The Global Political Economy of REDD+: Engaging Social Dimensions in the Emerging Green Economy

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Abstract

Recognised as a cost-effective climate change mitigation strategy, conservation of the forestry sector in developing countries has recently entered the field of the green economy. While low-carbon development has generally focused on techno-managerial solutions, current negotiations around the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, enhancement of carbon stock and sustainable management of forests in developing countries initiative (known collectively as REDD+) has attracted a wide range of pro-poor social groups who raised attention to the social implications of forestry management. This article seeks to analyse how social issues including poverty reduction, equity and social justice are integrated in the green economy by examining the global political economy of REDD+. Emphasising the importance of ideologies in policy processes we identify four related environmental worldviews that link forests and development and look at power dynamics among them shaping the global conceptualisation, negotiation and setting up of governance structures of REDD+. We argue that despite the inclusion of certain civil society demands, REDD+ remains focused on growth and governance, largely bypassing poverty reduction and social justice issues. We highlight the importance of political economy analyses in avoiding apolitical solutions to the climate change challenge and in un-packing assumptions about mainstreaming equity and social justice in the green economy. With view to an equitable post-2012 global climate change agreement, we call for increased institutional support to the social dimension in future REDD+ strategies.
Introduction

The Green economy has generally focused on the energy sector but interests in the role of forests in emission reduction and in forest carbon markets are growing. This has led to the emergence of the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (known collectively as REDD+) initiative as a means through which individuals, projects and communities in developing countries can be financially rewarded for reducing emissions from deforestation, forest degradation and enhancement of carbon stock (UNFCCC 2009).

Seen as a cost-effective mitigation mechanism, REDD+ has received attention from actors typically involved in the green economy, including the private sector, national governments, multilateral organisations and environmental groups. REDD+ negotiations have involved an unprecedented participation of human rights groups and pro-poor organisations in negotiation processes around green economy. Their participation occurs in the context of increasingly globalised environmental policy processes and the inclusion of forestry actions in the global climate change regime. As a result, actors previously involved in and/or concerned about national forestry decision-making processes have converged in REDD+ negotiations (Chan and Pattberg 2008).

Extractive practices in forested areas as well as forest conservation policies have often involved reduced access to forest products, community land dispossession and social conflict (Fairhead and Leach 1997: 35-55). A lack of governmental support has often pushed forest dwellers and their advocates to bypass their national government, building advocacy and demanding participation in global negotiations to ensure their rights are safeguarded. With increased transnational forms of environmental policy-making, these actors are organising through global partnerships to derive their agency in internal fora (Schroeder, 2010). The creation of participatory spaces at climate change negotiations opens up channels for more effective communication among REDD+ policy actors (Cornwall and Coelho 2007:5). At the same time it implies the invitation of pro-poor organisations and human rights groups to participate in power-embedded negotiating arenas to express their grievances, to discuss them and decide on new mechanisms to solve social problems (Navarro 2006). Thus, the entrance of forestry actions in the green economy, not only represents an opportunity for these groups to participate within forest policy processes, but also their participation within networks of power around climate change.

Through a political economy analysis of global REDD+ policy processes this research analyses how the social dimension is included within the green economy. In order to assess which ideologies are favoured over others in global REDD+ policy processes the paper addresses power from a historical, structural and relational point of view at the different stages of REDD+, framing analysis around conceptualisation, negotiation and implementation (Tanner and Allouche 2011):

- Conceptualisation - What are the narratives around REDD+ and by which actor-networks are they being supported?
- Negotiation - How is power shaping REDD+ design and hence favouring some ideologies over others? Which strategies/coalitions are being used by REDD+ actors to influence global REDD+ negotiations?
Implementation - How are REDD+ governance structures being set up globally? What are the key decisions that have key implications on the social dimension of REDD+ policies globally?

The paper argues that material choices are not the only factor hampering the possibility of an agreement on REDD+. While political and financial agendas play a key role in developing the global REDD+ architecture, actors’ competition around co-benefits, markets and rights also reflect different environmental worldviews. Four different narratives around REDD+ are identified that reflect different environmental worldviews that link forests and development (following Clapp and Dauvergne 2005): a market-liberal approach, an institutionalist approach, a bioenvironmentalist approach and a social green approach. The paper questions the linear correspondence between actors and narratives by providing evidence of the diversity of views within indigenous groups and donors. Authors suggest that understanding REDD+ as a product of non-linear power configurations is key to understand current and future developments in REDD+ policy processes and to avoid adequate solutions to the environmental challenges.

The paper starts with a contextual introduction followed by the conceptual framework and methodologies used. The history of REDD+ negotiations is analysed with a focus on the major contentions to date before identifying key actors and ideological drivers in REDD+. This is followed by a discussion on the implications of power configurations around REDD+ global policy processes. The paper concludes with a reflection on the key issues for a political economy of REDD+ under a post-Kyoto agreement.

Power in global environmental policy processes

Interests in state and non-state actors’ interaction within environmental policy processes have led to the emergence of political economy studies of the environment (Clapp and Dauvergne 2005). Research has generally focused political economy on the ways policies are negotiated and implemented. However, there is already evidence that ideas and ideologies play a fundamental role in policy processes. Highlighting the importance of ideas, ideologies and power play in these inter-relationships (Gramsci 1971; Bourdieu 1977; Maier 1987), Tanner and Allouche (2011) have proposed a new political economy of climate change. This framework splits policy processes analysis into three different stages, conceptualisation, negotiation and implementation and two levels, the global and the national. The conceptualisation of global climate change initiatives is given primacy within the processes of political negotiation and renegotiation that lead to different governance arrangements for implementation. It acknowledges the gap in understanding around how global initiatives are integrated within the national context and how global ideologies are contested, renegotiated and reframed nationally.
Power dynamics play a key role in each stage of policy processes. Power is referred to here as the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their own circumstances and fate (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 42). Power analysis has often been limited to formal top-down regulations, assuming linear policy processes driven by structural hierarchies, enforcement and threat of sanctions. In these cases power is understood as power over, that is, as a zero sum where actors gaining power implies that others need to give up some (Gaventa and Pettit 2006). However, there are other forms of power underlying policy processes. Limits to participation associated to formal rules are also determined by actors’ agency and the way social structures are internalised by them (Gramsci 1971). When agency is based on mutual support, actors build alliances, strengthening their collective power, also known as social capital (Bourdieu 1983). The role of transnational climate partnerships has already been recognised as a key issue influencing climate change negotiations (Levy and Newell 2002; Bäckstrand 2008).

Power is also historically accumulated through economic (money and property) as well as cultural capital (cultural goods and knowledge), key elements reinforcing the power of certain ideologies. These forms of capital provide policy actors with ‘productive power’, that is, the socially diffuse production of subjectivity in systems of meaning and signification. A particular meaning of development, for instance REDD+ understood as a cost-effective climate change mitigation strategy, orients social activity in particular directions, defines what constitutes legitimate knowledge, and shapes whose knowledge matters (Barnet and Duvall 2005: 55). Productive power provides the potential to produce profits such as the capacity to ideologically influence REDD+.

Developing REDD+: History of negotiations and key issues

REDD+ negotiations have led to the convergence of a wide range of actors, including national governments, multilateral institutions, private companies, financial institutions, research institutes, environmental organisations, development NGOs and human rights groups (UNFCCC 2011). They are intervening with different proposals for REDD+ implementation leading to the creation of clusters around particular interests hence reinforcing competition. Despite agreement on the recognition of REDD+ as a key
mitigation mechanism, there have been three major contentious issues around negotiations over REDD+, namely:

- The inclusion of environmental and social co-benefits, including improving community livelihoods, conserving biodiversity, governance and rights, poverty reduction, climate change adaptation and protecting water resources (Verchot and Petkova 2009: 22).
- The use of carbon markets as a way of generating financial resources for REDD+ has gained different degrees of support, from being a central driver of interest to being strongly criticised.
- Actor participation within REDD+ governance structures at the national level and the recognition of indigenous peoples’ and other forest dwellers’ rights in REDD+.

The 2009 COP15 witnessed the inclusion of co-benefits within REDD+ debate, such as improving community livelihoods, conserving biodiversity and protecting water resources (UNFCCC 2009). Nonetheless, there remains much divergence on whether and how social and environmental co-benefits should be mandated in the design of the international REDD+ regime. Underlying this divide is the question whether mitigation should take precedence over other development issues. Thus, while some actors favour keeping REDD+ simple and not encumbering it with additional requirements, others support a broader approach that ensures pro-poor outcomes and biodiversity benefits (Verchot and Petkova 2009).

Actor coalitions are playing a key role in supporting particular agendas, hence intensifying the REDD+ debate. At the Bonn UNFCCC meetings in June 2009 the development of measures and safeguards that protect biodiversity was discussed. However, in September 2009 at the 7th session of the Ad-Hoc Working Group for Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA), against the express wishes of some 20 countries (including Norway, Brazil, Mexico, India and Switzerland) the European Union supported by the Democratic Republic of the Congo speaking for Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, and the Republic of the Congo blocked the inclusion of language to prevent the conversion of natural forests to plantations. As a result, the provision for safeguards was eliminated from the negotiating text (Holloway and Giandomenico 2009).

The lack of a legally binding framework to protect tropical rainforests has also intensified contention around REDD+ financing as forest issues have remained underfunded. In addition, how money will be generated is central as REDD+ will require substantial investments, estimated to be between USD 17-33 billion per year (Parker et al. 2009: 19).

Box 1: Financial mechanisms in REDD+

The Copenhagen Accord of 2009 and subsequent Cancun agreement of 2011 stated that a Green Climate Fund will be established and will work as an operating entity of the financial mechanism of the Convention in order to support initiatives in developing countries related to mitigation, including REDD+ (UNFCCC 2011a: 7). Discussions surrounding financing moved towards a hybrid model that includes both marked-based mechanisms as well as voluntary donations as sources of funding. Parties and observers are therefore considering different options for funding, including direct carbon market funding (where buyers pay sellers for an environmental service such as REDD+),
market-linked funding (where revenues are generated from auctions of emissions), voluntary funds, and debt-for nature swaps (Parker and Mitchell 2009; Wertz-Kanounikoff and Angelsen 2009).

In particular, one of the major contentions around REDD+ finance generation (see box 1) is the use of carbon markets, with the inclusion of REDD+ in a post-2012 climate agreement seeming to support establishment of global carbon forest markets. Private sector and financial institutions suggest the use of carbon markets can be a way of creating incentives for private sector involvement (Kossoy and Ambrosi 2010) and some parties have already called for the use of markets in REDD+, including United States, the European Union and Australia (Parker and Mitchell 2009). On the other hand, indigenous groups and other civil society organisations (CSOs) have criticised the use of carbon markets in REDD+. In this line, Norway and Tuvalu both recommended that a decision on whether or not to link REDD+ to carbon trading be postponed in 2009 (Holloway and Domenico 2009). However, at the Ad Hoc Working Group for Long-Term Cooperative Action (AHW-LCA) in COP16 decided to ‘consider the establishment of one or more market-based mechanisms to enhance the cost-effectiveness of mitigation actions’. These mechanisms will be voluntary and will need to ensure good governance and robust market functioning and regulation while safeguarding environmental integrity.

Underlying this tension is the issue of property rights governing who owns the carbon and who has the right to benefit from incentives generated through REDD+ (Verchot and Petkova 2009). There are fears that private sector and/or national management of REDD+ involves the neglect of forest dwellers’ priorities hence reviving previous contentions in forest management. The manifestation of these concerns at different climate change negotiations has led to a multi-stakeholder approach to REDD+ involving national consultation processes. A decentralised governance approach to REDD+ has also been proposed as a way to ensure community participation in political decision-making, equitable distribution of forest benefits and recognition of forest people’s particular identities (Sikor et al. 2010). On the other hand, this approach has been received with scepticism by numerous organisations who argue that it opens up the participation of private sector in REDD+ (Skutsch, personal communication).

In this context, numerous organisations are calling for the protection of substantive as well as procedural rights of indigenous peoples and local communities has nonetheless been one of the major areas of contention in REDD+ negotiations. Substantive rights, which are concerned with the minimum standards of living, have been claimed by CSOs who highlight the need to make explicit the rights of forest communities to their forest resources in REDD+ agreements (Setra 2010). Procedural rights refer to a minimum level of participation by local people in political decision-making and include, for instance, the right to information and access to justice.

Despite the recognition of a multi-stakeholder participation the inclusion of procedural rights in REDD+ agreements has to date been a highly contentious issue, tensions which can be situated in the context of previous negotiations on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) (Menotti et al. 2009). At the COP14 UNFCCC meetings in December 2008 the US, Canada, New Zealand and Australia blocked the inclusion of reference to ‘indigenous peoples’ and the explicit mention of rights (Holloway and Giandomenico 2009: 14). In particular, there has not been agreement on the inclusion of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) in REDD+ (Brown et al. 2008). FPIC refers to no coercion, intimidation or manipulation of indigenous peoples, looking
for consent before the authorisation or commencement of activities and providing information to them (UN 2007).

As a result of these tensions, although the Copenhagen Accord stresses the need for full and effective engagement of indigenous peoples and local communities in REDD+, the rights of forest communities in REDD+ have not been recognised yet in COP agreement (UNFCCC 2009). Notwithstanding, the Cancun agreements have favour advancements in this sense. Firstly, parties agreed that all climate change related actions should fully respect human rights. In addition, the AWG-LCA has suggested the establishment of safeguards for REDD+ that respect for the knowledge and rights of indigenous peoples and members of local communities, by taking into account the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNFCCC 2011a).

Ideological drivers in the development of REDD+

The history of REDD+ negotiations provides evidence of a governance system where clearly different interests are competing with each other. To date, more than 33 governmental and non-governmental proposals have been submitted on different methodologies and approaches to REDD+ (Parker and Mitchell, 2009). Material choices are not the only factor hampering the possibility of an agreement. While political and financial agendas play a key role in developing the global REDD+ architecture, actors’ competition around contentious issues is also being determined by different narratives. System framings not only involve objective choices but also subjective values. These framings often become part of narratives that are supported by particular actors, networks and institutions and justify a particular set of actions (Leach et al. 2010). We argue here that REDD+ proposals can be linked to four main environmental worldviews that link forests and development (following Clapp and Dauvergne 2005).

Forests and economic growth: the market-liberal approach

Underpinning this ideology is the idea that economic growth and high per capita incomes are essential for human welfare and the maintenance of sustainable development. Market is ultimately the fairest distributor of benefits because its efficiency leads to maximising of overall welfare (Cazorla and Toman 2000). When it comes to forests this approach has produced two different discourses. The first is that forests products are a great source of economic growth and poverty reduction within developing countries (World Bank 2002). This is reflected in the vision the Indonesian government in 1990 around the contribution of forests to development:

The logging industry is a champion of sorts...It creates the necessary conditions for social and economic development. Without forest concessions most of the Outer Islands would still be underdeveloped.
(Ministry of Forestry quoted in Gellert 2005: 1351)

The recognition of negative consequences of forests exploitation, especially in the context of climate change, produced a shift in this approach (Rudel 2008; Stern 2009). This is characterised by the ‘double dividend’ that can ‘help the environment without hurting the economy’ (Bosquet 2000:19), also known as green economy. This approach to low carbon development assumes that economic growth is compatible with significant reductions in carbon emissions and proposes sectoral as well as technical changes to reduce the production of carbon (Urban 2010: 93-94). It suggests that
environmental conservation should foster market equilibrium and not produce economic distortions, emphasising cost-efficiency over equity (Gellert 2005). Participation of the private sector is seen as an essential option for future sustainability of REDD+ mechanisms. For instance, according to the World Bank:

… the magnitude of finances required for REDD+ (on the order of billions of dollars per year) requires the involvement of the private sector. Official development assistance alone will not be able to carry the weight. The question is therefore what will motivate the private sector to contribute to scale. The carbon market could provide one of these incentives. (Kossoy and Ambrosi 2010: 34)

A wide range of companies are showing their interests in this new approach. Companies involved in carbon trading are showing their interests in REDD+ as a potential expansion for carbon markets. Mining, oil as well as timber companies see REDD+ as part of their corporate social responsibility strategy (APP 2010) and as a potential mitigation mechanism to offset their emissions (Martins et al. 2010). The emergence of the double dividend approach has also led to the creation of multiple enterprises that manage investments in sustainable forestry. The managing director of the Australian company such as Keep the Habitat explained their interests in REDD+ as follows:

The underlying principle for REDD+ projects is sustainable forestry so we are working through with investors into the rehabilitation side...they are interested in REDD+ because with the regulation we have in Indonesia their investment will generate a financial return on the timber industry and they get a revenue on the carbon...they assess it as a profitable investment, we call it the business of conservation. (Turvey personal communication).

**Forests and governance: Institutionalists**

This ideology centres on the need for strong institutions, good governance and effective laws to protect the environment and human wellbeing. Key barriers for good governance include flawed policy and legal framework, minimal enforcement capacity, insufficient data, corruption and market conditions for wood products (ITTO and FAO 2009; EU-FLEGT 2011).

This ideology drives the belief that international aid to developing countries is needed in order to provide capacity-building for REDD+. This has led to the phased-approach to REDD+ supported by the World Bank Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) and the United Nations UN-REDD+ programme. In these programmes developing countries are assisted in lying out and organising the steps needed to achieve ‘readiness’ for REDD+ (FCPF 2009). For example the Australian government has reached a bilateral agreement with the Indonesian government for support to some of its REDD+ programmes by technical support (FCP 2009).

Capacity-building and the focus on governance become even more relevant in the context of the recent inclusion of REDD+ within Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) under the UNFCCC, where governments play a key role in mitigation actions (UNFCCC 2011b). On the other hand, the institutionalist approach may also lead to a predominantly market liberal discourse and a government vacuum in
some cases (Clapp and Dauvergne 2005). For instance, the FCPF states that ‘local government eligibility to participate in REDD+ will be conditional on meeting specific standards and indicators of good governance’ (FCPF 2009).

**The ecological value of forests: ‘bio-environmentalists’**

This environment worldview is led by the narrative that the Earth is seen as a fragile ecosystem which can support life but only to a certain limit. For instance, campaign groups argue that 350 parts per million CO\(_2\) in the atmosphere is the safe limit for humanity and that this should be the basis of international climate change negotiations (350, 2010). Since natural resources are also finite for bio-environmentalists, economic growth and population growth are incompatible with environmental sustainability. From this perspective, human behaviour needs to be modified in order to solve global environmental problems (Clapp and Dauvergne 2005).

Firstly, this narrative seeks to push the climate change agenda towards ambitious emission reduction targets as well as drastic changes in deforestation rates. For example, the World Wildlife Foundation (WWF) is proposing an emission reduction target of at least 75 per cent by 2020, with a view to eliminating nearly all human induced forest emissions by 2030 (WWF 2009). Greenpeace has stated that the Brazilian government should ‘adopt ambitious deforestation reduction targets in order to achieve zero deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon by 2015 and to adopt a five-year moratorium immediately on deforestation as an intermediate step towards zero deforestation’ (Greenpeace 2009). In addition, advocates of this worldview, such as the environmental NGO Fauna and Flora International highlight forests role in biodiversity conservation and in the provision of other environmental services and the need to ensure the presence of these two criteria in REDD+ implementation (FFI 2010).

While the bio-environmentalists are opposed to the business-as-usual model, their vision is not incompatible with the new version of the market-liberal approach. In fact, they may see carbon markets as a means for achieving greater environmental sustainability. For instance, Greenpeace proposes the creation of the Tropical Deforestation Emissions Reduction Mechanism (TDERM) which is a hybrid market-linked fund model for REDD+ (Parker and Mitchell 2009).

**Social Greens**

Social greens believe environment and society cannot be regarded as separated issues (Clapp and Dauvergne 2005). REDD+ is therefore not only about mitigating climate change, as forests are part of the culture and are essential for the well-being of forests communities. Social greens focus has been on indigenous and forest community rights and knowledge and see that this improvement can have positive aspects on the environment (Fairhead and Leach 1997; IIPFCC 2009). For example, in its submission to the SBSTA, the international environmental organisation Friends of the Earth International (FOEI) stated that:

> … ensuring Indigenous Peoples' and local communities' rights and interests in the design of REDD is beyond a matter of state obligation. A rights-based approach will also contribute to effectiveness and permanence of REDD programmes. (FOEI, 2009)

This approach also highlights the importance of forests as a source of biodiversity and the role of community participation in environmental conservation with alternative
actions such as participatory forestry management (Sunderlin and Atmadja 2009; Steni 2010). According to the director of the Indonesian indigenous organisation AMAN:

Indigenous Peoples are the guardians of forests, lands and water management, they have proven to be able to maintain and manage the natural resources. (Setra, 2010)

**The convergence between narratives and actor coalitions?**

While there is a tendency among some groups to advocate for a specific narrative, assumptions on a linear correspondence between actors and narrative may be incorrect. Indigenous organisations are often seen as a homogenous group, but their views vary depending on the organisation, country or region. According to the Interethnic Association of the Development in the Peruvian Rainforest (AIDESEP 2010):

… compensation markets of carbon and other polluting emissions have failed because GHGs emissions have not decreased from 1900 to 2007, but they have augmented in 11.2 per cent within “developed” countries … REDD cannot become a carbon market negotiated at the stock exchange masking the global climate criminality.

On the other hand, the Coordinating Body for the Indigenous organisations in the Brazilian Amazon (COIAB 2008) did not argue against the use of carbon markets and considered private sector participation in REDD+:

… the UNFCCC should guarantee the effective participation of Indigenous Peoples and Traditional Communities in the construction of mechanisms like REDD. However, this participation should be broadened in the pilot projects implemented by governments and private initiatives.

This disjunction between actors and narratives is also evident among Annex-I parties. Unlike other REDD+ country donors such as Australia and the United States, the Norwegian government has taken a line in keeping with the social green worldview in suggesting ‘REDD should secure the rights and involvement of local communities and indigenous peoples’ (Parker and Mitchell 2009: 43). As it can be inferred from above, tensions also arise within actor coalitions as those between the World Bank FCPF and the UN-REDD programme which proposes human-rights-based approach to programming. The institutionalist approach is also framed differently by UN-REDD and by the World Bank, in that the former includes the ‘respect for the knowledge and rights of Indigenous Peoples and members of local communities’ as a key issue in REDD+ governance (UN-REDD 2010).

**Power dynamics, the social dimension and the limits of compatibility**

Competition among the four environmental worldviews here described is influenced by the different ways in which power is exercised within REDD+ policy processes. In this way, some ideological narratives are given greater attention and influence than others. From global conceptualisation to national implementation arrangements, narratives over
REDD+ compete to influence the design of this climate change mechanism, affecting the way in which the social dimension is integrated.

The uncertainty and risks related to climate change have led to a political demand for rational and objective knowledge. This has conferred natural sciences and economics greater credibility and productive power in REDD+ conceptualisation to date (Jones et al. 2008; Berkhout et al. 2003). The impetus from international climate science and policy to develop cost-effective climate change mitigation strategies led to the emergence of REDD+ as a mechanism and attracted a wide range of actors from the green economy who on the whole have favoured private sector initiatives. The productive power of the market-liberal approach is situated in the context of increasing work on issues such as payments for ecosystem services, attempts to value and commodify carbon and forests or about more generic attempts to ‘marketise’ environmental governance (Newell 2010). This focus is reflected in 75 per cent of REDD+ proposals to date, in which 50 per cent advocate the use of markets for funding and 25 per cent the use of hybrid/market linked mechanisms to fund REDD+ (Parker and Mitchell 2009).

On the other hand, global negotiations have been driven by different dynamics. Firstly, previous government failures to protect forests in many countries have led to a focus on governance, implying strong institutions, avoiding corruption, law enforcement and multi-stakeholder participation. Hence, the institutionalist approach, backed by general consensus over the need for good governance among parties, and the subsequent creation of multilateral ‘REDD+ readiness’ initiatives, has gained a central role in REDD+. As such, the two main institutions working on REDD+ readiness, the FCPF and UN-REDD+ are currently working in 37 and 27 countries while contributing with more than US $180 million and $ 92 million respectively (Sierra 2010; UN-REDD 2011). Despite the multiple worldviews and interests competing at the sub-national level (Shankland and Hasenclever 2011), the institutionalist approach has led to a greater focus on national government management of REDD+. Thus, at the COP16 the AHW-LCA agreed the “implementation of national policies and measures and national strategies or action plans that could involve further capacity-building, technology development and transfer and results-based demonstration activities, and evolving into results-based actions that should be fully measured, reported and verified” (UNFCCC 2011).

Secondly, lessons learned from accountability deficits in previous closed negotiations have pushed social greens to organise collectively through engagement of constituencies, informal interaction among themselves and party delegates, dissemination of information in exhibits and other parallel events. Civil society mobilisation claiming increased public consultation has led to the creation of invited spaces where social greens attend to express their concerns around REDD+. There is much divergence on how inclusionary these new spaces are. While some CSOs argue that it has given them an opportunity to participate in forestry decision-making (Tauli-Corpuz, pers. comments), others suggest that they constitute a mere symbolic gift of power (Baimey, personal communication; Lang 2010).

In addition to invited spaces, social greens are increasingly gaining collective power by creating global fora outside the UNFCCC such as the World Peoples’ Forum on Climate Change and the rights of Mother Earth (WPFCC). This shift from hierarchical to networked governance is reflected in the incorporation of several demands of the WPFCC in the Cancun Agreements, including the creation of social safeguards. These
include inter alia: ‘the respect for the knowledge and rights of indigenous peoples and members of local communities, by taking into account relevant international obligations, national circumstances and laws, and noting that the United Nations General Assembly has adopted the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (UNFCCC 2011). Despite being an AHW-LCA decision, it represents some progress made since the COP15 where forest community participation in REDD+ was reduced to ‘monitoring and reporting of activities’ while there was no reference to their rights in REDD+ in the text (UNFCCC 2009).

These developments are important not only because they acknowledge the historical exclusion of local communities in forestry decision-making (Sikor et al. 2010: 432) but also because they show how collective agency can overcome constraints linked to hierarchical structures and hence broaden climate change approaches from those focused only on techno-managerial solutions. They also provide evidence of the dynamic nature of power and non-linearity of REDD+ policy processes. Despite not being its primary objective, including the social dimension in REDD+ has become a must in global climate change politics, pushing governments to recognise the risks of not including communities in forestry decision-making. REDD+ is not only a matter of exercising ‘power over’, but also the result of human agency and networks (Schroeder 2010).

The Cancun agreements that emerged during the 2010 UNFCCC negotiations seem to have taken a ‘something for everyone approach’ in considering market-based mechanisms while also attempting to include appropriate forest governance, community rights and biodiversity co-benefits in REDD+ (UNFCCC 2011). However, this raises questions about the integrity of a well-governed social green ‘climate capitalism’ (Newell, 2010). The inclusion of some social greens’ demands in REDD+ negotiating texts has not led to the reversal of current market liberal approaches. Rather it is likely to increase the legitimacy of REDD+. As Gramsci (1971) argues, the dominant market-liberal approach is coordinated concretely with the general interests of subordinate groups. Thus, its hegemony is not only dependent on coercive control by a small elite, but rather rests on its political and material accommodation to other groups demands and ideologies.

As a consequence, there are doubts whether such an approach will resolve previous conflicts within national forestry-decision making in REDD+ implementation (Shankland and Hasenclever 2011). In fact, evidence from the setting-up of national REDD+ governance structures suggests that collective power gained by pro-poor social groups in global negotiations is likely to be reduced at national REDD+ policy processes. Development paradigms by REDD+ country donors and recipients focused on growth and governance issues have led to the predominance of market-liberal and institutional approaches and a subsequent imbalance with the other two narratives. The predominance of government-led REDD+ initiatives added to the lack of institutional support to the social green narrative is forcing civil society to renegotiate the integration of the social dimension in REDD+ at the national level (Baimey, personal communication; Lang 2010).

**Concluding remarks: REDD+ post 2012**

How can we better understand the equity and social justice dimensions of REDD+ in a post-2012 global climate change regime? REDD+ decision making processes are likely
to be complex as they are part of a decentralised, power-embedded and non-linear network where diverse interests, narratives and actors converge (Peskett and Brockhaus 2009). Despite uncertainty, future decisions around REDD+ global architecture are likely to be dependent not only on financial and political agendas but also on subjective values and ideologies. In the current context of predominance of market-liberal and institutional approaches to REDD+ initiatives, using political economy analysis to explore the ways in which different environmental worldviews exercise power will be crucial to identify opportunities and challenges to the integration of the social dimension in REDD+ and to avoid apolitical solutions to the climate change challenge (Tanner and Allouche 2011).

Integrating social justice and pro-poor issues in REDD+ is likely to be a long-term process. The inclusion of certain social greens’ demands in global negotiations provides evidence not only of collective power gained by civil society, but also of the accommodation of market-liberal approaches to some of the demands around pro-poor social justice. From this perspective, unpacking assumptions on equitable ‘something-for-all’ REDD+ agreements through political economy analysis will be crucial to better understand the key challenges for a fair, effective and equitable REDD+ implementation. This will imply critically examining the compatibility among different environmental worldviews and recognising the heterogeneity of social justice approaches to REDD+ (Okereke and Dooley 2010).

Bringing the social dimension in REDD+ implementation will require balancing the need to guarantee indigenous rights and FPIC with the development of REDD+ as an economic opportunity, and the development of legal and institutional regimes at national as well as international level. Crucially, establishing national regulations and institutional architecture that recognises and engages local communities at different levels and enables benefit streams to reach them will be crucial. Addressing issues of procedural justice in representing diverse voices in REDD+ debates will be a major challenge as the issue filters from international regulation to national and sub-national implementation. Drawing on this approach we suggest that increased institutional support and policy space for currently less powerful forest voices is needed if equity, rights as social justice are to be considered as key aspects of the future global climate change regime.
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