Inequality, Popular Attitudes and Elite Ideology in Africa

The Case of Social Protection

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Abstract

Many Southern African countries have very high levels of inequality and thus far higher poverty rates than would be expected given their GDP per capita. The persistence of inequality despite multi-party democracy, mostly competitive elections and (in some cases) turnovers in government, suggests that we need to understand better how both elites and citizens view inequality, poverty and public policy. This paper argues that conservative ideologies and doctrines of welfare predominate in Africa. This ideology entails a distinction between ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ poor people, an aversion to ‘dependency’ on ‘handouts’, and anxiety about the effects of government interventions (including cash transfers) on productivity and morality. At the same time, there is a widespread discourse of responsibility for the poor, such that the state should assume some of the roles that were played formerly by kin or community. Whilst evidence on popular opinion is scant, the available evidence suggests that popular and elite attitudes overlap but are not identical.

Keywords

Social protection; ideology; public opinion; conservatism; social cash transfers

Bio

Jeremy Seekings is Professor of Political Studies and Sociology, Interim Director of the Institute for Democracy, Citizenship and Public Policy in Africa and Director of the Centre for Social Science Research at the University of Cape Town. His most recent book is Policy, Politics and Poverty in South Africa (2015).
Inequality, poverty and public policy

Africa stands out for its weak performance in terms of poverty-reduction. Taking into account uneven and missing data, the best estimates suggest that, in 1990, about 57 percent of Africa’s population lived below the standard international extreme poverty line. By 2015, this poverty rate had fallen only to about 41 percent. Moreover, over the same period, the absolute number of people in extreme poverty in Africa rose, because the population was growing faster than the poverty rate was falling (UN 2015; Beegle et al. 2016). This was a period of strong global economic growth, raising per capita GDP across much of Africa – and also increasing inequality. Africa’s poverty rate remained stubbornly high because few of the benefits of economic growth trickled down to the poor, i.e. the growth elasticity of poverty was small. Every 1 percent of economic growth reduced poverty by only 0.7 percent in Africa, compared to a reduction of 2 percent elsewhere in the world (Bicaba et al. 2016:10). In Africa, economic growth benefitted some people but left behind many others. “Development” has rarely been inclusive.

It is thus not surprising that there have been strong calls for the expansion of social assistance programmes (e.g. Hanlon et al. 2010). These might not be able to eliminate poverty, but they can and do reduce dramatically extreme poverty. Social assistance programmes have expanded in Africa, although the pace of this expansion is unclear. The international agencies that advocate expansion tend to talk up the pace at which expansion is actually happening, presumably in order to encourage laggards. In a celebration of cash transfer programmes, the World Bank counted 123 social assistance programmes in 35 sub-Saharan African countries as of 2009. The Bank reported that the “enthusiasm for conditional cash transfer programs in other regions has spilled over into the continent … [M]any policy makers are excited about how cash transfers can be used to meet Africa’s poverty and development goals” (Garcia and Moore 2012:350, xiii). More recently, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) reports “notable progress in the extension of social protection coverage” in Africa (2017:119); “most African countries have made social protection a priority in their development strategies” and have adopted or are developing national social protection policies and plans (ibid:131). An inventory of social assistance programmes (narrowly-defined) counts more than 45 million people (i.e. 5 percent of the population of sub-Saharan Africa) receiving a cash transfer as of 2015, through a total of 80 programmes in 37 countries (see Hickey et al. 2018: Table A1). Using a broader definition of social protection, the ILO estimates that 18 percent of the population of sub-Saharan Africa – i.e. 220 million people – are “covered” in the senses of either receiving at least one cash benefit or contributing to a contributory social insurance scheme (ILO 2017). The World Bank, using an even more inclusive definition of social protection, estimates that about 20 percent of households across Africa benefit from some kind of social protection.1 There are also many people across Africa living in peasant households who benefit from agricultural subsidy programmes that function much like social assistance, as the Food and Agricultural Organisation has noted (FAO 2017).

International agencies (as well as aid donors) have pushed strongly for social protection, not only placing it firmly on the policy agenda (von Gliszczynski and Leisering 2016) but also providing substantial funding and technical expertise. Large sums have been spent on study tours, seminars and other events to build coalitions of reform-friendly politicians and officials.

1 ASPIRE database, variable per_allsp.cov_pop_tot.
In some cases, parallel quasi-state, NGO-based bureaucracies have been established. Reform was often “donor-driven” (Devereux 2010). Yet, across much of Africa, it is the absence of social protection reforms that is most striking: whatever their policy documents proclaim, most national governments have resisted many reforms and been slow to implement the ones they have agreed to. This paper explores one set of factors informing the absence or slow pace of pro-poor social protection reforms: the ambivalence about social protection among both policy-making elites and citizens across much of East and Southern Africa. This focus should not be mistaken for any presumption that attitudes determine policy-making. Indeed, some countries have extensive social protection despite the ambivalence of elites and even citizens. Case-studies of policy-making suggest that ideology does matter, in conjunction with material and institutional interests, political and fiscal opportunities and constraints, although it remains unclear precisely how – and how far – norms and values matter.

Elite attitudes towards social protection

Regional organisations (led by the African Union) profess a commitment to social protection, and many governments have adopted national social protection strategies, but in practice the enthusiasm found within international organisations has been widely resisted by policy-making elites across much of Africa. “Policy-making elites” are understood here as encompassing both elected politicians and senior bureaucrats, as well as influential agenda-setters outside of the state. These elites’ attitudes towards social protection are rooted in their perceptions of the poor and their attributions of poverty. In Malawi, for example, Kalebe-Nyamongo found that elites (defined more widely than policy-makers) view the poor as “passive, dependent, and fatalistic”. Despite evidence of the positive effects of cash transfers on the poor, elites worry that such programmes simply encourage laziness and “dependency” and therefore favoured workfare (i.e. public employment programmes) and supposedly “developmental” programmes (such as microfinance) over cash transfers (Kalebe-Nyamongo and Marquette 2014). In interviews in a range of countries since 2014, political leaders and government officials repeatedly cite the mantra that people should “never get something for nothing”. In their view, social assistance (“handouts”) generates “dependency” in that recipients lose the incentive or will to work, become lazy and dependent on the government. In this view, social protection undermines “self-reliance” – the opposite of “development”, which strengthens “self-reliance”. In this normative worldview, work is the basis of desert.

The spectre of “dependency” weighs heavily on elites in different parts of Africa, including among self-conscious modernisers. For example, the Kagame regime in Rwanda views the peasantry as undynamic and needing to be modernised. Poverty is seen as the consequence of a lack of determination. “If we can utilize the resources that God has given to us to good effect, we can eradicate poverty”, Kagame told the country in 2000. “We would like to urgently appeal to the Rwandese people to work. As the Bible says, ‘he who does not work should not eat’” (cited in Ansoms 2009:297). This did not preclude social welfare reforms. The Kagame regime

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2 Many country case-studies have been conducted under the auspices of two research programmes, both funded by the UK’s Department for International Development: The Legislated and Implementing Welfare Policy Reforms (LIWPR) project based at the University of Cape Town (South Africa) and the Effective States and Inclusive Development (ESID) programme based at the University of Manchester (UK).

3 This finding is based on research conducted for the LIWPR project in Ghana, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa. Many of the publications from this project are listed in the bibliography at the end of this paper.
introduced a series of programmes, in part because they appear to facilitate production and in part because they serve to legitimate what is essentially an authoritarian regime (Lavers 2016).

Conservative attitudes among national elites have often blocked or at least inhibited the efforts of international organisations to promote social protection. A clear example of this was Zambia in the 2000s. Faced with the dual challenges of drought and AIDS, the German aid agency Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) and later the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) supported strongly pilot social assistance programmes and encouraged and assisted the Zambian government to draft a “social protection strategy”. The model prioritized cash transfers to “labour-constrained”, ultra-poor households. Reforms were, however, strongly opposed by the influential Minister of Finance, Ng’andu Magande, who saw the poor as largely responsible for their own poverty and resisted any government interventions that were not clearly developmental. His views on the largely undeserving poor may have been extreme within his party (the Movement for Multiparty Democracy, MMD), but the party had been elected in 1991 in reaction against the failed statism of Zambia’s previous governments (Kabandula and Seekings 2016). After Magande’s departure (in 2008), the MMD government was marginally more receptive to donor-driven reform but remained slow to expand the pilot donor-funded programmes. Only after a change of government in 2011 were social cash transfer programmes expanded significantly.

In Uganda, also, donors – especially DFID – worked hard to move social protection up the government’s agenda in the 2000s. The government was formally committed to poverty-reduction. It implemented a number of relevant reforms: it abolished fees in clinics and primary schools and introduced school feeding programmes and very modest programmes for orphans and the disabled. In 2002, a Social Protection Task Force was established within the Ministry for Gender, Labour and Social Development. In 2006, DFID and the government signed an agreement to design and pilot a cash transfer scheme to address “chronic poverty”. DFID-funded consultants worked closely with bureaucrats in the Ministry for Gender, Labour and Social Development as well as civil society groups. But, in 2007, the Minister of Finance blocked the proposed pilot cash transfer programme. The Minister expressed concern over long-term affordability. Underlying this concern lay a deep ambivalence about poverty-targeted cash transfers. The leader of the “technical assistance team” later explained that the initiative failed because decision-makers “didn’t see cash transfers as an answer to poverty, they saw economic growth and hard work and [the poor] getting off their backsides as the answer to poverty”.

Tanzania’s successive governments stand out in their disinterest in social assistance. The government – controlled since independence by a single party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) – has emphasised consistently and strongly self-reliance, responsibility and hard work. The World Bank pushed for a Productive Safety Net Programme integrating workfare with cash transfers. It promoted its programme as a “smart” safety net programme that raises the productivity of the poor. The Bank emphasised that poor people invested – rather than simply consumed – the benefits, expanding future production. The cash transfer component not only had developmental conditions attached, but programme officials emphasised that beneficiaries should “graduate” out of the programme within three years (and therefore did not include any specific provision for the elderly through social pensions). They emphasised that these were not “handouts”.

4 Statism refers here to a strategy that relied heavily on the state rather than the private sector or citizens themselves.
5 Quoted in Grebe 2014:17; see also Grebe and Mubiru 2014; Hickey and Bukenya 2016.
2015, the government finally agreed to the countrywide rollout of the programme to the poorest 10 percent of households, to be co-financed by the government with the World Bank and other donors. At the same time, HelpAge International, DFID and the ILO promoted unsuccessfully the idea of a social pension. As of 2015/16, however, the government was funding only 4 percent of the Productive Safety Net Programme, i.e. much less than the 25 percent to which it had previously agreed. Whilst newly-elected President Magufuli emphasised hard work, the media reported cases of irregular beneficiaries (Ulriksen 2016; Ulriksen et al. 2018).

In some countries in Africa (as in Europe), anxiety over dependency has become more prominent in part in response to the expansion of social assistance. In Botswana, the expansion of drought relief from the mid-1960s fuelled concern that peasant farmers would become dependent on it and cease to farm. Anxiety grew as “development” rose in importance for the government: Given that economic development meant rising productivity, dependency represented the failure of development. Anxiety about dependency became almost ubiquitous in Botswana by the 2000s. Whilst poor people might have understood the necessity of drought relief, elites thought that it fuelled the culture of dependency, causing rather than mitigating poverty (Seekings 2017). Whilst government programmes have considerable reach, benefits remain parsimonious in order, it is explained, to mitigate the risk of dependency (Seekings 2016c). In the 2010s, the government of Botswana repeatedly rejected calls from international organisations for new cash transfer programmes to support poor families with children (Chinyoka 2018). The most recent National Development Plan calls for programmes that “empower” people rather than support them in ways that lead to dependency (Botswana 2016).

In South Africa, also, the expansion of grants fuelled a backlash. The governing African National Congress (ANC) had always advocated development over welfare. In his inaugural presidential speech in 1994, Nelson Mandela himself had declared that his government would tackle the “scourge of unemployment” though creating opportunities to work not through “handouts”. The ANC aspired to build a developmental state, not a welfare state. In the late 1990s, it even considered abolishing programmes that it inherited. In the early 2000s, it rejected calls for a basic income grant. Instead, ANC governments expanded the child support grant to cover children up to the age of eighteen (Matisonn and Seekings 2003; Seekings and Matisonn 2012). Paying millions of grants every month, almost all to young mothers, prompted criticisms outside and inside the party. At an African Union meeting that was intended to promote social protection, South Africa’s Deputy-Minister for Social Development warned that “the main challenge … was not to create a dependency syndrome among the population to the detriment of productivity”.

The concerns of African elites are evident also in the ways in which “global” discourses of social and economic rights have been “vernacularized” through the African Union (or its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity). International organisations have been at the forefront of the promotion of concepts of social and economic rights derived from Western liberal or social democratic thought and tradition. From the 1981 African Charter through subsequent Protocols and Declarations, references to rights and the state have been balanced with references to duties (or responsibilities) and the family.

\[6\] AU 2015; see also Meth 2004; Seekings 2015.
Elite attitudes towards social protection are widely rooted in an anachronistic faith in the capacity of peasant families to support their members through agricultural production and kin-based redistribution. Elites seem to have little appreciation of the extent of de-agrarianisation – i.e. both the decline of smallholder agriculture and kinship obligations – across much of Africa (Bryceson and Jamal 1997). Nor do (mostly male) elites seem to have any appreciation that an emphasis on the family often entrenches patriarchy and places a growing burden on women (Bryceson 2018).

This does not mean that there is no normative basis for social protection among African elites. To varying extents, elites also subscribe to a concept of responsibility. Social and economic change means that the responsibilities previously effected through the family or community may now need to be assumed by the state. In Botswana, the post-colonial state expanded public programmes – initially of drought relief, later of general relief – on the basis that the new state needed to take over the responsibilities of traditional leaders (Seekings 2016b). Reformers elsewhere have also employed a discourse of responsibility, emphasising that responsibility is reciprocal: the poor have their own responsibility to help themselves and others, through work whenever this is possible. “Dependency” thus entails the denial of reciprocity as well as the failure of development.

Popular attitudes towards social protection

Solidarity with the poor is not easily achieved. Across much of the world, citizens often have a strong sense that some categories of poor people (especially the elderly, sick and disabled) are deserving but have (at best) mixed feelings about other categories (notably unemployed working-age adults and single parents) (see e.g. Taylor-Gooby 1981; Van Oorschot 2000, 2006). Popular attitudes towards poverty, inequality and social protection in Africa have not been examined deeply. Only for South Africa is there a substantial literature on perceptions of desert. Moreover, it is not simple to interpret popular attitudes: survey data on support for social protection show that responses depend on the precise question posed (Seekings 2007) and there is little detailed qualitative research.

In South Africa, which has by far the most widespread and most generous (or at least parsimonious) system of social assistance, general survey questions probing support for the system suggest that there is strong support for social grants. Table 1 reports data from a countrywide survey in 2015. Respondents were first asked about old-age pensions which (respondents were told) then paid R1350/month (approximately US$100/month). They were then asked about the Child Support Grant (CSG) which then paid R320/month (about US$25/month). Almost all South Africans agree that the value of the old-age pension should be raised. About half agree that the value should be raised even if it means that people like them pay higher taxes. Support for increasing the value of the CSG was slightly weaker, but almost 40 percent agreed that the value should be raised even if it meant higher taxes. More than two-thirds of the sample agreed also that it was right that anyone who was poor should receive a pension or grant from the government. The survey also revealed strong support for public employment programmes: almost everyone agreed that the government should provide jobs for everyone who wanted one.
Data from three earlier surveys (conducted between 2003 and 2009) in the South African city of Cape Town used vignettes (or “survey experiments”) to probe the contours of public opinion. Vignettes entail presenting respondents with a description of a hypothetical situation, or story, and then asking one or more questions related to the situation. The details of the situation or story can be manipulated, i.e. respondents get different versions. If the assignment of versions of the vignette to respondents is random, then we can use the results to analyse the effects of variations in the details of the story on the respondents’ answers to following questions and see also how this variation is affected by the characteristics of the respondents themselves. The Cape Town surveys entailed describing a person and then asking respondents whether this (imaginary) person should receive a government grant. The surveys revealed a clear hierarchy of perceived desert (or deservingness): the elderly and sick were considered most deserving, caregivers somewhat deserving, and other working-age adults least deserving. Neither the gender nor race of the respondent made a significant difference to assessments of desert (Seekings 2008, 2010, 2018). This picture conforms with qualitative research in South Africa. Dawson and Fouksman (2017) conducted focus group discussions with unemployed young men near Johannesburg. Dawson and Fouksman found that unemployed young men were hostile to the idea that unemployed young men should receive cash transfers from the state.

Both quantitative and qualitative research suggests that support for social grants in South Africa is conditional on the behaviour of the recipients. Asked about misuse of grants, respondents in the 2015 national survey distinguished sharply between old-age pensioners and CSG recipients. Only 20 percent of respondents agreed that pensioners spent too much of their pensions on (alcoholic) drink but more than 50 percent agreed that young women did so. One half of the sample also agreed that young women have children, so that they can get a CSG. Well over half (60 percent) of respondents agreed that adults who were physically able to work should be required to do so in return for any money received from the government. In the Cape Town survey experiments, respondents were easily persuaded to change their minds on the deservingness of the imaginary subject in the story, by telling them that the person in the story drank. Researchers argue that the CSG is not abused nor is it an incentive to have children (see, generally, Davis et al. 2016), but public opinion is at odds with these scholars’ assessments. Qualitative studies reveal that grant recipients – especially recipients of the CSG and disability grants – are subject to strong social pressure and potential stigmatisation.7

This might suggest that attaching conditions to social grants might enhance their legitimacy.8 In her study of Zambia, using a mix of qualitative, survey and experimental research, Schüring (2011) found a preference for conditionality among both urban and rural populations, especially among the better educated and better-off people.9

Schüring (2014) also found that ordinary Zambian citizens as well as the Zambian elite favoured targeting grants on the poor over categorical targeting (e.g. on the elderly). Yeboah et al. (2016) found the opposite in Ghana, where grants have been targeted on those poor people who are unable to support themselves because of age or infirmity. Community leaders and grant managers as well as grant recipients prioritised the disabled, children and elderly over other

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7 See e.g. Hochfeld and Plagerson 2011; Hochfeld 2015; Blake 2018; Kelly 2018.
8 In Brazil, survey data suggested that conditionality did increase the popularity of social grants. Experimental data indicates that this is especially true among sections of the population – including richer Brazilians – who were otherwise ambivalent (Zucco et al. 2016).
9 Schüring also found that government officials and Members of Parliament favoured conditionality, except for officials in the Ministry of Community Development of Social Services which administered social grant programmes.
poor people. In both Zambia and Ghana, most people did not hold the poor responsible for their own poverty and were therefore sympathetic to grants.

Popular attitudes might be inferred from voters’ responses to the promises made by parties and candidates during election campaigns. In Botswana, there is evidence that the provision of drought relief – which evolved into social cash transfers – was foundational to the incumbent Botswana Democratic Party’s support base in rural areas from the mid-1960s (Gulbrandsen 2012; Seekings 2016c). The expansion of social assistance may have slowed down but has not prevented the decline in voter support for the BDP. In South Africa, the evidence is mixed on voters’ responses to the African National Congress (ANC) government’s expansion of social grants. Voters were asked in a national 2016 survey why they supported one or other party. Almost 40 percent opted for “the party’s ability to govern” and 30 percent for “loyalty”. Twenty percent, however, opted for the response that they relied on social grants (Good Governance in Africa 2016).

A study of selected neighbourhoods around Johannesburg found a more complex picture. Whilst most voters in these neighbourhoods believed that access to social grants (as well as free or subsidised public services) did not depend on who you voted for, almost half suspected that the programmes might not be continued if another party were to win power. Few voters saw grants as a form of vote-buying. In contrast, most voters saw food parcels as a form of vote-buying (although few admitted that they themselves would be bought). Overall, receipt of a grant seemed to have little direct effect on voting behaviour (Graham et al. 2016). Whilst electoral pressures might have pushed the ANC to expand the reach of social grants in the 2000s, by the 2010s electoral pressure was probably encouraging ANC leaders to adopt a more cautious, conservative stance.

Social protection has rarely featured prominently in election campaigns. Even in South Africa, the ANC has been reluctant to emphasise heavily social grants in its formal campaign materials (although it is possible that activists emphasise them more heavily in their campaign speeches and other informal contacts with voters). Even populist parties such as Zambia’s Patriotic Front (PF) have been muted in their advocacy of social grants. In its 2011 election manifesto, the then opposition PF included a vague commitment to social protection, inserted by a social democratic faction within the party. Having won the election, the PF did eventually expand financial support for the hitherto donor-funded, “pilot” social cash transfer programme. But it invested more heavily in other programmes that it seems to have seen as more likely to win it votes: The existing fertiliser subsidies for farmers and discretionary funds to assist people to establish small businesses (Siachiwena 2016). In the 2016 elections, the PF praised its performance on billboards. One billboard proclaimed that 1.2 million people were benefitting directly from the social cash transfer programme, and implied that the PF’s candidate, Edgar Lungu, was responsible for this. But this particular poster does not seem to have been used widely. Lungu and the PF preferred to emphasise their achievements in infrastructural development. Sata’s death and the election of Edgar Lungu as his successor, the more social democratic faction was marginalised, and ended up being expelled or defecting to the opposition. The expansion of the cash transfer programme slowed again (Siachiwena 2017). This appeared to confirm that the Zambian political system was rooted in patronage politics (Pruce and Hickey 2017).

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10 I am grateful to Lena Gronbach for this source.
Social protection did feature prominently in one election campaign, in Malawi in 2014. Whilst it is not easy to identify the precise effect of the issue on the results, the outcome certainly does not suggest that championing social protection is a clear vote-winner. The circumstances of the election were unusual, in that the incumbent president, Joyce Banda, had succeeded to the presidency only because of the death of her predecessor, Bingu wa Mutharika, and despite the fact that Mutharika had expelled her from his party before he died. Mutharika had established a strong brand for himself and his party (the Democratic Progressive Party) as the champion of farmers, to whom he provided heavily subsidised fertiliser and other inputs, at considerable expense. Malawian voters favour government policies that strengthen their capacity to grow maize (Van Donge 2005). Banda was compelled to build a new party and establish a new brand for it and herself. She chose to present herself as the champion of women and the poor, through Malawi’s nascent social protection programmes. Banda spoke of “handouts” in positive terms but was strongly criticised by her opponents. Weighed down by a corruption scandal and a stuttering economy, Banda won just 20 percent of the presidential vote. The case showed that a pro-grant platform did not prevent a candidate or party winning some votes but was certainly not enough to offset other weaknesses (Hamer and Seekings 2017).

Apart from the one case of Malawi in 2014, social assistance has generally been – or quickly became – a valence issue, in that the competing parties have not staked out starkly contrasting positions. In any particular country, parties generally concurred on the direction of reform, i.e. they were usually either uniformly supportive (at least rhetorically, claiming pro-poor credentials) or uniformly opposed (sharing concerns over both the affordability of and “dependency” on government “handouts”). When an incumbent party introduces (or promises) a reform that seems to be popular, opposition parties leap to call for the benefits to be raised. This was the case in each of Lesotho (Granvik 2015), Botswana (Seekings 2016c), Zanzibar (Seekings 2016d) and South Africa. Rarely, however, have opposition parties taken the lead in proposing reforms. Even in Zimbabwe, where the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) claimed to be “social democratic” and criticised strongly the incumbent party, it did not propose any specific welfare reforms (Chinyoka and Seekings 2016). Voters, for their part, have generally rewarded incumbents deemed to have performed well and to have elected instead opposition parties or candidates when they were unimpressed with the incumbents’ performance – with little regard for specific policy positions. Moreover, when opposition parties have adopted a populist position, their promises with regard to social welfare programmes have generally been overshadowed by other populist promises (as is the case for the Economic Freedom Fighters in South Africa).

**Conclusion**

South Africa is the one country where there is strong evidence of popular support for at least some social grants, although there is also strong evidence of popular concern that some young mothers “abuse” their grants and do not deserve them. In South Africa, social grants have become taken for granted, and are enshrined in the constitution. This reflects the country’s distinct history before and under apartheid, when public welfare provision expanded initially for white citizens. South Africa’s policy-making elites tend to be more conservative than voters. In Botswana, also, policy-making elites are often stridently conservative in their denunciations of “dependency” on government “handouts”. Elsewhere, the evidence suggests that elites and
citizens alike tend to be wary of cash transfer programmes. Some people – especially the elderly – are deemed more deserving, but the predominant view is that people should support themselves through work, especially agricultural work, and the state should support this (including through farmer support programmes). In societies experiencing widespread and profound de-agrarianisation and urbanisation, these beliefs seem increasingly at odds with social and economic realities. Further research is needed into whether, how or how fast they are changing.

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<table>
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<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither agree or disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
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<td>11</td>
<td>39</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>The value of the child support grant should be increased even if it means that people like you have to pay higher taxes.</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>Elderly people spend too much of their old age pensions on beer or alcoholic drinks.</td>
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<td>29</td>
<td>19</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Young women spend too much of their child support grants on beer or other alcoholic drinks.</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Young women have children so that they can get a child support grant</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>It is right that anyone who is poor should receive a pension or grant from the government</td>
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Source: CNEP/South Africa 2015