State, Civil Society and Expanding Social and Solidarity Economy among Informal Sector Women in Ethiopia

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Draft paper prepared for the UNRISD Conference
Potential and Limits of Social and Solidarity Economy
6–8 May 2013, Geneva, Switzerland
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Introduction

The paper draws from empirical evidence gathered in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from April-May 2012, during field research to investigate the social and political dynamics of women’s community activism there. It examines the ways in which women engaged in informal sector work are being organised under savings and credit cooperatives (SACCOs), and through this critique, investigates the potential for expanding social and solidarity economy (SSE) through savings and credit cooperatives. The guiding hypothesis is that the political economy of policy changes in Ethiopia under which the savings and credit cooperatives are being formed delimits the possibility of expanding SSE through this method. Women in Addis Ababa are involved in many forms of informal sector work, most of which offer minimum wage, is dangerous at times, and most importantly, has failed to significantly lift them out of poverty. At the same time, however, women’s organisations in Addis Ababa have shown remarkable initiative with regards to mobilizing women around savings and cooperative schemes aimed at mobilizing women to save and regenerate their own incomes. These schemes enjoy a broad reach, and include women working as coffee sellers, weavers, street vendors, domestic workers, firewood carries, garbage collectors and even street beggars. There are a number of initiatives to empower women especially those that have no education and income, through savings, loans and income generating activities. Many are organized under self-help groups and cooperatives, which not only have economic objectives but also play an important social and cultural role in bringing together women who previously would not work together due to cultural discrimination and stigma around certain work, like garbage collection, which are identified with a lower caste. The savings and credit schemes, therefore, are viewed as playing an important psychological role, in addition to the economic and social function of instilling self-worth in women. Women working in the informal sector are organized into self-help groups (SHGs) which consist of 15-20 women; cluster-level associations (CLAs) which consist of 6-8 SHGs; and federations (consisting of up to 12 CLAs). This model though advanced, is not unique to Ethiopia. However, it is a demonstrable fact that Ethiopia’s repressive political and economic regime bears significant impact upon the effectiveness of this model. The proposed paper argues that due to the prevailing political conditions in Ethiopia, the cooperatives are being conceptualised and developed around a severely circumscribed vision of women’s empowerment and development. The criminalization of community activism under Ethiopia’s Charities and Societies Proclamation law (CSP law) blocks Ethiopian NGOs from accepting more than 10 percent of their funding from foreign sources and imposes strict and unregulated criminal and administrative penalties for violations. The CSP law criminalizes human rights activities undertaken by Ethiopian organisations that receive more than ten percent of their funding from abroad, and also criminalizes human rights activities by foreign NGOs, including campaigning for gender equality. The law also allows government surveillance of, and interference in, the operation and management of civil society organisations and imposes significant barriers to the work of women’s organisations and other civil society organisations. The approaches developed by women’s NGOs are, as a result, antagonised by a combination of state policies and civil society self-censorship which are undermining the effectiveness of women’s NGOs as catalysts for the development of social and solidarity economies among women in the informal sector. The three main

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1 This research was conceptualized and facilitated by the Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa – SIHA Network (www.sihanet.org)
critiques developed in this regard relate to questions of grassroots women’s lack of autonomy (due to dominant role of women’s NGOs); secondly to the ideology and the fact that the savings and credit cooperatives are struggling for relevance in a political context that depoliticize women’s rights discourses even as it affirms a neoliberal development agenda; and thirdly alienation as a result of the separation enforced between the economic spheres of women’s work and socio-political spheres of grassroots women’s activism. The paper’s main objective is to develop a critique of the approaches adopted by women’s rights groups in organising SSE at the local level through cooperatives, which it shall be argued, are circumscribed by the very laws and policies that ostensibly facilitate existence of the cooperatives. The conditions under which the regime has condoned the existence of solidarity economies for women are also paradoxically the same conditions that are resulting in women’s loss of social economies. For instance, the state’s tolerance of a discourse of economic empowerment while silencing the women’s rights discourse has the effect of depoliticizing women’s rights. This fact bears long term implications for women’s effective participation in SSE advocacy and governance. Taking a view of the state as an important actor and intermediary between civil society and markets, the paper explores the contradictions outlined above, arguing that any initiatives aimed at expanding women’s SSE through credit and savings cooperatives in Ethiopia must take seriously an analysis of the dialectical relationship between women’s NGOs and the state. The paper is structured into four parts: Part I deals with political economy questions of poverty, human/women’s rights and the neo-liberal state; Part II examines in detail the nature and dynamics of grassroots women’s organising under the savings and credit cooperative schemes; Part III of the paper offers a critique of non-governmental organisations with regards to their role in organising informal sector women and their complex relationship to the state: and Part IV explores ways in which the contradictions identified could be addressed or managed towards expanding the SSE that savings and credit cooperatives aspire towards.

Background: Structural poverty, the neo-liberal state and gender

After a 17-year hiatus of socialist experimentation, the implosion of the socialist military government in 1991 reincorporated Ethiopia into the sphere of neoliberalism accompanied by a social engineering project which brought unprecedented misfortune in the modern history of the country. The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which assumed power, adopted market-oriented structural and institutional reforms as a condition of getting an infusion of transnational capital and credit to resituate the Ethiopian economy which had been stagnant throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Demissie, 2008: 505). Since the early 1990s the neoliberal agenda of the IMF and World Bank began to emphasize good governance and management in the liberalization of the market. Rather than reduce the role of the state in the liberalization of the market, the new emphasis sought to establish a new kind of state in Africa which could undertake public sector reform programmes, capacity-building programmes, information management programmes and a range of training programme and policy mechanisms. In addition, the social infrastructure investment, particularly in road building and other similar projects were encouraged and funded by the World Bank to enhance the capacity of the state to reduce the negative impact of market failures. As Harrison observed, the measures became important for the IMF/World Bank because in the
1990s it became evident that reducing the state’s ‘unproductive’ involvement in society was not a sufficient condition to ensure the development of ‘properly’ functioning markets. The funding of investments in social infrastructure can be read as a neoliberal reaction to market failure: the state should ensure the conditions for people to act socially in a market-conforming fashion (Harrison 2005: 1310, emphasis added).

These shifts and emphases in the thinking of the IMF/World Bank incorporate a range of ‘extra economic’ concerns: from governance to institutions; from social capital to civil society, reflect neoliberalism as it exists today both as an ideology and a science of economic management, a form of social engineering at the disposal of transnational capital and international organizations (Harrison 2005: 1320). In arguing that the transition in Ethiopia, from socialism to neoliberalism was not a unilinear process of moving from one state to the next, Demissie (2008) has suggested that rather than focusing on predetermined outcomes, it is important to examine the actual ways that the state withdrew from the economy, the process of deregulation, privatization and the changing property relations and state institutions (Demissie 2008: 511). What such an analysis exposes is the wrenching impacts of this transition. The implementation of the IMF/World Bank market orientation programmes required the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Defence Force (EPRDF) government to reduce public expenditure and the role of the state in production and distribution, controlling prices and intervening in exchange and product market as well as in the liberalization of the markets, financial sector and privatization. The consequences of privatization and reduction of public expenditure on the urban population, particularly in Addis Ababa and the urban centres, has been acute. The unemployment problem in Addis Ababa has increased alarmingly in recent years.

A survey carried out by the Central Statistical Agency (CSA) in 48 major urban centers in 1997 found that three-quarters of a million people were engaged in the informal sector, of which almost two-thirds were women. Four-fifths of the activities were owner-operated. 47% of those were involved in manufacturing of petty commodities, 42% were in trade, hotel and restaurant businesses, and 11% were engaged in various activities, including street vending. Figures for Addis Ababa show that 61% of employment is in the informal sector making the city one of the largest concentrations of informal sector activity in the world, only surpassed by Kinshasa (80%), Accra (70%), Lagos (69%), Mumbai (68%), Delhi (76%), and Abidjan (65%). The incidence of urban poverty is also deepening in the major cities of the country. According to a study carried out by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED), urban poverty increased by 4 percentage points (from 33 to 37%) during the period 1995 to 1999, while rural poverty declined by 2 percentage points (from 47 to 45%) over the same period. While the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) reported no significant change in rural inequality in the same period, it registered a rising level of urban inequality, with an increase in the Gini coefficient from 0.34 to 0.38 over the period 1995 to

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3 Ibid, p. 520
4 The total unemployment rate in 1976 was 9.6% (Andargatchew 1992). In 1984, the unemployment rate was 10.5% and, in 1994, total unemployment sharply rose to 34.7%. This is an increase of 24.2 percentage points between the two census periods. The unemployment rate is consistently higher for females than males both in 1984 and 1994.
5 In Demissie (2008), ‘Situated neoliberalism and urban crisis in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia’, p. 521
1999 and again to 0.44 in 2004 in urban areas. Yet, the scale and depth of urban poverty in Addis Ababa is generally underestimated by the government. The most visible manifestation of the urban crisis in Addis Ababa has been in the general degradation of the quality of life of the majority, and in the appropriation and exploitation especially of female productive and reproductive resources in managing this decay.

In relating this historical representation of Ethiopia’s political economy to the growth of SSE among women, the paper makes two broad claims. Firstly, it argues that the rise of SSE, and the organization and supply of labour within them ought to be read as a constitutive response to this economic and social deterioration under the neoliberal regime – internal to or concomitant with the capitalist imperative for profit that marked the neoliberal turn in Ethiopia. It is thus, not uncharacteristic that majority of women’s groups in urban areas are organized around the informal sector and other marginalized sectors of work in which the government has failed to deliver. Ghosh (2012) has argued that throughout its history, capitalism has proved adept at causing patterns of labour supply to change in accordance with demand, and nowhere has this particular capacity of capitalism to generate its own labour been more evident than in the case of female labour (Ghosh 2012: 1). The emergence of solidarity economies among women can therefore, be read as a mode of resistance to capital’s appropriation of women’s unpaid or underpaid labour, and at the same time, highlights the limitations that SSE pose to capitalist accumulation. However, following an institutionalist critique, the organization of women through the model of self-help groups (SHGs) and cooperatives adopted by women’s organisations presents one of the primary contradictions to the expansion of social and solidarity economies: that is, while one of the core possibilities of SSE is to be found in the autonomous organisation of women’s labour around life-centred, subsistence political economies, this potential is undermined by the institutionalist logic that follows such modes of organizing. For instance, if it is the case that laws that enable the formation of cooperatives do not function autonomously from those laws that regulate capitalist markets, to what extent can a neoliberal legal and policy environment be expected to nurture SSE? This question recalls one of the primary critiques of microcredit, which views micro-lending as a strategy less in the service of poor women and more in service of an exploitative system, which has relied on creating groups of women who benefit in common from loans (in what are euphemistically called “self-help groups”) so that peer pressure for repayment substitutes for the absence of collateral in lending (see Ghosh 2012; Custers 2012).

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6 Demissie cites the following social functions as particularly affected: over-crowding and deterioration of housing; inadequate municipal and industrial dry-waste collection and disposal; lack of access to water and sanitation/sewerage service; and flooding (2008: 522-3).

7 Custers (2012) notes how the availability of women workers as the reserve army of labour is conditioned by the broader economic conditions, so that the greater poverty or misery of families sends out greater numbers of women (often younger women) in search of paid work (in Ghosh, 2012: 8).

8 On this question, the paper adopts the theorizing of neomarxists, who write about the informal economy primarily as a space of resistance. Ironically, these theorists share a bit of neoliberals’ optimism, in that they see the informal economy as the site where the most dynamic alternatives are likely to emerge (Burbach, Nunez, Kagarlitsky 1997; Esteva 1998). The difference, and it is a critical difference, is that these theorists see these alternatives as a form of resistance to the capitalist system, rather than as “engines of the system’s development.” Their logic is based on the notion that the growing masses of the marginalised poor will eventually overload the system by creating alternative survival mechanisms that lie outside of the formal
Secondly, the argument is made that the nature of state feminism visible in Ethiopia’s gender policies presents an obstacle to the entrenchment of SSE, an expected outcome given the fact that SSEs are being mediated through women’s NGOs which are at the same time legitimizing state feminism through compliance with conservative gender policies. The root of this problem is to be found in the imposition of a women’s machinery as a means for the state to access the grassroots, what Biseswar (2008) has argued is the ‘normal procedure from the EPRDF’s/TPLF’s perspective of a top-down process under which all policies, plans, orders and directions move from the top political cadres to the lower rungs of the ladder, finding thier way from there down to society’ (2008:408). The EPRDF/TPLF government sees itself as all-powerful, the supreme authority on women’s emancipation strategies. The EPRDF/TPLF has an intractable perception of the ‘woman question’ in Ethiopia, one in which there is no place for ‘gender’. The state blames Western radicals for attempting to inject alien habits into Ethiopia in the name of ‘gender’ reform. It sincerely fears that if gender issues were to receive attention women would become too radical and rise up against its oppressive rule. Therefore, it has made the de-politicization and deradicalization of women’s issues one of its main concerns. De-politicization and deradicalization of women’s issues has been backed by the establishment of Ministry of Women’s Affairs. The EPRDF/TPLF stubbornly insists that women’s issues only concern women and should be solved by women alone. Such an attitude translates into giving the ministry little or no political support, following the rationale that as long as women’s issues remain isolated from the rest of society, they will not be a threat to the political rule of the party. Rather, the problem will only emerge if ‘gender’ is allowed to take a front seat and begin a radical politicization of all women’s issues, problems and concerns (Biseswar 2008: 425, emphasis added).

What the state’s formal cooptation of the women’s movement under the rubric of state protection might conceal are thus the relations of economic exploitation and dispossession that persist. To paraphrase Harriss-White’s argument in relation to petty commodity production (PCP) suggests that the state’s relation to informal sector production is better understood as ‘incoherent’ and even ‘contradictory’, simultaneously endorsing actions which destroy informal trade, protect it, promote it and permit it through enforcement failures and neglect (Harriss-White 2012: 137). By way of example, the state’s infrastructural responsibilities to employers are avoided when production is outsourced to petty producers. Labour law is irrelevant or evaded. The state does not enforce laws through which the super-exploitative advantage of petty production would be abolished. In these ways, the state permits and preserves small enterprises it cannot regulate, while doing nothing about the forces restricting accumulation (Ibid, p. 138). In short, the state cannot act as the guarantor of more egalitarian economic and social relations in a society in which it is also the main agent through which exploitative relations of production and exchange are being reproduced. The question appears to be the extent to which the national environment can be fostered that supports ecological sustainability, gender equity and supports locally-centred livelihood systems in resistance to poverty.
Nature and dynamics of grassroots women’s organising under savings and credit cooperatives

Women in Ethiopia are involved in all forms of informal sector work, most of which offers minimum wage, is dangerous at times, and most importantly, has failed to significantly lift them out of poverty. At the same time, however, women’s organisations in Addis Ababa have shown remarkable initiative with regards to mobilizing women around savings and cooperative schemes aimed at mobilizing women to save and regenerate their incomes. These schemes enjoy a broad reach, including women working as coffee sellers, weavers, street vendors, domestic workers, firewood carries, garbage collectors and even beggars. There are a number of initiatives to empower women especially those that have no education and income, through savings, loans and income generating activities. Many are organized under self-help groups and cooperatives, which offer not only economic incentives, but are also playing a significant social and cultural role in bringing together women who previously would not work together due to discrimination and stigma around certain work like garbage collection, which are identified with a lower caste – in other words, challenging the gendered, ethnicized political economy of labour relations in Ethiopia. Many women also previously did not have confidence in the savings schemes, fearing that poverty was their fate and that subjecting their meagre incomes to such schemes would only impoverish them further. The savings and credit schemes therefore can be seen as playing an important sociological as well as psychological function towards empowerment and encouraging self-reliance among women.

The structure of the cooperatives is one that brings together women in self-help groups comprised of 15 – 20 women. For purposes of sustainability, the SHGs are further organized upwards into Cluster Level Associations (CLAs) which consist of 6 – 8 SHGs, and upwards again into federations which consists of 11 CLAs:

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  Federation (11 CLAs)
    ↓
  Cluster Level Association (6 – 8 SHGs)
    ↓
Self-Help Group (15 – 20 members)
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The CLAs function to strengthen the SHGs and have eight main roles: i) forming new SHGs if there are new members; ii) strengthening already formed SHGs; iii) strengthening linkages between the groups; iv) planning community based activities; v) resource mobilization; vi) paying school fees for children of group members; vii) supporting orphans and vulnerable children; viii) may take over activities of the promoting NGO. The process is currently ongoing to get a license to legalize the work of the CLA such that it becomes an autonomous institution with its own mission and vision. However, while great potential lies in this system of organisation, the hierarchized structure is vulnerable to bureaucracy and the reproduction of class differences to such an extent as to antagonise growth of SSE through this means. It is therefore necessary to question the real aim of forming the federations; would a hierarchized structure limit women and impose unnecessary power dynamics? To what extent is flexibility in such savings structures a desirable objective? Can the existing structure be strengthened enough to function on its own without intervention of the women’s NGOs under which they are presently being organized? This last consideration of the merits of women’s cooperatives
organizing autonomously from NGOs is pertinent given the present regime of state repression of civil society that limit the latter’s efficacy.

Savings and credit cooperatives were historically unpopular in Ethiopia, and as such, their recuperation under the current neoliberal regime as a path towards women’s empowerment is worth a brief interrogation here. Successive regimes, starting from the Imperial period to the EPRDF government, gave due recognition to the role of cooperatives and made deliberate effort to promote the same. However, the principles and approaches followed were markedly different, reflecting the political thinking and ideology of the regimes. In its Five Year Development Plan, the Imperial regime envisaged an important role for cooperatives in transforming smallholding agriculture. Thus, it set the stage by providing the first legal framework (the Farmer Workers Cooperative Decree No. 44, later replaced by the Cooperative Societies Proclamation No. 241/1966). The military regime, which viewed cooperatives as an instrument to build a socialist economy pursued the cooperatives agenda more aggressively. The approach followed combined coercion with extensive support including priority access to resources, goods and services (such as land, irrigation, bank loans at lower interest rate, capital goods, inputs & extension services, and consumer goods. Cooperatives were so unpopular that following the demise of the Derg regime in 1992 most of them disappeared quickly. The disorderly manner (e.g. bank loans and other obligations were not settled, no distribution of assets between members, etc.) of their demise also created a lasting suspicion and distrust of cooperatives, the stigma of which is haunting cooperatives until today. In an attempt for a fresh start with promotion of cooperatives, the incumbent government issued a new legal framework (Proclamation No. 147/1998 and 402/2004). In addition to being comprehensive, it incorporated universally accepted principles of cooperatives. SACCOs, which were only 495 during the Derg period (with membership of 119,799), reached 5,437 (with membership of 381,212) by 2012, currently constituting the second most common type of cooperatives (next to housing cooperatives) in the country in terms of both number and membership (Sebhatu 2012: 79). The retreat of the state under neoliberalism also facilitated the rethinking of the nature of cooperatives: the market logic prevailed to accelerate competition between buyers and sellers, and the proliferation of cooperatives also meant increased mobility of members to alternative cooperatives which they perceived as better serving their needs. Women-led cooperatives, organised under the umbrella of women’s NGOs proliferated in this context. But, as Wanyama (2012: 11) points out, the immediate collapse of cooperatives and increased malfunctioning of others triggered a corrective response from both the state and the cooperative movement itself. In most countries, state response tended to be reactionary in nature and it consisted

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10 The legal framework was relatively comprehensive and contained most of the essential contents of the legal framework issued more than three decades later in 1998 and coops were rightly viewed as primarily voluntary undertakings. However, success was limited.

11 The number of cooperatives significantly increased during the Derg regime (1974-1991), with approximately 10,524 primary cooperatives having 4,529,259 members recorded. Cooperative organization was highly political during this time and many cooperatives were dismantled following the downfall of the Derg regime in 1991. According to the FCA and estimates made by Lemma (2009), the number of cooperatives in Ethiopia declined from 10,524 during the Derg regime to 7,366 cooperatives in 1991. Policy support for cooperatives provided by the current government has seen the number of cooperatives start to increase again (Emana 2009: 5).

12 It was in the same vein that cooperatives would also be used as a means to mobilize community support for the ruling party. During the Derg regime, this was more conspicuous as cooperatives were forced to operate in line with socialist principle, where production and marketing of produce were done collectively and members pooled their land resources under communal tenure (Emana 2009: 4)
of either reintroducing strict control or revision of the legal framework to streamline the regulatory framework, the latter of which was the case in Ethiopia under the Charities and Societies Proclamation law No. 00/2008 (henceforth referred to as the CSP law).

**NGOs caught between informal sector and the state**

The argument is made here that the imposition of Ethiopia’s CSP law is a tactic of state co-optation and control of women’s organisations. The law imposes strict and unregulated criminal and administrative penalties for violations and criminalizes human rights activities undertaken by Ethiopian organisations that receive more than ten percent of their funding from abroad. It also criminalizes human rights activities by foreign NGOs, including campaigning for gender equality, children’s rights, disabled persons’ rights and conflict resolution, and imposes disproportionate and criminal penalties for even minor administrative breaches of the law. It establishes a Charities and Societies Agency with broad discretionary power over civil society organisations and allows government surveillance of, and interference in, the operation and management of civil society organisations, in this way imposing significant barriers to the work of women’s organisations and other civil society organisations.13

Firstly, the new law has compelled dramatic changes not only in organizational structures of women’s organisations, but also has increased the burden of those organisations still actively pursuing a women’s rights empowerment agenda. In addition, as reported by Human Rights Watch, the law has been quite successful in creating a substantial layer of fear and self-censorship among NGOs. One of the key responses to NGO repression is the splitting up and reconstitution of smaller organisations in order to circumvent funding restrictions. Some women’s organisations have narrowed down their work to focus only on economic empowerment – deemed as less political – as a means of retaining the prerogative to raise 100% of their funding from both local and international sources. Other organisations retain focus on human rights while accepting to operate within the funding restrictions.14 The prioritization of economic empowerment of women is accompanied by its depoliticization under the same platform. The implication is the delinking of human rights from poverty, and the disarticulation of the causes of inequality, hunger, and ecological destruction/resource depletion from their economic and social bases. In other words, it is the deliberate separation of the solidarity economy with its commitment to values of cooperation, complementarity, mutual support, human rights and democratic principles, from the action-oriented radicalism of the social economy. A singular focus on economic empowerment is a liberal-capitalist agenda that undermines what Kowano (2013) has termed as the transformative, post-capitalist aims of the solidarity economy.

Secondly, one of the main effects of the NGO law is that human rights organisations that previously relied on consistent funding cycles from donors now have to dedicate a substantial amount of time

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14 A good example of this kind of re-organization occurred with the formation of the Union of Ethiopian Women Charitable Associations (UWECA), whose members previously were hosted by the Network of Ethiopian Women’s Associations (NEWA). While the latter was constituted to bring together NGOs and CBOs whose primary focus is women’s economic empowerment and enjoys a broader funding base from international donors, NEWA has retained focus on human/women’s rights issues, albeit with weakened capacity as it is now compelled to raise most of its funds locally.
and resources towards fundraising activities. Different organisations have different approaches: some organisations have resorted to public advertising campaigns including promotional billboards and musical concerts, and approaching individual and corporate sponsors, all of which have been only moderately successful. Other organisations have implemented employee down-sizing measures, narrowed their programmatic scope, and in some instances, organizations are operating way below their capacities. The possible long-term impacts of these market-oriented fundraising approaches is that organisations receiving donations from big business, powerful individuals and other interested parties may become beholden to the (profit-oriented) interests of corporate donors which may not necessarily be congruent with the solidarity economy objective of serving the welfare of people and the environment. It is also an indirect cooptation and weakening of the women’s cooperatives operating under the umbrella of civil society organizations, given that such cooperatives are placed in direct confrontation and competition with the more profit-oriented corporate finance sector. As an alternative economic system, the solidarity economy includes the private/for-profit, public and the third (social) sector, all of which ought to operative in congruence, not competition with one another.

Thirdly, the government’s propaganda machinery and its tactics of beating activists and dissidents into silence appear to be increasingly effective. The retreat of critical voices in civil society is apparent in the reluctance of many interview respondents, including leaders of women’s organisations, activists and leaders of the women’s movement, to openly criticize the actions of the Ethiopian government towards civil society, and neither is there willingness to publicly protest and challenge the repressive CSP law. A number of activists have been arrested, jailed, harassed and others forced into exile by the state. The silencing of dissidence among human rights activists and the reluctance of activists to challenge their silencing and obscurity is a tacit in defence of the looming return to authoritarian and state-dominated economic systems, which do not support SSE.

Fourthly and tied to the previous point is the concern with the compelled movement away from community activist discourses that espouse ‘women’s rights’ and ‘human rights’, towards discourses generalizing the conditions of all women as based on ‘economic empowerment’ needs. In losing the language of rights, there is risk in losing sight of the very basis upon which the SSE emerges – as a response and alternative to the vagaries of the market, exploitative labour relations, and environmentally and socially destructive modes of production and reproduction that poor and working class women encounter. As already mentioned, the turn towards ‘economic empowerment’ programmes is one of the survival strategies adopted by women’s organisations in order access funding and to continue work among grassroots community. Yet without a definitive articulation of women’s rights and human rights to the objectives of empowerment, it becomes impossible to generate statistical and factual evidence of women’s oppression under the neoliberal regime that is surviving through means of accumulation by the dispossession of large sections of the society. The social and solidarity economy, Samuel (2013) argues, draws significant relevance from its ethical basis, which needs to be based on the values of cooperative solidarity, economic and ecological sustainability, accountability, human rights, democratization, diversity and justice. The language of ‘empowerment’ as opposed to ‘rights’ presumes that these ethical questions have already been settled.

The preceding arguments demonstrate the fragility of the close alignment of the increasingly weakened women’s organisations to grassroots women’s credit and saving cooperatives, and see questions of autonomous grassroots organizing as critical for the survival of SSE being engendered at the local level. The close proximity between women’s NGOs and grassroots women’s organising is
thoroughly undermined by the CSP law. These arguments pose significant challenges to the SSE prioritization of “territoriality/localism/subsidiarity” (Kowano 2013), inviting questions regarding whether the state been successful in its objective of divorcing women’s rights activism from the structural bases of women’s oppression, and whether alternative paths exist that can be pursued in such a context of state/civil society confrontation which can recuperate the growth of SSE in Ethiopia. In other words, through what strategies are these challenges to be circumvented?

Addressing contradictions, managing the expansion of SSEs
The primary contradiction identified in the preceding arguments is the model of NGO leadership with regards to organising grassroots women’s communities that challenges ‘localism’ at the same time as it enhances the state’s grassroots reach. Although the harmonious integration of the public, private and self-help sector is the desirable outcome of the social and solidarity economy, the co-opting nature of the CSP law is such that women’s organisations under whose umbrella women’s cooperatives are organised cannot guarantee the autonomous realization of the life-centered or people-centred political economies among poor and working class women that SSE seek to engender. State cooptation of civil society is dangerous for democracy, and in a country such as Ethiopia where NGOs have largely stepped in to supplement state deficits in service provision, and the conditions under which NGOs can survive are intricately dictated by state policy and the largesse of private capital, it becomes even more critical to focus on developing social and solidarity economies that can challenge the neoliberal development paradigm in the country.

In what ways, therefore, can the management of women’s cooperative in this political and economic context best combine economic, social, environmental objectives and establish participatory governance while minimizing the alienating impacts of profit maximization? Some opportunities exist to exploit the CSP law. For instance, the requirement for organisations to source funds locally has resulted in closer bonds and legitimacy between women’s NGOs and their local grassroots constituencies. This is because civil society organizations that are compelled to raise funds locally are also able to avoid the commonly held perception of NGOs as being ‘stooges’ of foreign powers, a discourse that is keenly pursued by the Ethiopian government as a tactic for repression. It is critical that women’s organisations continue to seek innovative ways of minimizing the impacts of the law. Expansion of SSE is a long-term project that requires a keen understanding of the structural dynamics of poverty, exclusion and dispossession. The highly politicized relationship between the Ethiopian state and civil society means that strategies for organising around SSE are also necessarily political. What the paper has shown is an increasing move to de-politicize the social and economic problems in the country, and demonstrated some of the ways in which this affects the mediatory relationship between civil society organisations and local communities. In concluding, it appears therefore, that the greatest potential to expand SSE through women’s savings and credit cooperatives lies in the possibility of minimizing the influence of the private sector and state on women’s non-governmental organisation.
References


