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Assessing the Relationship between Austerity, Labour Policies and Youth Unemployment in Oman, Jordan, Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia

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New Directions in Social Policy:
Alternatives from and for the Global South

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Study Overview

This study is supported by the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), and it is designed to examine the emergence, nature, and effectiveness of recent developments in social policy in emerging economies and developing countries. The purpose is to understand whether these are fundamentally new approaches to social policy or welfare systems which could offer alternative solutions to the critical development challenges facing low- and middle-income countries in the 21st century.

This study will shed light on the youth employment policy options and choices of Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Oman, and Tunisia. Specifically, it looks at how the economic and social policies implemented in these countries led to the high levels of youth unemployment prior to the Arab Spring and at how, after this series of massive social protests concluded, new policies and institutions have emerged to provide innovative solutions to address the problem.

Thus, the purpose of the work is to provide additional knowledge to answer the questions: how economic, social, political and institutional arrangements can be designed to achieve better social outcomes given the challenges of the contemporary development context; how the values and norms of human rights, equity, sustainability and social justice can be operationalized through “new” social policies; and how experiences, knowledge and learning about innovative approaches can be shared among countries in the South.

Economic growth in most countries in the MENA region during the 1990s failed to fully address calls for more, and higher quality, employment opportunities for the vast majority in the region, particularly its youth. According to some (see al-Nashif and Tzannatos, 2013; El-Said and Harrigan, 2015; UNDP and ILO, 2013; Bellin, 2013), the region’s sharp focus on increasing privatization and trade openness, reducing debt and inflation, and attracting foreign direct investment

Glossed over two decades of skewed economic policies, a widening social protection deficit, and the absence of institutionalized social dialogue between governments, workers, employers, and other segments of society (al-Nashif and Tzannatos, 2013).

The economic growth that did occur was not inclusive (Benar, 2007), leaving out the growing numbers of well-educated and skilled Arab youth who had benefitted from decades of state-level investment in improving education outcomes. This, coupled with the low levels of political accountability among elected officials, and of low levels of political voice among citizens, translated into a weakened ability of governments in the region to fully appreciate many of the social consequences of International Financial Institution (IFI)-encouraged economic reforms. Writing of Jordan, Assaad (2012) notes

Despite the fact that Jordan has experienced significant economic growth in the past decade, it continues to suffer from persistently high unemployment, especially among educated youth...The employment challenges faced by these increasingly educated new entrants co-exist with an economy that is creating a large number of low-quality informal jobs in construction and services that are mostly being filled by a growing legion of foreign workers.

Salehi-Isfahani (2015) argues that a disappointing ability to translate relatively high educational achievement into employment opportunities has contributed to

A widespread belief about education in MENA countries ...that the actual benefits of investments in education are increasingly below expectations. As emphasized in earlier studies, high rates of youth unemployment and long durations of waiting for the first job after leaving school erode the social trust in education as the path to social mobility that has been the hallmark of post-independence social and economic development in MENA countries (Salehi-Isfahani, 2012). High levels of inequality of opportunity in access to education and employment imply that the erosion of trust is occurring faster in the lower social and economic strata and is likely to undermine the social contract formed on the basis of social mobility through education.

In her study of social protection systems in the MENA region, Jawad (2014) illustrates the connection between high rates of unemployment, including among youth, and the lack of access to employment-based social protection systems:

Only 30-40 per cent of Arab populations are covered by formal social protection systems. Large swathes of the population are excluded such as agricultural workers, the self-employed and informal sector workers. In view of the fact that average rates of unemployment in the region reach 15 per cent (the highest in the world), then the benefits of social insurance reach a very small minority. In addition key health insurance benefits are skewed towards the military and political elites and are again not possible for those not in formal full-time employment. In various countries ranging from Egypt to Lebanon to Saudi Arabia, government and military elites in particular are able to access the best state hospitals. It is therefore, important for the Arab region to consider how the unemployed, informal sector workers and those on low salaries will access basic social services and a minimum income. Targeting or means-testing will cause questions about which groups are included and which are excluded and may also stigmatise certain groups that do receive assistance. They also risk creating dependency among vulnerable groups which means that long-term problems of poverty may not be dealt with. This issue is especially important in view of the high rates of unemployment in the Arab region.

Jawad goes on to suggest that, in a post-Arab Spring policy environment, policies and programs designed to address the “youth bulge” would contribute to resolving the larger social protection question by serving as sources of revenue generated by higher rates of youth employment.

In their largely qualitative study of economic reform and instability in the Middle East, El-Said and Harrigan (2014) ask “has economic liberalization as promoted by the IMF and World Bank had a negative impact on formal social welfare provisions in the Middle East?”, which they answer in the affirmative, noting that periods of economic growth have not been sustained, and as growth slows, poverty increases. Moreover, El-Said and Harrigan argue that austerity, and its accompanying weakening of social welfare provisions, required as a condition for support from the IMF and World Bank ultimately undermines regimes and promotes political and social instability.” (El-Said and Harrigan, 2014).

Similarly, a recent International Labour Organization report finds that uncritical adoption of trade liberalization policies in the region since the 1990s has likely contributed to social unrest through, in part, social exclusion and the increasing unemployment rates for even well-educated youth (UNDP, ILO, 2013). El-Said and Harrigan note that Tunisia’s insistence on maintaining social spending during its structural adjustment period (but not before rioting resulted from implementing IFI-required cuts to food subsidies, which were soon restored) enabled it to implement

reforms while also reducing poverty, making it the exception to the rule in the region and underscoring the importance of resisting calls for austerity that include drastic reductions in funding for human development.

For all of the hope engendered by the populist uprisings of the Arab Spring, the MENA region can hardly be said to have advanced economically, socially or politically as a result. Modest gains in these areas, particularly reductions in unemployment, have eroded in the years following the Arab Spring, although only partly because of it.

Since 2011, most Arab economies have been dramatically impacted by social unrest, the surge in commodity and energy prices (for oil importers), recessionary impacts affecting private and public sector sectors, increased uncertainty for investors and greater demands for expansionary expenditure for economic recovery and social justice. The unrest has already had a huge direct cost, and has also contributed to a decline in economic activity and increased unemployment. Since 2010, the decline in regional unemployment rates has been reversed (UNDP, ILO, 2014).

Proposal

We propose a mixed methods study of the dynamic relationship among economic growth strategies, human capital investment and political and social instability in Oman, Jordan, Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia to understand and explain past policy choices, their outcomes and the new responses to tackle the problem of youth unemployment. Each of these countries, with the possible exception of Tunisia and Egypt, has seen relatively strong economic growth in the early and mid-2000s slow significantly in recent years, due in large part to recent national political instability and geopolitical unrest in the region.

Moreover, and contrary to some of the main tenets human capital theory, the high primary and secondary education rates in this cluster of countries has not translated into robust employment opportunities for youth. Youth unemployment, assumed to be a key driver of political and social instability in the region, has grown steadily over most of the last decade. and in 2012 it ranged from 18.6 percent in Morocco to 42.3 percent in Tunisia. In any case, being well above the already high global average of 12.7 percent (UNDP, 2014).¹

The UN's Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia reports:

Secondly, even with an educated labour force, opportunities for decent employment were curtailed after the implementation of structural adjustment programmes and a general freeze on public sector recruitment in the 1990s. The private sector could not fill this void, leading to the proliferation of informal jobs, mainly in low value-added service sectors.... Arab youth with higher education qualifications, in particular, became disenfranchised and increasingly sought to migrate, considering it their only employment option (ESCWA, 2014).

Potential explanations for this disconnect between heavy investment in primary and secondary education in this subset of countries and high levels of youth unemployment are numerous, including population growth outpacing the ability to create employment opportunities, the global economic downturn, dropping out of the labor force altogether,

¹ Moreover, it is likely that these are conservative estimates given modest capacity for collecting and reporting data in several of these countries (World Bank's "Overall Level of Statistical Capacity" indicator, data.worldbank.org/indicator/IQ.SCI.OVRL).

the lack of a comprehensive national policy framework, or some combination of these factors.

This observed disconnect between economic growth in the early and mid-2000s and youth employment may also be attributed to weak and/or disintegrating public institutions and the absence of persistent active labor market policies that can translate economic growth into investment in the well-being of its citizenry and, ipso facto, future economic growth. Karshenas et al argue that a line can be drawn from budgetary imbalances in the 1980s, to the adoption of market-oriented economic policies, to the proliferation of NGOs that arose in response to the diminishment of state-led social safety net programs, to the removal of state-guaranteed employment, to the Arab Spring (Karshenas, et al., 2014).

Instead, a review of International Monetary Fund and World Bank pronouncements (author's database of IMF and World Bank public documents) indicate that these international financial institutions' focus remains on "public sector consolidation" and "tightly managed" central government budgets for each of four of five of these countries. In each case, structural reform to promote economic growth is advised as a pre-condition for improvement in social outcomes, especially employment, and particularly for youth and women.

Boozer et al (2011) find that, between 1960 and 2001, neither Jordan, Morocco, nor Tunisia had achieved the sort of balance between investment in human development (HD) (in their case, education and healthcare) and economic growth (EG) needed to put them on a path toward sustainable development. Contrary to the advice given by international financial institutions, Boozer et al suggest that, for countries such as these, low investment rates in social programming, and/or a dearth of social and economic policies and institutions capable of redistributing the gains of economic growth, may be at the root of these countries' inability to achieve this balance.

Departing from Boozer, however, we propose to substitute the change in infant mortality with change in youth unemployment as a proxy for progress toward sustainable human development. The primary aim of this research project, therefore, is to explore, through a mixed methods approach, the main factors behind the high levels of youth unemployment in the MENA region, asking what institutions and policies can do to reconnect economic and social policies with employment, and provide decent work for youth. The project pays special attention to the interactions between global and domestic factors, including policy prescriptions from international financial institutions, as well as the domestic policy making process, to examine how public institutions and policies guaranteeing jobs and social protection, albeit insufficient, have changed in the selected countries prior to, during and after the Arab Spring.

We propose to conduct an analysis of related policy decisions and institutional development efforts in each of these five countries, including those related to income redistribution, to identify potential linkages between these countries' current HD/EG condition and policy decisions made in the past two decades. For this part of the study, we will follow what has been described as a "policy prescriptive" approach by some (Van Evera, 1997), in order to analyze the economic and social policies and institutions that have emerged since the Arab Spring, with a particular focus on youth unemployment policies, in Oman, Jordan, Morocco, Egypt, and Tunisia. This analysis will focus on the problems that newly established institutions and newly formulated policies aim to address.

The qualitative portion of the study is meant to complement the quantitative study in that, we assume, the quantitative analysis will identify the relationship between certain economic and social policies pursued in these five countries. Through an iterative process, the outcomes of the quantitative analysis will guide and focus the qualitative research, and vice versa. Per the New Directions in Social Policy Concept Note (United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 2014), our aim with this study is to provide improved analytic and methodological frameworks and tools for understanding the development of social policies in the MENA region, and, in particular, to use these methodological frameworks and tools to assess the impacts of any new policies and institutions. Taken together, the quantitative and qualitative components of this study will provide evidence that will contribute to the elaboration of global development and policy priorities, and how they can be met in the post-2015 world (United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 2014).

Hypotheses and Research Questions

The hypotheses underpinning our study concern the dynamic relationship among social policy, economic growth and political stability. Of primary interest is the effect that policy prescriptions delivered by IFIs have had on four relatively resource poor countries, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia, and one relatively resource wealthy country, Oman. Specifically, our hypotheses are:

- Free-market-oriented, neoliberal policy prescriptions promote austerity in developing countries, with negative effects on investments in social programs designed to reduce poverty and promote economic self-sufficiency;
- The weak institutions that result from this austerity are poorly equipped to create, implement and sustain the sorts of programs needed to promote growth, expand employment opportunities, and lead to economic self-sufficiency;
- The resulting unemployment and erosion of public institutions contributes to political and social instability, thereby undermining economic growth and increasing reliance on assistance from IFIs to maintain the state and the economy.

The primary research questions that follow from these hypotheses are:

1. What economic and social policies and institutions most contribute to the high levels of youth unemployment?, and
2. What new, innovative policies have emerged since the Arab Spring that address youth unemployment? What are the drivers behind these approaches?

Following from these questions, we are also interested in the following sub-questions:

- i. What mismatch between policy options (particularly those in the policy areas of fiscal, education, labor and employment, income substitution and cash transfer programmes, and health) have delinked employment from human capital development?
- ii. Are post-Arab Spring reforms addressing the mismatch. If so, how? If not, what are the primary impediments?
- iii. To what extent do neoliberal economic growth prescriptions affect the domestic policies and institutions in the case study countries that contribute to high youth unemployment?
- iv. How and to what extent have economic and social policy programs affected economic growth and human development?

- v. What are the limitations of current theoretical frameworks on youth unemployment in the case study countries?

Clearly, some of these research questions are best answered by a qualitative analysis of the institution and policy landscape in these countries, while others may be answered by quantitative analyses. These approaches are described below.

Methods and Data

We believe that the questions posed above can be addressed empirically, and we propose the following mixed-methods approach.

Quantitative analysis

The relationship between economic growth and human development

By now, although this is a relatively new acknowledgement among development economists, it is generally accepted that the linkage between economic growth and human development should not be taken as a given. While economic growth may provide the funding needed to create and sustain improvements in human development, it is not sufficient on its own. Public investment in, for example, health and education are necessary for the maintenance of both human development and economic growth.

Relying on growth alone, as had been the focus of policy prescriptions offered up by developed countries for decades, rarely resulted in the sorts of economic, social, and political outcomes recipients of aid had envisioned. As Spence notes

Without appropriate public policies, economic growth can end up being jobless without increased employment opportunities; ruthless with benefits going mainly to the rich rather than the poor; voiceless without an expansion of empowerment and political engagement; rootless by stifling rather than encouraging cultural diversity; and futureless by depleting natural resources rather than being environmentally friendly (cited in Deneulin and Shahani 2009).

Boozer et al (2011) address the relationship between human development (HD) and economic growth (EG), with the aim of examining the joint effect of HD on EG and the feedback of EG on higher HD, permitting a better understanding of the dynamics of developing countries' growth paths. In their paper, Boozer et al examine the two-way causal relationships between HD and EG, conceptually and empirically, addressing cross-country heterogeneity through the use of panel data estimators to identify the relationship between HD and EG (vs. simpler OLS estimators, or via a simultaneous equation framework).

Boozer et al's work links two heretofore distinct parts of the current human development literature, namely work addressing HD and its determinants, and EG and its determinants. Their empirical contribution consists of successfully addressing the dual causality between HD and EG by, first, studying the two causal relationships involved separately: how HD contributes to EG and how EG supports HD; and then, secondly, examining the dynamic paths of HD and EG to determine how important HD is in generating sustained increases in EG and how important EG is in leading to improvements in HD. Their findings have important implications for the sequencing of policy (i.e., must investments in EG precede investments in HD in order for HD to occur, or vice versa?).

Boozer et al build on earlier work by Ranis, Stewart and Ramirez (2000). Employing data from 76 countries over 30 years, Ranis et al (2000) classify country performance into four categories: virtuous, vicious and two types of lop-sidedness – lopsided either with strong human development but weak economic growth (HD-lopsided), or lopsided with strong economic growth but weak human development (EG-lopsided). In the virtuous cycle, human development enhances growth, which in turn promotes human development, and so on. In the vicious cycle, poor performance on human development tends to lead to poor growth performance, which in turn depresses human development achievements and so on.

Boozer et al, like Ranis et al had earlier, found that economic growth contributes to human development (improved health and education) only if it is accompanied by a shift in resource-allocation towards health and education, equitable distribution of income, and extensive employment programs for the unemployed. Ranis et al (2000) also note that incomes of the poor are increased to the extent that economic growth generates employment for low-income groups, and to the extent that the social spending allocation ratio is made a priority of government activity.

These findings are critical to our study; only, or at least primarily, via these investments in employment, health and education, and income redistribution can economic growth be effectively translated into sustainable human development. In other words, there is nothing automatic about economic growth translating into improvements in human development.

For this study, we will exploit the panel nature of human development (HD) and economic growth (EG) data available for each of the five countries covered by our study. We will employ fixed effects panel regressions², with cluster robust standard errors, to identify the effect that various HD and EG indicators have on youth unemployment in Oman, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt over the period of 2000 to 2013. All models will be estimated using Stata 14.

Identifying a proxy for “human development”

Boozer et al, following Ranis et al, chose the Infant Mortality Shortfall Reduction (IMSR) as a proxy for human development in their analysis (and, so, as the dependent variable in their regressions) of the dynamics between human development and economic development because the infant mortality rate is relatively consistently measured over time, and because it is also correlated with other human development indicators, such as adult literacy and life expectancy.

In a similar fashion, and for similar reasons, we have chosen youth unemployment as a proxy for human development. In addition to its recognition as a critical component of human development by the likes of Rawls, Alkire, Nussbaum, among others, employment (or, in our case, youth employment) is measured consistently over long periods of time, and is highly correlated with other human development indicators,

² Fixed effects panel models control for country-specific unobservable determinants of youth unemployment, significant concerns with panel datasets similar to the one used in this study. One limitation of using fixed effects estimators, however, is that time-invariant variables, such as geographic characteristics, drop out of the models, making estimations of the coefficients for these variables impossible to determine. Instead, all of the effects of time-invariant factors are absorbed in the error term in fixed effects models. Random effects models are better suited to the use of time-invariant variables. However, Wooldridge (2006) notes that fixed effects models are the more appropriate models when using panel data to determine policy effects over time.

including the Human Development Index. We will use youth unemployment rate (YOUNEMP) as the dependent variable in our panel data analyses.

Proposed indicators

Countries will be classified as either HD-lopsided, EG-lopsided, or in either a virtuous or vicious cycle of development, based on population weighted developing world averages for the period between 2000 and 2013 (Boozer et al, 2011). Identifying these five countries as virtuous, vicious, HD-lopsided, or EG-lopsided will be primarily a descriptive exercise, permitting us to locate where these countries fall on an admittedly stylized representation of the intersection of economic growth and human development. Doing so will also permit us to chart any movement from one quadrant to another over time.

However, measuring causality among the drivers of change in youth unemployment in the region will require the use of panel data estimators and the regression of our YOUNEMP indicator on a range of explanatory variables, consistent with both the economic growth and human development literature.

For their study, Boozer et al selected several indicators that theory and the literature suggested should produce a measurable effect on their dependent variable (in their “Chain A” models), the IMSR. These included GDP per capita, gross primary enrolment rate, gross female primary enrolment rate, Gini Index, poverty headcount, public expenditure on education, and public expenditure on health. These, they hypothesized, should account for measurable, statistically significant change in their proxy for HD, the IMSR.

However, their findings shed little light on what drives change in the IMSR, except for the perhaps unsurprising findings that improvement in female education is associated with improvement in the shortfall rate, and that headcount poverty is associated with a worsening of the shortfall rate. In their defence, Boozer et al acknowledge that data availability on human development indicators was rather limited, particularly when compared with the data available for their economic growth models. In addition, the thrust of their study was less to identify causal factors for reductions in the IMSR than it was to demonstrate, empirically, the two-way relationship between investment in human development and virtuous economic growth.

For our study, however, we are primarily interested identifying at least a few of the key drivers of change in youth unemployment in our five MENA region countries. To this end, we will borrow some of Boozer et al’s indicators, but will also supplement our models with additional indicators that we understand from the literature, and that we hypothesize, are causal with respect to youth unemployment. A preliminary list of indicators includes, but is not limited to:

- Indicators of Economic Growth
 - FDI
 - GDP/cap
 - Household final consumption expenditure
 - Imports/exports as percentage of GDP
 - IBRD loans and IDA credits
 - Annual inflation rates
 - Labor force participation rates

- *Indicators of Human Development*
 - Primary and secondary school completion rates
 - Secondary enrollment rates (total, male and female)
 - Public expenditure on education and training as percentages of GDP
 - Gini index
 - Rule of law
 - Political freedom index

While a detailed definition of each indicator goes beyond the scope of this proposal (but will be included as a part of a data dictionary in the final report), perhaps it will suffice to make a few observations regarding this, still, preliminary list. First, nearly all of these indicators reflect an underlying policy decision, typically made at a national or supranational level, and, as such, are subject to revision by policy actors. Clearly, some, like the Political Freedom Index, are not directly chosen by policymakers, but reflect policy, or the need for it. Others, though, can be directly tied to specific policy decisions, such as decisions related to a country's education budget. In either case, however, an argument can be made (and, in some cases, has been made in the literature) that there may be a causal relationship between these indicators and change in the youth unemployment rate, possibly suggesting new directions for youth employment policy. Our models will explore this relationship.

A second observation regarding this list of indicators is that several are included in standard lists of "Washington Consensus" policies. These policies, said by many to have been abandoned by IFIs and bi-lateral aid agencies, and argued by others (see Bayliss et al [2011] for further exploration of this tendency) to have simply been renamed and kept in play, have long been part of the prescription for economic growth in the developing world. Following this prescription, according to the argument, would ultimately, or even in the near-term, lead to reductions in youth unemployment as demand for labour grew. Our models will also explore this relationship.

A third point has to do with the need for parsimony in modelling of this sort. The factors that drive change in youth unemployment are multiple and varied, are characterized by data limitations, and, moreover, may not lend themselves readily to any sort of quantitative analysis (cultural considerations, e.g.). At best, econometric modelling can be used to deepen our understanding of the effects on youth unemployment of those factors that are measurable, which, we would argue, is still vitally important, but then only if rooted in theory. So rooted, models can be used to test the relationships between variables identifiable from the theory, but are credible only if indicators are selected judiciously and with some working hypotheses as to the normative outcomes. To this end, we have selected only a few from among potentially hundreds of variables to measure in our models. However, based on (1) our substantial understanding of the literature on the topic, and (2) our initial findings from the qualitative research conducted in the field, we believe that this limited set of indicators may yield important findings as to the drivers of change in youth unemployment, thereby, we hope, pointing toward useful recommendations for new social policy in the region.

Finally, much of the data compiled for these indicators is taken from the World Bank's World Development Indicators, but other data comes from the OECD and from the Quality of Government database maintained by the Quality of Government Institute at the University of Gothenburg.

This conceptual model may be presented as an equation:

$$YOUNEMP_{it} = f(zg, zc, t) + C_i + E_{it}$$

in which youth unemployment for country i at time t is explained as a function of zg , a vector of economic growth based variables, zc , a vector of human development-based variables, and t , representing time. The model includes a set of indicators C_i representing the countries in the model. The variable time is key since it will show whether a change in policy contributes to a change in YOUNEMP, potentially providing the strongest evidence of “cause.”

In addition, and as a means for testing the robustness of the panel regression findings, we will employ a two-step structural equation model to estimate the relationships among our key variables of interest: economic growth and youth unemployment (proxying for human development). We hypothesize that is an important channel that runs from underinvestment in human capital to reduction in economic growth, and then to reliance on IFI-imposed policy prescriptions that further constrain investment in human capital. Moreover, we hypothesize that this relationship is non-recursive (i.e., that the causal flow among these variables may run in both directions).

Based on a review of the literature addressing the causes of youth unemployment, the a metric of youth unemployment will then be regressed on the same indicators of interest used in the fixed effects regressions (noted above).

Qualitative analysis

The qualitative portion of this study will focus on the process by which beneficial policy decisions were made, implemented and sustained in Oman, Jordan, Morocco, Egypt, and Tunisia. In addition, we will identify barriers to expanding the reach of these policies, as well as to creating new, beneficial social policies.

For the qualitative study, we anticipate conducting document reviews of state-level policy decisions, reviews of international financial institution policies as they relate to these three countries, and extensive field research on site, including interviews with key policymakers, staff and civil society actors responsible for implementing policy change on the ground. We also intend to collaborate with local researchers to assist in introductions and scheduling interviews and site visits. Most of our team is fluent in Arabic, and have lived and worked extensively in the region.

Research Team and Duties

Heath Prince, PhD

Heath Prince will serve as Principal Investigator on the project, and will be the lead quantitative analyst and will manage the project. He will also participate in field research in Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia, with either Yara Halasa or Amna Khan, and will serve as an alternate for field research lead in Oman and Egypt. He will work closely with the research team as a co-author of the final report, and will represent the team in a convening to be scheduled for either March or April, 2016.

Dr. Prince is the Ray Marshall Center’s director and a research scientist. Dr. Prince has over fifteen years’ experience in the education and workforce development fields as a researcher, project manager, policy analyst, and evaluator. Currently, Dr. Prince serves as principal investigator on multiple research projects involving statistical analyses of confidential administrative records data on education and the labour market. Dr. Prince

designed the impact evaluations for several U.S. Department of Labour grants—each measuring the labour market impact of pro-poor education and training interventions.

Dr. Prince is a pro-bono consultant for the One Acre Fund and Nuru International, and leads a team of hydrologists, geologists and volunteers in the completion of a water pipeline and treatment plant in Cevicos, The Dominican Republic, where he has participated in the operation of a health clinic, micro-lending program, and scholarship program since 2009. Dr. Prince is also a non-resident monitoring and evaluation advisor for the Center for Global Development and Sustainability, at Brandeis University's Heller School for Social Policy and Management. In addition, his research into multidimensional poverty has led to invited conference presentations in Peru and, most recently, Cameroon.

Prior to joining the Center, Dr. Prince was a senior policy analyst at the Center for Law and Social Policy in Washington, D.C. Dr. Prince has a Bachelor's degree in International Affairs from the University of Colorado, Boulder, a Master's degree in Public Affairs from the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas, Austin, where he focused on labour policy, and a Master's degree and PhD in Social Policy from Brandeis University's Heller School for Social Policy and Management. His dissertation research focused on measuring the drivers of change in multidimensional poverty in developing countries.

Yara Halasa, DDS, MS

Yara Halasa will lead the qualitative field research in Jordan and either Oman or Egypt, along with consultants (TBD) in either of those countries. She will also serve as co-author of the final report.

Dr. Halasa is a health economist with demonstrated experience in costing, cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness studies, health financing, modelling, and health policy research. In addition to her work in the U.S., Dr. Halasa has worked extensively in developing countries, conducting both qualitative and quantitative analyses.

Dr. Halasa currently holds a Research Associate position with the Schneider Institute for Health Policy at Brandeis University, and is a lecturer in the International Healthcare Policy and Management Masters' program at Brandeis University's Heller School for Social Policy and Management.

Dr. Halasa received a Doctor's degree in Dental Surgery from Aleppo University, as well as Masters of Science degrees in International Healthcare Management from Bocconi University in Milan, and International Healthcare Policy and Management from Brandeis University. She has also recently successfully defended her doctoral dissertation proposal.

Amna Khan, MPA

Amna Khan, from her base in Islamabad, will lead the field research in Morocco and Tunisia, assisted by Heath Prince. She will also co-author the final report.

Ms. Khan is the Deputy Project Director for the Center for Advanced Studies in Energy, a USAID-funded project in Islamabad, Pakistan. Prior to her current position, Ms. Khan worked as a Research Associate for the RMC, evaluating programs in family policy, workforce development and education, on both domestic and international projects. Ms. Khan specializes in qualitative research and process evaluations.

Ms. Khan has a Master's degree in Public Affairs from the LBJ School of Public Affairs at The University of Texas at Austin. Her thesis evaluated public private partnerships in education in Pakistan. As a student, she also presented her paper on institutional capabilities at the South Asian Economic Students Meet in New Delhi, with support from the World Bank.

Deliverables, Activities, Personnel, and Schedule

Activities	Personnel	Schedule	Deliverable	Due Date
Field research: Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia	Heath Prince, Amna Khan, Yara Halasa,	Late August-October, 2015	Internal field notes	Mid-November, 2015
Field research: Oman, Egypt	Consultants	November, 2015-January, 2016	Internal field notes	Mid-January, 2015
Quantitative analysis	Heath Prince	Late August, 2015-January, 2016	Internal draft analysis	February, 2016
MENA Convening	Heath Prince	March, or late April, 2016	Preliminary findings	March, or late April, 2016
Work on final report	Heath Prince, Amna Khan, Yara Halasa	April-May, 2016	Final report	June, 2016
(TBD) Assist with editing MENA volume	Heath Prince (with UNRISD and Rana Jawad)	June-December, 2016	Edited volume	TBD

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