistic social democratic parties was to
try to organize their own worker movement, unions and working class wings of
Catholic parties, and, beginning with the Papal Encyclical Rerum Novarum in 1893, to
appeal to workers with their own anti capitalist ideology which rejected the market but
also rejected the notion of class conflict. While the basic relationship between the social
democrats and Catholics was competitive and often hostile, this did not stop them from
cooperating on specific issues, as we saw in the case of suffrage reform in the
Netherlands and Belgium.

A similar relationship existed between the centrist liberals and the social
democrats. Though the liberals infrequently set up their own unions and even more rarely
were very successful at it, they did simultaneously compete with the social democrats for
political supporter and voters among workers and cooperate with them on some issues, as
we saw in the case of democratizing reforms in Britain, Sweden, and Denmark.

For the period under examination here, there are no comparable data on
social spending, the most common measure of social policy generosity. However, one
can trace the development of social policy by examining the passage of the first
significant social legislation in the five areas covered in the US Social Security
Administration's publication, Social Security Programs Throughout the World. A
drawback of the USSSA dating of the first program is that the program could be
voluntary and/or cover very few citizens and thus not provide social protection to a
significant proportion of the citizens of the country in question. To remedy this, Hicks
(1999: 50-53) consulted other sources and country specialists in order to come up with
dates for the first binding law or law with extensive coverage and for the first law which
was both binding and extensive (Table 3). Hicks' (1999: 53) definition of these terms
follows:
Binding here refers to programs that are (a) legally compulsory for some set of national actors (citizens, firms, and so on) or (b) virtually binding, as in the case of Ghent unemployment programs . . . Extensive and funded programs are programs that cover a notable share of potential target groups . . . and are adequately funded to begin provision within some period of two or three years (after the passage of the legislation).

For his analysis of "early program consolidation", Hicks employs Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), an analytic techniques based on Boolean algebra developed by Ragin (1987). QCA requires that the analyst dichotomize both the dependent and independent variables. For 1920, Hicks' criterion to qualify as an "early consolidator" is that a country must adopt three programs that were binding or extensive. He crosschecks this with an analysis for 1930 in which the country must have three binding and extensive programs. For 1920, he finds that are three paths to early consolidation: a "lib-lab" path which combines strong working class organization and frequent liberal party government (Britain, Sweden, Denmark, and Italy), the labor-Catholic path which combines strong working class organization and Catholic government (Belgium and the Netherlands), and finally a Bismarckian path which combines authoritarian government with strong working class organization (Germany and Austria – the one case included in Hicks's analysis not included here). Thus, strong working class organization is a necessary but not sufficient condition for early program consolidation.

QCA can only demonstrate association and one must go to the historical sequence to determine whether the configurations correspond to actual historical causal sequences. In at least two of the three pieces of legislation in the countries, except in the case of Italy, the configurations do conform to the causal sequences. In Germany, the reforms of 1883-89 were in fact an attempt by a conservative monarchist government to coopt the rising working class and consolidate the authoritarian regime. In Belgium and the Netherlands reforms were passed by Catholic led governments either faced with rising working class movements or, in the case of the legislation after the turn of the century by the same cooperation between Catholic governments and social democratic parties and unions which was responsible for the reforms that brought full democracy to these two countries. Similarly, in Sweden, Denmark, and Britain, the reforms were passed by liberal government faced with rising working class movements or, in the case of the post 1900 reforms, the same lib-lab cooperation that was responsible for the democratic reforms.

Italy is clearly not a lib-lab case comparable to Sweden, Denmark, and Britain. Before World War I, Italy was not even a restricted democracy because under the trasformismo system of political clientelism, the Liberals were able to maintain their hold on power through a combination of fraudulent elections and patronage. The two hundred odd deputies from the backward South were key to their grip on power. Thus, the 1898 reform, which was aimed a coopting the working class, resembles the Bismarckian reforms more than the lib-lab reforms in Britain or Scandinavia. The regime was democratic in 1919 and the reforms of 1919 were passed by the Liberals in an attempt to broaden their base, that is, in competition with the Socialists, not as a result of cooperation with them as in post 1900 reforms in Britain, Sweden, and Denmark.
It is striking that none of the early democratizers or the former British colonies were "early consolidators" by Hicks' criterion. Even more striking is the lag between the adoption of full democracy (using the 1832 date for the United States) and the adoption of three binding and extensive programs (Hicks' post 1920 criterion). It is important to remember that five of these countries were "agrarian democracies" (Switzerland, Norway, New Zealand, Canada, and the north and west of the United States), countries dominated by family farms with no significant agrarian upper class and no legacy of feudalism, weak or no legacy of monarchism, not to speak of absolutism. In these countries and in France, there were no or weak modern social democratic labor movements at the time of transition. Working class contributions to democratization, if any, came from the pre-industrial working class. Hicks (1999) points precisely to the weakness of the working class movement to account for the welfare state laggard status of these countries. Amenta (1998) would add that the undemocratic American South was a significant obstacle to social policy innovation in the United States.

In Hicks' (1999) analysis, Australia was the one country with a strong labor movement prior to 1920 which was not an early consolidator by either his 1920 or 1930 criteria. In part, this represents a reality in that national legislation existed only in the two areas indicated in Table 3. The reason for this is simple: The Australian federal constitution of 1901 reserved power in all other social policy to the states. However, even before independence, the Labor party had become the largest or second largest party and, with liberal cooperation, had passed social legislation in every colony except Tasmania. More important, as Castles (1985) has argued, was the development of "social protection by other means", namely via the system of compulsory arbitration, in both Australia and New Zealand. In Australia, the Harvester judgment of 1908, which guaranteed unskilled workers sufficient wages to support himself, his wife, and three children, was the critical turning point and, in 1920, this was complemented by a decision guaranteeing workers 100% wage replacement in sick pay for short sick absences. If one counts this along with the legislative reforms, then Australia qualifies as an early consolidator and also a lib-lab case since the social legislation and the arbitration court were products of cooperation between the Labor Party and the protectionist faction of the liberals.

By 1930, New Zealand rises into both Hicks' strong labor movement and early consolidator categories. Hicks' placement of New Zealand in the lib-lab path is supported by the historical events of the period. Moreover, as in Australia, the arbitration system guaranteed workers a living wage for their family.

There can be little doubt that relatively high levels social reform legislation in the nascent European democracies following the lib-lab and Catholic-labor paths (Denmark, Sweden, Britain, Belgium, and Netherlands) helped to stabilize the democratic systems in these countries. It continued a virtuous cycle of working class integration and moderation begun by the earlier democratizing reforms. The working class victories in the struggle for political and then social rights reinforced the dominant reformist wings of these movements. This, in turn, led to acceptance of democracy and social reform by conservative upper class groups. The contrast with Norway which otherwise is so similar to Denmark and, especially, Sweden is telling. As one can see from Table 3, no social policy initiatives were made between 1909 and the Labor Party's
accession to power in 1935. The revolutionary wing of the Norwegian Labor Party took control of the party in 1918 and took it into the Communist International in 1919, the only western European social democratic party to make this move. Moreover, as one can see from Table 4, Norway had easily the highest strike rate of any of our countries in this period. Disappointment with the fruits of democratic party politics is certainly one reason for the party's radicalization.

**Interwar Period**

Among our ten European countries, only two countries suffered democratic breakdowns in the interwar period. However, among the ten Eastern and Southern European countries not examined here, democracy survived only in Czechoslovakia and Finland, and in the latter only in restricted form due to exclusion of the numerically significant Communists. With the advent of the depression and the resultant additional political pressures, the political climate for the remaining democratic regimes was not particularly favorable. Moreover, as one can see from Table 4, this was a period of great industrial unrest in many of these countries. Nevertheless, not only did they weather the period as democracies, in five of these eight countries, the Scandinavia and the low countries, profound class and political compromises which prefigured the post World War II development of neocorporatism emerged. In all of these countries, social policy innovations figured as one element of these compromises.

After the post war surge of union organization and industrial unrest subsided, an impasse in the area of social policy emerged in most of these countries. At the heart of this impasse was the pre-Keynesian economic orthodoxy which prescribed budget austerity and real wage decreases as response to prevailing high levels of unemployment. This was a vexing problem for social democratic minority governments in Denmark and Sweden. The first break with orthodoxy came with the 1929 Social Democratic election victory in Denmark and the striking of a political deal with the Radical Liberals, the junior partner in the ensuing coalition government, who represented small farmers, and the opposition Liberals, representing large farmers, which traded agricultural subsidies for farmers for support for the Social Democrats' active crisis policy (Esping-Andersen 1985: 76-77). This was followed by the Social Reform Bill of 1933, which not only improved sickness and maternity pay as indicated by Table 3, but also made substantial improvements in unemployment benefits and other measures, making it "the most comprehensive social legislation in any European country at that time" (Christiansen and Petersen 2001: 182). With their election victory of 1932, the Swedish Social Democrats followed suit, striking a similar agreement with the Farmers' Party, based on well worked out Keynesian principles four years before the publication of Keynes' *General Theory*. In the area of social policy, the Social Democrats passed the unemployment legislation noted in Table 3 in 1934 and important improvements of pensions in 1935 and 1937 (Lundberg and Åmark 2001: 26). In Norway, the farmer-labor agreement was struck in 1935 and followed by social legislation (see Table 3). In all three countries, the events of the thirties ushered in extended periods of social democratic governmental dominance.

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10 Due to opposition to democratic centralism, the Norwegian Labor Party left the Comintern in 1923 but continued to espouse revolutionary goals in election campaigns in 1927 and 1930. The decisive move to reformism came between 1930 and 1933 (Esping-Andersen 1985: 80-81).
In the Netherlands, the Social Democrats did not join the government until the outbreak of World War II, but the country experienced many of the steps toward class compromise due to the dominant position of the Catholics, who had a very strong trade union wing, in most governments. In response to working class militance right after World War I and taking the lead from the Catholic trade unions, the Catholic led government passed a number of pieces of social legislation improving pensions, limiting the workweek, and improving workers compensation. A decade later, in response to the Depression, the Social Democrats and left Catholics demanded an expansionary Keynesian style policy. The government initially resisted, but, in 1937, initiated an extensive program of public works and purchased both agricultural and industrial goods in order to support prices and boost consumption; a move reminiscent of the red-green compromises in Scandinavia (Aarebrot 2000: 325-27).

The Social Democrats in Belgium were included in the war time government in exile and afterward continued in the government of the war torn country. This government, which was faced by a huge surge in union organizing, enacted much progressive legislation, including an eight hour day, progressive taxation, and pension legislation; some of which was rolled back after the Social Democrats left the government in 1921 (Cole 1958: 503). Though the Social Democrats again joined the government for a short period in the mid twenties, it was the "national unity" government of the three major parties; Social Democrats, Catholics, and Liberals; that took power in March 1935 that marked the new turn toward deepening class compromise. Initially, the government was preoccupied with a banking crisis, and but then strikes affecting half the workforce and the success of the fascist Rexist movement in the May 1936 election, with 11.5% of the vote, galvanized the new national unity government, in which the Social Democrats had a stronger presence, to action. It conceded to some of the strikers' demands and granted a higher minimum wage, six days of paid leave per year, and the gradual introduction of a forty hour working week (De Meur and Berg-Schlosser 2000: 82).

Katzenstein (1985: 136) points out that the cross-collaboration of the 1930s in these five countries "played the midwife at the cradle of democratic corporatism", the highly institutionalized postwar system of political exchange which featured highly centralized employer organizations and union federations and bargaining over a wide range of social and economic objectives. The events in the social policy arena and cross party compromises outlined above were complemented in industrial relations by agreements between employers and unions that paved the way for the development of centralized bargaining and a dramatic decline in strikes, which had been very high in most of these countries in the interwar period, in the post period (see Table 4).

Though the Swiss Social Democrats entered the Federal Council, the seven member collegial executive, in 1935 and a peace agreement between employers and unions was struck two years later, Switzerland stuck with economic orthodoxy and did not experience a new breakthrough in social policy, a pattern which continued after World War II (see Table 3). As Immergut (1992) argues, the Swiss constitutional structure, which provides for multiple veto points necessitating the construction of very large coalitions to pass any legislation, is the reason for the laggard status of the Swiss
welfare state, especially when compared to Belgium and the Netherlands, the two other consociational democracies with similar social cleavage structures.

Social policy development in France is strikingly backward at the outbreak of World War II (Table 3). The Popular Front government elected in 1936 promised to change this, but it was short-lived and its main achievement, an industrial relations agreement in which employers for the first time agreed to recognize unions and negotiate with them, was quickly rolled back. After establishing itself as an early consolidator, Britain also made little progress in the field of social policy in the interwar period. The Conservative Party won every election except the 1929 election that produced a minority Labour government, which quickly fell apart as the MacDonald leadership of the party refused to break with economic orthodoxy and bolted to support a Conservative government which carried out an austerity policy.

By contrast, the two North American welfare state laggards did experience major departures in this period. As Hicks (1999) argues, the two cases are similar in that the social democratic parties are small and politically unimportant at the national level and it was centrist parties, who enjoyed very large political majorities, which carried through the reforms. Amenta (1998) adds that, in the United States, the New Deal reform burst required not only a Democratic and reform-minded president but also a Congressional majority of non-Southern Democrats. Despite this, the Southern representatives retained sufficient power to assure that the reforms did not threaten the agrarian labor control system in the South: Agricultural workers were excluded entirely and the states controlled the level of compensation in the unemployment insurance system.

In New Zealand, the Labour Party won the 1935 election in a landslide and was re-elected in a second landslide in 1938, an election that was fought largely on Labour's social security bill. The bill was passed soon after the election and was complemented by other measures during Labour's period in office which ended in 1949. The package included increases in the means-tested pension, a flat rate universal superannuation benefit, a universal family allowance with a flat rate benefit for each child, and essentially free medical care. In Australia, Labor was shut out of office in the interwar period and no progress was made in the social policy arena.

Post War Compromise

World War II and its outcome stimulated class compromises, the cornerstones of which were Keynesian economic policy, social policy innovation, and the routinization of industrial relations, across the advanced industrial world, but most intensively in the European countries. During the war in the democratic European countries, the war and the struggle against fascism stimulated national cross class solidarity which expressed itself in war time grand coalitions, even in neutral Sweden and Switzerland. The defeat in war discredited the fascists and the ruling classes who had collaborated with fascists. This eliminated the most powerful opponents of democracy. The class compromise further strengthened democracy as it (further) integrated the working class movements into the system and thus moderated their demands which served to reassure any potential upper class opponents of democracy.
In the Scandinavian and Low Countries, the immediate post war period consolidated the work of the thirties as the same coalitions ruled these countries and pushed through the post war legislation. From Table 3, we can see that these countries completed the laying of the foundations for the basic welfare state transfer programs. In addition, they also passed national health insurance in this period. Finally, as I mentioned in the previous section, these five countries developed centralized bargaining systems and broader patterns of neo-corporatist bargaining among labor market and political actors in the early post war period and, as a consequence, experienced dramatic declines in industrial conflict. Here the class compromise was most complete and, in the long run, the outcomes most egalitarian (Bradley et al. 2003). In the areas of social policy and macro-economic management, the Labour government of 1945-51 moved Britain in a similar direction. The new concepts of macro-economic management were adopted by subsequent Conservative governments and the welfare state reforms were accepted but not extended by them, until the Thatcher government reversed the policy course in both areas.

In Germany, the class compromise was less favorable to labor, which one might expect given the exclusion of the Social Democrats from government. Nonetheless, the Christian Democratic government, in part because of its pro-welfare ideology, in part because of pressure from its labor wing, and in part because of competition with the Social Democrats, did implement significant social reforms, which propelled it to the position of highest social spender among the countries analyzed here though the program structures were less egalitarian than those in Britain, Scandinavia, and the Low Countries (Huber and Stephens 2001: 147-49, Huber et al. 2003). On the industrial relations front, post war development led to more inclusionary arrangements for labor. The coal, iron, and steel entrepreneurs had been among the earliest supporters of Hitler and this led to labor demands for nationalization of these industries. The compromise was a system of co-determination in which labor received full parity in the management boards in these industries. In 1952, this was extended to other large business but labor received only one-third of the seats on the board of these businesses. The result in terms of its effect on industrial conflict was similar to neo-corporatist countries, dramatic declines in strikes (Table 4).

The compromises struck in Switzerland and France and Italy were less inclusionary for labor in different ways and for different reasons. In Switzerland, an industrial peace accord between employers' associations and unions was struck prior to the war, but the multiple veto points in the legislative process continued to impede the progress of social legislation and the resulting social policy regime was the least generous and least redistributive in Europe. In France and Italy, the Communists became the largest parties of labor due to their successes during the Resistance. After the war, broad popular front coalitions including the Communists passed important pieces of social legislation in both countries. With the beginning of the Cold War and the exit of the Communists from the governments of both countries in 1947, the largest working class parties were politically isolated. One manifestation of this was the level of industrial unrest, which in these two countries was higher than in the interwar period, in sharp contrast to all of the other European countries.
In Australia, the Labor Party came to power in 1941 but was in a tenuous parliamentary situation until it emerged victorious in the 1943 election. The Labor governments of 1943-49 passed legislation providing for child allowances, unemployment benefits, sick pay, and health care benefits for the first time at the federal level and they passed legislation improving pensions and maternity allowances. Most of this legislation was of dubious constitutionality, so the Labor Party moved to amend the constitution, which it managed to do after one false start. The last Labor government also passed national health insurance, which, however, was not fully implemented when it left office in 1949, and the new Liberal government replaced it with federal subsidies for nonprofit health insurance.

In Canada and the United States, there were no post war compromises, at least in regard to social policy. The progress in social legislation of the thirties and early forties came to a halt. After the unions failed to extend the welfare state, they turned to collective bargaining to achieve the benefits in health care, supplementary pensions, and sick pay which most European workers received (or would receive) from the welfare state. Of course, these benefits only went to organized workers and, even among them, they were unequally distributed due to differences in bargaining power and labor productivity. The reliance on the strike weapon can clearly be seen in Table 4. The United States and Canada join Italy and France as the countries with the highest levels of industrial conflict in the post war period, and all four registered increases over the interwar period. As Korpi and Shalev (1979) show, the commonality among these apparently strange bedfellows is that, in all four of them, the working class had no access to political power: In Italy and France because of the pariah status of the Communists; in the United States and Canada because of the absence of a significant labor party.

As I pointed out in the discussion of democracy, the United States does not become a full democracy until the mid 1960s, a period which also witnessed new social policy initiatives. As we have found at many other points in this analysis, the politics of democratization and the politics of social policy are again linked as the coalition of social political forces behind national support for the Southern civil rights movement were much the same as those that pushed through President Johnson's Great Society legislation. Still the US initiative fell short of developments elsewhere among the advanced capitalist democracies; while neighboring Canada passed national health insurance for all citizens in this period, the United States implemented a program that covered only the aged and the poor, remaining the only advanced industrial country without very broad or universal coverage in its public health care system (Maioni 1998).

Conclusion

This historical overview has shown that the development of democracy and the development of the welfare state were deeply interwoven but distinct processes. As of 1870, there was only one full democracy among our fourteen countries and in none of them had a single piece of modern social legislation been passed. By 1950, all of them were democracies and nascent welfare states. The feature that ties the two together is the development of the modern working class movement, which was critical in many of the democratic transitions and central, either as an agent or object, in the development of modern social policy.
However, the processes were hardly identical. In the countries which transited to democracy before substantial industrialization, the agrarian democracies (Switzerland, Norway, New Zealand, Canada, and the north and west of the United States) as well as France, any participation of the working class in the transition to democracy came in the form of artisanal, pre-industrial workers and they were at best partners in a much larger coalition. In these countries, there was a very long delay between the transition to democracy and the development of the first modern social policies.

By contrast, in the remaining countries, the final transition to democracy came after substantial industrialization, the coalitions for democracy and welfare state reform were closely related, and substantial social reform came simultaneous with democratization or followed it closely. In all of these the modern working class, in the form of unions, social democratic parties, or working class wings of Catholic parties, was a central actor in the historical drama. In Sweden, Denmark, Australia, Belgium, and the Netherlands, the two processes were practically identical; labor-liberal or labor-Catholic party coalitions championed social reform and democratic reform. In Britain, labor was not as central to democratic reform, but lib-lab coalitions were responsible for the early social legislation. In Germany and Italy, early social reforms were sponsored by governments in efforts to co-opt growing working class movements. In both countries, democracy came as a result of the dislocations caused by World War I and it did not survive the interwar period.

The paths to the post war compromise can be read off these early twentieth century democratic transition/welfare reform cases. In the Low Countries, the social democratic-Catholic alliances continued or were reformulated after a hiatus. In Sweden, Denmark, Britain, and Australia, there is a shift to social democratic dominance of the reform process. Among the early democratizers, Norway and New Zealand join this latter group. In these eight societies, the post war compromise is most favorable to labor. In these countries, on the average, over half of the labor force was covered by sickpay legislation and more than 60% by unemployment compensation and pension legislation. The average income replacement rate for the average production worker was 37% in the case of unemployment compensation and sickpay and 24% in the case of pensions. Public health care was available at no or modest cost to all or nearly all citizens, except in Australia (see above).

In France and Italy, the post World War II liberation coalitions, which included Catholics, social democrats, and communists, installed the social legislation

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11 Students of the welfare state may be surprised at the inclusion of Britain, New Zealand, and Australia in this group of generous welfare states, given that these three countries are classified as liberal welfare states in typologies influenced by the Esping-Andersen (1990) scheme, but, in 1950, they were certainly among welfare state leaders. It is the infrequent periods of labor government in the subsequent three decades which arrested welfare state development in the three countries which accounts for their laggard status in Esping-Andersen's 1980 measures of social policy characteristics.

12 The coverage and replacement rate figures are estimates based on graphs in Palme (1990), Kangas (1991), and Carroll (1999). For Australia and New Zealand, I have adjusted the sickpay coverage figures to reflect the rights secured through the arbitration system and the unemployment coverage figures to reflect coverage in the means tested system.
pillar of the post war compromise. In Germany, the compromise between the unions and the Social Democrats and to be dominant Christian Democrats was worked out under the shadow of the occupation and a power vacuum on the right and followed Christian democratic lines in social policy and social democratic lines in industrial relations. In Switzerland, an inclusionary industrial relations accord was struck, but the multiple veto points in Swiss political structures blocked the development of more generous social policy. Finally, in Canada and the United States, the period of innovation occurred before the end of World War II, and social policy and industrial relations were least favorable to labor, certainly a product of the fact that neither country had a social democratic party capable of competing for national power.

In the recent literature on democratic transitions, it has become routine to attribute successful democratic transition and consolidation to strong civil societies. In my accounting of the events, the term "civil society" appears infrequently. Secondary associations do figure prominently in the analysis, but they are differentiated by their position in the cleavage structure instead of lumped together under the umbrella term "civil society". The strong social democratic movements are strong not simply because they get many votes, but also because the party, the unions, their women's associations, their cooperatives, their youth organizations, their sports clubs, and so on, enlisted many members. Likewise, underlying the strength of the agrarian parties of Scandinavia was a network of farmers' organizations. For the Liberals, it was the dissenting churches and the temperance movement. Similarly, and in part in reaction to the rising labor movements, the Catholic Church built a parallel network of organizations. The advantage of analyzing the impact of strong civil societies through the lens of the cleavage structure is that it allows one to recognize that a network of secondary organizations can be a conduit for authoritarian values as was the case in the German middle class, and thus not contribute to democratic transition – on the contrary.

I contend that not only did social policy and democracy develop hand in hand, social policy was necessary for democratic stability. If democracy is not a sham, then the less privileged must be able to use the democratic process to influence the outcome of the policy making. If they are unable to do this, they will either become alienated from the political system or move to oppose it. This is etched in the history recounted here; the labor movements in Western Europe were initially quite radical; their ultimate goal was the complete transformation of the capitalist system. Once they were successful in their demand for political democracy, they became in practice reformists – they accepted the decisions that emerged from the democratic process. As they were able to achieve some of the distributive goals within capitalist democracy, those long term socialist goals began to recede in importance, eventually to be put on the shelf forever. The integration of the working class movements also reconciled the nineteenth and early twentieth century upper class opponents of democracy as they began to see that democracy would not result in expropriation.

Is the experience of the advanced capitalist democracies relevant to less developed countries now? Skeptics might contend that the level of affluence of these countries makes their experience irrelevant to the less developed countries of today. However, at the end of the historical processes outlined here, these countries were not much more affluent than the more advanced parts of the less developed world today, such
as Latin America and the Caribbean. The average per capita income in constant dollars corrected for purchasing power parities of the 14 countries examined here was $7583 in 1950 compared to $6538 in Latin American and the Caribbean in 1998. The overlap in the distribution is impressive: Eight of the 29 Latin American and Caribbean countries for which Penn World Tables data are available in 1998 are above the 1950 industrial country mean and another eight are within one standard deviation of the 1950 industrial country mean. Moreover, the social spending levels were very similar: In 1950, these 14 advanced industrial countries spent 7.6 percent of GDP on social security, welfare, and health benefits; in 1999, 12 Latin American and Caribbean countries for which data are available spent 7.0 percent of GDP in these areas.\footnote{The advanced industrial country data are the ILO social security benefit spending measure; the Latin America and Caribbean data is from IMF financial statistics. These 12 countries are not more wealthy than the 29 referred to above. The average per capita income for these 12 is $6551.}

Let us be clear, social spending and entitlement in the 14 advanced capitalist democracies would not qualify them as being the advanced welfare states they became 25 years later. By 1975, social security benefit expenditure had risen to 18% of GDP in these countries; income replacement rates in sickness and unemployment insurance and pensions had doubled and coverage had increased by at least half. Moreover, the similarity in spending levels between Latin America and the Caribbean in 1998 and the advanced industrial democracies in 1950 hides as much as it reveals, because it ignores differences in employment structure and the distribution of benefits. In the advanced industrial democracies in 1950, what is known as the black economy in current Southern Europe or the informal economy in Latin America was quite small and most non-agricultural employees were covered by the social security laws. Though some social security legislation gave privileged status to white collar workers and civil servants, this was largely limited to Christian democratic welfare states and even there it was limited when compared to contemporary Latin America. Thus, in 1950 in our eight leading welfare states, an average production worker, who clearly would be in the bottom half of the income distribution, would receive adequate (by the standards of the time) and near free health care, quite modest sickpay when sick, employment compensation if out of work, child allowances if with children, and a quite modest pension when retired. In short, he would receive very basic economic security from the nascent welfare state.

By contrast, in Latin America and the Caribbean, anywhere from 20 to 60% of the labor force is in the informal sector where they are not covered by most social security programs. On the average, over 70% of the funds in the social security spending figure cited above goes to pensions and not only does this accrue entirely to formal sector employees, it is often highly inegalitarian in its structure, with privileged groups, such as military officers, judges, and higher civil servants receiving much better pensions than manual workers. Thus, a worker in the bottom half of the income distribution is unlikely to receive any of the transfer payments received by the production worker in the advanced welfare states in 1950. Moreover, though many Latin American countries guarantee public health care, it is grossly underfunded and many people, particularly in the rural areas, are miles, even scores of miles, from the nearest clinic. Thus, it is not surprising that social security and welfare spending is very highly inegalitarian in its impact in advanced industrial democracies (Bradley et al. 2003) but highly inegalitarian in Latin America and the Caribbean. By contrast, health and education spending which does
benefit informal sector workers is modestly egalitarian in Latin American and the Caribbean (Huber et al. 2004). My point here is that, as indicated by their per capita GDPs, these countries have adequate national resources to provide basic welfare state provisions. What is lacking is social and political movements with sufficient power to push through the required social policy legislation.


Appendix

Table 1

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Source: Stephens (1979: 115)
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Mean: 5.8 13.7 21.8 26.6 28.2 31.5 35.9

Source: Mackie and Rose

### Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Welfare Program</th>
<th># of Programs Adopted by:</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Old Age, Disability &amp; Survivors</td>
<td>1920 1930 1940 1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sickness &amp; Maternity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Workers Compensation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unemployment Compensation</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Family Allowance</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Binding or extensive</td>
</tr>
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<td>Social Democratic Dominance</td>
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</tr>
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<td>1922 1933 1916 1907</td>
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<td>1925 1911 1946 1920</td>
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Cont. Table 3

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<th>Welfare Program</th>
<th># of Programs Adopted by:</th>
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<td>Old Age, Disability &amp; Survivors</td>
<td>1920 1930 1940 1950</td>
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<td>Sickness &amp; Maternity</td>
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British Settler Colonies
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<th>Form of Government</th>
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<th>1908</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1941</th>
<th>1944</th>
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Source: Hicks (1999: 51)

Table 4

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Cell entries are man hours lost per 1000 workers.

Source: Korpi (1983: 165)