



UNRISD

United Nations Research Institute for Social Development

Understanding Social and Solidarity Economy in Emergent Communities

*Lessons from Post–Fast Track Land Reform Farms
in Mazowe, Zimbabwe*

*Manase Kudzai Chiweshe
Rhodes University
Grahamstown, South Africa*

Draft paper prepared for the UNRISD Conference

Potential and Limits of Social and Solidarity Economy

6–8 May 2013, Geneva, Switzerland

The United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) is an autonomous research institute within the UN system that undertakes multidisciplinary research and policy analysis on the social dimensions of contemporary development issues. Through our work we aim to ensure that social equity, inclusion and justice are central to development thinking, policy and practice.

UNRISD ▪ Palais des Nations ▪ 1211 Geneva 10 ▪ Switzerland
info@unrisd.org ▪ www.unrisd.org

Copyright © United Nations Research Institute for Social Development

This is not a formal UNRISD publication. The responsibility for opinions expressed in signed studies rests solely with their author(s), and availability on the UNRISD website (www.unrisd.org) does not constitute an endorsement by UNRISD of the opinions expressed in them. No publication or distribution of these papers is permitted without the prior authorization of the author(s), except for personal use.

Abstract

This paper concerns itself with the emergent and evolving forms of social organisation that emerged on farms post Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) in Zimbabwe. It highlights how these institutional formations show the emergence of a social and solidarity economy in which self help and grassroots organisations surface as a viable alternative to state or capitalist interventions. In 2000 Zimbabwe experienced a major shift in its rural landscape when land occupations and the government-initiated land reform saw the emergence of new communities of black farmers on formerly white owned farms. The government of Zimbabwe neither had funds nor the capacity to provide social amenities when the fast track programme started. The paper shows how small scale farmer communities ensured service provision through their own initiatives. The government did not have the resources to monitor let alone enforce people into functional communities. It is through informal institutions built up through interaction and negotiation, and built on trust, reciprocity and unity of purpose, that these communities have sustained their existence. These farm level institutions are part of an emerging social and solidarity economy based on trust, reciprocity and communality.

Introduction

In 2000 Zimbabwe experienced a major shift in its rural landscape when land occupations and the government-initiated Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) saw the emergence of new communities of black farmers. This paper concerns itself with the emergent and evolving forms of social organisation at farm level. These institutional formations are part of an emerging social and solidarity economy (SSE) based on trust, reciprocity and communality. Fast Track Land Reform Programme was criticised both locally and internationally for its chaotic character and dire economic effects. Such criticism especially from Western donors brought with it sanctions, suspension of balance of payments supports, reduction in direct foreign investment and decreases in humanitarian aid. This, combined with declines in agricultural productivity and subsequent industrial production in downstream industries, led to a rapidly devaluating Zimbabwean dollar, enormous inflation and high unemployment figures. This economic crisis has impacted heavily on new farmers who found it increasingly difficult to afford inputs and access loans. Unlike in the communal areas, most new farmers (in resettlement areas) cannot depend on kinship ties for help: thus they have formed other social networks to respond to these challenges, taking the form of institutions such as farm committees, irrigation committees and health committees.

The government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) had neither the funds nor the capacity to provide social amenities when the fast track programme started. The paper is thus based on the hypotheses that A1 farm communities have tried to ensure services provision through their own initiatives. Certainly, the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) never had the foresight or resources to monitor let alone enforce the people into becoming communities. It is through informal institutions built up through interaction and negotiation, and built on trust, reciprocity and unity of purpose, that these communities have sustained their existence. In many ways, A1¹ communities exist under pronounced social, political and economic marginalisation. These processes of marginalisation were exacerbated by a state which restricted the entry of external actors onto the fast track farms to ensure it maintains near hegemonic control of the fast track areas. In this light, this paper offers a localised and nuanced perceptible of experiences at farm level of how people made sense of their dilemmas and created their own spaces to survive within a hostile environment characterised by lack of services and social infrastructure, droughts and a national political and economic crisis. The emergent social networks, mutual assistance and farm level institutions form a complex system which I describe as social and solidarity economy.

Background to the study

Significant literature exists analysing the farm occupations and fast track land reform process that emerged in Zimbabwe in the year 2000 and that led to the A1 and A2 farms (Alexander 2006; Hammar and Raftopoulos 2003; Moyo 2001, 2002; Moyo and Yeros 2005; Sadomba 2008; Selby 2006). Much of this literature on Zimbabwe tends to focus on the broader political economy of the country. In so doing, these works regularly make assumptions about the people on the land without offering a critical examination of their lived experiences. There is hence a serious gap in the literature on the conditions of existence of this novel class of farmers within the emerging communities in the

¹ Zimbabwe's land reform had two types of schemes namely A1 and A2. A1 schemes are small holder scheme with 6 hectares mainly geared towards household consumption. A2 farms are larger land holdings concentrating on commercial agriculture.

newly resettled areas. There are number of works emerging providing a clearer sense of life after resettlement (Scoones et al. 2011; Moyo et al 2009; Matondi 2012).

The FTLRP in Zimbabwe – code-named Third *Chimurenga* (war of liberation) or *jambanja* (violence) – was characterised by chaotic and violent land invasions which led to the destruction of property, sabotage, beatings and in some cases murder (Chaumba et al. 2003; Human Rights Watch 2002; Masiwa 2005). The ordered nature and continued existence of communities that germinated from *jambanja* is sociologically intriguing. The Zimbabwean case illuminates important insights into how communities borne out of conflict can sustain themselves through various forms of associational groupings at local (in this case, farm) level. Another related dimension of the land reform programme in Zimbabwe is that there were very few restitution cases that resettled whole communities on their ancestral lands. Rather, land redistribution under fast track meant that on the majority of farms there were people drawn from diverse ethnic groups, languages, professions, communal areas, urban areas, sex, age, religious beliefs, customs and traditions. The new farm inhabitants in Mazowe are a collection of war veterans who were allocated a quota (on average, 15% of the plots on farms), youths, war collaborators, government workers, formerly unemployed urban dwellers, politicians, women, and ordinary people from all walks of life.

The concept of the social and solidarity economy (SSE) is described as follows by the International Labour Organisation (ILO): ‘The social and solidarity economy (SSE) refers to organisations and enterprises that are based on principles of solidarity and participation and that produce goods and services while pursuing both economic and social aims.’ (Fonteneau, Neamtam, Wanyama and Morais 2010:vi). ILO (2009) notes that ‘the social economy is a concept designating enterprises and organization, in particular co-operatives, mutual benefit societies, associations, foundations and social enterprises, which have the specific feature of producing goods, services and knowledge while pursuing both economic and social aims and fostering solidarity.’ In this paper farm level institutions in emergent communities in Zimbabwe can offer valuable lessons in understanding how alternatives to capitalist economics can emerge from everyday relations of ordinary people. ‘New farmers’ in Zimbabwe were segregated from main capitalist systems with no access to finance or support services yet there emerged institutions initiated by farmers’ agency to respond to various challenges.

Conceptual framework

This paper is influenced by the concept of social capital and how it relates to social and solidarity economy. The argument here is that every economy requires a medium of exchange and social capital provides interesting dimensions into understanding the dynamics involved in self help institutional formations at the grassroot. Social capital has varied definitions which stem from the highly context specific nature of the concept and the complexity of its conceptualization and operationalization. It does not have a clear, undisputed meaning (Dolfsma and Dannreuther 2003; Foley and Edwards 1999). Because of this, there is no set (and commonly agreed upon) definition of social capital, and the particular definition adopted by any study depends regularly on the discipline and level of investigation (Robison et al. 2002).

Bourdieu (1986:249) conceives of social capital as one of four key forms of capital, along with economic, cultural (embodied, objectified or institutional) and symbolic. He defines social capital as:

The aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition – or in other words, to membership in a group – which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectively owned capital, a credential which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word (Bourdieu 1986: 249–250).

Social capital is thus a collective asset that grants members social credits that can be used as capital to facilitate purposive actions (Glover and Parry 2005:452). Social relations, in this fashion, constitute useful resources for actors through processes such as establishing obligations, expectations and trustworthiness, creating channels for information, and setting norms backed by efficient sanctions (Burt 2000; Coleman 1988; Putman 2000).

Social capital has been viewed as a concept which is formed for the benefit of everyone in a community. Hence, Putnam (1995:2) argues that ‘the productive activity of social capital is manifest in its capacity to facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit.’ Lin (2001:56) highlights that – like other forms of capital – social capital is premised on the notion of an investment (in social relationships) which will result in some benefit or profit to the individual. In other words, social capital makes it possible to achieve certain aims that cannot be achieved by individuals alone. Investing in social capital is however a risky venture; for example, given that a member of the network may fail to perceive or act upon a mutual obligation, any investment may fail to yield any positive result (Holt 2008:232). According to Coleman, social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity, but a variety of different entities, with two elements in common: they all consist in some aspect of social structures, and they facilitate certain actions of actors within the structure’ (Coleman 1988:98). Like other forms of capital, social capital is not completely fungible but may be specific to certain activities. A given form of social capital that is valuable in facilitating certain actions may be useless or even harmful for others.

In this context, social capital is referred to as _features of social life-networks, norms, and trust that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives (Putnam 1994:1). Social capital is thus productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends that in its absence would not be possible. Social capital exhibits a number of characteristics that distinguish it from other forms of capital. Unlike physical capital, but like human capital, social capital can accumulate as a result of its use. Social capital is both an input into and an output of collective action. Other forms of capital (such as physical and human capital) have a potential productive impact which social capital does not. Creating and activating social capital requires at least two people. In other words, social capital has public good characteristics that have direct implications for the optimality of its production level. Therefore, social capital should be the pre-eminent and most valued form of capital as it provides the basis on which a true civil society exists (Cox 1995). This view is largely premised on Putmanian understanding which emphasise the positive aspects of social capital.

When researching social capital there should be an insistence on identifying the ways in which gendered, racialized and other forms of power are embedded in different forms of social capital, and thus also on the ways in which certain forms of social capital serve to reproduce prevailing norms of inequality. This would make clear that a critical domain of social policy would be to challenge these norms – to upset doxa with public debate (Bebbington 2007). Bourdieu’s (1977) analysis of the reproduction of forms of power within institutions allows for a deconstruction of concepts sanitised of their radical intent. This is clearly the view of Laurie et al. (2005), who argue that the very language of social capital has played precisely this sanitizing role in policy discussions of ethnicity, exclusion and poverty in the Andes. They argue:

Whereas some versions of development with-identity engage with empowerment, racism and institutional strengthening, the understanding that has become

predominant in donor rhetoric is one rooted in narrow understandings of social capital and culture which sideline such concerns (Laurie et al. 2005: 474).

Methodology and study area

Mazowe District is located in Mashonaland Central Province and is divided into twenty-nine wards, of which thirteen wards are in Chiweshe communal areas and the rest in new resettlement areas. Mazowe has three administrative centres (Concession, Glendale and Mvurwi) and it has a total surface area of almost 453,892 hectares. It is in the south-western section of the province where Guruve and Muzarabani mark the district's boundaries to the north, Bindura and Mashonaland East Province to the east, and Harare to the west. It is also bordered by Zvimba district in Mashonaland Central Province. The district's main government administrative centre (Concession) is about sixty kilometres from Harare.

The study uses case studies from small-scale 'A1 farmers' in Mazowe District which is in Mashonaland Central Province. It employs qualitative methodologies to enable a nuanced understanding of associational life in the new communities. Through focus group discussions, in-depth interviews, narratives, key informant interviews and institutional mapping the study outlines the formation, taxonomy, activities, roles, internal dynamics and social organisation of farm level institutions. Case study consisted of six purposively selected A1 (small holder) schemes in Mazowe. Five of the schemes selected (Hariana, Hamilton, Davaar, Visa and Usk farms) have one or more of the following: irrigation equipment, school and clinic as well as proximity to A2 schemes to ensure that a wide range of farm level institutions are covered. The assumption was that, on farms with such infrastructure, management and conflict issues will arise and one or more farm level institutions will be in operation. The sixth scheme (Blightly Farm) covered is situated a long distance away from major roads and service centres and would have none of the facilities noted above.

The case study approach entailed studying social phenomena through analysis of an individual case. A case study represents a detailed examination of a single example of a class of phenomena, that is, it strives towards a thorough examination of one or a small number of instances of the unit identified by the research interest. The case method gives a unitary character to the data being studied by inter-relating a variety of facts to a single case. Hence, it entails an in-depth study of a particular situation by narrowing down a very broad field of research into an easily researchable topic (Punch 2004). In this study, the six farms offered a chance to gain an intimate understanding of everyday life on fast track farms. Using a variety of research techniques outlined below, this thesis brings forth the voices of A1 farmers in a way that pronounces their experiences in a profound way. Situated research methodologies that take into cognisance local contexts require reflexivity and flexibility so as to respond to everchanging needs in the field.

Findings

New communities and new institutions

One of the greatest legacies of the land reform programme in Zimbabwe is how communities were created seemingly overnight². The social relationships in the new communities are important in the analysis of the political and administrative structure

² Morgan Tsvangirai (then president of the opposition party Movement for Democratic Change) was once quoted saying these communities were sprouting everywhere like mushrooms.

on farms. Chaumba et al. (2003a:19) note that there was a sudden emergence of a hierarchical governance structure which ensured easy monitoring and surveillance by government. They argue that in its own way the sudden appearance, seemingly from nowhere, of an integrated top-down system of governance in the new resettlements is as striking as the dramatic physical transformation of the landscape. This new pattern of authority is characterised by a very hierarchical committee-based structure and has parallels with the decentralised ruling party cell and district development committee systems of the 1980s. The various institutional arrangements that cropped up at farm/scheme level require careful analysis. In doing so, the thesis investigates the ways in which the concepts of social capital and power can be used to understand the formation and evolution of these various entities.

In Mazowe the A1 farmers have been grouped into villages on every scheme, leading to the creation of what Baar (2004:1753) terms ‘stranger neighbouring households.’ These new communities were created by chance³ and include households that have never met before. These stranger neighbours were forced by circumstances to settle and interact with each other. Given that 39% of A1 settlers in Mazowe are from Chiweshe communal areas, many people have a starting point with which to relate to each other. This is because they are coming from a similar cultural and social background. However 26% of members of these A1 communities come from a different cultural setting to the one in Chiweshe. These new citizens were forced to learn and assimilate the many norms prevalent in Mazowe. This was a source of conflict as new farmers were caught breaking various norms in Mazowe. One example is of a farmer at Wychwood Farm who killed a python which is not allowed in Mazowe.

Formation and taxonomy of informal institutions in the newly resettled areas

The formation of farm level institutions is an enterprise fraught with contestation, negotiation and sometimes domination. In this chapter diverse processes involved in the formation of institutional forms at farm level are discussed, including the involvement of charismatic leaders, external agents, everyday interaction, coercion and even negotiation. Processes of formation are highly complex and, at times, it is difficult to delineate the different factors involved in influencing farmers to organise. As noted before in this thesis, the formation of institutions was largely a response to the diverse challenges facing fast track farmers (though there are other social and political factors involved, as discussed below). What is important to highlight is that these institutions are in a constant state of wax and wane, such that they are never fully formed but are rather created and recreated in ongoing interaction among farmers.

Farm level institutions emerge in different forms within the fast track farms. Under fast track reform, each A1 farm became a community on its own – defined and delimited by the farm boundaries. Farm level institutions are thus any groupings that emerge and evolve within this bounded geographic area serving the needs of some or all the people. These institutions are however fluid and expand in some cases to operate and influence beyond the physical borders of the farm. In many ways their existence and identity has a spatial and temporal fluidity which makes typologies difficult. This thesis however offers a broad-based taxonomical understanding of farm level institutions. The institutions range in size, form, organisation, membership and influence. This wide variety of institutions found in the newly resettled areas is testimony to the vigour and enterprising spirit of rural societies in Africa (Rahmato 1991).

³ A1 plots in Mazowe were mainly given to people through picking a number from a hat.

Table 1: Taxonomy of institutions in new resettlement areas

Type	Brief description
<i>Sabhuku</i> /village head	Unlike traditional <i>sabhuku</i> in communal areas who inherit the position, in the new resettlement areas they are chosen by the traditional chief.
Committee of Seven	<i>Sabhuku</i> heads this committee but the other members are democratically chosen by the plot holders on the farm.
Irrigation Committee	Present at farms with irrigation and usually chosen by only those involved in irrigation.
Development committee	Present at some farms and works independently of the Committee of Seven. However at other farms the Committee of Seven becomes the ad hoc development committee.
Farm committee	Present at some farms and works in the same manner as the development committee but differs in that it has more responsibility over other non-developmental issues.
ZESA/Electricity committee	Usually tasked with issues that relate to payment of bills, fixing faults and in cases spearheading applications for connection.
Health committee	This committee, like most locally-initiated committees, is chosen by the settlers and is responsible for health issues including HIV and AIDS. There are also Home Based Care Committees initiated by Tariro Clinic at Howard Hospital.
School Development Committee	Operates at schools in the newly resettled areas.
Women's clubs	Women come together once or twice a week to discuss issues that affect them.
Youth's clubs	Mainly organized along sports or church lines.
Revolving savings clubs	Small groups based on trust where people pool resources together and share.
Burial societies	Arrangements at scheme level to offer assistance in case of death.

Source: Fieldwork 2010

New farmers in Mazowe create and recreate conditions of their own existence through various forms of associational activities. Given the paralysed nature of the Zimbabwean government post-2000, new farmers were forced to invent ways to survive and provide basic on-farm services. Based on my own fieldwork, Table 1 above shows some of the different types of governance structures within the new resettlement areas, and provides a brief description of each associational form. The following table (Table 2), on the other hand, derives from the Land and Livelihoods Study and shows that 73.3% of the 539 respondents belong to religious groups. This highlights the dominance of religion and its accompanied beliefs in influencing associational life at farm level.

Table 2: Types of social institutions in Mazowe

Institution	Frequency	Percentage
Religious group	395	73.3
Agricultural consortium	64	11.9
Farmer organization	153	28.4
Women's organization	85	15.8
Burial society	20	3.7
Savings club	14	2.6
Irrigation committee	189	35.1
Cooperative project	14	2.6

School development committee	68	12.6
Commodity association	8	1.5
Football club	68	12.6
Health committee	48	8.9

Source: Land and Livelihoods Survey 2007/08

Institutions in newly resettled areas are formed for the specific political, social and economic needs of communities. In most instances, the farm-level formations are a response to challenges or are a way to ensure that certain needs are met. For example, the HIV pandemic has forced Howard Hospital to initiate a programme of Home Based Care Committees on farms, which are responsible for out-of-hospital patients. At Blightly Farm, there is an operational committee which helps in the caring of terminally ill patients on the programme. It assists with food, medicines, psycho-social support and general care of the terminally ill. It is headed by a health worker who was chosen after training workshops with the hospital.

Mutual support groups and multi-purpose farm organisations

In Mazowe farm level institutions vary from mutual support groups to multi-purpose farm organisations. Small-scale mutual support groups do not extend beyond the farm (Rahmato 1991). They are usually informal and involve a small number of members. At Usk farm, there are various groupings of farmers involved in rotating saving clubs (*maround*). At the time of the research there were four such groups operating at the farm. They were made up of three to six members who contributed money on a monthly basis which was given to one member monthly. Money dispersed ranged from twenty to fifty American dollars. One of the groups ensures that the money collected per month is used to buy inputs by the farmers. Such groups are based on trust since farmers contribute on the grounds that, when it is their turn to receive money, everyone will also contribute. They are self-selective and, at least at Usk, it is usually people who have known each other before settling on the farm who form these groups. Trusting people you have known for only a few years (i.e. since the start of fast track) with money is difficult for most farmers.

One member of a saving group indicated: '*Zvinonetsa kutrusta munhu nemaUS dollar. Vamwe vanhu vakauya kuma resettlement vadzingwa kumisha yavo nenyaya dzekuba saka unotoita nevanhu vawaziva kwemakore akawanda*' (It's difficult to trust people with American dollars. Some people were chased away from their rural homes because of theft so you can only trust people you have known for years). One of the groups had two members who had been involved in a similar scheme when they were in the communal areas. Revolving savings clubs are thus not novel to the resettlement areas; rather, these clubs exemplify continuities from communal areas. In 2007, at the height of the Zimbabwean economic crisis and before the introduction of the American dollar, there were no revolving clubs operating at Usk due to the inflationary environment that made it impossible to save with the local currency. At other farms such as Kia Ora, farmers during this period used groceries, kitchen utensils and inputs as a form of barter exchange. Each month members would buy soap, sugar and cooking oil and give to one member at a time.

On the upper end of the continuum there are multi-purpose farm institutions which involve all the farmers on a particular farm. Such institutions are more or less formally constituted and are geared towards service provision. An example of such an institution is the electricity committee at Blightly Farm, which ensures a regular supply of electricity to the farm. The committee is responsible for the maintenance of electricity

infrastructure and the collection of monthly levies for payment of the farm's electricity bill. It comprises five members who are voted in every five years. Currently the chairperson is a woman who was chosen by the scheme members. One farmer noted: '*Committee yakazara vanhu vakachangamuka. Tinoisa vanhu vanomhanya mhanya*' (The committee is made up of wise people. We only choose people who work hard). There is an element of participatory democracy through the fact that the committee is chosen by an election.

Farm level institutions are fluid in how they operate. In many cases institutions overlap and at one point or another all institutions are multi-purpose in nature. At Hariana Farm, the school development committee provided and manages the borehole which the community uses for its water. Water provision on the farm is the responsibility of the Committee of Seven or the farm development committee. The school however took the lead in providing water and it controls the use of and access to the water source. Thus an institution created for education provision can be involved in water provision. At Blightly Farm the home-based care group now also works as the health committee as it is involved in all health issues and not only HIV and AIDS. Farm level institutions are thus multi-purpose and, in the section below, I focus on the management of these institutions.

Internal savings and loan groups

There are various groups involved in internal loan and savings operations. They are commonly called *maround* (rounds). Such groups involve pooling together an agreed amount every month which is given to one member. This lump sum allows the recipient to buy items or take care of any task which s/he could not do on his or her own. Trust becomes an important component of the social make-up of these groups because they are based on the assumption of reciprocity. Whoever obtains money in the first month of operation is obligated to continue contributing. These groups are usually made up of people who are related or had relationships prior to the resettlement areas. It is rare to come across people in the same group who met each other after resettling. In such cases strong bonds of friendship would have emerged amongst such farmers to trust that each other would not abscond. The groups remain particularly small with an average of four members.

At Usk Farm there are two groups of women involved in savings. One group is made up of four women and the other has six women. Two of these women are plot holders, four are wives of plot holders and the rest are relatives of plot holders. There are no farm workers involved, mainly because they rarely interact with A1 farmers at a level that can allow trust to develop. Social class is also important as farm workers might be perceived as unable to afford membership in the groups, as membership requires a regular source of income every month to be able to meet the obligations. This type of group is thus highly exclusive and depends not only on trust but also on access to resources. Another female savings group at Hariana indicated that during 2007, when there was a problem with accessing money in Zimbabwe because of inflation, they resorted to using household utensils or groceries bought from neighbouring countries as modes of exchange.

The absence of men in savings groups on the farms in this study was an interesting observation. Through further probing among men I discovered that *marounds* have always been viewed as a feminine activity in the areas where these people come from. The majority of farmers were from Chiweshe communal areas in Mazowe and from Harare. Talking to men on the farms it was apparent that they viewed saving groups as a

women's activity as one male farmer at Hariana noted, '*zvema round ndezve vakadzi izvi*⁴' (Internal savings and loans are for women). It was however not entirely clear why savings clubs are viewed as a women's domain, because men on other A1 farms were taking part in saving clubs⁵. Exclusive female participation was thus limited to the farmers in my sample. It however remains a significant finding in that women were able to form groups in which exchange of goods and money was the major preoccupation. Women in patriarchal societies such as the Shona are mainly relegated to the private domain and men are the ones involved in public transactions involving money. These saving groups challenge this notion and thrust women into positions in which they amass a considerable amount of resources. The question nevertheless is whether these women ultimately have control at household level of the resources acquired from this activity.

Production and marketing: social networks and pooling together

Another critical activity of FLIs has been the provision of assistance in productive activities. The general characteristic of A1 farmers not only in Mazowe but in the whole country is that they are resource poor. Farming is an enterprise which requires considerable resources and most farmers coming from poor backgrounds find it difficult to obtain productive assets. Most farmers depend on help from others in their productive activities. Production and marketing of agricultural produce is the major economic activity that ensures that farmers associate together.

Labour pooling: A1 farmers in Mazowe generally lack mechanisation thus they have serious problems with tillage. Access to cheap labour is crucial for successful farming. The Mazowe Land and Livelihoods Survey found that, in the resettlement areas, 51% of the farmers use donkey drawn ploughs whilst 38.4% use ox drawn ploughs. Another 7.5% practice zero tillage while 2.6% use hoes to prepare their land for planting. Only 0.4 % use tractors for land preparation. This lack of mechanisation makes it necessary to develop cooperative arrangements to find enough labour for ploughing. With only 34.4% of farmers owning cattle, draught power becomes a major challenge for those without cattle. Labour pooling takes various forms which include borrowing draught power, reciprocal help in ploughing, and drawing resources as a farm to hire a tractor.

Borrowing cattle or donkeys from those who own them is a difficult process as people will only loan you their livestock after they have already finished with their fields. Given that there are few people with livestock, not everyone without is able to borrow as this is based on trust, friendship or family bonds. Most A1 farmers have six hectares of land, and livestock is only able to plough a limited percent of this land. In most cases farmers are forced to employ zero tillage or reduce the area under cultivation.

Reciprocal help is when farmers give each other a hand in their fields on alternate days. This takes the form of three or four households who agree to all work on a particular A1 plot for a day or two and rotate between plots. This type of arrangement resonates with the traditional system of *nhimbe* where a farmer will brew beer, prepare food and invite people to come help him/her in the fields. After work the beer and food will be consumed by all those who attended. In the newly resettled areas such an arrangement is difficult, considering that with monetisation people are more concerned with what they may earn and not with food.

⁴ In-depth interview with household head, Hariana Farm , 23rd April 2010.

⁵ Interview with Agritex officer at Glendale, 7th June 2009.

The other form of labour pooling is the putting together of money to hire tractors when and where they are available. Tractors are often hired from A2 farmers or government through the District Development Fund (DDF). On some farms such as Blightly there are no nearby A2 farmers with tractors and the DDF only comes to their area once such arrangements are not possible. At Usk they inherited a tractor and planter which are controlled by the Committee of Seven who ensure that everyone benefits from the resources. It is at Hariana and Hamilton farms that the pooling of resources amongst farmers to hire tractors occurs. Hiring a tractor as a group is cheaper as costs are shared.

Combating marketing constraints as a group: Finding transportation for their produce remains a big challenge to farmers. Bad roads, long distances to depots and high transport costs are all serious challenges with which farmers have to grapple. At Hariana Farm, maize and soya beans are marketed at the Mvurwi GMB depot which is approximately twenty kilometres away. Tobacco is sent to the auction floors in Harare which is approximately eighty kilometres away. The advantage is that Hariana is next to the Mvurwi highway thus the A1 farmers do not have a problem of bad roads. It is easy to find transportation but the major problem is the cost. Tobacco farmers at Hariana produce on average ten to fifteen bales each with some farmers having as little as one bale. Transporting a few bales on your own is very expensive as you have to pay for the whole truck alone. Tobacco farmers have resorted to transporting all their tobacco at once to reduce costs. Transport owners only bring their lorry if the amount of tobacco available is enough to fill their lorry so that they realise the maximum benefit. Filling a lorry means that many farmers are forced to market together as a way of securing transport to the market.

Discussion

Farm level institutions in Mazowe embody a particular and important form of structural social capital. In many ways they constitute an important asset in farmers' livelihood strategies and thus are essential in service provision, agricultural development and poverty reduction. These institutional formations vary greatly in scale, size, effectiveness, democratic content, activities and degree of inclusiveness and exclusiveness. Such diversity makes it neither possible nor desirable to invoke unitary conceptions of social capital among fast track farmers. It also cautions us from romanticising about the existence and work of rural organisations. The diversity and competitive positioning of farm level institutions, and their internal relations and social cohesion (based often on trust and reciprocity), illustrate the existence of both bonding and bridging capital.

Various discussions of social capital have suggested that it is important to distinguish between two types of relationship, each of which constitutes social capital but which apparently have different characteristics. One set refers to intra-group relationships: relationships of bonding or integration that strengthen links between people facilitating forms of intra group interaction and collective action. The other set of relationships has been called linkage or bridging mechanisms, relationships that strengthen linkages between groups and other actors and organizations (Bebbington and Carroll 2000). The problem is that farm level institutions remain fragmented and separated by divergent interests. They represent often competing groups, opinions, interests and sometimes political actors; such that there are only limited bridging relationships between groups (particularly across farms). As such it is easier for government to play them against each other through divide and rule tactics and keep A1 farms governable.

A1 farmers, despite their numbers, appear voiceless and lack any coordinated movement to propagate their cause. Mazowe is littered with hundreds of singularly independent groups operating in isolation and competing against each other for space and resources. Discussions with several groups indicate that they are aware of other similar groups; but rather than seeing them as allies, they are viewed as competitors and strategies are formulated by groups to ensure that they are more successful than others in lobbying government. Until A1 farmers realise that they belong to the same farming class by virtue of shared characteristics (such as being resource poor or lacking access to resources) they will remain without any form of collective action. Following Bourdieu's thesis on social capital, it is apparent that most farmers join farm level institutions as a strategic move to ensure their selfish needs are met. As such the vision of most institutions is short sighted, focusing on resources that can be accrued from group membership and not focusing on cultivating collective action amongst farmers.

The farm level institutions form a part of multilayered survivalhoods based on short term ambitions to acquire basic resources by farmers. Such organisations are survivalist and needs-based. Murisa (2010) in a study of farmer organisations in Zvimba and Goromonzi has shown that they lack an agrarian vision or plan. This is typical of farmer institutions in Mazowe. My research shows that most need-driven institutions have no agrarian vision beyond meeting the needs for which they were formed. Beyond that A1 farmers remain individualistic, viewing farming as a lone enterprise and avoiding collective action. These institutions do not have any developmental or future plans. For example irrigation committees only concern themselves with ensuring equipment is working properly but they do not come up with any future irrigation plans. There is no thought into how irrigation equipment can be increased and ways of improving irrigation systems.

Farm level institutions are however important sources of social cohesion through maintaining order and resolving conflicts at farm level. Institutions such as the Committee of Seven have several roles in maintaining security and ensuring good neighbourliness amongst fast track farmers. Organising into institutions allows greater interaction and promotes togetherness of farm dwellers as they work for the collective good. Bonding of farmers is facilitated through working together for similar causes. Households that were strangers to each other find space through associational activities to know and interact with each other. Rules, norms, mores and regulations are affirmed, shared and policed through various institutional forms that ensure that, despite personal differences, conflicts remain manageable. This positive side of social capital as outlined by Putman (1995) is apparent in Mazowe and building on it has potential benefits for fast track farms as they continue to evolve towards well functioning and highly productive communities.

Conclusion

The farm level institutions form a part of multilayered 'survivalhoods' based on short term ambitions to acquire basic resources by farmers. Such organisations are survivalist and needs-based. Murisa (2010) in a study of farmer organisations in Zvimba and Goromonzi has shown that they lack an agrarian vision or plan. This is typical of farmer institutions in Mazowe. My research shows that most need-driven institutions have no agrarian vision beyond meeting the needs for which they were formed. Farmers in Mazowe are involved in various processes such as school development associations and health committees to meet actual needs through coming together and contributing to their own well being. Scoones et al. (2010) note that the creative solutions generated by the necessity of solidarity, organisation and building a sense of community have

emerged on the margins of state action and practice. Social isolation from kin that comes with moving into the fast track farms leaves farmers vulnerable and without a safety net. There is need for them to have multiple identities through different institutions that offer a promise of security in times of trouble. Fast track farms were new frontiers fraught with uncertainties especially for farmers in the A1 schemes. The new farmers had to devise manifold strategies to survive an unfamiliar environment without support of kin. A single farm has a plethora of institutions, all catering for different needs.

References

Alexander, J. 2006. *The Unsettled Land: State Making and Politics of Land in Zimbabwe 1893 – 2003*, Harare: Weaver Press.

Barr, A. 2004. Forging Effective New Communities: The Evolution of Civil Society in Zimbabwean Resettlement Villages, *World Development*, Vol. 32 (10), pp. 1753-1766.

Bebbington, A. 2007. Social Capital and Development Studies II: Can Bourdieu Travel to Policy? *Progress in Development Studies*, Vol. 7 (2), pp. 155–62.

Bebbington, A.J. and Carroll, T. 2000. Induced Social Capital and Federations of the Rural Poor, Social Capital Initiative Working Paper No. 19, Available from, <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSOCIALCAPITAL/Resources/Social-Capital-Initiative-Working-Paper-Series/SCI-WPS-19.pdf> [Accessed 13 May 2009].

Bourdieu P. 1983. *Economic Capital, Cultural Capital and Social Capital*. *Soziale-Welt* p. 2.

Bourdieu, P. 1986. The Forms of Capital in J.G. Richardson (ed) *Handbook of Theory and Research in the Sociology of Education*, New York: Greenwood Press.

Burt, R.S. 2000. The Network Structure of Social Capital in R. Sutton and B.M. Staw (eds) *Research in Organizational Behaviour*. New York: JAI Press.

Chaumba, J; Scoones, I and Woolmer, W. 2003a. From *Jambanja* to Planning: The Reassertion of Technocracy in Land Reform in South-Eastern Zimbabwe? *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 41 (4), pp. 533–554.

Chaumba, J; Scoones, I and Woolmer, W. 2003b. New Politics, New Livelihoods: Changes in the Zimbabwean Lowveld since the Farm Occupations of 2000, *Sustainable Livelihoods in Southern Africa Research Paper 3*, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies.

Coleman, J.S. 1988. Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 94, pp. 95–120.

Cox, E. 1995. *A Truly Civil Society*, Sydney: ABC Books.

Dolfsma, W. and Dannreuther, C. (eds) 2003. *Globalisation, Social Capital and Inequality*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Foley, M. and Edwards, B. 1999. Is it Time to Disinvest in Social Capital? *Journal of Public Policy*, Vol. 19, pp. 141–73.

- Glover, T.D. and Parry, C.D. 2005. Building Relationships, Accessing Resources: Mobilizing Social Capital in Community Garden Contexts, *Journal of Leisure Research*, Vol. 31 (4), pp. 450–474.
- Hammar, A and Raftopoulos, B. 2003. Introduction in A. Hammar, B. Raftopoulos and S. Jensen (eds) *Zimbabwe's Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of Crisis*, Harare: Weaver Press.
- Holt, L. 2008. Embodied Social Capital and Geographic Perspectives: Performing the Habitus, *Progress in Human Geography*, Vol. 32 (2), pp. 22–246.
- Human Rights Watch. 2002. Fast Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe. *Human Rights Watch*. Vol. 14 (1)
- Laurie, N., Andolina, R. and Radcliffe, S. 2005. Ethnodevelopment: Social Movements, Creating Professionals and Indigenous Knowledge in Ecuador, *Antipode*, pp. 470–496.
- Lin, N. 2001. *Social Capital: A Theory of Social Structure and Action*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Masiwa, M. 2005. The Fast Track Resettlement Programme in Zimbabwe: Disparity between Policy Design and Implementation, *The Round Table*. Vol. 94 (379), pp. 217–224.
- Moyo, S and Yeros, P. 2005. Land Occupations and Land Reform in Zimbabwe: Towards the National Democratic Revolution in S. Moyo and P. Yeros (eds) *Reclaiming the Land: The Resurgence of Rural Movements in Africa, Asia and Latin America*. London: Zed Books.
- Murisa, T. 2010. *An Analysis of Emerging Forms of Social Organisation and Agency in the Aftermath of 'Fast Track' Land Reform in Zimbabwe*, PhD Thesis, Rhodes University.
- Putnam, R.D. 1995. Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 6 (1), pp. 65-78.
- Putman, R.D. 2000. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*, New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Rahmato, D. 1991. *Peasant Organizations in Africa: Constraints and Potentials*, CODESRIA Working Paper Series 1/91, Dakar: CODESRIA.
- Robinson, L.J., Schmid, A.A. and Siles, M.E. 2002. Is Social Capital Really Capital? *Review of Social Economy*, Vol. 60 (1), pp.1-21.
- Sadomba, W.Z. 2008. *War Veterans in Zimbabwe's Land Occupations: Complexities of a Liberation Movement in an African Post-Colonial Settler Society*. PhD Thesis, Wageningen: Wageningen University.
- Selby, A. 2006. *Commercial Farmers and the State: Interest Group Politics and Land Reform in Zimbabwe*, unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Oxford.
- Scoones, I. et al. 2010. *Myths and Realities About Zimbabwe's Land Reform*, London: James Currey Publishers