

11

Gender, Citizenship and New Approaches to Poverty Relief: Conditional Cash Transfer Programmes in Argentina

Constanza Tabbush¹

Introduction

Recent years have seen poverty and social exclusion debates attain renewed attention in international policy circles and donor agencies. The “lost decade” and the negative social outcomes of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), the persistence of poverty and inequality in many Latin American countries, and the current international consensus around the Millennium Development Goals invigorated attempts to tackle poverty and to provide, at least rhetorically, market liberalism a more inclusive face. New approaches to address poverty in the form of conditional cash transfer programmes (CCTs) provide an example of the new “inclusive liberalism” (Porter and Craig 2004) developed in Latin America. With the intent of re-embedding the market and mitigating the social consequences of market-led liberalism, a discourse of “investment” has emerged, aimed at including the *par excellence* liberal subject: the vulnerable. Efforts to fight poverty are articulated in targeted and demand-led programmes that provide assistance to poor families conditional on the performance of socially valued activities, such as paid work, or investing in children’s health and education. Their objective is to fight immediate poverty by giving cash directly to families, and to diminish vulnerability in the long term by investing in the human capabilities of poor children—the “citizen-workers” of the future (Lister 2003).

These programmes build on notions of targeting and conditionality already present in residual approaches to social policy. Yet observers also identify some innovative features that include the unprecedented coverage of poor households, the multidimensional understanding of poverty and deprivation, the linking of social assistance to minimal social rights, the perception of beneficiaries as co-responsible

and active partners, the emphasis on families, and in particular the identification of women as the primary targets for addressing poverty. Various evaluations signal that the new generation of programmes offers unprecedented and much needed support to vulnerable sections of the population (Barrientos and Jocelyn 2004; de la Briere and Rawlings 2006; Gonzalez de la Rocha 2003, 2005; IPC 2006; Rawlings 2004; Rawlings and Rubio 2003; Serrano 2005a, 2005b; Villatoro 2004).

Either explicitly written into their legislation, or in practice, women constitute the main recipients of the cash stipends offered to beneficiary households, and are positioned as the key social actors expected to perform the required co-responsibilities. Research in Mexico, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Argentina presents some initial assessments of the gender assumptions underpinning these programmes, the roles prescribed to women in relation to other household members, and, to a lesser extent, their impact on gender relations (Adato et al. 2000; Bradshaw 2008; Bradshaw and Linneker 2003; Bradshaw with Quirós Viquez 2007; Chant 2008, 2006; Gonzalez de la Rocha 2003, 2005; Molyneux 2007, 2006; Pautassi 2004; Rodriguez Enriquez 2006). Given the special role played by women in poverty management, CCTs are said to encompass a degree of renegotiation of the reproductive bargain² between state institutions and poor households. So how these programmes of “inclusive liberalism” articulate citizenship³, gender and state mechanisms in order to build social inclusion is the guiding question of this chapter. Drawing on the Argentine case, the chapter explores the gender differentiated rights and obligations expected of poor citizens, the mechanisms put in place for “including” poor women and men within mainstream society, and finally reflects upon the gender implications of new forms of social protection developed in the region, hand in hand with the rise of the new social policy paradigm (Abel and Lewis 2002).

More specifically, the chapter compares two phases of CCT programmes set up in Argentina after the economic crisis of 2001, a first phase defined by “Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desocupados: Derecho Familiar a la Inclusión Social”⁴ (*Plan Jefas*) and a second one embodied in its successors, “Plan Familias por la Inclusión Social”⁵ (*Plan Familias*) and “Seguro de Capacitación y Empleo”⁶ (*Seguro*). These particular programmes were selected taking into account their national salience, their rights-based rationale, and the distinct mechanisms they put in place to achieve the promised “social inclusion” of the poor. The data and ideas presented are based on a review of the existing academic literature, a textual analysis of legislation and implementation

manuals, an examination of programme evaluations and official statistics, and interviews with state bureaucrats, and key informants in NGOs and grassroots organizations, as well as selected beneficiaries.

The chapter is organized as follows. The first section presents the socioeconomic background of the case study. The second section discusses the main features of *Plan Jefas* and its consequences in terms of poverty, employment creation and gendered inequalities in entitlements. The third part builds upon the results of the previous programme and presents the reasons and the shape taken by the new CCT programmes (*Plan Familias* and *Seguro*). The last section draws together the main conclusions and findings.

The Social-Economic Context to Poverty Alleviation in Argentina

Argentina is a middle-income country and a regional pioneer in social policy terms (Mesa-Lago 1991). Until the 1980s, some social policy experts classified Argentina as a “universally-stratified social state”, along with other Southern Cone countries like Uruguay and Chile (Filgueira 2005). Inspired by conservative welfare systems (Esping-Andersen 1991, 2003) and developed hand in hand with the rise of Peronism in 1945, the social state provided protection to the vast majority of the population by means of a social security system and basic health services. However, it did so in a stratified manner, along occupational lines which conferred better entitlements to state workers, professionals, urban service workers and urban manufacturing workers (Filgueiras 2005; Filgueiras and Filgueiras 2002; Mesa-Lago 1991). Simultaneously, those working informally, rural workers, and the unemployed were sidelined from state-provided social security mechanisms. Their sources of insurance were limited to family and kinship networks, church and community, and paid work. This combination of formal work-based social insurance described by Filguiera (2005), and the informal networks of survival, leads other regional analysts to classify this period of the Argentine welfare system as a “conservative-informal” welfare regime (Barrientos 2004).

After the turbulent decade of the 1970s, the new democratic government in 1983 initially experimented with economic heterodoxy. As the “lost decade” unfolded, Raul Alfonsín’s administration faced various general strikes, military

uprisings and an economic turmoil that triggered hyperinflation. These critical political and economic conditions put an early end to his presidency and facilitated support for more orthodox economic recipes supposedly to achieve economic stability. The first of Carlos Saúl Menem's presidencies (1989–1995) embraced these ideals which continued to be applied during his second term in office (1995–1999). Argentina became subject to SAP policies and was regarded by the International Monetary Fund as one of its “best students” in the region. State reforms in this direction entailed, in addition to the privatization of state-owned enterprises, fiscal constraint and the opening up of the economy; a fixed currency exchange plan and the flexibilization of labour markets via diluting employment legislation and payroll taxes (Lo Vuolo et al. 2002; Barrientos 2004; Vinocur and Halperin 2004).

Fiscal retrenchment meant that Argentina neglected its old system of social security and in turn advanced moderately into a “liberal-informal” welfare regime type that invokes residual forms of welfare and poverty alleviation programmes (Barrientos 2004; Filguiera 2005). The new policy scenario brought significant changes and deterioration in labour market conditions. While coverage of social insurance declined, some components of the “welfare state” were dismantled and established social rights partially curtailed (Vinocur and Halperin 2004; Pautassi 2006; Rodriguez Enriquez 2006).

To contain the negative effects of adjustment, policy makers resorted to minimal and targeted social assistance and food programmes. Social Funds⁷ proliferated throughout this decade to address particular needs and to provide income and temporary paid work. In overall terms, they were limited in coverage and meagre in resources, as well as poorly articulated. They created a juxtaposition of initiatives with similar design and objectives (Kessler and Roggi 2005; Pautassi 2006). In the year 2000 there were 20 employment programmes in simultaneous operation. Not surprisingly, social policy in this period has been characterized as, at best, chaotic, fragmented and overlapping⁸ (Auyero 2000).

These adjustment measures resulted in strong negative impacts on social development indicators (Lo Vuolo et al. 2002; Kessler and Roggi 2005). With escalating extreme poverty and inequality, both unemployment and informal work also rose to unprecedented levels. Impoverishment peaked in 2002 when 57.2 per cent of the population was living in poverty and 27.5 per cent in extreme scarcity. Unemployment also reached its highest level in May 2002 when it stood at 21.5 per

cent, and underemployment at 18.6 per cent of the workforce. The dire social scenario at the beginning of the new millennium was one of the main causes of the institutional and economic crisis set off in 2001 (Pautassi 2006).

Economic stagnation deepened after 1998 and was followed by the breakdown of the monetary regime and by a political and economic crisis at the beginning of the new millennium that generated broad social mobilizations and put an abrupt end to the Presidency of Fernando de la Rúa (1999–2001). The fragile political legitimacy and high levels of social unrest saw the succession of four interim Presidents until national elections were called. The new government of Nestor Kirchner (2003–2007) in the post-crisis scenario with its own re-interpretation of the historical legacy and vision of Peronism pledged its adherence to fighting scarcity and inequality and, in practical terms, secured political stability by adopting broad poverty alleviation measures to deal with the extreme social and economic consequences of the crisis.

The attempts at providing more inclusive forms of liberalism built upon the experience of the Social Funds and the public work programmes of the 1990s (Golbert 2004; Pautassi 2004). In addition to CCTs which attempted to tackle deprivation and surpass previous deficiencies in reaching the poor, the state also envisaged active policies to encourage formal employment and to extend basic health and pension insurance to those previously dependent on informal mechanisms. The most prominent example of such formalization was the campaign for the registration of domestic workers. Table 11.1 summarizes the main features of each historical period.

Table 11.1 Welfare regimes and type of social protection in Argentina

<i>Welfare regime</i>	<i>Conservative-informal (1950s–1970s)</i>	<i>Liberal-informal (1980s–1990s)</i>	<i>Inclusive (2000s)</i>	<i>liberalism</i>
<i>Main forms of protection</i>	Work-based social insurance. Informal networks for rural informal or unemployed workers.	Residual social assistance. Dilution of social rights and increasing reliance on informal work and informal survival networks.	Widespread coverage of minimal social assistance. Policy to expand formal work, and provide basic insurance for informal workers.	
			CCTs	
<i>Paradigmatic Examples</i>	Social insurance	Social funds		

In order to rapidly expand the coverage of social assistance programmes in 2002, two conditional cash transfer programmes were launched. The biggest in reach and the more visible in the public sphere was the programme for unemployed heads of households or *Plan Jefas*, while a more modest strategy was linked to the protection of vulnerable groups. Three years later with a more stable socioeconomic situation and the need to move from emergency measures to long-term ones, the structure of social protection was reassessed and modified into the programme for families for social inclusion—*Plan Familias*—and the insurance for training and employment⁹. These two phases in the design and development of CCTs assumed and encouraged particular constructions of gendered identities and citizenship practices.

The First Phase: Plan Jefas

Plan Jefas constituted the high point of emergency programmes launched at a time of extreme social tensions. Initiated by interim President Eduardo Duhalde (2002–2003), the programme was later redefined and expanded during the administration of Nestor Kirchner. In the decree of 4 April 2002 it was defined as the main strategy to fight the adverse employment consequences and the loss of income triggered by the economic crisis of 2001.¹⁰ With its extensive regional coverage and magnitude, reaching in 2002 16 per cent of all households, this initiative is without historical precedence in Argentine social protection (MTESS 2004a).

The programme targets unemployed “heads of households” regardless of sex who are responsible for a child below the age of 18 or caring for a disabled child or a pregnant spouse¹¹ (Decree 565/2002, art. 2). A monthly stipend of 150 Argentine pesos (ARS)¹² is offered to each family conditional on the performance of 20 hours of paid work per week. In its legislation *Plan Jefas* articulates two simultaneous objectives: to supply a minimal monthly income to all unemployed families by means of the cash provided, as well as to secure families’ right to social inclusion and future labour reinsertion through involvement in productive, communal or educational activities (Decree 565/2002). These conditionalities are, in turn, assumed to encourage a “real work culture”, and reduce the vulnerability of families (Decree 1506/2004, Resolution MTESS 406/2003). Initially the Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Security was assigned as the overseeing state entity (Decree 565/2002, art. 14),


because it had the adequate institutional and human resources to do so (Golbert 2004). Since 2004 the task is shared with the Ministry of Social Development (MSD) (Decree 1506/2004, art. 4 and 5).

The selection of beneficiaries was carried out by a massive call to the population. To avoid delays due to complex targeting methodologies, the programme did not fix regional targets; instead, individual self-selection was taken as the path. As a result, the requirements of household headship and unemployment were defined by beneficiaries themselves through a signed declaration of their alleged status. Given the problematic nature of defining household headship,¹³ it is not surprising that it was not clearly defined in the legislation of the programme, and thereby left to the beneficiaries and those implementing the programme to do so. From the legislation, for example, it is not clear if the notion of “household head” refers to the main economic provider, to the main decision maker, or to the person whom others designate as the head. Furthermore since the targeting criteria was not vigorously enforced, those actually not heading a household or informally employed could in practice access the programme. The only factor precluding participation in *Plan Jefas* is social security contributions attached to formal employment.

The selection process had a further particularity. Initially all citizens fulfilling the stated criteria were entitled to receive benefits through the programme but, given the large number of applicants and budgetary considerations, an arbitrary decision was taken to stop receiving new applicants after 17 May 2002 (CELS 2003). Even though the programme has been continued annually since 2002 by presidential decree, this restriction has effectively closed the programme to new applicants.¹⁴

Despite these shortcomings, 90 per cent of those participating in the programme fall below the poverty line (Ronconi et al. 2006). The accelerated intake of participants registered in 2002 peaked in 2003 when all those that applied before 17 May 2002 were finally enrolled at slightly over 2 million beneficiaries. But as economic conditions improved, formal and informal work opportunities became more widely available, and other social programmes captured part of *Jefas*' beneficiaries; the number of beneficiaries decreased, so that by 2007 the figure stood at about half of the initial figure.

Figure 11.1 Total number of beneficiaries of *Plan Jefas*, per year




Note: * 2007 only includes the period January–May.

Source: Author's own elaboration based on data provided by the Ministry of Labour (MTESS).

Even though the cash provided by the programme was not sufficient to have a major impact on poverty levels, it did have an effect on the incidence of indigence.¹⁵ The impact on levels of indigence, though, has decreased over time, along with a reduction in the number of beneficiaries. Figure 11.2 shows that, while in 2003 the programme reduced the level of indigence by 3 per cent, the impact was reduced to 0.9 per cent in 2006.¹⁶ Furthermore, given that programme beneficiaries were counted as “employed” in official statistics, another outcome of the programme was to reduce the level of unemployment (MTESS 2004a, 2004b). Assessments signal, for instance, that the reduction in the level of unemployment a year after the programme was roughly equivalent to the number of participants in *Plan Jefas* (Galasso and Ravallion 2003). Finally the contribution of the income provided is calculated at 37 per cent of overall household income of beneficiaries (Pautassi 2004).

Figure 11.2 The impact of *Plan Jefas* on levels of poverty and indigence, 2003–2006



Note: The impact of *Plan Jefas* was calculated by computing the difference between levels of poverty and indigence per year with and without the income provided by the programme.

Source: Author's own elaboration with data from INDEC, Household Survey.

As these results indicate, *Plan Jefas* “did partially compensate many losers of the crisis and reduce extreme poverty” (Galasso and Ravallion 2003:1). Furthermore it played an important part in diminishing levels of social tension produced by the crisis not only due to the distribution of plans, but also through the alliances carved between key social actors: the unemployment movement, government officials, NGOs and faith-based organizations (Golbert 2004).

Programme evaluations and academic studies describe the main characteristics of beneficiaries. They often use different data sets. The analysis provided in this chapter, for the sake of consistency, uses official statistics to the extent possible. When there are important inconsistencies, and reason to believe that the data may be misleading, other sources are used.

The available data suggests that close to 71 per cent of participants in the programme are women, with low educational levels (primary school) and in their reproductive years (between 30 and 40 years of age) (MTESS 2004a). Household surveys carried out by independent researchers¹⁷ indicate that programme beneficiaries are from the poorest sectors of the population, with the following characteristics: they tend to live in large households with, on average, five household members; they have low levels of economic activity and experience high unemployment rates (Cortés et al. 2004).

In spite of targeting heads of households, around half of the female participants defined themselves in later surveys as spouses. So, as shown in table 11.2, male and female beneficiaries of *Plan Jefas* occupy different positions within their respective households.¹⁸ In terms of their links with the labour market, the great bulk of beneficiaries were not only unemployed—the original target of the programme—but 37.6 per cent of female and 10.5 per cent of male beneficiaries reported being economically inactive before joining the programme. Compared to the unemployed population more generally, participants of the programme encounter greater difficulties in re-entering the labour market (MTESS 2004a).

Table 11.2 Proportion of male and female participants and their household status

<i>Position within household</i>	<i>Male beneficiaries (%)</i>	<i>Female beneficiaries (%)</i>
Head	81.4	25.9
Spouse	0.9	49.4
Other	17.8	24.7

Source: Pautassi 2004.

Gender analyses of *Plan Jefas* point out that despite women's visibility in the programme, much like previous Social Fund initiatives it lacks a serious concern with gender equity. The main question these studies raise is the significance and impact of the programme on the lives of poor women. Does it help overcome exclusionary labour market mechanisms through its work-related and training conditionalities? Or does it simply provide some additional income in a moment of crisis (Pautassi 2004, 2006)? The effects of the programme on intrahousehold dynamics as well as the gender ideologies underpinning policy formulation have remained, however, largely unexplored. Little consideration has also been given to the resonance with liberal feminist ideas of promoting women's equality with men. The title selected for the programme explicitly recognizes *both* women and men as potential beneficiaries—*Plan Jefes y Jefas*. Does this equal recognition given to both sexes mean that women's interests and constraints are sufficiently reflected in the design of the programme?

The next section considers from a gender perspective the significance of the cash stipend for both women and men, as well as the gender-differentiated responsibilities required by the programme in the form of the labour conditionality.

The section will also explore the exit strategies that are available to beneficiaries, in particular, the extent to which they can re-enter the labour market.

Programme entitlements: Cash, gender and household structure

Given that programme participants were self-selected, the income provided by the programme seems to have mainly attracted poor women with limited possibilities of accessing other sources of income. While economists foresaw that the gender division of household tasks and the different constraints and possibilities of accessing the labour market would probably mean that more women would be attracted to the programme than men, as a way of complementing their other meagre sources of income, policy makers claim that they did not expect the high levels of female intake.


Because of women's high levels of inactivity and underemployment during the 1990s, and the extent of labour market segmentation and gender wage gaps, it is not surprising that the programme would have been more attractive to women than to men in low-income households. Contrary to men's employment rates that declined during the 1990s (ILO 2005), women's economic activity rates grew. Yet instead of entering employment, women's increased economic activity resulted in rising levels of female unemployment and underemployment. In 2002 these two figures rose to 18.9 per cent and 25 per cent of the female workforce, respectively. The work trajectory of beneficiaries a year and a half before the programme follows this general trend and indicates that labour vulnerability for women was mainly related to either inactivity or unemployment (Cortés et al. 2004).

Almost half of female participants in the programme are spouses, and 43 per cent of them declared to be economically inactive a year before joining the programme, mainly due to labour market constraints, discouragement and/or incompatibility of paid work with their unpaid household responsibilities (Pautassi 2004). It appears that for women entering or increasing their labour market participation was not as feasible or attractive as joining the programme, the latter providing a more sustained source of income than they would have obtained through the labour market. Thus, the extended feminine presence in the programme can be explained as a household strategy to maximize resources by bringing women out of forced inactivity in a context of crisis (MTESS 2004a; Rodriguez Enriquez 2006; Pautassi 2006).

The households of women beneficiaries, many of them spouses, show better economic conditions and an income 30 per cent higher than those households with male *Plan Jefas* beneficiaries. The former tend to be large families with a higher number of income earners and links to the labour market, while households of male beneficiaries tend to be nuclear families with fewer members who are economically active¹⁹ (Pautassi 2004). Yet information on how earnings and/or power are distributed within each household arrangement to evaluate overall well-being is not presently available.

The use of *Plan Jefas* became increasingly feminized during the consolidation of the programme. Figure 11.3 shows this development with a near 10 per cent increase in the number of female participants over the designated period (2002–2007).

Figure 11.3 Percentages of female and male beneficiaries of the *Plan Jefas*, by year



Note: * 2007 only includes the period January–May.

Source: Author's own elaboration based on data provided by the Ministry of Labour (MTESS).

It seems that men resorted to *Plan Jefas* only in the immediate aftermath of the economic crisis as a temporary measure, but as social conditions improved, many found other sources of income. By contrast, poor women in households with multiple income earners accessed the stipend on a more permanent basis. They relied on it as one of several strategies they call upon to secure household survival, along with their tenuous participation in the informal economy and unpaid care responsibilities.²⁰ The

households of male beneficiaries that remain in the programme over time constitute a particularly vulnerable group, given that many of them have fewer income earners, and the fact that the contribution of the programme to their overall household income is 11 per cent higher than the equivalent figure for female beneficiaries (Pautassi 2004). This group of male participants experience a stronger tendency to engage in sporadic work, persistent unemployment, or toddle from inactivity to unemployment at an intensity superior to that of female programme participants (Cortés et al. 2004).

Programme obligations: Gender dynamics, work conditionality and market inclusion

The Argentine strategy targets unemployed—not poor—heads of households and its long-term strategy of inclusion is based on paid labour and not human capital development. In practical terms, the contribution of the work conditionality to labour market inclusion remains debatable (Pautassi 2004, 2006; Rodriguez Enriquez 2006). The ambiguity of the work component was partly a result of the conditionality appearing as an afterthought to the initial design—a mechanism that was later put in place to reduce the large number of applicants in a context of budgetary constraints (Galasso and Ravallion 2003; Módolo 2004) in order to ensure that the cash transfer would go to those in “real need” (Giovagnoli 2005).

The implementation of the work requirement was decentralized to local governments. General assessments on its significance would therefore have to be tampered by the variance of local experiences. These often differ depending on the characteristics of municipalities, the number of beneficiaries, the role of social movements and faith-based organizations, as well as local labour market dynamics. In many cases, local governments did not have the organizational capacity to develop and monitor activities, which compromised the quality of the work being provided, limiting it to low-skill tasks and occupations (Pautassi 2004; 2006; Rodriguez Enriquez 2006). However, some scholars argue that even where beneficiaries are required to perform cheap labour for regular municipal tasks this should not be seen as entirely negative (Kessler and Roggi 2005). Yet what is also clear is that participation in labour activities declined over the life of the programme. Initially beneficiaries saw them as an obligation in order to access the cash stipend, but when the poor monitoring and low enforcement of municipalities became apparent, work requirements were progressively discouraged.

In spite of these ambiguities and limitations, at least in principle, the work-rationale of the programme should be able to supply poor women some opportunities for labour market inclusion that go beyond the little productive prospects opened by other CCT programmes with human development prerogatives—a point to which we will return later.

The tasks involved

Community projects provided the main form of work conditionality and involved 60 per cent of beneficiaries, while administrative tasks drew 20 per cent, followed by microenterprise development (8 per cent), finishing school (6 per cent), training (4 per cent), and work for the private sector (2 per cent). Each of these activities and social spaces attracted women with particular sociodemographic characteristics and offered different opportunities for social interaction and empowerment. Community projects—the main form of work conditionality—attracted women from low-middle income backgrounds with higher educational levels. These spaces stirred social exchanges, autonomy and self-valorization, as well as knowledge exchange on how to maximize benefits from the *Plan*. At the same time, finishing school was taken up by women experiencing poverty for more than a generation and with no primary education. Adult education offered a chance to break their social isolation. It does not seem to enrich social networks and participation, but it enhances self-esteem, cultural capital and a perception of more autonomy in the eyes of their children (Di Marco et al. 2006).

The majority of beneficiaries fulfilled work requirements, but women did so more frequently than men (93.4 per cent and 81.6 per cent, respectively, MTESS 2004a) (Pautassi 2004). For men, over time, the labour requirement lost its significance as their main occupation. In contrast, for women the work performed as part of the programme continued to be significant (Calvi and Zibechi 2006), concurring with the above-mentioned differential usages of the programme by gender.

The tasks generally carried out are mostly low-skill and similar to those required by previous employment programmes: construction, repairs, care of children and old people, tourism activities (CELS 2003). A closer look at gender disaggregated data shows that these activities reinforce patterns of gender segmentation already present in low-skill occupations, with women overwhelmingly clustered into reproductive tasks or other typically “feminine” occupations (Daeren 2004). Women’s

work in community projects, for instance, was geared towards care-related tasks involving cleaning, caring, repairing shoes and clothes, and less prominently clerical responsibilities. Men tended to specialize in general maintenance and construction related activities (Pautassi 2006; Rodriguez Enriquez 2006). In addition to providing poor training opportunities, the lack of skill generation was further reinforced by a general low intake of training as a form of co-responsibility.²¹


Despite the low skills involved and the lack of training available to female beneficiaries, for many of them the conditionalities represent a way of temporarily escaping the confines of family life and being included in public spaces of social interaction (Di Marco et al. 2006).²² Further, anthropologists suggest that women's employment in social work and clerical activities at the municipality or neighbourhood level has given them a sense of doing socially valued work, compared to men who are often engaged in physically demanding tasks. The conditionality of *Plan Jefas* might therefore offer women a way of building social capital, of learning new skills for personal or family use, and of fostering a new sense of social inclusion and social status that is more desirable than that of being "unemployed" or "economically inactive" (Kessler and Roggi 2005). Beneficiaries interviewed underlined the positive effects of being offered socially useful work. Notwithstanding these positive outcomes, it is also clear that the new mechanisms of inclusion are essentially without any form of social protection (and are being used to cut personnel costs in public administration) (Colmegna 2004). Nor did *Plan Jefas* offer women any assistance by providing childcare services (Kessler and Roggi 2005). The legislation of the programme makes no explicit reference to childcare provision (Pautassi 2004).

Exiting the programme: Inclusion in formal work and social mobility

The available evidence suggests that almost 40 per cent of those exiting *Plan Jefas* entered registered employment (MTESS 2007); in total nearly 600,000 beneficiaries found formal work between 2002 and 2007.²³ Labour reinsertion has been partially stimulated by the high growth rates during the last four years of close to 9 per cent (World Bank 2006) that translated into a 30 per cent increase in registered employment (MTESS 2006a). This was facilitated by explicit government efforts to promote employment creation.²⁴ Yet access to formal work has provided different opportunities for female and male programme participants. Time-series data suggest

an initial bias towards men, but over time, the gender gap appears to have narrowed as shown in Figure 11.4.

Figure 11.4 Beneficiaries (re)-incorporated into the formal labour market, by sex and by year



Note: Beneficiaries suspended or cancelled per year due to formal labour insertion.

* 2007 only includes the period January–May.

Source: Author's own elaboration based on data provided by the Ministry of Labour (MTESS).

Women formed the bulk of the beneficiaries, yet until 2006 women had a much lower chance of graduating from the programme into formal work than their male counterparts. While in 1996 and 1998 job creation was driven by the service sector, which provides relatively easier entry for women (MTESS 2004b), since 2003 the growth in employment has risen in the construction sector which typically provides low- and semi-skilled occupations for men (MTESS 2006a, 2006b). Not surprisingly, 65 per cent of the posts created in 2006 were occupied by men (MTESS 2006b). Moreover, there is a high correlation between the prior work experience of beneficiaries and the sectors of the economy in which they find employment. For example, 83 per cent of those beneficiaries hired in the construction sector and 80 per cent of those in industry had already worked in those sectors (MTESS 2007). Male beneficiaries, concurring with employers' expectations, had previously worked in the required sectors, while women had significantly lower formal work experience, most having worked as paid domestic workers (see table 11.3) (MTESS 2004a; Pautassi 2004). In other words, women's employment histories, more than men's, tend to be geared toward informal activities. This is confirmed by qualitative research suggesting

that women beneficiaries are actively involved in the informal economy, including domestic work and industrial home-based production for small enterprises.

*Table 11.3 Previous occupation of Plan Jefas beneficiaries transferring to the Seguro**

<i>Women: Previous occupation</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Men: Previous occupation</i>	<i>%</i>
Domestic service	22.6	Construction	26.9
Administration and planning	9.9	Industrial and craft production	14.2
Industrial and craft production	9.2	No data	6.1
Gastronomical services	9.2	Transport	5.5
Non-domestic cleaning services	8.8	Non-domestic cleaning services	5.1

Notes: Information until 30 May 2007.

*The Seguro is one of the CCTs that replaces *Plan Jefas*; it maintains the work-related approach of *Plan Jefas*.

Source: Author's own elaboration based on data provided by the Ministry of Labour (MTESS).

Hence, the initial employment bias in favour of males was for the most part determined by factors external to the programme: changes in growth patterns, higher levels of overall male employment, and employers' preferences for those with previous formal occupations in their own sectors (be it manufacturing or construction).


As the presence in *Plan Jefas* of male beneficiaries with the required characteristics declined, women's and men's patterns of labour market entry slowly converged. Unfortunately there is no sex-disaggregated data on the types of occupations into which programme beneficiaries enter.

Quality of jobs being created

After 2004 the entry into the labour market of male *Plan Jefas* participants progressively declines (see figure 11.4). The jobs obtained seem to have become more precarious; temporary employment has increased and constituted 55 per cent of men's total employment in 2007. At the peak of men's labour market entry, the number of programme beneficiaries obtaining work for short-term periods was low and much of it confined to women. As men's entry into employment diminished, the re-entry of beneficiaries back into the programme grew (see figure 11.5). Furthermore, male

beneficiaries who find additional barriers in accessing paid work and who remain in *Plan Jefas* tend to enter insecure forms of paid work, highlighting that men's vulnerability is mostly linked to intermittent employment (Cortés et al. 2004).

Figure 11.5 Percentages of beneficiaries that return to *Plan Jefas* after obtaining employment, by sex and by year



Note: * 2007 only includes the period January–May.

Source: Author's own elaboration based on data provided by the Ministry of Labour (MTESS).

In the case of women, at the start of *Plan Jefas* not only did they experience difficulties in accessing formal work, but even for those who did access paid work, close to 60 per cent returned to *Plan Jefas* within three months. After 2005 the situation for women appears to have improved: not only do a larger proportion of programme beneficiaries appear to find employment, but the paid work that they find seems to be more stable. Short-term occupations have declined, despite the slight increase in the percentage of women who returned to the programme after 2006. Despite women participants being incorporated into the labour market at a much lower rate, it is worth noting that many of those who are entering had no recent experience of formal sector work (MTESS 2004b), and are slowly cultivating links with the formal labour market.

In addition to the instability of jobs found by beneficiaries, their salaries tend to cluster below ARS350 (MTESS 2007). Some studies suggest *Plan Jefas* tends to promote informal or precarious forms of work. These critics suggest that the

programme encourages the substitution of formal work with informal part-time jobs and non-registered employment, because those who are formally employed are not able to access the programme (Rodriguez Enriques 2006).

As noted above, domestic work appears to be the most common prior occupation of female beneficiaries. However, since programme evaluations focus on formal employment, domestic work that generally belongs to the informal economy does not appear in official documentation. And despite recent efforts to formalize it, the labour market conditions of domestic workers remain poor with the level of pay at the discretion of individual employers. Moreover, even if the wages offered for domestic work are comparable to wages offered in jobs involving similar levels of skill, hourly wages tend to decrease concomitant with the number of hours worked, discouraging such workers from working full- or over-time (MTESS 2005).²⁵

Plan Jefas: Gender, social inclusion and work

Plan Jefas sees paid work as the key mechanism of social integration (Resolution MTESS 256 2003), which has some parallels with the “welfare-to-work” policy thrust in the United States (US) and social democratic prescriptions for social inclusion in Europe (Gerhard et al. 2002). Liberal feminist concerns with equality, embedded in the design of such programmes, assume that the strategy of inclusion through the labour market provides equal opportunities for women and men. The above analysis, however, suggests that in practice the manner in which women and men enter such programmes, and the extent to which they are able to exit such programmes and enter the labour market are gender-differentiated.

Three different groups of beneficiaries can be identified. First, women, a high percentage of whom are spouses, discouraged from participation in economic activities, and living in large families with several income earners. These women tend to resort to the programme because the stipend it provides compares favourably with their poor labour market prospects. Given the multiple income earners, the households of these female beneficiaries seem to have a higher level of income than those of male participants. Little is known about the incidence of other forms of risk in their lives related to time poverty and their economic insecurity; since their economic dependence on other household members, especially male partners, they do face particular risks associated with divorce, separation and widowhood. Although some of these women may have been able to benefit from the programme in terms of entering

some form of economic activity and social networks, their involvement appears to be disarticulated from the economic citizenship and long-term labour inclusion called upon by programme regulations. Up until 2005 women's labour market prospects were highly unstable; in more recent years there has been some improvement, thanks to the dynamism of the manufacturing and administrative sectors. Some women seem to be entering more stable forms of employment.

Second, men resorted to *Plan Jefas* in the immediate aftermath of the social emergency, but once the economy showed signs of recovery those with stronger links to formal work re-entered employment in construction and industry. Formal labour market participation is an opportunity mostly enjoyed by one-third of male programme beneficiaries. And even in these cases new jobs provide wages that are significantly lower than the average wage in the economy as well as being unstable.

Finally there is a group of male beneficiaries who could not take advantage of formal work openings, and who still remain in *Plan Jefas*. This remnant male group shows signs of intense vulnerability: their households have fewer income earners and relatively lower levels of income than those of female participants. Furthermore, as the next section suggests, this group of men will not be included in the new programme that is intended to replace *Plan Jefas*, and is likely to become sidelined from the state's efforts at providing social protection.

Beneficiaries: Subjects of rights or assistance

From a rights-based perspective, *Plan Jefas* signals improvements in terms of coverage²⁶, and the core logic of the programme, the right to social inclusion, signals a growing valorization of citizenship, social rights and capability enhancement (CELS 2003; Golbert 2004; Pautassi 2006.). Notwithstanding these nominal gains, the amount of cash provided is insufficient to have made a significant dent into poverty.

In principle *Plan Jefas* attempts to surpass "assistential" social programmes. However, equality of access and entitlements, and state accountability to programme beneficiaries are curtailed in three respects. First, there is little effort to monitor the extent to which the state performs its side of the "co-responsibility", nor are there clear and timely complaints procedures available to beneficiaries. Centralized structures of administration in the programme further jeopardize effective appeal mechanisms (CELS 2003, 2007). Second, informal and/or arbitrary deadlines for beneficiary enrolment (in this case 17 May 2002) act as barriers to entry. Finally, even

if discretionary allocations are less prevalent than in previous decades, research still shows that beneficiary participation rates are significantly higher in Peronist than in non-Peronist municipalities (Giovagnoli 2005), pointing to the persistence of politicized forms of enrolment.

The above-mentioned ambiguities are also evident in how beneficiaries perceive the programme. *Plan Jefas* is mostly interpreted by the target population as a form of assistance to the poor, aimed at gaining some form of political support for ruling parties. Only one-tenth of beneficiaries think that the programme can meet their rights as citizens, while the majority see it as a form of “social aid”.

Table 11.4 The meaning of the *Plan Jefas* from the perspective of beneficiaries

<i>The programme is</i>	<i>%</i>
An act of charity	7.0
A right	10.4
A political manoeuvre	16.1
A social aid	63
Other	1.1
No answer	2.4

Source: MTESS 2003.

Special consideration should finally be given to the growing emphasis placed on citizens’ obligations, to the detriment of their claims/rights. In the context of targeted efforts to alleviate poverty, emphasizing the obligations of the poor in exchange for access to minimal rights can end up being detrimental for the extension of those same entitlements (Levitas 2005; Kessler and Roggi 2005).

The Second Phase of Inclusive Liberalism: “The Plan Familias”

After the immediate years of the social emergency had passed, various criticisms voiced by Catholic organizations, the association of national industry and international donors on grounds of “clientelism” and of not encouraging a culture of work (Clarín 14/02/2006; CTA 2006) signalled the need to re-evaluate the strategies of social protection put in place during the emergency period. In response, *Plan Jefas*

underwent major modifications, and, though it is still in operation, it has sought to downsize the number of beneficiaries by transferring them to two other CCT programmes—the *Plan Familias* and the *Seguro*—each supposedly targeting a specific profile of *Jefas* beneficiaries²⁷.

Government authorities divided the occupational profiles of beneficiaries of *Plan Jefas* into different groups based on their employment prospects. Beneficiaries with higher educational levels and previous work experience, those with low levels of education yet with a motivation to continue their studies, and those facing added difficulties (older beneficiaries with low levels of education and no labour skills) were identified as having different degrees, yet still possessing some employment prospects. Consequently, they continue to receive their benefits under the umbrella of the Ministry of Labour. “Inactive beneficiaries, women or the elderly”, in contrast, form a group that is considered to be socially vulnerable yet “not employable”. This group is seen as highly vulnerable and therefore in need of income support or human development in the form of *Plan Familias* which is being implemented by the Ministry of Social Development (MTESS 2004a, Decree 1506/2004).

The rationale behind these changes is that different measures are needed to deal with extreme poverty and unemployment. First, to secure training and productive employment, the *Seguro* reproduces the *Jefas*’ work rationale and continues to prioritize re-insertion into formal paid work (Resolution 336/2006). It targets the unemployed or informal workers and helps promote a “real work culture” (Decree 1506/2004).²⁸


The need to develop institutional capacity and build employment agencies at the municipal level almost from scratch meant that by April 2007 the *Seguro* was operating in only 99 municipalities in the country. Hence, only a small number of beneficiaries of *Plan Jefas* (nearly 44,000) had transferred to this new initiative. However, contrary to expectations, women were strongly represented among those who agreed to move to this initiative (77 per cent), slightly older than *Jefas*’ participants²⁹ and only 61.7 per cent of them have previous work experience.³⁰

The second objective, the strengthening of vulnerable families was to be pursued through *Plan Familias* (Resolution MSD 648/2006). In its current format *Plan Familias* was launched in October 2004 with the aim of combating the social exclusion of poor families through the promotion of human development and capacity-building of children’s health and education (Resolution MSD 825/2005).

Those eligible to participate are previous beneficiaries of *Plan Familias*'s predecessor—the programme IDH (income for human development)³¹—and female beneficiaries of *Plan Jefas* who have low education levels, two or more children, and who reside in one of the 403 municipalities or surrounding areas identified as geographical priorities³² (MSD 2006c, 2006d). In terms of design and objectives, *Plan Familias* mirrors the Mexican programme, *Oportunidades*, and other subsequent human development strategies developed in Latin America. It provides cash transfers dependant on family size directly to women, conditional on school attendance and health checks of their children between 5 and 19 years of age³³. The minimum monetary provision is ARS185³⁴ for families with two children, and offers a top-up of ARS30 per child, up to a maximum of ARS305³⁵ per month for a family with six or more children³⁶ (Resolution MSD 693/2007). A second component only targeting 60 municipalities nationwide also offers optional community and family activities focused on training in health promotion and school progress for children and adolescents (MSD 2005a). Currently, programme beneficiaries can have other sources of income, through either work or pensions, as long as the total amount of household earnings does not exceed the minimum salary.³⁷ The programme has an estimated annual budget of US\$322.5 million (MSD 2005a), with an estimated funding of US\$2 billion for the next five years. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) currently provides 70 per cent of this funding, and the national government the remaining 30 per cent.

To date 203,402 beneficiaries have migrated from *Plan Jefas* to *Plan Familias*, which, together with the IDH beneficiaries, brings the total number of programme beneficiaries to 427,282 (see figure 11.6 below). Yet, it was expected that close to 500,000 households would migrate from *Plan Jefas* to *Plan Familias* in 2006 and 700,000 in 2007 (MSD 2006d). Delays in programme expansion have to do with poor administrative capacity, as well as scepticism on the part of *Plan Jefas* participants towards any effort to downsize and modify the programme. *Plan Jefas* enjoyed a level of legitimacy, durability and public visibility that gives beneficiaries a sense of security. As a result, beneficiaries are resisting the changes being proposed; they nevertheless opt for *Plan Familias* mainly due to the larger stipend it offers (MSD 2005a).

Figure 11.6 Number of new participants in *Plan Familias* coming from *Plan Jefas* and previous IDH programme, by year



Note: The figure excludes those entering the programme by decree or judicial ruling; in total: 906 beneficiaries from 2002 until 2007.

*2007 only includes until March

Source: Author's own elaboration with data from MSD.

Since the programme has been recently implemented there is little information regarding its outcomes. However the data available shows beneficiaries that opt to transfer to *Plan Familias* are mostly women (95.79 per cent) in reproductive ages and with large households; 64 per cent of these beneficiaries describe themselves as heads of households.³⁸ The cash received is generally used for satisfying needs such as purchasing food, clothing, school equipment and accessing health care. Almost three-quarters of participants claim that the programme enhances their children's school attendance at the primary level (MSD 2006a).

Re-traditionalizing gender roles in the management of poverty

The government justifies *Plan Familias* by suggesting that social exclusion encompasses a breakdown of the "work culture" as well as a weakening of the mechanisms of social reproduction that have traditionally given access to public or social goods and services to guarantee social integration (MSD 2005b). Following moral underclass theories on social exclusion developed in liberal welfare arrangements (Levitas 2005), gender segmented trajectories are prescribed for people's integration into mainstream society: paid work and the ethics associated with it largely for men and responsible motherhood for women.

In its regulations *Plan Familias* is said to consider equal treatment and opportunities for all household members as well as guaranteeing the recognition and commitment of women and men to the education and development of their children (Resolution MSD 825/2005). However, the programme offers an inclusion strategy aimed at women, which strongly identifies them with caring roles and their reproductive capacities. The naturalization of care as an essentially female activity is evident in the way *Plan Familias* treats the few male beneficiaries of *Plan Jefas* who opt to transfer to the former. In such cases a thorough analysis of the characteristics of the male applicants is undertaken, their levels of vulnerability are assessed as well as the feasibility of passing the benefit to a female member of the household.³⁹ Extra scrutiny of these “suspicious” participants and their families often follows through an added home interview by programme representatives prior to their enrolment (Joint Resolution of MTESS and the MSD 143 and 264/2005). The Ministry of Social Development then recommends that those men who are eligible should reassign the subsidy to a woman member of the household who can fulfil the programme’s requirements, making her responsible for the contractual bidding stipulated in programme regulations (MSD 2005a). Men are not the ones who are meant to sign the contract with state institutions. Only in cases where the male applicant is a single parent, or when he has a partner who is a foreigner, disabled, imprisoned or below 18 years of age, is he allowed to act as the main participant in the programme (MSD 2006d, Formulario C solicitud de aceptación de titulares varones por excepción).

The targeting of mothers to contribute to human capital formation of future citizen-workers shows the maternalistic assumptions that underpin human development CCTs where women are positioned as “conduits of policy” since they acquire a visible role in poverty alleviation but their needs are not the ultimate policy objective (Molyneux 2006). *Plan Familias* is thus grounded in what Ann Whitehead (1991) labelled “the ideology of maternal altruism” and promotes a virtuous model of the “empowered” woman based on her alleged altruism and commitment to family welfare, willing to perform unpaid community and family work (Sabates-Wheeler and Kabeer 2003). The next sections consider the conjunction of contextual variables that serve to explain the motives and particular shapes acquired by the retraditionalization of gender roles in the Argentine scenario.

The unmet needs of Jefas beneficiaries

There were specific social needs of a particular group of *Jefas*' beneficiaries that were not being addressed by the labour-related initiative. Women with large families and mounting care responsibilities may not necessarily have the opportunity to derive extra earnings (from formal or informal paid work). These women do have a real need for further income support, without the co-responsibility requirements imposed by *Plan Jefas* (MTESS 2004a). The latter, due to the direct link it constructed between poverty and unemployment, effectively overlooked the unpaid forms of work and caring that some women have to provide, which renders their participation in paid work difficult (without some kind of support for their caring duties).

Gender analysts suggest that with *Plan Familias* state authorities seem to be partly acknowledging the difficulties that women with a low level of skill and education and intense domestic responsibilities face in accessing paid work (Rodriguez Enriquez 2006). Preliminary reports show that the reasons women cited for transferring to *Plan Familias* were the larger cash stipend it provided and the less demanding conditionalities (MSD 2005a). Therefore, these changes partially respond to a real and unmet need for further income support on the part of a certain beneficiary group of *Plan Jefas*.

But like other social programmes which identify women solely as mothers, the programme effectively overlooks their simultaneous contributions as workers and carers (Razavi and Hassim 2006), and makes it difficult for them to re-enter paid work (Rodriguez Enriquez 2006). The distinction made between *Plan Familias* and *Seguro*: social vulnerability and lack of work respectively, and the dissociation between them, overlooks women's links to labour markets. The reality of beneficiaries' lives is at variance with this abstract distinction. Almost half of *Plan Familias*' beneficiaries (48 per cent) claim to perform informal labour activities to gain an income, through domestic work, street vending and care of the elderly (MSD 2006a). The view of mother-carers being de-linked from paid labour is questioned by these preliminary findings, and has been partially acknowledged by subsequent changes in programme regulations that allow women receiving the cash stipend to work in the formal sector—only if the salary they earn is less than the minimum wage.

Deactivating women

In 2004, *Plan Jefas* reached a paradoxical situation: while it aims to provide a link with productive activities for all beneficiaries, there are not enough employment opportunities to absorb the large numbers turning to the programme, especially those with particular difficulties in accessing formal labour markets. This, together with the political necessity of reducing unemployment, seems to have increased the attraction to transfer women to *Plan Familias*. As documented by programme evaluations, women beneficiaries of *Plan Jefas* face greater barriers in accessing formal work opportunities. In addition, they are also less likely to become politically problematic for the state. Therefore, instead of providing them with further support in reaching their productive potential, *Plan Familias* de-activates them. This situation is reminiscent of the argument made by some feminist economists of the benefits (for capital) of having a female “reserve army” of labour that can be absorbed in times of economic expansion and relegated “not merely out of work but out of the labour force, back into dependency within the home” (Mackintosh 1991:5) when needed. Additionally, in the Argentine case, by encouraging female beneficiaries to enter *Plan Familias*, statistically they are classified as economically inactive, which reduces unemployment figures. *Plan Jefas* had a similar statistical effect on unemployment rates, but in this case workers who declared the programme conditionality as their main occupation (mostly women) were considered to be employed. Yet in the case of *Plan Familias*, beneficiaries are altogether removed from the economically active population.

Despite these governmental prerogatives, sociological studies suggest that given the positive evaluation that female beneficiaries made (whether inactive or in low-skill occupations such as domestic service) of the labour conditionality in *Plan Jefas*, levels of economic activity among women beneficiaries of *Plan Familias* are likely to remain high, contradicting official expectations of a reduction in female unemployment (Calvi and Zibecchi 2006). Participation in the informal economy and the multiple survival strategies that characterized women in *Plan Jefas* reinforce this assertion. If these assertions turn out to be true, then the result may be higher female unemployment since their levels of economic activity will remain stable, but the work created by *Plan Jefas* is dismantled.

Global ideologies and national machineries

International institutions have carried an important weight in the design of national poverty alleviation strategies. Initially *Plan Jefas* was nationally funded. In January 2003 the World Bank approved a US\$600 million loan for *Plan Jefas* (World Bank 2002) and publicly endorsed and financed the transformation of this original programme into *Plan Familias* and *Seguro* (Clarín 23/03/2006; La Nación 30/05/2006).

Currently close to 70 per cent of *Plan Familias* is funded by the IDB. With the funding has come the pressure from international financial institutions to adopt what is seen as a highly successful model for poverty alleviation provided by programmes such as the *Oportunidades*. Academics are sceptical of the results of duplicating antipoverty strategies without consideration of national contexts and local dynamics (de la Briere and Rawlings 2006). For instance, attaching cash transfers to improvements in access to compulsory education and basic health care makes sense in the Mexican context that has state institutional capacity but falls short of universal health and education coverage. The Mexican programme therefore improved performance in these areas. The benefits of reproducing the same form of co-responsibility in contexts with almost universal health and education coverage, though with high variations in the quality of that provision, as is the case in Argentina, have yet to be shown. By contrast there is no consideration of educational and childcare facilities for children under five years old—an area in which state provision in Argentina is weak, but which has significant implications for the autonomy and labour market success of women with young children.

When the IDH programme was redesigned to become *Plan Familias* and cater for the *Jefas*' female beneficiaries, some modifications in its design were introduced that reinforced traditional gender roles rather than transforming them. For example, a critical requirement for women's economic security and the enhancement of their labour market prospects is the provision of work-related training. Among the numerous activities available in the previous IDH programme,⁴⁰ beneficiaries had shown the greatest interest and participation in labour-related training (MSD 2006b). In spite of this, when negotiating the IDB loan, this institution showed little interest in this second component of the programme related to community activities, job training was cut down as one of the options available to women, and a rigid set of requirements for the implementation of community projects impeded the functioning

of activities related to health and education of children. The views of key international players on gender relations thereby contributed to a more conservative interpretation of gender roles. Whereas before there was some form of training provision for women, this has now been curtailed. The conservative family ideologies of those heading the Ministry of Social Development in charge of the programme have further reinforced such traditionalist tendencies.

In sum, the transition from a labour-based to a human development CCT seems to have “feminized” poverty alleviation in a variety of ways. The current targeting of women brings their efforts into centre stage and intensifies the presence of women in CCT strategies. Second, the activities attached as conditionality to *Plan Familias* naturalize traditional female roles within the family around motherhood and care.

The influence of international donors notwithstanding, national bureaucracies reproduce historical practices in social protection that impact programme development. The administrative structures and the employees of the programme’s predecessor survived the transformations to *Plan Familias*. So there is significant continuity in terms of programme personnel. Short-term thinking, an emergency approach to social protection, assistential practices, lack of transparency and accountability towards beneficiaries, and a general atmosphere of secretism surround the workings of the ministry. Historical legacies were also evident during the design phase when proposals were made to call the current *Familias* programme “Plan Evita”, making reference to the social work of Eva Perón.

The cash entitlements provided by the *Familias* programme still correspond to the idea of minimal social rights; these have even been in fact slightly increased, are now proportional to family size, and additionally provide support for a more extended time span (since they continue to operate until all dependants reach 19 years of age). However, the entitlement provided by the stipend while an improvement on *Plan Jefas* is still below the income needed to lift families out of poverty.⁴¹ Secondly the contract signed between the programme and the key beneficiary includes a clause in which the latter relinquishes the right to make any claims or complaints.⁴² Furthermore, municipal workers note that beneficiaries’ grievances have to be centrally channelled to the national ministry; but these concerns generally go unanswered.

Old habits die hard—as the saying goes—in the form relations between state institutions and the poor take. As one programme beneficiary elaborated:

I am waiting for their promise, social inclusion, I want that ... For me it is all a deceit to maintain the poor quiet, still, so that they do not rebel against the state, so that they do not do trouble ... I don't see they do much to include people, for example, I could work in an office, and they give me 300 pesos but they don't give me the job that would strengthen me as a person, as an individual. They are feeding me like a little dog. If you have an animal in your house, you have to feed it or it will die of hunger. If you don't feed him he will get angry. What do you do with people who don't work? You give them money, for what? So that they will stay quiet, so they will continue being lazy, do you get it? There are some that like it. But they don't educate you, they don't strengthen you as a person.⁴³

Conclusion

As this chapter has shown, Argentina follows the regional trends towards new ways of thinking and addressing poverty and social polarization, labelled “inclusive liberalism”. The Argentine experience shares many of the characteristics of CCTs being implemented in other countries of the region as well as the general understanding of managing social risks that emphasizes the administration, rather than the eradication, of poverty. The reinterpretation of social rights to sets of minimal conditions narrows the welfare entitlements attached to broader conceptions of social citizenship (Serrano 2005b). So, “while ‘inclusive’ liberalism may deliver palliative services to the poor, it is not any kind of immediate challenge to the basic disposition of global or local assets” (Porter and Craig 2004:412–413). Yet, despite the emphasis on the provision of minimal standards, a common theme across these efforts is the use of a citizenship-based rhetoric and the claims to enhance individual rights to social inclusion.

This chapter has considered some of the ways in which the citizenship claims of two Argentine CCT programmes have been, in turn, gendered, and how, through a diverse set of obligations and entitlements opened for men and women, the

programmes construct gender differentiated roles and identities in the process of tackling poverty. The first Argentine experiment—the *Plan Jefas*—does not solely target women as cash recipients, and provides a labour-based form of inclusion. On the basis of this initial phase as well as shifts in public opinion regarding the programme, and given the increasing stake of international financial institutions in funding and designing national measures, *Plan Familias* offers cash stipends to mothers in exchange for health checks and school attendance of their children, and provides integration through human capital formation.

This changing scenario provides a fruitful opportunity to analyse the distinct notions of membership to a given community structuring diverse paths for “integrating” women and men into mainstream society. To return to the guiding question of this chapter, table 11.5 provides a synthetic view of how these diverse approaches of “inclusive liberalism” articulate citizenship, gender and state mechanisms of providing social inclusion.

Table 11.5 Selected features of two Argentine CCT initiatives

<i>CCT programme</i>	<i>Inclusion strategy</i>	<i>Gender citizenship</i>	<i>Claims and duties</i>
<i>Plan Jefas</i>	Inclusion through paid work. Women and men as “workers”.	Gender-uniform citizenship.	Equal in theory, but in practice it stimulates insecure paid work for men and provides minimal social reproduction for women.
<i>Plan Familias</i>	Inclusion by means of moral integration. Women as “mothers”.	Gender-differentiated citizenship.	Different in theory and practice. Women have slightly more secure entitlements, but their duties naturalize conservative gender roles and could jeopardize their future livelihoods.

Gender-uniform citizenship based on women’s equality with men is commonly associated with liberal feminism that emphasizes equal rights and obligations regardless of gender. The priority here is to enable women to compete on equal terms in the public spheres of politics and labour markets (Hobson and Lister 2002). As illustrated in table 11.5, *Plan Jefas* combines a gender-uniform understanding of citizenship with liberal notions that treat paid work as the priority avenue for exiting deprivation. This uniform vision leaves gender—and gender implications in access to resources—unproblematized.

In fact, as this chapter has shown, women’s and men’s claims to the programme were far from uniform; nor were their prospects of exiting the programme and entering paid work in the formal labour market. While the programme encourages women’s participation in the workforce, and provides some opportunities for status enhancement through the labour conditionality, nevertheless female beneficiaries encounter more severe barriers in accessing formal labour markets. For many of these women, paid domestic work and other forms of informal work remain the most obvious destinations after exiting the programme. Men, on the other hand, especially those with pertinent skills and work experience have re-entered the workforce in

sectors which have seen some modest growth in the post-crisis years. And yet despite such differences, it is also clear that *Plan Jefas* stimulated marginal jobs with significantly lower salaries and of a temporary nature, while features such as discretionary allocations, lack of monitoring of state performance and unclear complaints procedures diluted the rights-based rationale claimed by programme regulations.

Plan Familias offers a view of poverty as weak human capital formation, while providing gender-differentiated channels for social integration and citizenship, within which the strengthening of the family and the care of children are seen as women's main vocation and duty. A variety of factors have been identified behind the retraditionalization of gender roles in Argentina, evident in the transition from *Plan Jefas* to *Plan Familias*. Some evaluations of the *Plan Jefas*' (MTESS 2004a) argued that female beneficiaries with many children and demanding care duties required more income support and less work conditionality. At the same time, the programme also serves a useful political aim of reducing the unemployment rate by counting women out of "economic activity". In addition, the increasing influence of donor agencies in the funding of poverty alleviation programmes has meant that "successful" regional formulas for fighting poverty are often prescribed, regardless of context.

In the US context, Mead (1997) referred to the trend towards growing governmental enforcement of personal responsibility as the "new paternalism" (Gerhard et al. 2002). Within Latin American this shift has been labelled as new forms of maternalism (Molyneux 2007, 2006). Maternalism here involves the devolution and individualization of this contractual citizenship to female members of the household, who are, in turn, required to conform to dominant stereotypes of "good wives" and mothers (Razavi and Hassim 2006). While the recognition of women's unpaid care responsibilities is to be welcomed, the one-dimensional association between care and women in *Plan Familias* has the unfortunate affect of naturalizing and reifying gender differences, while doing very little to improve women's labour market prospects and their economic security.

Even though the CCT programmes represent an important effort in providing social protection, one of their crucial flaws is "the failure, post-dependency theory, to adequately engage the causes and structural effects of peripherization, marginalization, and their relation to security and stability" (Porter and Craig

2004:415–416). With the unfolding of “liberal inclusion” and the passage from uniform to gender-differentiated citizenship, gender identities and relations are permeated by a strong moral rhetoric. The reified categories leave the dichotomy men/work and female/care unchallenged. Women then mostly remain the holders of a reproductive function, while care is essentialized as women’s work regardless of their opportunities for seeking education, paid work and entrepreneurship. On the other hand, male participation is strictly associated with employment and related responsibilities to the detriment of their vulnerability in the market or their family relations.

The main developmental consequence of the progressive moralization of gender relations in CCT programmes is that, by encouraging family responses that are not adaptive for current forms of risk and vulnerability, these gender ideologies become an obstacle to positive policy outcomes (Jelin 2005). Thus, the way in which gender discourses are articulated obscures the necessities and pressing conditions of particularly vulnerable groups. The specific needs, for instance, of the residual group of men with lower incomes and difficulties in obtaining paid work still participating in *Plan Jefas*, as well as those of male beneficiaries attempting to transfer to *Plan Familias* that show high levels of social risk and weak and intermittent links with labour markets are made invisible. In addition, in spite of the increasing presence of women, CCT strategies do not consider their possible overburdening and time-poverty, nor do they attend to their need for long-term exit strategies out of poverty through job training and the provision of affordable and accessible care services.

Notes

¹ I would like to thank Shahra Razavi, Maxine Molyneux and Alessandra Dal Secco for comments, discussions and suggestions on earlier drafts of this chapter. Funding for this research was provided by the Institute for the Study of the Americas and the School of Advanced Study from the University of London. The author is grateful to both institutions for their support.

² The concept of negotiating the reproductive bargain is taken from Pearson (1997).

³ Citizenship here is “more than simply the formal relationship between an individual and the state presented by an earlier liberal and political science literature”. It

understands “citizenship as a more total relationship, inflected by identity, social positioning, cultural assumptions, institutional practices and a sense of belonging” (Werbner and Yuval-Davis 1999:4, cited in Hobson and Lister 2002). The feminist literature locates gender within a broader analysis of diversity social divisions, and understands citizenship both as membership of a community, and as the patterns of inclusion and exclusion which shape that membership (Hobson and Lister 2002).

⁴ Programme for Unemployed Heads of Household: Family’s Right to Social Inclusion.

⁵ Programme Families for Social Inclusion.

⁶ Employment and Training Insurance.

⁷ “Social funds were initially conceived to provide temporary low-wage employment on small-scale social and economic infrastructure projects under conditions of structural adjustment, such as building clinics, schools, roads and irrigation canals” (Sabates-Wheeler and Kabeer 2003:31).

⁸ In spite of these shortfalls, minor gains were made in terms of more flexible management styles that included social participation and that strengthened institutional capacity in the local public sector (Kessler and Roggi 2005).

⁹ There are two other programmes that will not be discussed here: *Programa Manos a la Obra* and *Programa Adulto Mayor Más*. For an analysis, see CELS (2007).

¹⁰ The Decree 565/2002 expanded and “universalized” the reach of the programme.

¹¹ In particular, the decree establishes that, if beneficiaries’ children are under 18, proof of school attendance and respective medical checks are to be provided while, if beneficiaries are above 60 years old, proof of unemployment and of not receiving any pension benefits are to be brought (Decree 565/2002).

¹² Approximately US\$49.

¹³ For a discussion of the ambiguities of the concept of household headship, see Budlender (1997).

¹⁴ The main exception is access through judicial rulings that, due to severe levels of social vulnerability, can dictate the inclusion of a particular family in the programme.

¹⁵ The programme provides 150 Argentine pesos (ARS). Poverty as measured by INDEC (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos) was set in October 2002 at ARS764.84 covering nutritional and basic service needs of a nuclear family of two adults and two children; indigence was set at ARS346.07 for the same household.

There is some disagreement about the extent of its effects. For the Ministry of Labour, poverty was reduced by 6.3 per cent and extreme poverty by 28 per cent (MTESS 2004a). World Bank evaluations argue that an extra 10 per cent of participants would have become extremely poor in the absence of the programme (Galasso and Ravallion 2003). Ronconi et al. (2006) estimate the programme aided 3.5 per cent of households out of poverty and 6 per cent out of indigence, while one-third would have remained inactive or unemployed.

¹⁶ In 2003, the level of indigence was 20.5 per cent, considering the income provided by *Plan Jefas*, and 23.5 per cent without it. In contrast, in 2006, it was 9.95 per cent, considering the income provided by *Plan Jefas*, and 10.85 per cent without it.

¹⁷ Official documents note that their data on household structure and position of the beneficiary within the household might be incomplete; hence, we rely on studies based on the national household survey from the national statistic bureau.

¹⁸ As already stated, some gender analysts find problematic the notion of household headship. If we assume that the concept refers to the individual, that is, the main income earner of the household, we encounter the awkward fact that most households in Latin America today have two main breadwinners. A distinction often made is between de facto and de jure headship, where the former is determined by the real contributions of different individuals to the household economy, while the latter refers to normative criteria often underpinning how respondents interviewed in household surveys designate different household members. These two measures do not always correspond, and women's contributions to household income are often underreported (Arriagada 2004). The data presented here refers to de jure headship and might therefore underestimate de facto female headship.

¹⁹ The average of income earners is 1.6 for households with male beneficiaries, in contrast to the case of female participants, that is, 2 income earners per household (Pautassi 2004).

²⁰ Most beneficiaries declared being engaged in the informal economy as a strategy to complement the cash provided by the programme, at an average wage of US\$127 for 18 hours per week (MTESS 2004a).

²¹ But it is worth noting that women seem to make more use of training opportunities than men (6.5 per cent and 2 per cent, respectively) (Pautassi 2004).

²² A paradigmatic example is provided by women working in communal kitchens. One of the women interviewed indicated that after a year of working there, she and her co-workers were like family, and that those for whom she cooked gave her much care and affection.

²³ Information provided by the monitoring section of the *Plan Jefas* at MTESS, May 2007.

²⁴ With measures such as the Law 25.877 that establishes a year exemption on employers' social security contributions for each new employed worker.

²⁵ Domestic workers who are employed for up to 30 hours per week earn ARS5.1 per hour, while those who work more than 150 hours per week earn only ARS1.6 per hour (MTESS 2005).

²⁶ While during the 1990s the number of participants in Social Funds did not exceed 140,000 (Golbert 2004), the *Plan Jefas*, at its peak, reached 2 million households, and today slightly over 1 million.

²⁷ Figures 11.1 and 11.6 show, on the one hand, the decline in the number of beneficiaries of *Plan Jefas* and, on the other, those beneficiaries who are being transferred to the *Plan Familias*.

²⁸ Inspired by the experience of Job Centres in the United Kingdom, it encompasses a two-year insurance of ARS225 (approximately USD 73) per month (after 18 months the stipend is reduced to ARS200), conditional on active job search and training through the provision of job search support, training and employment intermediation. Additionally, the time spent in the programme is recognized for pension purposes (Decree 336/2006). This initiative is directed to those beneficiaries that due to their educational background and work experience have higher prospects of finding paid work (MTESS 2004a), that is, young males from *Plan Jefas*.

²⁹ 33.4 per cent of *Plan Familias* beneficiaries are above 45 years, while in the *Plan Jefas* the percentage above that age is lower (26.4 per cent).

³⁰ Information provided by the monitoring of *Plan Familias* at the MSD, April 2007.

³¹ The *Plan Familias* existed prior to 2004, though on a smaller scale and with a slightly different design, in the form of the human development programme IDH “programa de atención a grupos vulnerables, subprograma de ingreso para el desarrollo humano”. In October 2004 it was renamed “*Programa Familias para la inclusión social*” (Resolution of the MSD 825/2005).

³² A smaller number of families can be included in the programme through extraordinary judicial ruling: families that face grave social risks or inhabit vulnerable areas. These cannot surpass the 10 per cent of beneficiaries transferred from the *Plan Jefas* (Resolution 825/2005). This should amount to approximately 40,000 families, yet there might be no administrative capacity to fulfil this target. Finally, this stipulation also enables the inclusion of additional beneficiaries financed by national sources only. Some critics point to the plausible use of this last instrument within the electoral year for political purposes.

³³ The health conditionality requires them to fulfil the national vaccination plan for children, and to perform bimonthly health checks in the case of pregnant women. In terms of education, mothers need to present certificates of enrolment and assistance of children aged between five and 19 years old (MSD 2006c).

³⁴ Approximately US\$60.

³⁵ Approximately US\$99.

³⁶ The stipend has increased over time. Resolution 648/2006 established ARS175 for two children and up until ARS275 for families with six or more children. While welcome, this sudden change seems to respond again to political or electoral considerations. It was announced by President Kirchner and not by those coordinating the programme, and was not based on an impact assessment of the changes in the subsidy.

³⁷ Set at ARS921 in February 2007.

³⁸ Of the beneficiaries, 80.74 per cent are between 26 and 45 years of age; 47.18 per cent of beneficiaries have three or four children, and 18.36 per cent have more than five (information provided in April 2007 by the monitoring of the *Plan Familias* at the MSD, based on the data base of beneficiaries of 16 May 2007).

³⁹ Male beneficiaries that opted to transfer to the *Plan Familias* have some particular features compared to male participants of *Plan Jefas*. They are characterized by extreme poverty, high vulnerability, heading large households, with a strong presence of children and with little possibilities of labour insertion. So the fact that there is no work co-responsibility, that it is not limited in time and that the money provided is determined by the number of dependants seems to provide them with a better alternative (MSD 2005a).

⁴⁰ Training in health, childcare, school support for children, training in an occupation or craft, discussion forums and recreational activities (MSD 2006b).

⁴¹ For the institute of national statistics, INDEC, a basic supply of food for a family of five costs ARS425,44 and this, added to basic needs in terms of services, mainly health and education, is estimated at ARS931,73. The cash provided by *Plan Familias* to a family with two dependents (ARS185) is way below this figure.

⁴² The letter to be signed by the beneficiary says: “I certify that once the period of the programme is over, or that by other circumstances I am not a programme beneficiary, I will stop receiving the stipend without right to any complaint” (MSD 2006d, author’s translation). For a discussion of the programme from a human rights’ perspective, see CELS (2007).

⁴³ Interview with *Plan Familias’s* beneficiary, Morón, Province of Buenos Aires, 8 May 2007.

References

- Abel, C. and L. Colin (eds.). 2002. *Exclusion and Engagement: A Diagnosis of Social Policy in Latin America in the Long Run*. Institute of Latin American Studies, London.
- Adato, M., B. de la Briere, D. Mindek and A. Quisumbing. 2000. *The Impact of Progresá on Women’s Status and Intra-Household Relations*. International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC, July.
- Arriagada, I. 2004. *Tendencias de las familias latinoamericanas en la última década*. Paper presented at La Familia y la Vida Privada. Transformaciones, Tensiones, Resistencias y Nuevos Sentidos, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Santiago de Chile, 29–30 September.
- Auyero, J. 2000. “The hyper-shantytown. Neo-liberal violence(s) in the Argentine slum.” *Ethnography*, Vol. 1, pp. 93–116.
- Barrientos, A. 2004. “Latin America: Towards a liberal-informal welfare regime.” In I. Gough and G. Wood, with A. Barrientos (eds.), *Insecurity and Welfare*

Regimes in Asia, Africa, and Latin America: Social Policy in Development Contexts. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Barrientos, A. and J. DeJong. 2004. *Child Poverty and Cash Transfers*. CHIP Report No. 4. Child Poverty Research and Policy Centre, London.

Bradshaw, S. 2008. "From structural adjustment to social adjustment: A gendered analysis of conditional cash transfer programmes in Mexico and Nicaragua." *Global Social Policy*, Vol. 8, No. 1.

Bradshaw, S. and B. Linneker. 2003. *Desafiando la pobreza de las mujeres. Perspectivas de género y estrategias para la reducción de la pobreza en Nicaragua y Honduras*. Catholic Institute for International Relations, London.

Bradshaw, S., with A. Quirós Viquez. 2007. *Women Beneficiaries or Women Bearing the Cost? A Gendered Analysis of the Red de Protección Social (RPS) in Nicaragua*. Mimeo.

Budlender, D. 1997. *The Debate about Household Headship*. Central Statistical Service, Government of South Africa.
www.statsonline.gov.za/publications/DiscussHouseholdHead/DiscussHouseholdHead.pdf, accessed in September 2007.

Calvi, G. and C. Zibecchi. 2006. "¿El epitafio del Plan Jefes de Hogar o una nueva orientación de la política social? Evaluando algunos de los escenarios socio-laborales posibles ante la consolidación del Plan Familia." *Laboratorio*, Vol. 8, No. 19, pp. 21–28. http://lavboratorio.fsoc.uba.ar/textos/19_4.htm, accessed in August 2007.

CELS (Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales). 2003. *Plan Jefes y Jefas. ¿Derecho social o beneficio sin derechos?* CELS, Buenos Aires.

———. 2007. *Programa Familias por la inclusión social, entre el discurso de derechos y la práctica asistencial*. Colección, Investigación y Análisis No. 4. CELS, Buenos Aires.

- Chant, S. 2008. "The 'feminisation of poverty' and the 'feminisation' of anti-poverty programmes: Room for revision?" *Journal of Development Studies*, Vol. 44, No. 2, pp. 165–197.
- . 2006. *Not Incomes but Inputs: Critiquing the "Feminisation of Poverty" and the "Feminisation" of Anti-Poverty Programmes*. Paper prepared for International Seminar Development and Vulnerability: Outlooks for Resuming Development in Southern Countries, Institute of Economics, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, 4–6 September.
- Clarín. 14/02/2006. "Reestructuran los planes sociales, con aumentos a partir de Abril." Clarín. www.clarin.com/diario/2006/02/14/elpais/p-0071.htm, accessed in June 2007.
- . 23/03/2006. "El banco mundial aprobó un préstamo de 350 millones de dólares." Clarín. www.golf.clarin.com.ar/diario/2006/03/23/um/m-01163970.htm, accessed in September 2007.
- Colmegna, P. 2004. *Planes sociales: ¿Mecanismos de inclusión o perpetuadores de exclusión? Vivir de planes: Efectos de las políticas sociales en un municipio bonaerense*. Presented at VII Congreso Argentino de Antropología Social, Cordoba, 25–28 May.
- Cortés, R., F. Groisman and A. Hoszowski. 2004. "Transiciones ocupacionales: El caso del Plan Jefes y Jefas." *Realidad Económica*, Vol. 202, pp. 11–28.
- CTA (Central de Trabajadores Argentinos). 2006. *Sin cambio de planes. Acerca de las medidas de reconversión del Programa Jefes y Jefas de Hogar*. Paper presented at Mesa de Políticas Sociales, Instituto de Estudios y Formación-CTA, Buenos Aires, March.
- Daeren, L. 2004. *Mujeres pobres: ¿Prestadoras de servicios o sujetos de derecho? Los programas de superación de la pobreza en América Latina desde una mirada de género*. Presented at Políticas y Programas de Superación de la Pobreza desde la Perspectiva de la Gobernabilidad Democrática y el Género,

Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Quito, 25 March.

de la Briere, B. and L. Rawlings. 2006. *Examining Conditional Cash Transfer Programs: A Role for Increased Social Inclusion?* Social Protection Discussion Paper Series No. 0603. World Bank, Washington, DC.

Di Marco, G., A.L. Rodríguez Gustá, V. Llobett and A. Brener. 2006. *Ejercicio de derechos y capacidades institucionales en la implementación de un programa de inclusión social*. Presented at ALACIP, 3er Congreso Latinoamericano de Ciencia Política, Universidad de Campinas, SP, Brazil, 4–6 September.

Esping-Andersen, G. 1991. *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.

———. 2003. “Against social inheritance.” In A. Giddens (ed.), *Progressive Futures, New Ideas for the Centre-Left*. Policy Network, London.

Filgueira, F. 2005. *Welfare and Democracy in Latin America: The Development, Crises and Aftermath of Universal, Dual and Exclusionary Social States*. Mimeo. Paper prepared for the UNRISD project on Social Policy and Democratization. UNRISD, Geneva.

Filgueira, F. and C. Filgueira. 2002. “Models of welfare and models of capitalism: The limits of transferability.” In E. Huber (ed.) *Models of Capitalism, Lessons from Latin America*. Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, PA.

Galasso, E. and M. Ravallion. 2003. *Social Protection in a Crisis: Argentina's Plan Jefes y Jefas*. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3165. World Bank, Washington, DC.

Gerhard, U., T. Knijn and J. Lewis. 2002. “Contractualization.” In B. Hobson, J. Lewis and B. Siim (eds.), *Contested Concepts in Gender and Social Politics*. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.

- Giovagnoli, P.I. 2005. *Poverty Alleviation or Political Networking? A Combined Quali-Quant Analysis of the Implementation of Safety Nets in Post-Crisis Argentina*. Destin Working Paper No. 05–66. London School of Economics, London.
- Golbert, L. 2004. *¿Derecho a la inclusión o paz social? Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar desocupados*. Serie Políticas Social No. 84. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Santiago de Chile.
- González de la Rocha, M. 2003. *Oportunidades y Capital Social*. Presented at Capital Social y Programas de Superación de la Pobreza: Lineamientos para la Acción, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Santiago de Chile, 10–11 November.
- . 2005. “Familias y política social en México. El caso de Oportunidades.” *Serie Seminarios y Conferencias*, Vol. 46, pp. 245–274. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Santiago de Chile.
- Hobson, B. and R. Lister. 2002. “Citizenship.” In Barbara Hobson, Jane Lewis and Birte Siim (eds.), *Contested Concepts in Gender and Social Politics*. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
- ILO (International Labour Organization). 2005. *Fact Sheet. Equal Remuneration for Men and Women in Argentina: Basic Facts and Regulatory Framework*. ILO, Geneva.
- IPC (International Poverty Centre). 2006. *Do CCTs Reduce Poverty?* One Pager IPC, No. 21. IPC, Brasilia, September.
- Jelin, E. 2005. *Family Life and Public Policy: A South American Reflection on the Swedish Trajectory*. CONICET-IDES Report prepared for the EGDI Gender Report, Buenos Aires.
- Kessler, G. and M.C. Roggi. 2005. “Programas de superación de la pobreza y capital social: La experiencia Argentina.” In I. Arriagada (ed.), *Aprender de la experiencia. El capital social en la superación de la pobreza*. Economic

Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Santiago de Chile.

La Nación. "Fondos del banco mundial para empleos. Planes sociales: Préstamo de 350 millones de dólares." 30 May.

www.lanacion.com.ar/archivo/Nota.asp?nota_id=810183, accessed in June 2007.

Levitas, R. 2005. *The Inclusive Society? Social Exclusion and New Labour*. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.

Lister, R. 2003. "Investing in the citizen-worker of the future: Transformations in citizenship and the state under new labour." *Social Policy and Administration*, Vol. 37, No. 5, pp. 427–443.

Lo Vuolo, R., A. Barbeito and C. Rodriguez Enriquez. 2002. *La inseguridad socio-económica como política pública: Transformación del sistema de protección social y financiamiento social en Argentina*. Working Paper No. 33. Centro Interdisciplinario para el Estudio de Políticas Públicas (CIEPP), Buenos Aires.

Mackintosh, M. 1991. "Gender and economics: The sexual division of labour and the subordination of women." In K. Young, C. Wolkowitz and R. McCullagh (eds.), *Of Marriage and the Market: Women's Subordination Internationally and Its Lessons*. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.

Mead, L. (ed.). 1997. *The New Paternalism*. Brookings Institution, Washington, DC.

Mesa-Lago, C. 1991. *Social Security in Latin America*. In Inter-American Development Bank, *Economic and Social Progress in Latin America: 1991 Report*. IADB, Washington, DC.

Módelo, C. 2004. *Los peligros institucionales del Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar*. Paper presented at Novenas Jornadas de Investigación en la Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Estadísticas, Universidad Nacional de Rosario, Rosario, November.

- Molyneux, M. 2007. *Change and Continuity in Social Policy in Latin America: Mothers at the Service of the State?* Programme on Gender and Development, Paper No. 1. UNRISD, Geneva.
- . 2006. “Mothers at the service of the new poverty agenda: Progresas/Oportunidades, Mexico’s conditional transfer programme.” *Social Policy and Administration*, Vol. 40, No. 4, pp. 425–449.
- Pautassi, L. 2004. “Beneficiarios y beneficiarias: Análisis del Programa Jefes y Jefas de Hogar desocupados de Argentina.” In M.E. Valenzuela (ed.), *Políticas de Empleo para Superar la Pobreza: Argentina*. International Labour Organization (ILO), Santiago de Chile.
- . 2006. “Política social en Argentina ¿Sustancia o procedimiento?” *Revista Escenarios* (La Plata), No. 10, March.
- Pearson, R. 1997. “Renegotiating the reproductive bargain: Gender analysis of economic transition in Cuba in the 1990s.” *Development and Change*, Vol. 28, pp. 671–705.
- Porter, D. and D. Craig. 2004. “The third way and the third world: Poverty reduction and social inclusion in the rise of ‘inclusive’ liberalism.” *Review of International Political Economy*, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 388–424.
- Rawlings, L. 2004. *A New Approach to Social Assistance: Latin America’s Experience with CCT Programs*. Social Protection Discussion Paper Series No. 0416. World Bank, Washington, DC.
- Rawlings, L. and G. Rubio. 2003. *Evaluating the Impact of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs: Lessons from Latin America*. Policy Research Working Paper No. 3119. World Bank, Washington, DC.
- Razavi, S. and S. Hassim (eds.). 2006. *Gender and Social Policy in a Global Context: Uncovering the Gendered Structure of “the Social”*. UNRISD/Palgrave and Macmillan, Basingstoke.

- Rodriguez Enriquez, C. 2006. *Gender Aspect of Social Policy in Argentina: The Case of Money Transfer Policy*. Presented at 6th International Conference: Engendering Macroeconomics and International Economics, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT, 2–3 July.
- Ronconi, L., J. Sanguinetti, S. Fachelli, V. Casazza and I. Franceschelli. 2006. *Poverty and Employability Effects of Workfare Programs in Argentina*. PMMA Working Paper 14. Poverty and Economic Policy Research Network, Montreal.
- Sabates-Wheeler, R. and N. Kabeer. 2003. *Gender Equality and the Extension of Social Protection*. Extension of Social Security Paper No. 16. International Labour Organization (ILO), Geneva.
- Serrano, C. 2005a. *La política social en la globalización. Programas de protección en América Latina*. Serie Mujer y Desarrollo No. 70. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Santiago de Chile.
- . 2005b. “Familia como unidad de intervención de políticas sociales. Notas sobre el Programa Puente—Chile Solidario.” *CEPAL Serie Seminarios y Conferencias*, Vol. 46, pp. 231–243.
- Villatoro, P. 2004. *Programas de reducción de la pobreza en América Latina. Un análisis de cinco experiencias*. Serie Políticas Sociales No. 87. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Santiago de Chile.
- Vinocur, P. and L. Halperin. 2004. *Pobreza y políticas sociales en Argentina de los años noventa*. Serie Políticas Sociales No. 85. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Santiago de Chile.
- Werbner, P. and N. Yuval-Davis. 1999. “Introduction: Women and the new discourse of citizenship.” In N. Yuval-Davis and P. Werbner (eds.), *Women, Citizenship and Difference*. Zed Books, London.

Whitehead, A. 1991. “‘I’m hungry mum’: The politics of domestic budgeting.” In K. Young, C. Wolkowitz and R. McCullagh (eds.), *Of Marriage and the Market: Women’s Subordination Internationally and its Lessons*. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.

World Bank. 2002. *Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Loan in the Amount of US\$600 million to the Argentine Republic for the Jefes de Hogar (Heads of Household) Program Project*. Report No. 23710–AR. World Bank, Washington, DC, 22 October.

———. 2006. *Argentina Country Brief*. World Bank, Washington, DC.

Official documents

Decree 565. 2002. *Programa Jefes de Hogar*. 3 April 2002. Poder Ejecutivo Nacional (National Executive Power), Buenos Aires.

Decree 1506. 2004. *Emergencia ocupacional nacional*. 28 October 2004. Poder Ejecutivo Nacional (National Executive Power), Buenos Aires.

Decree 336. 2006. *Seguro de capacitación y empleo*. 29 March 2006. Poder Ejecutivo Nacional (National Executive Power), Buenos Aires.

Joint Resolution MTESS and MSD 143 and 264. 2005. *Programa Jefes de Hogar*. MTESS and MSD, Buenos Aires, 28 February.

MSD (Ministry of Social Development). 2005a. *Programa Familias II. Documento preparatorio a la misión del BID*. MSD, Buenos Aires, May.

———. 2005b. *Documento conceptual sobre el Plan Familias II*. MSD, Buenos Aires.

———. 2006a. *Análisis de una encuesta a beneficiarios del Plan Familias*. Programa Familias para la Inclusión Social, MSD, Buenos Aires.

———. 2006b. *Encuesta de percepción y participación de actividades del Programa Familias*. Programa Familias para la Inclusión Social, MSD, Buenos Aires.

- . 2006c. *Reglamento operativo*. Programa Familias para la Inclusión Social, MSD, Buenos Aires, June.
- . 2006d. *Unidad de gestión operativa: Proceso de traspaso*. Programa Familias para la Inclusión Social, Área de Capacitación, MSD, Buenos Aires.
- MTESS (Ministerio de Trabajo, Empleo y Seguridad Social). 2003. *Plan Jefas y Jefes de Hogar desocupados. Encuesta a beneficiarias y beneficiarios. Informe final sobre la población beneficiaria*. Dirección general de estudios y formulación de políticas de empleo, Subsecretaría de Empleo, MTESS, Buenos Aires.
- . 2004a. *Segunda evaluación del Programa Jefes de Hogar. Resultados de la encuesta a beneficiarios*. MTESS, Buenos Aires.
- . 2004b. *Inserción laboral de los beneficiarios del Programa Jefes de Hogar*. MTESS, Buenos Aires.
- . 2005. *Situación laboral del servicio doméstico en la Argentina*. Subsecretaría de Programación Técnica y Estudios Laborales, MTESS, Buenos Aires.
- . 2006a. *Presentación EIL octubre 2007: Otro mes de esta gestión que el empleo crece sin interrupción*.
www.trabajo.gov.ar/prensa/historicos/2006/gacetillas/12/05eil.doc, accessed in October 2007.
- . 2006b. *Encuesta de indicadores laborales. August 2006*.
www.trabajo.gov.ar/left/estadisticas/eil/files/2006/eil_anual_2006.pdf,
 accessed in September 2007.
- . 2007. *Inserción laboral de los beneficiarios del PJH en el empleo registrado*. Dirección General de Estudios y Formulación de Políticas de Empleo, Subsecretaría de Empleo, MTESS, Buenos Aires.
- Resolution MTESS 256. 2003. *Promoción del empleo, creación del plan holístico para la promoción del empleo*. MTESS, Buenos Aires, 23 October.
- Resolution MSD 825. 2005. Ministry of Social Development, Buenos Aires, 12 May.

Resolution MSD 648. 2006. Ministry of Social Development, Buenos Aires, 28 February.

Resolution MSD 693. 2007. Ministry of Social Development, Buenos Aires, 5 March.

Resolución MTESS 406. 2003. *Programa Jefes de Hogar*. MTESS, Buenos Aires, 29 December.