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**REFUGEE SELF-SETTLEMENT VERSUS  
SETTLEMENT ON GOVERNMENT SCHEMES:**

**THE LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES FOR SECURITY,  
INTEGRATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF  
ANGOLAN REFUGEES (1966-1989) IN ZAMBIA**

**by  
Art Hansen**

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November 1990

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## Preface

UNRISD has been undertaking research on the social and economic problems of refugees for a number of years. The current work programme envisages research on two important but relatively neglected topics in refugee studies: the integration of returning refugees in the economy and society of their countries of origin, and the interaction - social, economic and political - between the host society and the refugee population. The case studies on the former topic are being carried out in Zimbabwe, Chad and Uganda. The latter topic is being studied in Mexico and Zambia. The present paper presents preliminary results of a large-scale study which was conducted in Zambia. The study was carried out by a team of researchers from the University of Zambia and co-ordinated in the earlier phase by Hanne Christensen, UNRISD and Art Hansen, University of Florida. This paper reports on the results of the field work undertaken by Hansen. It is hoped to publish in book form the results of the research done by the University of Zambia team.

This paper seeks to analyse the differences in the pattern of integration in host society and economy between two categories of Angolan refugees: the self-settled and the scheme-settled. The author is especially interested in measuring the social and economic welfare of refugees. He has thus collected information on the following five dimensions of refugee welfare: income and wealth, integration into host society, confidence and security, health and access to infrastructural facilities. This paper reports on findings concerning the first three aspects.

The analysis is based on the data collected by the author through interviews with the refugees in self-settled and scheme-settled areas and with the Zambian villagers. Hansen had done research in the same areas on two earlier occasions in 1970-1971 and 1979. He was therefore able to work with the same sample of respondents. In addition to the threefold division between the Zambian villagers and the two categories of refugees, the results are further disaggregated by gender thus providing useful information on the integration of women refugees in the host economy and society.

After a brief historical survey of the patterns of migration in the region, the author sets out the methodology used in the study. The bulk of the paper is devoted to presenting the empirical findings of the study. Refugees in settled schemes are on average younger, better educated and more wealthy. Their incomes are more evenly distributed than those of the self-settled. However, they are less self-reliant with regard to food. They are also less fully integrated into the host society in the sense that a higher proportion regard themselves as refugees and are so regarded by the Zambians, and nearly 60 per cent of the males would like to return to Angola.

This is in sharp contrast to the self-settled refugees who, to all intents and purposes, regard themselves as Zambians and do not wish to return home. However, unlike their brethren in the settled schemes, they continue to experience fear and insecurity about their future. This is in large part due to their uncertain status. Under Zambian law, refugees cannot be citizens of the country and must live in settlement schemes. Thus, one of the recommendations made by Hansen is that the refugees be permitted to acquire Zambian nationality after a certain period of residency. At the least, the government of the Republic of Zambia should issue a public proclamation of amnesty to long-term, self-settled refugees, thus legalizing their stay.

This paper contains a wealth of information which can illuminate the policy debate on the alternative modes of settlement of refugees and their implications for the host society. Apart from the financial and economic implications for the international community and the host country, considerations of equity also bear on the relative merits of different patterns of settlement of refugees.

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Dharam Ghai  
Director

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### Research Objectives and Questions

The objectives of this research were to better understand African refugee settlement and refugee-host interactions over time and to provide guidance to policy makers about the different results of two types of refugee settlement. To accomplish these objectives, this research examined the long-term consequences for Angolan refugees in Zambia of being self-settled or scheme-settled. The specific subjects of this study were Luvale-speaking Angolan refugees who arrived in the North-Western Province of Zambia between 1966 and 1972 and were still living in that Zambian province in 1989. Some of these refugees settled themselves in villages in Zambezi District along the Zambian-Angolan border, while other refugees were settled by the Zambian government in the Meheba scheme of Solwezi District. I spoke the Luvale language and knew the districts well because I had studied the area since 1970 and had lived there for more than two years. This research has obvious relevance for the refugee settlement policies of Zambia and other African host governments, the United Nations, and international aid agencies.

The basic research question was: Which refugees were 'better off' in the long term, those who settled themselves in existing Zambian villages and re-established their livelihoods on their own (without any direct government assistance), or those who were settled by the government (with international assistance) in an agricultural settlement scheme?

In order to address the basic question, other more specific questions also needed to be answered. What did it mean to say that someone was 'better off' than someone else? How could 'better off' be measured? What had been the specific consequences for refugees of one form of settlement or the other? What social and economic strategies were employed by refugees in the two areas? To what extent could assimilation or rejection processes be observed between local people and refugees? Were there psychological differences (in innovativeness, risk-taking, etc.) between refugees in the two settlement areas? How had settlement affected the refugees' desire to repatriate to Angola or remain in Zambia?

Being 'better off' meant approximately the same as being successful in life or having a better quality of life. Success and quality were multidimensional variables. To measure the successfulness or quality of life of refugees, I collected information along five dimensions: (a) economic, or wealth and income; (b) integration into the host society and economy; (c) psychological, or confidence and security; (d) health; and (e) access to infrastructural facilities.

This paper analyses data from the interviews that I collected from late May through early October 1989, focusing on three dimensions: economic, integration, and psychological. During those months, I interviewed 93 refugees in both locations, plus 53 Zambians from the border villages where self-settlement occurred. Each interview lasted about two hours and was conducted in the local language (Luvale). In this analysis, the interview data were complemented by my personal observations from the months that I lived in the villages and the scheme during 1989, and from my previous research.

### **Differences Revealed and Issues Raised**

The research revealed significant differences in 1989 between the self-settled and scheme-settled refugees. In brief, most of the self-settled refugees had remained poorer materially, but all had become *de facto* Zambians, while the scheme-settled refugees had become richer materially, but many had remained Angolan refugees. None of the self-settled wanted to repatriate to Angola, whereas half of the scheme-settled wanted to repatriate. The self-settled considered themselves to be settled villagers (as did their local hosts) but continued to fear the Zambian government because the self-settled were afraid the government would involuntarily resettle them away from the villages. The scheme-settled did not show that fear but thought that their future residence depended upon the Zambian government. If they repatriated, it would not be a voluntary act, but one determined by the Zambian government.

These differences raised a number of important issues and questions that are discussed in this paper. There was a discrepancy among the dimensions of 'being better off'. The dimensions did not vary together and in the same direction, i.e., the overall quality of life could not be determined solely by measuring the economic factors of income and wealth. Scheme-settled refugees were economically better off, but were worse off in terms of their long-term integration into the host society. Self-settlement was shown to have some beneficial consequences. The research demonstrated the advanced integration of the self-settled refugees. They had pioneered a 'durable solution' on their own initiative. If self-settlement had advantages, why was it prohibited by law? If the self-settled had achieved integration and become *de facto* Zambians, why were they denied *de jure* citizenship? The more integrated refugees lived in the villages, but they were not the refugees who had received governmental and international assistance. Why had integration proceeded better in the absence of direct governmental assistance? Was integration considered beneficial or dangerous by the Zambian government? How could the scheme and the assistance have been modified to assist integration? What were the goals of Zambia's refugee settlement policies? Do the policies of other African countries encourage or discourage integration?

### **Significance of the Research**

Fifteen million refugees lived in our world in 1989, almost one third of them in Africa (UNHCR, 1989; United States Committee for

Refugees, 1990). That meant the African refugee population was larger than the population of many African states. The refugees included people who were compelled to flee their countries and seek asylum owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted, and people who had fled external oppression, foreign occupation and domination, or events seriously disturbing public order (Organization of African Unity, 1969). A crucial issue for Africa since the mid-1960s was how to settle this many refugees and provide for them over the years that they were displaced, without worsening the living conditions of the residents of the host country (Ford Foundation, 1983; Gorman, 1987; Stein, 1980; United Nations, 1981; Walker, 1978; Winter, 1984).

Over the years, two long-term settlement options had emerged: self-settlement and settlement in government-organized agricultural projects, or 'schemes' as they were known in anglophone Africa (Chambers, 1969). In self-settlement, sometimes called spontaneous settlement, the refugees lived in existing villages among local residents, or formed their own villages, with the sufferance or welcome of local relatives and authorities. Sometimes these refugees had kinship or friendship relations with local people and relied on those for initial hospitality and for information that helped them find food and work. These refugees usually subsisted on their own with little or no direct government assistance (Betts, 1980; Cato, 1967; Gould, 1974; Hansen, 1977 and 1982; Mageed and Ramaga, 1986; Zartman, 1970).

For a scheme, the government acquired a large block of land, usually with the permission of local authorities. The land was often unoccupied or sparsely populated because of tsetse fly infestation, lack of surface water, or other reasons. Sometimes existing residents were displaced, and there were conflicts over the land being alienated. With international aid, the government established a smallholder agricultural settlement project and allocated plots to refugees, or less commonly a mixture of refugees and residents. The government put roads in the scheme and built and staffed schools and clinics. When refugees arrived, they were given plots to farm, food rations (usually for years), blankets, clothing, and sometimes tools (Hansen, 1979c, 1980a and 1980b; Rogge, 1981). Scheme-settled refugees were expected to become self-sufficient (in terms of their staple food requirements) through farming. In Sudan this general pattern was modified because the government set up some schemes near major areas of irrigated farming, with the expectation that the refugees would provide wage labour for the adjacent irrigated farmers (Rogge, 1987).

Little research was conducted and little was actually known about the processes and situations of self-settled refugees and their host areas; almost all of the limited research on refugees was carried out in schemes. The interaction within and between heterogeneous refugee and host populations was also unclear, as was the impact of interaction on socio-economic differentiation and stratification among refugees and among hosts. Both refugee and African rural populations were noted for the disproportionate

presence of children, aged, women without husbands, and disabled, all of whom were vulnerable groups that required special attention (Mazur, 1988).

Two fundamentally opposed points of view emerged in the literature on refugees about the advantages and consequences of self-settlement versus scheme-settlement (Hansen, 1979a; Mazur, 1988; Rogge, 1981). The common view held by governments, agencies, and most observers was that self-settlement was detrimental to both the refugees and their local hosts (Chambers, 1979 and 1986; Kibraeb, 1985). The refugees suffered because they lived in unrelieved poverty without direct governmental or international assistance. Remaining invisible, or low profile, through self-settlement took the pressure off governments and international agencies to respond to the needs of both the refugees and their local hosts. If the refugees had been more visible, the governments would have been forced to care for them and to ask for international aid. The local hosts suffered, the argument continued, because the refugees made heavy demands on existing medical and educational facilities, and refugees competed with local residents for scarce food stocks, medical supplies, arable land, and wage labour opportunities. This drove wages down and prices up. Those changes affected most the poorest local residents who had little or no land, and who bought their food with income from wage labour, or who exchanged labour for food. Furthermore, self-settlement left refugees physically vulnerable, sometimes for generations. Refugees tended to settle themselves close to the border, and their presence in the border area incited attacks by the armies or enemies they had fled from originally (Harrell-Bond, 1986). Local residents also got caught in those attacks. Eventually, for all of those problems, local people sometimes attacked the refugees to drive them away.

The opposing viewpoint was that self-settlement had, on balance, beneficial consequences for many refugees and hosts (Hansen 1977, 1979b and 1982; Mazur, 1988). For the refugees, village settlement provided an atmosphere more similar to the life they left behind and entailed the minimum in social, psychological and physical adjustment. In many instances, refugees remained in their own ethnic and linguistic territories that had been bisected by colonial borders. Sometimes, the refugees even had relatives in the host villages. Socio-economic and socio-political roles and relationships in the villages were more familiar. The similarities between life in the host villages and in the villages of origin diminished the extent of desocialization, anxiety, and loss of power and control (Hansen, 1981). In schemes, the refugees were in unfamiliar socio-political arenas and were sometimes thrown together with strangers, or even traditional rivals. Schemes were always far from borders for security reasons, and refugees in border villages may simply have felt better because they were physically closer to their earlier homes. Refugees who self-settled probably remained or became more independent, self-confident, innovative and risk-taking.

Furthermore, according to this more positive view of self-settlement, local hosts sometimes benefited because refugees were

resources for the economic growth and development of the host districts. Refugee craftsmen and traders provided regular access to a variety of goods in remote rural areas where previous access had been poor (Harrell-Bond, 1986; Wilson, 1985). Agricultural or pastoral refugees brought with them their skills, some movable assets and their personal resourcefulness. Refugees provided a market and a ready supply of cheap labour at different skill levels for local employers who could then expand their own agricultural production. (Note the Sudanese schemes mentioned earlier where refugees were sited to provide labour to irrigated Sudanese farms.) Those local hosts who had the resources to take advantage of the added labour and demand that refugees brought to an economy could develop new commercial enterprises, providing new wealth and employment. Instead of simply impoverishing the host district because they increased the demand on scarce resources, refugees might have been the impetus for the structural transformation of the district economy (Hansen, 1977; Scudder, 1981).

Whatever the debate in the literature, the choice for African refugees was often clear. Most refugees were rural people, who usually arrived in the host country with what they could carry on their heads or backs. Almost all governmental and international assistance went to camps and schemes. If the refugees settled in a government-organized project, they were given food, blankets, land to farm, primary education facilities for their children and medical services. By contrast, if the refugees settled themselves in existing villages, they received almost no assistance from the government or international agencies. The choices were clear, although there were exceptions (wealthier refugees and some assistance to village settlement).

The preceding paragraphs have discussed the socio-economic well-being of refugees and their local hosts. Another important issue has been security from the viewpoint of the host governments. Refugee settlement decisions have always been intimately linked with national and international security policy. In a 1967 international conference at Addis Ababa, the issue of self-settlement versus scheme-settlement was debated for the first time. Policy recommendations were that self-settlement be promoted if local resources could be generated for the refugees and if the security of host settlement areas were not threatened by the conflicts in the refugees' home countries. When these conditions could not be met, the optimum solution was to develop government-organized settlements in areas further away from the border.

In another conference in 1979, assistance policies to refugees were discussed again. It was recommended that self-settlement be granted a larger share of national and international assistance, and that research be conducted to clarify the conditions of self-settled refugees. National and international policies did not change in spite of these recommendations. Despite the obvious importance of self-settlement, the major portion of national and international assistance since 1967 has continued to be allocated to approximately 100 government-organized schemes. I assume that most governments

continued to focus on schemes for several reasons: security concerns (the most-often publicized reason), because officials feared the absorption capacity of self-settlement areas was too limited, because the development of schemes was congruent with most governments' development programmes and because officials knew very little about the short-term or long-term consequences of self-settlement versus scheme-settlement.

Despite those government policies and differences in the provision of assistance, the great majority of African refugees in the past were self-settled, and large numbers, perhaps the majority, continued to settle themselves through the 1980s (Mazur, 1988). Refugee statistics were unreliable, but gave some idea of magnitudes. In 1975, 75 per cent of African refugees were self-settled, while only 24 per cent were in schemes, and 1 per cent were in cities (Chambers, 1979). In a major conference in 1979, African governments estimated that more than 60 per cent of African refugees were self-settled (UNHCR, 1979). In Zambia, where this research took place, 77 per cent of the refugees in 1988 were self-settled.

## Background

### A History of Precolonial and Intercolonial Migration

Long before the 1966 influx of modern refugees began, a regional pattern of precolonial, later intercolonial, and now international migration existed. The history of the Luvale people traced the precolonial migration of their chiefs and followers from what is now Zaire (the Kingdom of Mwanta Yavwa) into what is now Angola and Zambia. These Luvale-speaking and related peoples were called the Ganguella by the Portuguese and the Balovale peoples by the British (McCulloch, 1951). Luvale chiefs had arrived in this part of Zambia before 1820 (White, 1962; Hansen and Papstein, 1979). Precolonial territories of these peoples were later cut in pieces in the late 1800s and early 1900s by colonial boundaries established by the British, the Portuguese and the Belgians. But Africans continued to travel back and forth within their ethnic territories.

A strong migratory drift out of the Portuguese colony (what is now Angola) into the British colony (what is now Zambia) developed during this century as Africans escaped from Portuguese colonial wars and labour practices, and as labour migration patterns evolved. The routes to South African, Southern Rhodesian (now Zimbabwe) and Northern Rhodesian (now Zambia) mines, farms and cities led down the Angolan rivers and through the Zambian border areas, and many labour migrants from Angola settled along the route to work. Though the Luvale and related peoples had arrived in Zambia before 1820, the majority of these peoples in Zambia before 1966 were first- and second-generation immigrants and refugees who had come from Angola between the early 1910s and the 1930s. Thus, migratory drift, normal social patterns of back-and-forth mobility, and labour migration routes connected many Angolans with their relatives who

lived in Zambian border areas, and whose villages later provided both destination and welcome to many refugees who began arriving in 1966 (Hansen, 1977, 1981 and 1982).

### **Angolan Refugees in Zambia (1966-1989)**

Angolan refugees began fleeing into Zambia in 1966, when the war for national liberation against Portugal opened its eastern front. Although national independence was gained in 1975, a civil war has continued until now. More refugees have continued to come into Zambia, although an unknown number have voluntarily repatriated during the years when the war was less intense near the Zambian border. The recent (1989) peace talks among the government of Angola, the opposing UNITA movement and mediating African governments might signal an eventual end of the conflict.

As of 1988, approximately two thirds of Zambia's 140,000 refugees were Angolans (94,000). By law the Zambian government required that all refugees live in schemes (Refugees Control Act, Chapter 112 of the Laws of Zambia), and the government conducted a number of 'sweeps' during the 1970s to round up self-settled refugees and remove them to schemes. The law remained the same in 1989, but government policy had changed since the mid-1970s. The government in 1989 was really only concerned about picking up the refugees who had entered Zambia since October 1985. This did not mean that the government considered self-settled refugees who had arrived earlier to be legally entitled to remain in the villages; it only meant that the government was no longer actively seeking out self-settled refugees who had arrived before October 1985.

Zambian law required that all refugees, upon arrival in the country, declare themselves to the police or to immigration (after which they were taken to a scheme). In order to remain in the villages, self-settled refugees had not declared themselves. Thus, they were "guilty of an offence against this Act" (Refugees Control Act). When discovered, they were registered as refugees and sent to a scheme. Also, the Zambian legal code did not allow refugees to become citizens. There was a provision for naturalization of immigrants, but there was no agreement that refugees could be naturalized. Having entered the country with the status of refugee, the refugee was not permitted to drop or exchange the status. The Zambian Commissioner for Refugees told me in 1989 that, given the current legal code, refugees remained refugees forever.

In spite of government policies and sweeps, the Zambian government acknowledged that 70 per cent of the Angolan refugees in 1972 were self-settled in the North-Western and Western Provinces. This trend continued, and 86 per cent of the Angolan refugees in 1988 were self-settled. My own experiences with self-settled refugees were in the Chavuma border area of the Zambezi District of North-Western Province. When I first lived and worked in villages there from 1970 to 1972, I estimated that one fourth to one half of the local population were refugees; this included their children born in Zambia (Hansen, 1977).

Of the Angolan refugees in schemes in 1988, 83 per cent (11,600) lived in the Meheba scheme in Solwezi District of North-Western Province. Although all of these locations were in North-Western Province, the scheme was on an asphalt (tarmac) highway that connected it with the nearby major cities, while the Chavuma border villages were separated from that asphalt highway by 580 kilometres, or 350 miles, of not-so-good gravel road.

Figure 1 shows the location of:

1-2) The two districts and their capitals, Zambezi and Solwezi (500 kilometres apart on gravel roads).

3) The Chavuma border area where self-settled refugees lived (80 kilometres north of the town of Zambezi).

4) The Meheba scheme (70 kilometres west of the town of Solwezi).

### **Previous Research in Chavuma**

For two years (1970-1972), and again for three months in 1977, I lived in a village in the Chavuma border area of Zambezi District of North-Western Province and studied my neighbours, who were self-settled Angolan refugees, and their local village hosts (Hansen, 1977, 1979a, 1979b, 1981 and 1982). For one month in 1979, I studied Angolan refugees in the Meheba scheme and then spent two more weeks in the village reinterviewing some of the self-settled refugees and hosts (Hansen, 1979c, 1980a and 1980b).

In both the village and the scheme, I interviewed and observed the same cohort of refugees. This was the cohort that came to Zambia between 1966 and 1972. Identifying the cohort of self-settled refugees in the Chavuma area was the most difficult part of the 1970s research. From 1966 to the mid-1970s, the Zambian government required all refugees to live in settlement schemes. Any self-settled refugee who was identified to the police or the immigration authorities was moved to a scheme, and the government initiated 'sweeps' to catch all of the self-settled refugees. Therefore, continued (successful) self-settlement from 1966 to 1972 required concealment. People did not publicize their refugee status, and many of them were so well assimilated and protected by local relatives that it was difficult, and often impossible, for me to positively identify them as refugees. I was also reluctant in that politically charged environment to pursue many questions about people's identity because too much suspicion of my motives could have cut off the flow of information that I was receiving (see Hansen, 1977, for more information about local political ferment at that time).

As an indication of how difficult it was to communicate directly and frankly with self-settled refugees, no one admitted to me that he was a refugee until I had lived in the rural area for an entire year. Once that first man started talking, and realized that he was not immediately reported and sent to the scheme, he became more open. Interviewing him gave me names of other men and women refugees (using such questions as "When you came from Angola, who accompanied you?" and "Who else do you know here who came from




Figure 1  
North-Western Province in Zambia

Angola since the war began?"). By interviewing the people he named, and then following their personal networks, I was able to identify many of the 1966-1972 local cohort of refugees during the second year that I lived in the villages.

During that second year (1971-1972) of field research, living in the rural border villages with the refugees and their local hosts, I was able to talk openly with many refugee men and women about their experiences in Angola, their flight to Zambia, and their experiences and attitudes about life in the villages and the scheme (Hansen, 1977). Even so, it was impossible to completely determine the migration status (host or refugee) of many local people.

The research in Zambezi District included both individual and district level data, and combined ethnographic methods (intensive observation of a locality plus long-term interviewing of a small sample) with extensive surveys. During 1971, and again, one year later, in 1972, I conducted a survey of three villages (1,223 people in 1972) to understand the demographic structure of the locality and to assist me in knowing who everyone was and where they lived. In the 1972 survey, I was able to positively identify 321 refugees and 349 hosts (Hansen, 1977 and 1981). I knew their migration status, names, residence, and local relatives and friends. This named and located 1972 population served as a sample frame for the 1989 village study of self-settled refugees and their local hosts.

#### **Previous Research in Meheba**

Before 1989, I had spent a month in 1979 interviewing and observing Angolan refugees in the Meheba scheme (Hansen, 1979c, 1980a and 1980b). Refugee research is often controversial. It was difficult and time-consuming in 1979 to obtain permission to enter the scheme, which is why I ended up being able to spend only one month there.

There had been recent Rhodesian bombing attacks against refugee, or freedom fighter, camps in Zambia. As several freedom fighter camps were in the vicinity of Meheba, security precautions were tight. I had to justify my research to staff members of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in New York, Geneva and Lusaka (Zambia), to the Zambian government's Commissioner for Refugees, and to the director of the agency that was administering Meheba for the UNHCR. After much hesitation, I was cleared, but then had the problem of getting to Meheba. Transport within Zambia was (and continues to be) a problem, and the road between the town of Solwezi and Meheba was dangerous to travel for non-official vehicles because of sniper fire. After another delay, the UNHCR agreed to help by letting me ride in one of their vans, which was safe.

In Meheba, I had intended to interview a random stratified sample of the cohort of Angolan refugees who had arrived between 1966 and 1972. Unfortunately, my plan for such a sample was frustrated by some of the same difficulties that I encountered again

in 1989. The scheme administrators in 1979 did not have a list identifying refugees in the scheme by time of arrival. Although UNHCR had conducted such a census the previous December, identifying all of the refugees in Meheba by name, sex, adult or child status and year of arrival, that data supposedly had not been analysed seven months later (and had disappeared by 1989, along with any other previous censuses). As there were between 9,500 and 11,000 refugees in the scheme in 1979, it was impossible for me to conduct another census by myself.

I soon realized that refugees in Meheba were also suspicious of me and were either reluctant to talk or evidently only telling me what they thought would advance their own interests. The only methodology to get people to talk to me and to assure reliability was to approach people through personal networks. Fortunately, a friend from Chavuma (not a refugee) owned the store in the scheme, was closely related to important refugees (chiefs) and was trusted by most of the Angolans. He introduced me to refugees, one of whom was a chief, and I started interviewing them in the back room of the store. Gradually I moved out to interview people at their homes, and, by the end of the month, I had interviewed 40 men, 33 of whom had arrived in Zambia between 1966 and 1972. In general, the men in Meheba had more previous urban experience and had higher political rank (as chiefs or in political movements) in Angola than the self-settled men. There was also a greater ethnic diversity in Meheba. Although I had asked to speak only to Luvale-speakers, and all did speak Luvale, some identified themselves ethnically as Chokwe, Luchazi, Mbunda or Lunda, rather than Luvale.

As is evident, I had less background knowledge of scheme-settled refugees than of self-settled refugees, and the sample of refugees interviewed in Meheba was too small and non-random in its selection to serve as a sampling frame for the 1989 research. What I gained from the time in Meheba was a sense of similarities and differences between refugees in the two locations, a sense of the differential consequences of the two settlement patterns, and a commitment to later conduct a better comparison, which I was able to do in 1989.

## **Methodology of the 1989 Research**

### **Defining and Measuring the 'Better Off' Dependent Variable**

The dependent variable in this research was being 'better off', which meant approximately the same as being more successful in life or having a better quality of life. In order to compare categories of people (refugees in the two locations, men and women, refugees and hosts in the villages), I had to be able to measure this variable, i.e., identify whether people were more or less better off. I chose to subdivide the variable along five dimensions that I considered important and then measure each of the dimensions.

The five were:

- (a) Economic - wealth and income.
- (b) Psychological - confidence and security.
- (c) Integration into the Zambian society and economy.
- (d) Health - mortality and morbidity.
- (e) Access to infrastructure - distance from facilities.

To measure the five dimensions, I collected the following data from each informant (in an interview that took about two hours):

- (a) Personal bio-data (if not known already) - name, sex, age, village headman, education, religion, ethnicity, birthplace and current Zambian registration status (citizen, alien, refugee).
- (b) Marital history - current status, all spouses and living children. Natality history (only for women) - outcomes of all pregnancies. For all currently living children, their age, education, location and employment. Age and location at death of all deceased children.
- (c) Migration history (all trips since birth) - dates, places, purpose. Especially the refugee flight, labour migration, trips to town, and trips to Angola since war began. Why person came to current location?
- (d) Composition of current household and matri-village - names, sexes, ages, and relationships to headman and respondent.
- (e) Food self-sufficiency - purchases, sales, or exchanges of staple foods (cassava, maize, millet, and sorghum) since the end of the rains in 1988 (type of food, units, total amounts, reasons, names of people from whom purchased or to whom sold), plus a general history of sales, purchases and self-sufficiency of staple foods since arrived in current location. (Rainy season usually lasts from late November to April, so there was more than a full year between the end of the rains in 1988 and the interview in 1989.)
- (f) Agriculture and land tenure - number and current status of fields (seepage zone gardens or commercial farm?), land tenure and history of acquisition, crops grown during last rains (and in seepage zone during dry season), mode of farming (hoe, plough, tractor), sales and purchases of any crops or agricultural inputs (seeds, fertilizer), plus general history of land sales and loans since arrived in current location.
- (g) Livestock (cattle, sheep, goats, pigs, chickens) - numbers owned and location, sales and purchases since end of the rains in 1988 (including by-products such as soured milk and eggs).
- (h) Employment history (working for others and hiring others to work) - number of times worked or people hired since end of the rains in 1988, specific tasks, for cash or exchanges, units, total amounts, reasons, names of people hired or for whom worked.
- (i) Fishing and fish trading - number of fishing/fish trading trips since end of the rains in 1988, amounts caught and sold, or purchased and resold, units, plus general history of informant's experience with fishing and fish trading since arrived in current location.
- (j) Beer - times made and amounts sold since end of the rains in 1988, source and cost of ingredients (purchased or grown).
- (k) Other businesses or sources of income (peddling, store, tailoring, carpentry, handicrafts, construction, supplying construction

materials or fuelwood, medicine, divination) - specific occupation, amounts earned since end of the rains in 1988, plus general work history since arrived in current location.

(l) Income and expenditure since the end of the rains in 1988 (most of which will be collected from the questions 5-11 above) - major sources of cash and food income, expenditures on house, clothes, ceremonies (curing, burial, puberty, new wife), equipment, production inputs.

(m) Inventory of other major possessions - ownership and cost of vehicle (truck, car, cart, tractor, bicycle), furniture, radio, etc., plus evaluation of house (observation) and clothing.

(n) Medical - current health status (including observation), trips to hospital or clinic since end of the rains in 1988, major sickness or curing ceremony during same time.

(o) Infrastructural access - location of nearest primary and secondary school, clinic, hospital, road, market, store.

(p) Attitudes toward changes in life and locality since arrived in current location, and toward future improvements, security and choice of future residence (including the possibility of moving to Angola), innovativeness and dependency. Opinions of nearby refugees and hosts.

(q) Relatives living elsewhere in Zambia, in other settlement option (village or scheme), and remaining in Angola - relationships, last time visited and location (some known from migration history).

At the end of the research I wanted to synthesize the five dimensions into a compound variable and merge the scores along the five dimensions into a single score for each person. As will become evident in the following analysis that focuses on the first three dimensions, the dimensions scored very differently for the various categories of refugees, and the differences raised significant policy questions.

### **Sampling Self-Settled Refugees and Village Hosts**

I collected interviews and observations in the Chavuma border villages from May through August (and then returned in late October for further interviews). I interviewed a sample of self-settled refugees and host villagers who were randomly selected from the 1972 census that I had conducted earlier (Hansen, 1977 and 1981). The 1972 census of 1,223 people included everyone who lived in three villages. Because the sample was randomly selected from strata of a census of the entire population, I am confident in hypothesizing that what was true about the sample was also true about the larger populations of self-settled refugees and village hosts from which the sample was drawn.

The random sample for 1989 consisted of 300 people from that 1972 census, 75 from each of four subpopulations, or strata: male and female refugees and hosts. All of the 300 had been adults (defined as 15 years of age or older) in 1972, the date of the census. I eliminated people who had been children in 1972 from the sample because I wanted everyone to have an adult's memory and experiences during the complete refugee and settlement period. Thus, all of the

informants were at least 32 years old in 1989. In fact, this turned out to be an elderly sample.

Chavuma in 1972, and this was true for much of rural Africa, was disproportionately inhabited by the old, the young, women and the handicapped, since many of the working-age (15-44 years of age) men, and some women, had migrated away for work. The refugee population in 1972 was relatively older than the host population; this was particularly noticeable in the 60-years-and-older category (Hansen, 1977). Since I eliminated the young (under 15 years of age) from my sample, I remained with the old. The average age of the village sample in 1972 was 52 years. Seventeen years later, in 1989, the average was 69 (assuming completed age, i.e., assuming that everyone lived through the intervening 17 years).

Many of the people (71 per cent) in the sample were not found in 1989. Only 78 people (26 per cent) were found and reinterviewed, with another eight (3 per cent) temporarily absent but possibly available later in October. The most common reason for a person in the sample not being available in 1989 was that the person had died; 40 per cent of the entire sample had died between 1972 and 1989. The high death rate reflected the advanced age of the sample. Death occurred equally to refugee and host, man and woman.

The first difference between self-settled refugees and their local hosts became apparent in tracing the sample (see table 1). Hosts were a more stable population; 37 per cent of the host subsample were there to be reinterviewed in 1989, compared with only 21 per cent of the refugees. From the 75 in each subsample, 29 host men and 24 host women were reinterviewed (with another two men there but not yet reinterviewed), while only 10 refugee men and 16 refugee women were reinterviewed (with another four men and two women being temporarily absent and not yet reinterviewed). The difference was caused by the number of people who had migrated away since 1972; 39 per cent of the refugees and only 23 per cent of the hosts had emigrated. Several motives for emigration were given by the people who remained behind:

(a) Reasons for both refugees and hosts to emigrate:

- Better fishing elsewhere.
- More agricultural land available elsewhere.
- Normal mobility upon marriage, divorce, widowhood, death of relatives or extended visits to kin.

(b) Reasons for refugees (not hosts) to emigrate:

- Repatriating to Angola.
- Being 'rounded up' by the government and taken to an official settlement scheme.
- Fleeing to escape government round-ups.

The survey noted that 9 per cent of the self-settled refugee men, and 4 per cent of the refugee women, repatriated since 1972. All but one of these people died in Angola after their repatriation. Three hosts (two men and one woman) also went to Angola for various reasons and died there since 1972.

Table 1

Location in 1989 of sample of self-settled refugees and village hosts from 1972 census (expressed in percentages)					
	Interviewed	Not seen	Moved away	Died	Total sample
Refugee men	13	5	40	41	99
Refugee women	21	3	37	39	100
Zambian men	40	3	19	38	100
Zambian women	32	-	28	41	101
TOTALS	26	3	31	40	100

Among the hosts, women were more mobile than men, which reflected the cultural pattern of virilocal post-marital residence, i.e., upon marrying, a woman left her matrilineal relatives' village and went to live with her husband in his village. Upon divorce or widowhood, the woman left her ex-husband's village to return to her matrilineal relatives.

### Sampling Scheme-settled Refugees

A different and less desirable sampling strategy was followed in the official settlement scheme (Meheba), where everyone was a refugee. In order to have a random sample, I needed to start with a known population census from which to randomly select the sample. In the village I had used my 1972 census, but there was nothing similar in Meheba. The scheme had been in operation since 1971, and a number of censuses had been conducted, but none could be identified or located from which to draw a random stratified sample. There was not even a list to indicate where any of the refugees currently in Meheba had come from or in what year they had come. Without this background, I could not select a sample that was representative of the earlier (1970s) population of refugees, or even representative of the refugees currently in Meheba.

Beginning in September, I tried to locate a population of scheme-settled refugees in Meheba that was similar in key features to the population of self-settled refugees that had been sampled already. My comparison of two settlement strategies would be more difficult if too many other variables were uncontrolled, such as initial differences between the refugees who went to schemes and those who stayed in the villages. Therefore, as much as was possible, I wanted the self-settled and scheme-settled refugees to be fairly similar subpopulations of the larger population of Angolan refugees in Zambia.

The self-settled refugees who had been interviewed in Chavuma border villages were Luvale-speaking people coming into Zambia from 1966 to 1971 from areas of Angola that were adjacent to Zambezi District. All of the self-settled had been rural farmers and fishers. To ensure that the population of scheme-settled refugees would be comparable with the village population, people in the scheme had to satisfy certain criteria:

- (a) Originating from the same general area within Angola as the self-settled refugees. (This was controlled by their entering Zambia through the same district, Zambezi.)
- (b) Entering Zambia between 1966 and 1971.
- (c) Living in a Zambian government scheme since 1971.
- (d) Being at least 32 years of age in 1989.

These criteria were met by identifying, locating and interviewing Angolan refugees (32 years old or older) who had lived in the Lwatembo scheme in Zambezi District before entering Meheba. The Lwatembo scheme was opened in 1966 to take care of all of the Angolan refugees entering Zambezi District. In 1971, the Lwatembo scheme was closed and its refugee population transferred to Meheba. Ex-Lwatembo people satisfied the conditions of being long-time scheme-settled refugees and of entering from the same Angolan areas and at about the same time as had the self-settled refugees.

A rapidly conducted census revealed 92 plots of land in Meheba that were occupied by ex-Lwatembo people. Each plot was treated as a separate household from which one adult would be interviewed. By early October, at least one member of 72 per cent of the households had been interviewed. Five of the people interviewed turned out to be too young, so they have not been included in the comparison.

Another smaller population (not ex-Lwatembo people) was included as well in the Meheba sample. Some self-settled refugees from the Chavuma border area villages had been rounded up by the government in 1974 and brought to Meheba. These people had experiences both as self-settled in Chavuma and, for the last 15 years, as scheme-settled in Meheba. By coincidence, several of these refugees had been selected in the random sample of 150 self-settled refugees to be reinterviewed, and were counted among the 'moved away' in the village sample. Nine plots in Meheba were found to be settled by these people, and a member of eight of these households had been interviewed by early October.

There were 101 households in the Meheba population of ex-Lwatembo and ex-self-settled-in-Chavuma refugees. My sampling strategy was to interview as many of these as possible, hopefully reaching 100 per cent, i.e., instead of a sample I tried to interview the entire population. By early October, 73 per cent had been interviewed. Discarding the five who were too young, and one ex-self-settled woman who had lived in Meheba for only two years, the scheme-settled sample totalled 48 men and 19 women.

I was able to overcome the problem of sampling the same cohort of refugees in Meheba (by identifying and interviewing a person from most of the ex-Lwatambo households), but I was not as comfortable with the way in which men and women were selected for interviewing. The issue was solved in the villages because men and women were independently selected from the 1972 census. In Meheba, in the absence of a prior census, I chose which individual to interview at each household upon arrival at that household. The usual choice was the head of household, whether a man or woman. Sometimes, the choice was made for me because only one of them was home when I arrived. Sometimes, in order to increase the number of women interviewed, I chose to interview the wife even though the male head of household was present. Because of my arbitrary choices, I cannot claim that the sample of women was exactly representative of all of the women in the population of 101 households. The issue of representativeness was more important when there were small differences between categories of people, but was probably not that important when there were major and dramatic differences between scheme-settled women and self-settled women or scheme-settled men.

## **Preliminary Analysis of the 1989 Data**

This is a preliminary analysis of the data that I collected from May through early October 1989. By that time I had interviewed refugees (men and women) in both locations (villages in Chavuma and the Meheba scheme), plus Zambian host villagers in the Chavuma border area where refugees had self-settled. More refugees were interviewed later in October, both in Meheba and in Chavuma. I hand-tabulated the data for this paper in early October while still in the Meheba scheme. Only the major, or most obvious, highlights of the data were hand-tabulated, concentrating on three dimensions of the dependent variable, and the statistical analysis was simple.

### **Age, Literacy and Marital Status of All Six Samples**

The six samples (self-settled and scheme-settled refugees and village hosts by gender) were compared in terms of three basic biodata indicators (age, literacy, and marital status) to see the extent and direction of any differences (table 2).

**Age.** Scheme-settled refugees were younger than self-settled refugees, who were younger than village hosts. Men were older than women in each category. Scheme-settled refugee women were the youngest of all six subsamples. This difference in age may affect other variables, as older age was correlated with more dependence, less education and less physical strength. Relative youthfulness of the sample of scheme-settled refugees may be due to interviewer bias, rather than to differences among the populations from which the samples were drawn. That of scheme-settled refugees was the only category in which the individuals to be interviewed were not randomly selected from an earlier census. The household occupying each plot was sometimes a complex aggregate, and I may have

chosen to interview younger subjects when there was more than one possible head. There was no existing census that could be used to provide independent confirmation about the average age of the scheme-settled refugee population.

Table 2

Sample size, age, literacy and marital status					
	Sample size	Mean age	Age range	Literacy (%)	Marital status (%)
Refugee men (scheme)	48	64	35-87	44	96
Refugee men (village)	10	67	48-85	20	80
Zambian men (village)	29	69	38-94	69	79
Refugee women (scheme)	19	58	40-77	21	37
Refugee women (village)	16	62	48-91	-	31
Zambian women (village)	24	65	48-96	4	46
TOTALS	146	64	35-96	33	68

**Literacy.** Scheme-settled refugees were much more literate than self-settled refugees, both for men and women. Host men were by far the most literate category. This referred to literacy in any language, and in most cases meant literacy in the Luvale or another Bantu language. Literacy in a European language (English and Portuguese) was almost totally restricted to scheme-settled refugees (10 per cent of the men and 11 per cent of the women). Only one other person in the study, a host man, was literate in a European language. Refugee women in the scheme were unusually literate for women, as only one other woman in the study, a host, was literate (in Luvale). Better educational opportunities for refugees in the scheme were probably the major factor explaining the variation in literacy among refugees, although another factor remained to be analysed - the variation in education in Angola (preflight) among people who later became self-settled or scheme-settled. Variation between host men and women obviously reflected different educational priorities (by families? the government?).

**Marital status.** Scheme-settled refugees, both men and women, were more likely to be married than self-settled refugees. This may be related to differences in age. The self-settled sample was older, and older people were more likely to be widowed or divorced. Women were more likely than men to be currently unmarried (divorced or widowed) in all three categories. To some extent, this reflected that there were more women than men in all three populations. In Meheba in September 1989, according to government statistics, there were 4,091 adult women and 3,567 men among the Angolan refugees, or 1.15 women for each man. My 1972 survey showed 466 adult women and 347 men in the three villages, or 1.34 women for each man.

The extreme variation in marital status between men and women in the sample was an exaggeration caused by the sampling procedure. In the general population, there was less difference

between the genders. This may be illustrated using the Meheba statistics. According to the sample, 96 per cent of the men and only 37 per cent of the women were married. Each monogamously married person had a spouse, however, and each polygynous marriage in this study included one husband and two wives. The Meheba male sample included 48 men, 39 of whom were monogamously and seven of whom were polygynously married. Thus, the male sample included 46 married men and indicated 53 married women. The Meheba female sample included 19 women, seven of whom were monogamously married (thus, indicating seven married men). In all, the total Meheba sample showed 55 men (96 per cent of whom were married) and 72 women (83 per cent of whom were married). Correcting the self-settled refugee sample in the same way resulted in totals of 15 men (87 per cent married) and 26 women (58 per cent married). The same relative differences continued as were noted earlier. Scheme-settled men and women were more frequently married, and men in general were more frequently married than women.

Variation in marital status in rural life influenced household wealth, food self-sufficiency and annual gross income. Two adults, or three adults in the case of polygynous marriages with two co-wives, were able to cultivate more fields and produce more food and cash crops than one adult. In this specific study, differences in marital status exaggerated the wealth of married people because:

(a) When informants answered questions about wealth indicators (ownership of bicycles, radios and blankets), married men and women sometimes included what both spouses owned.

(b) Cash crop income was considered in most cases to be earned by the household as a unit and was credited to whoever (man or woman) was interviewed (raising married women's incomes, particularly important in the Meheba sample).

### **Indicators of Accumulated Wealth**

**House type.** The house has been used in many studies as the single most reliable indicator of accumulated wealth. In this study, house type was complemented by the ownership of radios, bicycles and blankets (table 3). The house type was observed during the interviews, and the materials used for roofing (either thatch or tin sheets) and walls (reeds, mud and daub, mudbricks, or plaster over brick) were selected as indicators. There was little variation among the refugee samples in terms of house type, although self-settled women were the most likely to live in houses with reed or mud and daub walls, a definite sign of poverty.

**Bicycles and radios.** Ownership of a bicycle or radio clearly differentiated the two categories of refugee men. No self-settled refugee man owned either of these items, while about one fourth of the scheme-settled men did. Host men were the wealthiest, although the difference in radio ownership between host men and scheme-settled refugee men was very slight. Few women in any category owned either item.

Table 3

	Indicators of accumulated wealth				
	(percentages)				
	House construction		Those owning working		Those not owning any blankets
	Tin roof	Brick/plaster walls	Bicycle	Radio	
Refugee men (scheme)	7	96	23	25	2
Refugee men (village)	10	100	-	-	40
Zambian men (village)	39	96	41	28	11
Refugee women (scheme)	-	100	6	11	-
Refugee women (village)	7	80	6	-	31
Zambian women (village)	21	92	4	4	26

**Blankets.** Many people in the villages were embarrassed when they were questioned about the number of blankets that they owned. Many self-settled refugees and some hosts did not own even one blanket. To a minor extent, this absence was caused by the customs of wrapping a deceased relative in a good blanket as a burial shroud, or giving away, upon the death of a spouse, all of the items that were previously shared with the dead spouse. More important than these customs was the virtual impossibility at this time of finding a new blanket to buy in Zambia. Everyone in the villages, including those with blankets, criticized the difficulty of finding blankets to buy. Two village traders had even travelled to the city of Livingstone, site of the national blanket factory, to buy blankets, and they had been unsuccessful.

Scheme-settled refugees were fortunate because many blankets had been given away to them. Even at the time of the study, new arrivals to Meheba were receiving free blankets from the United Nations. (These newly-arriving refugees were being relocated from border areas of Zambia, where they had been living for several years.) Often these new arrivals to Meheba had to sell their blankets and some of their clothes to the more-established scheme-settled refugees in order to have money to pay for other essential goods and services.

#### Annual Cash Incomes and Their Sources

The following statistics were gross cash incomes, that is, the costs of doing business or buying goods for later resale had not been subtracted from the gross receipts (table 4).

Scheme-settled refugee women were very unusual in two ways. First, their average cash income was extremely high compared with any village women (host or refugee). Second, the incomes of individual refugee women in Meheba were well distributed across the range with 10 women earning more than ZK 1,000 (about US\$ 67). No woman in the village earned more than ZK 950.

Table 4

Gross annual cash incomes from all sources (in Zambian kwacha; as of October 1989 1 US\$=15 kwacha)					
	Mean (in ZK)	Range of incomes (percentages)			
		None	<ZK 1,000	ZK 1,000 <3,000	>ZK 3,000
Refugee men (scheme)	2,142	4	33	38	25
Refugee men (village)	2,333	30	50	-	20
Zambian men (village)	3,052 *	17	38	21	24 *
Refugee women (scheme)	1,068	21	26	47	5
Refugee women (village)	189	25	75	-	-
Zambian women (village)	195	33	67	-	-

\*The mean income for Zambian men excluded the wealthiest individual, who owned and operated a maize grinding mill. His estimated annual gross income of ZK1,687,700 was 20 times the sum of the gross incomes of all the other Zambian men. Including his income would increase Zambian men's average income to ZK61,143.

Men earned more cash income than women in all categories. Refugee men in both locations had similar mean incomes, but these were based on very different distributions of individual incomes. The incomes of scheme-settled men were distributed fairly evenly across the range, with a small percentage not earning any cash. A fairly even distribution across the range meant that the average income was not unduly influenced by one or two unusually high incomes. The incomes of self-settled refugee men were clumped with many not earning any money, half earning between ZK 530 and ZK 960, and one earning ZK 16,130. If the income of this wealthier individual were excluded, the average income of self-settled refugee men would fall to ZK 800.

The difference between the incomes of scheme-settled and self-settled refugees, both men and women, was primarily due to the importance of cash crop agriculture (soybeans in 1988 and 1989) in Meheba. People in the study earned money from five major sources:

- (a) Crops, including the sale of food crops.
- (b) Livestock, mainly goats with a few cattle.
- (c) Fishing and trading in dried fish.
- (d) Brewing and selling beer.
- (e) Other or miscellaneous.

This last category included a wide range of activities: owning a grinding mill, peddling dry goods, cutting planks (being a sawyer), carpentry, being a security guard at the scheme and collecting honey (especially important at Meheba) (table 5).

**Crop income.** People earned money from selling food crops (maize, cassava, vegetables and fruits) as well as cash crops. Crop income was more important in the Meheba scheme than in the villages. About three fourths of the men and women in Meheba earned cash income from selling crops, while half of the village hosts and only one fifth of the self-settled refugees earned money from crop sales. Almost half of the Meheba people earned ZK 1,000 or more a

year from crop sales (table 6), and this income was primarily from cash crops, mainly soybeans in 1988 and 1989. This level of crop income agreed with Meheba's importance in the entire province as a producer of crops (food and cash) for the market. Although host men were also involved in large-scale (by local standards) farming, few earned ZK 1,000 or more from crop sales, and no self-settled refugee earned that much.

Table 5

Percentage of people earning cash income by source					
	Crops	Livestock	Fishing	Beer	Other
Refugee men (scheme)	82	2	14	-	45
Refugee men (village)	20	10	60	-	20
Zambian men (village)	52	17	35	-	31
Refugee women (scheme)	67	-	-	28	-
Refugee women (village)	21	5	11	47	11
Zambian women (village)	50	-	-	29	-

Table 6

Percentage of people earning more than ZK 999 annually from crops, livestock, fishing or other sources and people earning more than ZK 99 from brewing and selling beer					
	Crops >999	Livestock >999	Fishing >999	Beer >99	Other >999
Refugee men (scheme)	49	2	2	-	22
Refugee men (village)	-	-	20	-	10
Zambian men (village)	17	7	14	-	14
Refugee women (scheme)	44	-	-	28	-
Refugee women (village)	-	-	-	26	-
Zambian women (village)	-	-	-	25	-

Everyone, whether male or female, participated in agriculture and, to varying degrees, received some cash income through crop sales. The other four sources of cash income were sex-specific, i.e., were linked through the customary divisions of labour and responsibility to one gender or the other. Men earned money through livestock, fishing and fish trading, and other commercial or wage-earning activities. The only money-earning activity specifically for women was brewing and selling beer. This sexual specialization of income sources was even more marked when the magnitude of earnings was calculated, as in table 6 where only those people earning ZK 1,000 or more were considered (except for beer where incomes were too low). The only exception to a complete specialization of income by gender was the unusual involvement of Meheba women in cash cropping.

**Livestock income.** Livestock were relatively unimportant as a source of cash income, with host men being the only subpopulation for whom livestock were even somewhat important. This reflected the almost complete absence of larger animals (cattle and goats) among all of the refugees in both locations. Livestock in all smallholder societies serve several functions, one of which is as a means of storing wealth. Villagers in Chavuma, where refugees have self-settled, were explicit about larger livestock serving as a savings bank, with deposits usually withdrawn (slaughtered and sold) only in cases of emergencies such as the need to pay a fine or court case, or finance a wedding. Keeping this function of livestock in mind, the virtual absence of large livestock among the refugees in both locations was a good indicator of their relative poverty in comparison to their Zambian hosts.

The absence of cattle and goats in Meheba expressed another by-product of larger livestock. They incited quarrels and court cases by eating other peoples' crops. Several scheme-settled refugees indicated this as the reason why people did not keep cattle or goats. Although international agencies helped to introduce goats to Meheba in the early 1970s, there was almost no trace left of those goats in 1989. The single Meheba refugee who earned cash income from livestock sales in this study did so by selling his last four goats. He sold them because his neighbours complained too much. The grid pattern of plots in Meheba did not provide any relatively isolated grazing areas, while, in the villages, cattle-owners kept their cattle in grazing areas that were separated from the cropping areas. The fact that self-settled refugees did not sell (or own, for that matter) cattle and goats indicated poverty and an orientation among men toward fishing rather than livestock.

**Fishing and the fish trade.** Fishing and the fish trade were more important in the villages than in the scheme. The majority of self-settled refugee men earned the majority of their cash incomes from fishing (and, to a lesser extent, from the buying and selling of fish caught by others). As practiced by the Luvale people, fishing required men to live for months during the rainy season in temporary houses at distant fishing camps. This meant that their wives were left at the home villages in charge of growing the crops. The survey was directly affected by this seasonal migration pattern because four of the self-settled refugee men in the random sample were away fishing during the time that village interviews were conducted. (They were back in the villages and were interviewed in late October.) Some Meheba refugee men said that they would like to go fishing but could not because, as 'refugees', they needed permission from the administrator of the scheme to travel.

**Other sources.** Other sources of cash income were more important in Meheba than in the villages, both in terms of the percentage of men involved and of the percentage of men earning ZK 1,000 or more. The importance of these other income sources reflected Meheba's more favoured access to resources, both natural (such as trees and honey) and infrastructural (such as urban markets and good roads). The importance of sawyering and carpentry

was due as well to the provision of training and equipment (productive capital goods) by international relief agencies during the early 1970s. In 1971, the area around Meheba was largely uncut woodland. The area was still sparsely populated in 1989, compared to the border village area, which has been densely populated with little available woodland for decades. Meheba was located on a tarred road not too far from some major urban areas with markets for planks, furniture, vegetables, fruits and honey. The border villages are about 580 kilometres (350 miles) of gravel roads farther away, and that distance and the quality of the roads prohibited the sale of anything other than dried fish and labour to the cities.

### **Food and the Adequacy of Home Production**

Food was the most obvious and immediate necessity. I wanted to know how people in the two locations obtained their staple food, and whether they were able to produce enough food for themselves from their own gardens or had to purchase food. Subsistence production is sometimes defined as the ability to produce all of the food that is needed to eat. I studied the adequacy of subsistence production by asking several questions about the informant's behaviour during the past year:

- (a) Had the informant obtained all of his or her staple food from his or her own fields?
- (b) Which staple foods had the informant eaten?
- (c) What crops did the informant plant last year?
- (d) How many cassava fields did the informant have currently?
- (e) Had the informant purchased any cassava, maize or flour?
- (f) Had the informant sold any cassava, maize or flour?
- (g) Had the informant received any staple food as gifts?
- (h) If there were purchases, sales or gifts, who else was involved, and what were the amounts and prices?

The answers to these questions provided a multidimensional picture of the relationships among the production, local distribution, purchase and consumption of staple foods. I was also able to verify in several ways whether home production provided enough staple food for the person and household, and whether the informant was partially or totally dependent on relatives or others (perhaps members of the same congregation) for staple food.

Village men, whether self-settled refugee or Zambian host, were much more self-reliant in these terms than were scheme-settled refugee men (table 7). The relative order of total self-reliance within each gender correlated fairly well with differences in the average number of cassava fields, supporting the impression that variable control of home-produced cassava was the single most important factor in terms of adequate subsistence production. There was little difference among the three categories of women. Approximately one fourth to one fifth of the women in each category were totally dependent on others (usually close relatives) for their staple food, but total dependency was not very common for men, especially for refugee men.

Table 7

Percentage of people who are self-reliant in subsistence (staple food, i.e., cassava and/or maize) production for home consumption, and mean number of cassava fields			
	Totally dependent	Totally self-reliant	Mean number of cassava fields
Refugee men (scheme)	2	29	1.4
Refugee men (village)	-	70	3.1
Zambian men (village)	10	62	3.1
Refugee women (scheme)	21	47	1.0
Refugee women (village)	25	56	1.6
Zambian women (village)	21	67	3.1

There were greater differences between men and women in the refugee populations than in the host population, and the differences were not all in the same direction. About the same percentage of host men and women claimed to be self-reliant; they had the same average number of cassava fields, and 10 per cent of host men were totally dependent. Self-settled refugee men were more self-reliant and had more cassava fields than self-settled refugee women, while scheme-settled women were more self-reliant than scheme-settled men.

**Cassava.** Cassava had been the staple food crop in the Chavuma border area for at least 60 years and became the most important staple food crop of the Meheba refugees during the 1970s and 1980s, even though sorghum was the most common staple food crop of the Kaonde-speaking villagers around Meheba. Most of the cassava crop was killed in 1985-1986 in both locations by the appearance of the cassava mealy bug, and cassava production dropped dramatically throughout the region (in neighbouring countries as well). That infestation, which lasted for several years in the Chavuma area, transformed many families and both areas from food self-reliance to dependency on maize imports. This dependency was still widespread in 1989. Unlike cereal crops (such as maize or rice) that are planted using seeds, new cassava plants are started by stem cuttings from healthy adult plants. When the mealy bug pest killed most of the cassava plants, that also meant that the farmers did not have any planting material to start new fields. In these areas of Zambia, cassava took about two years to grow large enough to be harvested, and many farm families still did not have enough mature cassava to be self-reliant again. The mealy bug infestation (which had diminished by 1989) also affected farmer confidence in cassava, and many farmers (especially in Meheba) were reluctant to replant cassava until they knew for certain that the mealy bug menace was over for good.

**Maize.** The other major staple in these locations was maize, which was more important in Meheba than in the Chavuma border villages. In the border area, maize was grown more for brewing beer or as a snack to harvest and eat early in the rainy season. The mealy

bug infestation caused people to plant more maize and rely on it more as a regular staple. In both locations maize grew poorly unless fertilized. People in Meheba were able to buy fertilizer (or get it on credit), although many refused because they thought the price was too high. People in the Chavuma area were unable to obtain fertilizer because the government maintained a legal monopoly on supplying essential agricultural inputs, and the government failed to bring fertilizer out to the isolated border area. Much of the maize consumed in both locations during the years since the mealy bug infestation had been imported by truckers and traders from the rest of Zambia.

Maize was usually imported in the form of grain; less commonly the importers brought in maize that had already been ground into flour (called mealie meal). Maize was harder than cassava to pound by hand into flour, and most women preferred to take maize to a grinding mill. In both locations the switch from cassava to maize meant that families were dependent on grinding mills to process their staple food. There had always been grinding mills in Meheba since the inception of the scheme in 1971 because maize grain was the staple in the food rations that were supplied by the United Nations to the scheme-settled refugees. The grinding mills wore out over the years, however, and became less important as cassava became more common in Meheba. With the recent change in diet because of the mealy bug, the remaining mills became overworked, and Meheba refugees reported that they sometimes had to wait in line for three to five days at a mill to have their maize ground. This was the reason why scheme-settled refugees sometimes purchased maize meal to eat when they still had maize grain stored in their houses. This was also one of the reasons why some people were not eating the normal two meals a day. There were no maize grinding mills in the Chavuma area when I stayed there in 1977, but one mill was installed in the late 1980s to grind locally grown and imported maize. The demand for the mill was evidenced by the mill owner's income (see footnote to table 4).

The variable of self-reliance in staple food production appeared to show that men in the villages (self-settled refugees and their hosts) were 'better off' than refugee men in the schemes, but self-reliance is a concept that needs further examination. The study did not measure the level of consumption, which was difficult and time-consuming to measure. This is a problem for analysis. Self-reliance in production, i.e., no purchases or gifts of staple food, may have meant that the informant produced enough to satisfy his or her hunger, or it may have meant that the informant restricted consumption (tightened his or her belt) to the level of food available. Not purchasing staple foods may have indicated a lack of money or other marketable resources to purchase enough food to satisfy hunger. In other words, self-reliance in this study may have meant plenty or poverty. I do not know whether the self-reliant informant needed (or wanted) additional staple food, and this was a question that people were not willing to answer, except in a few cases of obvious scarcity or starvation. The following section on meal frequency continues to address this issue of adequate consumption.

## Meals and the Frequency of Eating Meals

Some background information was needed to understand how many meals people ate a day. A meal for the Luvale people consisted of a staple food (whether cassava, maize, millet or sorghum) prepared in the traditional manner (as *shima*, a thick stiff mass prepared by stirring flour into boiling water) and accompanied by a cooked side dish (*ifwo* or 'relish') of leafy vegetable, fish, or (infrequently) chicken or meat. The word *kulya*, as a noun, in the Luvale language meant 'food', or the staple food. The same word (*kulya*), as a verb, meant 'to eat', or 'to eat a meal'. Only the combination of *shima* and *ifwo* was a meal. There were other substances that non-Luvale might call foods, and there were other means of preparing them (such as fresh chunks of cassava, roasted maize or peanuts, baked sweet potatoes, fresh fruits, etc.), but all of these were categorized by the Luvale as 'snacks' (*visakwola*). None of them counted as a meal. People who had eaten only snacks felt deprived; they had not really eaten a meal. If a Luvale person were asked whether he or she had 'eaten' (the verb *kulya*) yesterday, the correct response would be 'no' if he or she had not eaten a meal (*shima* and *ifwo*).

Luvale people thought that two meals a day were normal, usually one around midday and another in the late afternoon. Wealthier people might have eaten something in the early morning as well, although this would usually be porridge or a snack, not a meal. The major reasons for people not eating the normal two meals a day were that:

- (a) They had no flour to fix *shima*.
- (b) They had nothing to use as *ifwo* (relish), or the only relish was the same leafy vegetable (usually cassava leaves) that they were tired of eating.
- (c) The woman was working in the fields in the morning (when most agricultural work was done) and returned too late or was too tired to fix more than one meal around mid-afternoon or in the evening. The customary sexual division of labour also required the woman to draw water in the afternoon for cooking and bathing.

Some people ate less than twice a day because they had no appetite (primarily caused by sickness or old age), but eating fewer than two meals a day was usually understood by the Luvale as a sign of lacking critical resources (flour, relish or labour). When men were asked how many times they would eat the day of the interview, many replied that they did not know. In fact, they said that they could not know. The number of meals depended on the wives, who might cook once or twice. The Luvale considered this to be a truthful answer, not an evasion of the question.

In the Meheba scheme, there was an added complication that was noted above. As people had shifted from relying on cassava as the staple to relying on maize, which was a harder substance to pound into flour, people had become more dependent on the machinery of grinding mills. At Meheba there were long queues of people waiting at the mills in the scheme and at the mills in the

villages around the scheme. People complained of waiting in line for three to five days. Some families had not eaten because they had no flour, even though they had maize in the form of grain. In the Chavuma area there was less delay at the mill, and no one in the study complained of not eating because they had been unable to grind their grain.

Village men, whether refugees or hosts, were more likely to eat two meals a day than scheme-settled men, who were twice as likely to eat only once a day or less. Women in all three categories ate less frequently than men. This reflected the relative poverty of women, particularly those who were unmarried. The differences in meal frequency between married men and women were also influenced by marital patterns because a polygynously married husband would receive food from both wives. Self-settled refugee women ate least often. Thirteen people in the study had not eaten a meal for two days.

For the men, there was a general agreement between the data on meal frequency and on food self-reliance, and the differences between the village and scheme locations were greater. Village men, both self-settled refugees and hosts, were better off in both indicators than were scheme-settled men. The data for women were not as consistent, and the differences were smaller. Self-settled refugee women were better off in terms of total self-reliance and numbers of cassava fields, but were worse off in terms of meal frequency.

Table 8

Percentage of people not eating, eating once, or eating twice a day during the last 2 days (cultural preference is 2 meals per day, or 4 in 2 days)				
	Not eaten any meal (0 in 2 days)	Once a day or less (1-2 meals in 2 days)	Twice a day (4 in 2 days)	Mean number of meals in 2 days
Refugee men (scheme)	4	45	30	2.7
Refugee men (village)	-	20	50	3.3
Zambian men (village)	3	28	55	3.2
Refugee women (scheme)	-	67	22	2.7
Refugee women (village)	6	69	25	2.3
Zambian women (village)	-	42	17	2.6

### Integration into Zambian Society

The survey also measured the attitudes of both refugees and hosts about refugee integration into Zambia (the locality and country). There were significant differences between self-settled and scheme-settled refugees. In essence, the self-settled refugee men and women were completely integrated. All of them felt settled and at home, and their local Zambian hosts considered the refugees to be part of the community. Also, all of the self-settled refugees had acquired Zambian registration cards (reserved for citizens) at one time or another. Many scheme-settled refugees also felt that they were well-established in Meheba, as might be expected since they had lived

there for 18 years. In contrast, approximately one fifth of the scheme-settled refugee men and women still considered themselves to be 'strangers' to Zambia, even after all those years (see table 9). An important factor contributing to this feeling of 'strangeness' was the attitude that nearby villagers had of the scheme-settled refugees. The villagers around the Meheba scheme had not accepted the refugees, and many refugees were well aware of this (Nsolo Mijere, personal communication).

Table 9

Self-reported scores on the 5-rung ladder of integration (the first rung is the stranger or newcomer)		
	Scoring themselves as strangers (%)	Mean scores
Refugee men (scheme)	20	2.8
Refugee men (village)	-	3.5
Zambian men (village)	3	3.6
Refugee women (scheme)	20	3.2
Refugee women (village)	-	3.0
Zambian women (village)	-	3.4

The study did not investigate attitudes toward integration by asking the individual informant point-blank whether he or she felt integrated or not. Attitudes toward integration were measured in two ways: (a) using a little model ladder with five rungs, and (b) asking about relations in general between local refugees and local Zambians, and whether local refugees were well integrated. The question and answer method was well understood, but the use of the model ladder required some explanation. The interviewer showed the informant the ladder and stated that a newcomer (*ungeji*, which meant both newcomer and stranger) to the area started on the first rung. The newcomer started there because he or she had no home nor fields; he or she was just beginning to build a house and to plant fields. Over the years, some people would go up the ladder; some would stay in the same place; and some would fall off. Then the interviewer asked where the informant placed himself or herself, and why the informant thought he or she belonged on that rung.

In the Chavuma area, most people placed themselves on rungs 3, 4, or 5. The most common reasons for self-placement from both refugees and hosts, both men and women, were as follows:

- (a) I belong here. I am *mwenyembo*, or a member of the village.
- (b) I have built my house. I have my fields.
- (c) I have lived here a long time, or I have grown old here.

Among the four subpopulations in the village area, refugee women scored themselves lowest, while there was little difference in the average scores of the other three categories. Only one person in Chavuma scored himself a stranger (on the first rung). He was an 83-year-old host man who was very ill; he had spent three months of

1988 in the local clinic in a coma. He said that everyone he knew (the other elders) had already died, and he was now left to die among people he did not know. This was a unique response to the question, and a unique way of defining 'being a stranger'.

The answers from scheme-settled refugees revealed an important difference. The majority of the refugees in Meheba answered in the same way as the self-settled refugees. In contrast, one fifth of the men and women placed themselves on the first rung because they were still strangers to Zambia. They thought that they were not part of the local district and that they would never belong. The primary reason why these refugees considered themselves permanent strangers was because local villagers (who were, in African custom, referred to as 'the owners of the land') continued to complain about the presence of refugees in the district and to emphasize that the refugees did not belong there. Scheme-settled refugees said that Zambians in Solwezi District often called the refugees names, such as 'refugee, refugee' (in English), *mukameheba* (person from Meheba), or *mukakuchitajita* (person who fled the war). This name-calling emphasized the distinctiveness of the refugees. Scheme-settled refugees, including some who indicated that they were better integrated, also mentioned how quarrels and fights sometimes broke out between refugees and local villagers when they met in the woods.

### The Desire to Repatriate

These differences in attitudes of self-settled and scheme-settled refugees, and in their experiences with local hosts, were vividly expressed by their different responses to a question about their desires to repatriate to Angola when the war was over (table 10). None of the self-settled refugees wanted to repatriate, while approximately half of the scheme-settled refugees wished to go back to their country. The desire to repatriate was always prefaced by the qualification that the war must really be over, since the refugees were well aware that the war had died down in the past, only to begin again, and no one wanted to return until the war was really and finally over.

Table 10

Percentage of refugees desiring to repatriate to Angola when the war is over			
	Repatriate to Angola	Stay in Zambia	Unsure
Refugee men (scheme)	58	31	10
Refugee men (village)	-	90	10
Refugee women (scheme)	42	42	16
Refugee women (village)	-	69	31

These statistics on attitudes toward repatriation did not represent all of the refugees since 1966 who had ever self-settled or had ever been scheme-settled. The people interviewed in 1989 were those who still remained in the villages and in Meheba in 1989. Over

the intervening years (1966-1989), some refugees (an unknown number) had already repatriated. The sample of people in the Chavuma village area noted that 9 per cent of the self-settled refugee men and 4 per cent of the women had already repatriated since 1972, while 3 per cent of the host men and 1 per cent of the women had moved (not repatriated) to Angola during the same years. It was unknown how many refugees repatriated to Angola from Meheba since there was no early census for comparison, but informants in Meheba mentioned that many people had left over the years, especially in 1975 (the year that Angola became independent and the war seemed to be over). Official Meheba records from the 1970s also noted that many refugees had left the scheme over the years for unknown reasons. Some of them probably repatriated, while others may have moved to self-settle elsewhere in Zambia.

The most common reason given by scheme-settled refugees in 1989 for their desire to repatriate was: "This (Zambia) is not my country". When asked to explain why they thought that Zambia was not their country, the refugees mentioned their treatment (name-calling and exclusion) by villagers and townsmen in Solwezi District. Scheme-settled refugees also frequently noted, in this regard, their unhappiness with needing travel permits. The refugees needed to ask permission from the government's administrator of Meheba, and then receive a written travel permit from him, before the refugees could legally leave the scheme to visit, work or even go to market.

Another reason given by the scheme-settled refugees for their desire to repatriate was the anticipation that economic conditions in Angola would be better than those in Zambia. The comparison was at two levels: local and national. People in Meheba and in Chavuma (both self-settled refugees and hosts) mentioned that the depopulation of rural Angola because of the war meant that: (a) there were many fish in the streams; (b) there were many game animals to hunt; and (c) there were many fertile areas to farm. These local level economic (or livelihood) factors were commonly cited as reasons why some refugees had already repatriated over the years, and why some refugees and hosts continued to travel into Angola during these war years. The worsening national economic conditions in Zambia also played a part in refugee (and host villager) dissatisfaction. People talked about the high prices for many goods (especially clothes) and the unavailability of others. Blankets, salt, sugar, powdered milk and cooking oil, for example, were not available in Zambia during May-August. Chavuma people remembered the low prices and ready availability of clothes brought in from Angola earlier in the 1980s, when there was no warfare in the nearby border area, and the border was open for trade. There was a limited amount of cross-border trade in the Chavuma area in 1989, even with the continuing warfare. The trade was mostly of food items (dried game meat from Angola being exchanged for flour from Zambia).

### **Dependency and Fear**

The study was also designed to discover psychological differences in the two refugee populations. Two important differences were

found. Scheme-settled refugees were more dependent and self-settled refugees were more fearful.

Scheme-settled refugees exhibited more dependency in their answers to the question about repatriation. While self-settled refugees clearly stated their desire (to stay in Zambia) and considered that to be within their power, refugees in Meheba usually assumed that the government would make a decision about their repatriation, and they would comply. "The government has the power" (*jingolo jya fulumende*). When the informant was asked whether he or she wanted to repatriate after the war was over, the most common response in the scheme was: "If the government tells me to go, I will go". I then had to carefully explain that the informant should suppose that the government really wanted to know what the informant personally wanted to do. This was almost always followed by a moment of silence, after which it became evident that the informant had never really thought that he or she had the freedom to decide. Saying that the scheme-settled refugees showed dependency in their answers to the question about repatriation does not mean that the refugees had learned to be permanently and inherently helpless. They may simply have learned the situational limits of their personal power in relation to the government.

Self-settled refugees, on the other hand, were fearful of exposing their identity as refugees. They were afraid that they would be picked up by the government and taken to Meheba. As noted earlier in this report, the national law on refugees still states that all refugees must live in schemes, and the government had conducted a number of 'sweeps' over the years to round up self-settled refugees. During the 1970s some refugees were rounded up in Chavuma against their will and taken to Meheba, where they were interviewed in this study, and others had moved away from Chavuma during the 1970s to escape the sweeps.

Even though current government policy states that self-settled refugees arriving before October 1985 will not be actively sought after, villagers still remembered the sweeps and have not been notified of the new policy. There was a pervasive atmosphere of fear in the villages during the period of interviewing in 1989. Even some host villagers were afraid to mention that they had been born in Angola for fear that they might be labelled as refugees and taken away. This pervasive fear resulted in some lying and distortion of the data. Even though the self-settled refugees were completely integrated at the local level and had national identity cards, the refugees were still fearful of losing their village identity.

## Conclusions

There were many issues that could have been addressed with these rich data, but this paper focused on the key issue of the long-term consequences for refugee welfare of self-settlement versus scheme-settlement. The primary question in this research was - Which refugees were better off? The data showed significant

differences between the two sets of refugees (combining the genders) in three dimensions (economic, integration, and psychological) of this dependent variable. These obvious differences stimulated a number of questions about policies. The basic outlines of the data and their implications were clear, although the following conclusions must be considered to be preliminary because: (a) more data were collected later in this study, and (b) only the highlights of the data have been analysed by hand-tabulation.

### **Differences in Wealth and Income**

**Men.** Overall, scheme-settled men were wealthier and had better cash incomes than self-settled men. In terms of annual gross cash incomes, self-settled refugee men had a slightly higher average income than scheme-settled refugee men, but the self-settled average income was distorted upwards by the unusually high income of one individual. The distribution of incomes among the scheme-settled men was more even. If that one individual's income were not counted, then the average income of the self-settled men would have been much lower than that of the scheme-settled refugee men. Scheme-settled refugee men were much wealthier in terms of owning blankets, bicycles and radios.

**Women.** Overall, scheme-settled women were much wealthier and had much better cash incomes than self-settled women. In fact, scheme-settled refugee women had a much higher average income than either category of village women (self-settled refugees and hosts). The distribution of incomes for scheme-settled women was more even as well and, except for a small percentage of women with incomes below ZK 3,000, approximated the male rather than the female pattern of incomes. Scheme-settled women were wealthier than self-settled women in terms of owning radios and blankets.

**Blankets.** Blankets were important to everyone as a means of sheltering from the cold nights. Blankets were also an item that distinguished scheme-settled refugees from all of the men and women in the villages (refugee and host alike). The scheme-settled refugees were much wealthier in ownership of blankets. The general unavailability of blankets throughout the North-Western Province was an obvious sign of Zambia's economic problems.

**The cassava mealy bug.** Both locations had been devastated by a cassava pest (the mealy bug) that had affected the subsistence food production of many households and had made almost everyone more dependent on purchasing maize and maize meal. The mealy bug attacked both locations in 1985-86, so both local economies reflected short-term (a few years) adjustments that might have distorted the longer term patterns that this research was designed to study. As cassava production recovers from the pest, I think that people may divert some of the attention they now give to cash crops, and cash crop production may drop.

### **Differences in Integration**

**Men and women.** Self-settled refugees of both genders were much more integrated into Zambian society than were scheme-settled refugees. Approximately half of the men and women in the scheme in 1989 wanted to repatriate, whereas none of the self-settled wished to do so. One fifth of scheme-settled refugee men and women still felt themselves to be strangers in Zambia, whereas none of the self-settled felt that way. None of the scheme-settled refugees (to the best of our knowledge) had Zambian registration cards, although some of them had cards when they were self-settled. All of the currently self-settled refugees had Zambian registration cards and, therefore, de facto citizenship. The integration of the self-settled refugees was supported by the local villagers, who viewed the refugee-host relationship in kinship terms. The relatively poor integration of the scheme-settled refugees was partially caused by the attitudes and behaviours of the Zambian villagers and townspeople living around the scheme.

### **Differences in Psychological Security and Independence**

The Zambian government affected the psychological security and independence of both sets of refugees, although in distinct ways. There was a pervasive fear among self-settled refugees that the government would still take them away from the village to the scheme, and perhaps deport them to Angola, i.e., the threat to the psychological security of the self-settled refugees came from the Zambian government. The scheme-settled refugees did not seem to be fearful. On the other hand, scheme-settled refugees obviously were insecure in another way. They did not believe that they had the power to determine their future. They believed that the government would decide whether they were repatriated or not, i.e., repatriation would not be a voluntary but a government-determined act.

### **Poorer Zambians versus Richer Angolan Refugees**

Scheme-settled refugees were materially better off than self-settled refugees, who were more integrated and felt at home. Many scheme-settled refugees remained 'refugees' after 23 years in Zambia, whereas self-settled refugees were no longer 'refugees' in their eyes or in the eyes of their local hosts. Instead, self-settled refugees were now perceived by themselves and their neighbours as (generally poor) rural Zambians. Therefore, in the simplest terms, the long-term consequences of the two settlement strategies were that the self-settled refugees were now poor de facto (though not de jure) Zambians, while the scheme-settled were richer but still Angolan refugees.

### Defining and Recognizing a Durable Solution

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees tries to promote 'durable solutions' for refugees. Achieving economic self-sufficiency is not seen as achieving a durable solution. Agricultural settlement schemes, which are designed to allow the refugees to achieve self-sufficiency, are seen as long-term holding actions, cost-effective ways to maintain refugee populations for a long time. What constitutes a durable solution? Durable solutions occur when refugees stop being refugees. There are two logical ways for people to exchange the refugee status for the status of citizen or resident: (a) repatriation to their country of origin, or (b) integration into a host country. That integration could be into the first host country, or when the refugee is resettled into a second host country.

The self-settled refugees whom I interviewed and observed were no longer really 'refugees'. The term no longer applied. They thought and said that they were villagers, and their local hosts agreed. The 'Angolan refugees' did not think that they were still Angolans, strangers, newcomers or refugees. I could identify people as having been refugees in 1970-1972, when I took the census. Some of them were willing to admit in 1989 that they had come from Angola during the war (while others were too frightened to admit to having been refugees), but each one said that he or she now was a *mwenyembo*, a villager. They had stopped being refugees. They had exchanged that status for the status of villager. I felt that they were correct; it was wrong to still categorize these self-settled people as 'refugees'.

The situation of the self-settled Angolan refugees in Zambia, which I have described in this paper, constituted a durable solution. If this was not a durable solution, why not? If these people had not achieved complete integration, a durable solution, then how are durability and integration defined and achieved?

This case showed self-settled refugees, with the help of their local hosts, achieving de facto integration. All of the ones I interviewed had also acquired Zambian national identification cards, i.e., citizenship. They had become de jure Zambians. However, the Zambian legal code did not provide for the possibility of refugees becoming citizens. There was a provision for naturalization of immigrants, but there was no agreement that refugees could be naturalized. Having entered the country with the status of refugee, the refugee was not permitted to drop or exchange the status. At the end of my field research, I informed the Zambian Commissioner for Refugees and his staff about the preliminary results of the research. When I noted the differences between self-settled and scheme-settled in terms of the latter still considering themselves to be 'strangers' in Zambia, the Commissioner was careful to point out

that, given the current legal code of Zambia, all of the refugees remained strangers (refugees) forever.

### **In Whose Interest?**

In whose interest is it that refugees remain refugees forever? Is it in Zambia's best interests that refugees be prohibited from integrating, or that already well-integrated people be prevented from attaining full legal citizenship or residency? Is it in Angola's best interests? Who benefits from a legal system that requires people to remain refugees for more than 20 years? Do the refugees or their local hosts? Does the United Nations benefit, or do international assistance agencies? Who benefits by making people continue to be long-term aliens? Why would African countries refuse the option of allowing long-term refugees to naturalize and become de jure citizens, if they so desire?

## **Recommendations**

### **To the Government of the Republic of Zambia**

I recommend that the Government of the Republic of Zambia amend or revise Chapter 112, the Refugees Control Act, of the Zambian legal code to:

(a) Permit refugees to acquire citizenship after a period of residency in Zambia. This will allow the self-settled (and other well-integrated) refugees to become de jure as well as de facto Zambians.

(b) Permit an alternative settlement option (self-settlement) for those refugees who are qualified, in terms of kinship relationships with residents or other personal or social resources. This means allowing a dual system in which both scheme-settlement and self-settlement are permitted.

I also recommend that the government of the Republic of Zambia issue a public proclamation of amnesty to long-term, self-settled refugees in North-Western and Western Provinces. The amnesty will allow those already integrated people to become citizens, or to keep their Zambian registration cards, in spite of their earlier contravention of the Refugee Control Act (by not registering with the authorities upon first arrival). The public proclamation is necessary to eliminate the fear among self-settled refugees in the villages. Those villagers would never learn about the change in the legal code unless it was publicly announced.

I also recommend that the government of the Republic of Zambia sponsor research to determine why the form or management of Meheba inhibited refugee integration.

### **For Research**

The goals of refugee settlement policies are to protect and aid the refugees and the hosts. In order for policy makers to make good refugee settlement policies, they require good information about the situations of refugees and hosts and about the consequences of

policies and programmes. More research is needed to produce that information. Millions of Africans have been refugees for years. We know very little about those refugees, and less about self-settlement and the long term. The conclusions presented in this paper are based on solid case data, but I do not know how representative the Zambian case is of other African refugee situations, or whether the same variation between the long-term consequences of the two modes of settlement will be found in studying other cases. This research is a beginning, and I caution the reader about generalizing from this case to all of Africa. Africa is large and complex. There is a lot of variation in refugee situations, in the form and management of settlement schemes, and in refugee-host interactions.

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