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Advancing the Social Agenda: Two Years After Copenhagen

Report of the UNRISD International Conference and Public Meeting, Geneva, 9-10 July 1997

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Preface

In March 1995, participants in the World Summit for Social Development recognized the growing seriousness of poverty, unemployment and social disintegration in the contemporary world, and endorsed an ambitious and comprehensive Programme of Action that outlined various approaches to addressing these problems. Some approaches involved increasing or re-allocating public funds towards social development goals, and reforming public institutions. Others implied stimulating the creativity of citizens at the local or national level, and fostering an "enabling environment" that might allow their initiatives to prosper.

UNRISD has been, and continues to be, deeply involved in the Social Summit process, both through a series of international conferences and through various research programmes concerned with advancing social policy reforms. The Institute's influential report for the Copenhagen Summit, **States of Disarray: The Social Effects of Globalization**, has now been translated into six major languages. This book examines the implications for social development of global economic reform, including the erosion of governments' responsibility for, and capacity to meet, basic social commitments. Problems of ethnic strife, as well as rising levels of violence and crime, are explained in part as a function of the dynamics of social and economic exclusion that have resulted from such reforms.

The conference "Advancing the Social Agenda: Two Years after Copenhagen", held on 9-10 July 1997 in Geneva, marked another step in UNRISD's efforts to maintain international attention on the issues and commitments made at the Social Summit. It was organized to coincide with the meeting of the United Nations Economic and Social Council and was attended by a large audience of government delegates and representatives of United Nations agencies, non-governmental organizations, and the diplomatic and academic communities. Its six main sessions were designed to explore promising approaches to some key issues of social cohesion. The first session covered major initiatives taken by governments, international agencies, and civil society and grassroots organizations to implement the Summit Programme of Action. The second addressed the question of mobilizing resources for development, and considered innovative ideas for channelling additional resources into social development. The third looked at lessons to be drawn from the experiences of poor countries that have achieved significant improvement in the social sector, most notably in health and education. The fourth session addressed the question of how to promote social harmony in multi-ethnic and multi-cultural societies; while the fifth turned to the critical issue of how best to deal with the legacy of hatred and bitterness generated by years of violence and civil strife. The final session dealt with complex social problems in major cities worldwide, and considered pioneering efforts on the part of community groups, NGOs and municipal authorities to deal with these problems.

The opening and closing addresses of the July conference were presented by two eminent individuals who played central roles in the entire Social Summit process. Nitin Desai co-ordinated the work of the United Nations Secretariat for the Social Summit, while Ambassador Juan Somavía was Chairman of the Summit's Preparatory and Main Committees. Both Somavía and Desai are committed to ensuring that the Declaration and Programme of Action will be translated into concrete measures to improve the level of living of the least advantaged members of society.

This report summarizes formal presentations and discussions at the July conference. The report makes it clear that, while certain initiatives are indeed resulting in meaningful advances at a local or national level, responses at the international level are not adequate for these to gain any real momentum on a global scale. Economic globalization, with its focus on the freedom of capital and markets, continues apace. Meanwhile, people's organizations around the world are creating their own solutions to the problems that the international community sought to address at the Social Summit: poverty, unemployment and social disintegration. For those whose livelihoods are at stake, it is a question of survival.

In the face of an often unfavourable economic environment, civil society organizations confront the dilemma of how best to further their interests. If they seek to expand or "scale-up" their impact they risk becoming the mirror-image of large, bureaucratic institutions, with all the attendant problems of accountability and effectiveness. Yet if they limit themselves only to the local or regional scale, their efforts remain at best fragmented and possibly insignificant.

In the period leading up to the programmed review of the Social Summit at the United Nations in the year 2000 (the so-called "Copenhagen Plus Five" review), UNRISD will continue to provide opportunities for discussing and analysing such issues. New research programmes are likely to take up questions associated with the evolving role of civil society organizations in the international arena. Networks will also be created to study the actual and potential uses of information technology for social development, and to look at the interaction of non-governmental organizations and business interests in the field of environmental protection. Another new UNRISD project is set to explore the measures that must be taken to create viable public sector institutions in crisis-ridden states — a subject of vital importance if there is to be any enabling environment for innovative social policy in many parts of the world where poverty is most acute.

Material from some of these new projects, as well as from a number of recently completed UNRISD research programmes, constitutes useful background for much of the discussion summarized in the following pages. Readers interested in exploring specific points in more detail are invited to consult the reading list of UNRISD publications provided at the end of the report.

December 1997

Dharam Ghai
Director

Acknowledgements

A number of people were involved in planning the conference. A committee comprised of Yusuf Bangura, Dharam Ghai, Cynthia Hewitt de Alcántara, Peter Utting, and David Westendorff at UNRISD, along with Deborah Eade, developed the agenda. David Westendorff co-ordinated the preparatory work. Lauren Engle, Véronique Martinez and Rosemary Max handled publicity and dissemination. Josephine Grin-Yates, Wendy Salvo and Christine Vuilleumier assisted with conference organization. The present report was written for UNRISD by Deborah Eade, with editing and design by Jenifer Freedman.

Abbreviations and Acronyms

BRAC	Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee
CSO	civil society organization
ECOSOC	United Nations Economic and Social Council
EU	European Union
GDP	gross domestic product
GII	Global Information Infrastructure
GNP	gross national product
HIPC	highly-indebted poor countries
IGO	inter-governmental organization
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ITU	International Telecommunications Union
LDC	least developed country
NGO	non-governmental organization
SEWA	Self-Employed Women's Association
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Economic and Social Council
WIPO	World Intellectual Property Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization

Inaugural Session

Post-Copenhagen: Personal Reflections — Juan Somavía

I would like to take this opportunity not so much to look at what has already been achieved since the Social Summit, but rather to look forward to "Copenhagen Plus Five": a special session of the General Assembly to be held in the year 2000 in order to assess the commitments made in the Declaration and Programme of Action, and to take these still further.

Why look to the future? First, because it is only by having our ultimate objectives clear that we can ensure that what is currently being done genuinely conforms with what was agreed in Copenhagen. And second, because the recently held "Rio Plus Five" event — though excellent in terms of high-level participation, affirmation of the United Nations as an international forum, and showing that the environment issue is very much alive — failed, in that it simply repeated an exercise already undertaken five years ago by re-opening negotiations on the text of an agreed document. I am adamant that this should *not* happen with Copenhagen Plus Five. We cannot afford to allow the special session of the General Assembly, which will coincide with the beginning of the twenty-first century, to negotiate on texts: it must negotiate on action and on initiatives. To get involved after the event in re-drafting the Copenhagen documents would be to bureaucratize a political process. Rather, we must use this opportunity to concentrate our initiatives — whether these are at a global, regional, national or local level — to make it a wholly different kind of five-year celebration.

I would therefore like to share with you some of my thoughts on what such a General Assembly would look like. First, it must bring together all the real actors — governments, parliaments, political parties, business, unions, banks and financial institutions, civil society organizations and citizens' groups, mayors and local authorities, religious and spiritual leaders, media and communications outlets. Ideally, it would have the capacity to convene such a range of actors, and to stimulate their imagination and sense of collective responsibility — for each of them has a role to play if the Copenhagen document is to become a reality. We have to remember that the Social Summit was a governmental meeting, albeit with many other ancillary activities — it represented a traditional way of approaching the issues. I would like to see a General Assembly that convenes these actors in a way that enables *them* to take forward the commitments within their own spheres of action. In other words, the United Nations should open up the spaces for society to be a part of decision-making processes, along with governments.

We must be ambitious, as we were with the Social Summit itself: being so makes it possible to achieve even very difficult things. I would like to see us inaugurate the twenty-first century with the largest gathering of real actors that the world has ever seen, coming together around the most central issue of all — people. Only the United Nations could do this.

I would like to give examples of eight initiatives that such a special session of the General Assembly could serve to foster.

1. We could launch the preparation of a legally binding convention on the eradication of poverty. This was discussed in the process leading up to the Summit, though it would have been premature to go ahead without first having the political commitment to the eradication of poverty — which the Declaration achieved. This worldwide commitment already represents a watershed. But now we must move on, so that this commitment has some legally binding elements to it, within a realistic time frame.
2. We could launch an integrated community development initiative. Would it be so impossible to focus our attention on the most disadvantaged 20 per cent of communities in

the world, and to take concrete action based on their own definition of need — whether this is the elimination of shanty towns, the generation of employment or the eradication of violence? In other words, how can we address some of these basic things that affect people's lives in so many ways? These are issues that need to be addressed at the local or municipal, as well as national, level.

3. A critical issue, which was reinforced at "Rio Plus Five", is the level of subsidy that is required by unsustainable development. We need to examine tax systems, which are currently riddled with loopholes and anomalies in ways that actually encourage unsustainable practices. This means looking more carefully at who benefits and who loses from the existing arrangements, at what kinds of practices are rewarded or discouraged. Unless we understand the real impacts of prevailing fiscal systems, we cannot gear these to encourage sustainable development.
4. We need to develop new ways of putting private capital at the service of social needs. It is important to note here that the business sector was involved in the Summit process. Two things emerged from this. First, the idea that private capital can be used to generate goods and services that serve social needs has been quite foreign to most of us who have been accustomed to thinking of these issues in terms of public expenditure. Second, while the private sector may see good business opportunities in social provisioning, it too has been accustomed to seeing investment in this area as falling within the public sector. I believe that there is great scope here: not in terms of encouraging private companies to dedicate a small proportion of their profits to charitable activities, but of encouraging business activities that produce income but which also provide goods and services that can help to resolve social problems. More research is needed in this area, and both sides need to be prepared to look at the issue creatively.
5. There is a clear need to establish some form of global co-operation on employment generation. The creation of jobs must be at the heart of economic policy. Financial resources are available, but the decisive will is lacking. Jobs must be at the centre of the economy if people are at the centre of development, bringing micro-economic and micro-social concerns into harmony. We need to be clear that the national accounts cannot be balanced by unbalancing the lives of people. We have fortunately moved on from the kind of economic adjustments that went on in the mid-1980s, thanks in some measure to widespread critiques coming from various quarters, including the United Nations agencies and the Social Summit itself. But we have yet to reach global consensus on the fact that it is only through employment that the Summit's objectives will be met: employment has a major impact on the reduction of poverty, and on the promotion of social cohesion.
6. It is vital to stop the reduction of international co-operation flows. Of course, the richer countries are facing internal problems, both economic and in terms of public opinion, and so cannot be as generous or unconditional in their assistance as they were in the past. It is also true that there have been mistakes, and that aid resources have not always been put to best use. But this is not the point. The real issue is that given the global political structure, the least developed nations cannot be expected to develop exclusively on the basis of private investment. In certain circumstances, of course, this can be a way forward; but certainly not in all. What is totally unviable is to reduce international co-operation while increasing protectionism, and still expect global stability. We urgently need to convince public opinion, parliaments and media in the North of this reality, and also to understand their own preoccupations. As the Summit Declaration says, social problems are real in *every* country. Even so, it is not through introspective policies that the North will find the stability it seeks. Co-operation is, however, pre-eminently a political issue. It is not just a question of passing resolutions, but also of bringing together those actors who are prepared to take practical steps towards realizing them. While they may not be as much in evidence as the critics of international co-operation, there are many Northern parliamentarians who understand this very well. These and other sympathetic forces need to be brought together — as I have already proposed that "Copenhagen Plus Five" should do.

7. We urgently need to develop solidarity initiatives among Third World countries. The argument is one of moral consistency: the need to apply to our own actions the values that we hope will orient the actions of others. Here, I would propose that the world's 30 most advantaged Third World nations — however these are defined — begin to develop solidarity initiatives with other developing countries. Nothing would do more to reinforce the prospects for change on an international scale.
8. Finally, such an initiative could serve to foster the international-level role of civil society organizations and NGOs, which have had a major impact on the Social Summit and other recent global conferences. In Copenhagen, we deliberately created the space for this to happen both in the plenary sessions — in which of 250 delegates, mainly from within the United Nations system and from member states, an unprecedented 50 were from NGOs — and throughout the negotiating process itself.

However, the problem with civil society organizations overall is that they are organized around sectors: women's organizations mobilize around women's issues, ecologists around the environment, human rights bodies on human rights issues, and so on. While some of these have cross-sectoral links, my feeling is that there is often an enormous amount of energy dedicated to drawing on partial information, and this leads to very little joint action. On the other hand, there are social actors who are playing what could be described as a structural role — such as consumers — who are largely not organized. We can talk about putting private business at the disposal of social development, the great merit of which is that both sides benefit. But in the final analysis, a company makes a profit because someone is consuming its product. It is misleading to imagine that, in the whole production process, one actor is more important than the other. Investment is key, as is accumulation, and the capacity of private investment to generate wealth is essential since there can be no distribution without wealth. However, that wealth depends on consumers. Yet, with the exception of organizations such as Consumers International, consumers remain largely dispersed. I believe that consumers should begin to organize in a more political way, affirming our rights as consumers just as trade unions organized to affirm and defend the rights of workers. When I say that civil society is too diffuse, that consumers are insufficiently organized, that trade unions are not fully enough linked with the wider civil society, I am also, of course, affirming that a huge array of social actors could play a real role in resolving many of the issues under discussion — if they worked together.

This brings me to the idea of a global civil society movement, some kind of framework that would connect all these different social actors, and which could establish a highly focused common agenda on which they could really act. The issues of the Social Summit — the eradication of poverty, full employment and social integration — are very clearly part of that common agenda.

Finally, in terms of the concrete initiatives that could be taken forward, using the Social Summit as a launching pad, UNRISD could embark on policy-oriented research into the real bottlenecks holding up implementation of the Declaration and Programme of Action. It could thus perform a function in the special session of the General Assembly similar to the one it played in relation to the Social Summit itself.

In conclusion, critics might say that all these ideas sound fine, but nothing will ever happen; that the cards are stacked against us. Exactly the same things were said when work in organizing the Social Summit began, five years ago. It was argued that social development was not a global issue, that it was not interesting, that the developed countries would not engage, that it would be just another conference ending with appeals for more resources to be distributed from the North to the South: a litany of reasons why the Social Summit would not and should not take place, or would be a failure. But the reality is that there was a political space for the Social Summit, not merely the management of consensus — indispensable

though this is in enabling people to feel comfortable about coming together around such an agenda. That consensus was possible because the political space was there — but the outcomes depend on the commitment with which we all act.

Whenever I am challenged by cynicism, I recall Oscar Wilde who argued that "cynics know the price of everything, but the value of nothing". Some might feel that I veer to the other extreme. But, I maintain, *attitudes* are critical. We can always highlight difficulties and problems. Alternatively, we can highlight our own strengths in confronting these, and seek to maximize our collective energy in doing so. We were told that slavery would never disappear, that trade unions would never be created, that women would never vote, that the idea of human rights and democratic process would never take hold throughout the world, that decolonization was impossible, that the Berlin Wall would be there forever, that apartheid would never end. But these things happened. And they did so *not* because people allowed themselves to be discouraged by the difficulties, but because they decided to act and to come together, to have the force, the strength, the conviction and the values that make things happen.

This is the point we have reached with the Social Summit. The process got off to a good start, but there are struggles ahead, struggles in which it is worth participating, and which are worth organizing well. There is no vision without organization. The vision must be accompanied not only by organization, however, but also by consensus building that stems from a willingness to listen to and learn from each other, since we are all part of what must change. Diversity is essential, and must be accommodated within an overall attitude and commitment to building a better society. If we are to have the power to change the world, we must look within ourselves, our convictions, our desires, and also our capacity to listen to and work with others in creating consensus.

Session One — Implementing the Copenhagen Agenda: Achievements and Disappointments

Two years have passed since the Social Summit — long enough, argued **Dharam Ghai**, Chairperson of the session, for progress to have been made (and setbacks identified) in furthering the ambitious and far-reaching goals embraced by the international community in the Declaration and Programme of Action. There have been cases of countries, notably the Netherlands, that have tried to reconcile deep engagement in the processes of globalization with reduction in poverty and unemployment, and increasing social cohesion.

The Response of the International Community — Jacques Baudot

As **Jacques Baudot** warned, however, while the Summit was extraordinarily successful as an event, and as an effort both to reach a common definition of what constitutes "the common good" and to express this through a common agenda, the event itself will be a quickly forgotten footnote in the history of the late twentieth century. However, the Summit was also an *outcome*, in the form of the Declaration and Programme of Action: negotiated documents which are, inevitably, deeply flawed; but which nevertheless contain valuable insights and ideas, and represent a touchstone for the many people worldwide who believe that progress in social development is both possible and necessary.

Baudot noted that one approach to follow-up to the Summit would be simply to chart progress in achieving each of the commitments made in Copenhagen. But a better approach would be to use what is most positive from these formal undertakings as a point of departure for further reflection and analysis. This implicitly acknowledges that there are many legitimate readings of the actual texts, and so recognizes that these readings are to an extent subjective.

The most significant aspect of the Summit documents is the fact that they bring together the economic and the social spheres, albeit in a somewhat ambiguous way. The latter is seen to concern individual well-being and the way that society functions, though it is also viewed in some parts of the Programme of Action as simply the product of economic relations. Similarly, while the Summit documents stress that economic development should serve social goals, it is also implied that the economy is in some way autonomous of society, which must therefore adjust to its unchangeable laws.

The three main starting points for implementing the Summit commitments are, first, to recognize that to eliminate poverty, every individual needs an economic base. This insight may seem banal, but it is in fact revolutionary given the fundamental changes that would be required in terms of how economies and financial systems work, in order to create *democratic markets* based on promoting the greatest level of human participation and creativity. Second, it is vital to get beyond seeing globalization and the integration of the world's economies either as a divine blessing or as a fatal curse. It is of paramount importance to ensure that the currency of globalization is not merely inequality and marginalization. Globalization also encompasses the cultural, scientific and philosophical spheres; and we need to be aware of all of these facets, too. Rather than trying to stop the process altogether, it may be wiser to introduce brakes on it: to slow down and democratize the process in order to ensure that it does not only favour the rich, and that the more powerful sectors are effectively obliged to explain their motives and the impacts of their actions. Third, the state and the public sector must be "rehabilitated", but put firmly at the service of people. Similarly, the United Nations needs to be reinforced, since no Social Summit follow-up will be possible unless its relationships with the other major players — namely, the World Trade Organisation and the Bretton Woods institutions — are radically altered. The United Nations has, or should have, the moral authority to represent shared values, and both to define what is a life that is worth living, and to defend every human being's right to attain it.

On the international front, there has been relatively little follow-up to the Social Summit, in part because the structures and relationships between the relevant bodies have not changed. This Summit was unique, among other things, in not making specific recommendations for actions to be taken by individual institutions — though advances have been seen at the local, national and regional levels. Its most significant value, however, may prove to have been its success in putting the realm of ideas and values back into the centre of international debate.

National-Level Social Policies in Developing Countries — Rehman Sobhan

Echoing Baudot's view, **Rehman Sobhan** noted that the long-standing "Washington Consensus" forged by the Bretton Woods institutions is now unravelling, and perhaps giving way to a more enabling intellectual environment than that which has prevailed for the last 20 years. "Paradigms lost" might yet prove to be the epitaph to the twentieth century; for the orthodox "market theology" did not address global structures, and failed to consider the disastrous effects of disparity in the power of individual nation states. Today, while Third World élites are able to integrate themselves into the global system, those who represent the true economic base of these countries remain anchored in a disintegrating social order to which the wealthy have no commitment. For instance, by availing themselves of the benefits of the global market, the latter gain access to international standards of health care and education. Their poorer compatriots have no recourse to anything other than those national systems of social provision that have survived the ravages of inadequate and declining investment.

The Social Summit attempted to restore some intellectual balance, in taking stock of the impact of the rampant individualism that has characterized the latter part of the twentieth century. The resulting inequity within and between nations has had several profoundly damaging results:

- mass poverty and unemployment, of which South Asia now has the world's largest concentration;
- economic stagnation in the Third World and low economic growth in the industrialized First World;
- structural regression, as countries go through a "de-industrialization" process, and revert (on very poor terms of trade) to being agrarian economies. This in turn both accentuates and perpetuates poverty;
- ethnic strife and the elevation of crime (including the narcotics trade) as elements of "coping strategies" to deal with social disintegration; and
- policy disownership, as public policies are shaped not by national governments, but by multilateral institutions, and governments become accountable not to their citizens but instead to the World Bank.

In addition, Sobhan continued, the values of individualism have been placed above all others: social welfare has been seen as and then turned into a commodity, and all social transactions have been "marketized", even within the public sector (for example, through "internal markets"). Social capital has been dissipated, or "de-accumulated", thanks to the loss of control over the productive sector that itself derives from the abandonment of the policy instruments formerly available to governments, through the process of policy disownership already identified.

While the World Bank's 1997 **World Development Report** may not yet represent a requiem on the Washington Consensus, it may suggest a greater degree of agnosticism than was hitherto the case. While events such as the Social Summit, or annual publications such as the UNDP's **Human Development Report**, place the accent on human resource development, however, the reality in many Third World countries is that the quality of schools and schooling has disintegrated as teachers are underpaid and also prefer to work in the towns and cities rather than in the rural areas.

Against this backdrop, there have nonetheless been some micro-successes. For instance, the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh reached two million households in 1997; BRAC, the world's largest NGO, reached some 40 million people. Remarkable achievements have also been made by organizations such as the Self-Employed Women's Association (SEWA) in India, Sarvodaya in Sri Lanka, and the Aga Khan Foundation throughout Asia. Essentially, however, the picture is that, while the situation of some individuals may have improved as a result of the work of these organizations, overall levels of poverty have risen significantly. The green movement is active and effective, but the global environment continues to deteriorate. The active social movements that have emerged in many countries have done so in the context of societies that are in fact disintegrating. Even the spectacular achievements of the Grameen Bank and similar initiatives have not been able to integrate their micro-initiatives with the market in such a way that small borrowers can become major players in terms of defining the economic policy framework. The conundrum remains that of how to ensure that these millions of beneficiaries acquire the political power to contribute to the social re-balancing that is so sorely needed, rather than merely operating within the macro-policy designs of the institutions controlling the global economy.

According to Sobhan, the old order is beginning to crumble, and new initiatives are starting to emerge. He outlined the salient features of a new world order which, however, is yet to be born:

- the (re-)accumulation of social capital, and the revival of values of mutuality and solidarity in the quest for greater humanity, and for sustainable development;

- the rebuilding of communities and community, through the empowerment of those who are deprived or vulnerable;
- the re-introduction of *tension* rather than partnership in the relationship between the state and civil society; and
- a separation between Third World states and donors, and the restoration of policy ownership to national governments. The World Bank and the UNDP should not seek to transform recipient governments by imposing their own recipes for change, but should instead condition their aid on the latter's capacity to design their own development policies.

Finally, redistribution has to be put back onto the policy agenda, so that poor and rich alike become stakeholders in their own national economy. The last two decades have seen the redistribution of resources to the largely undeserving and often corrupt rich, and the further disempowerment of the poor. The challenge is to transform the hard-working, creative, efficient and "patriotic" poor into masters of their own resources, in order in turn to escape from the tyranny of market forces. Humankind has long sought to conquer nature, but has now become victim instead to the abstract forces of the market. The building of a national as well as a global community depends on recovering the capacity to govern markets, and abandoning the notion that human beings must or should be ruled by them.

National-Level Social Policies in Industrialized Countries — J.N.M. Richelle

The issues of unemployment, poverty and social exclusion also affect industrialized countries, albeit not so dramatically as in the Third World. **J.N.M. Richelle** maintained that the question of the security of people, and not merely of states, is an idea that is now gaining momentum; and that the Social Summit represented a milestone in the process of placing social development centre-stage as a condition for, and a goal of, sustainable economic development. While it would be foolish to generalize about how the Summit commitments have been taken up in the industrialized countries, the case of the Netherlands offers some useful parameters.

The Netherlands seeks to balance the economic and social aspects of public policy, and has since the Social Summit made efforts to incorporate a wide range of social sectors into the policy debate. For instance, during its presidency of the European Union, the Netherlands held a conference in Amsterdam in early 1997 on "Social Policy and Economic Performance". This addressed the relevance to economic success of social policies, such as the promotion of life-long learning, investing in employability and so on. In the Netherlands, the "consensus model", introduced after the Second World War, is a system of institutionalized debate between the three main actors in the socio-economic sphere: employers, employees and government. Previously mocked by outside observers, this system, also known as "the polder model", is now seen as a vital element in an exemplary form of decision-making — though not one that can simply be exported to other social settings. It has assured a high level of economic success and social cohesion to date. However, future success depends on identifying the socio-economic consequences for an export-oriented country of the increasing internationalization and liberalization of markets for capital, technology, labour and services.

In November 1995, the Dutch government launched a national campaign based on the memorandum, "The Other Face of the Netherlands: About Preventing and Combating Hidden Poverty and Social Exclusion". This was part of a strategy for implementing the Social Summit Programme of Action, and included measures to stimulate participation, provide income support, limit fixed welfare costs and reduce the number of people who fail to claim social benefits. Since then, a new bill has provided for measures such as child care schemes, and giving local authorities more scope for special forms of assistance. In addition, a system is being devised to monitor the magnitude of indicators of poverty and social exclusion on an annual basis. This will include statistics on the number of minimum income households, their

characteristics and financial trends within them, the health of their members, and the extent to which they participate in society. The system is also intended to measure the impact of strategies to combat poverty and social exclusion.

To ensure that poverty continues to appear on the political agenda, from 1996 until the year 2000 an annual national conference will focus political attention, and encourage the various parties concerned — central government, municipal authorities, care services, employers' associations, trade unions and interest groups — to stand behind the cause.

Tackling poverty and social exclusion is also central to Dutch development co-operation policy, the Netherlands being one of only four countries that meets the target of devoting 0.7 per cent of GNP to overseas development assistance — the figure is currently 0.81 per cent. A major plank in the Social Summit platform is that governments are responsible for the development of their own countries. But another concerns the "enabling environment" and international solidarity. More than financial assistance, this refers to giving the space to allow every state to integrate into the world economy. Hence, the Netherlands strongly supports the initiative to reduce the debt burden of the poorest developing countries (known as HIPC), as well as giving special attention to LDCs within the WTO framework. At the normative level, the Netherlands emphasizes the importance of "ownership" of policies and programmes in the recipient countries, and of demand-driven co-operation. On the practical side, along with Norway, it has embraced the 20:20 concept as a means of enhancing basic social services. For instance, the Netherlands was actively involved in the 1996 "Oslo 20:20" conference, the follow-up to which is scheduled for 1998, preferably in a developing country.

The Social Summit marked a break from seeing economic and social policy goals as competing or even contradictory ends. The 1996 OECD conference "Beyond 2000" discussed a "new social policy agenda" that places the human dimension at the heart of the socio-economic debate, and calls for a social investment approach to social expenditures. Within Europe and the industrialized world, unemployment is one of the most serious social questions on the political agenda. The Dutch government believes that the key to social development lies in enabling those on the margins of society, and those about to enter the labour market, to work. This includes the promotion of part-time work, and support for combining unremunerated activities (such as child care) with paid employment, as well as support for a more gender-equitable sharing of paid work and unpaid caring tasks.

The Netherlands is also committed to improving the quality of work and employment, as well as to safeguarding workers' rights, believing in particular that no economic reasoning can justify the exploitation of children. Thus, in early 1997, the "Child Labour Conference" was organized in Amsterdam in co-operation with the ILO, to discuss joint action to halt the employment of children in slavery and slavery-like practices; forced or compulsory labour (including debt-bondage and serfdom); the use of children in prostitution, pornography, and the drugs trade; and their employment in work that is dangerous, harmful or hazardous, or that interferes with their education. The Netherlands also supports the elaboration of an ILO convention to combat the most intolerable forms of child labour.

Dutch development co-operation policy has always highlighted the issue of employment, along with poverty. Within the framework of macro-economic policies to stimulate labour-intensive economic growth and integration into the global economy, effective policies for poverty alleviation can help to reduce unemployment. Better employment rates can help to create an environment in which to promote private sector development, particularly of small and micro-enterprises; and may indirectly promote investment in the social sector, which in turn will improve the quality of the labour force. Any such policies should be complemented by the further liberalization of world trade, where the WTO can assist in helping the LDCs to

gain access to the world market. Such steps can also help to promote core labour standards and combat the use of labour standards for protectionist purposes.

The need to get development co-operation onto a more business-like footing, so that donors can feel entitled to demand results, cannot be over-estimated. Unless such standards are adopted, there may be an even greater decline in international assistance. Despite the criticisms that could be made of them, the Social Summit documents form enough of a basis for agreement and consensus. Indeed, the commitments made in Copenhagen are still highly relevant, and progress towards meeting them will be reviewed at a special session of the General Assembly in the year 2000, "Copenhagen Plus Five". In undertaking this review, it is critical to avoid the fascination for texts and amendments which so undermined the success of the recent "Rio Plus Five" Summit. The focus should instead be on the substantive issues, exchange of experiences, identification of best practices, and enhancement of accountability. This forum should also focus on action. Relevant actors, including NGOs and others, must be mobilized in the preparatory process that begins in 1998 for the stock-taking meeting; and research institutions such as UNRISD also have an active contribution to make.

Initiatives from Civil Society — Julian Disney

Within the NGO sector, the International Council on Social Welfare (ICSW) has been actively involved in promoting and monitoring the implementation of the Social Summit agenda. Its President, **Julian Disney**, identified several major initiatives in relation to publicizing the Summit commitments and monitoring and reporting on follow-up; convening meetings of civil society organizations (CSOs) to pursue Summit follow-up; and urging governments and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) to pursue implementation. For instance, the ambitious **Social Watch Report**, jointly produced by NOVIB and the Third World Institute in Montevideo, has been widely circulated, as has the ICSW quarterly journal, **Social Development Review**. Various CSO meetings have also been convened at the regional and international levels by ICSW.

Only two years after the Summit, it would be unrealistic to expect dramatic improvements in relation to poverty, unemployment and social exclusion. Moreover, the extent to which any such changes could be attributed to the Summit will always be a matter for conjecture. Nevertheless, the main hope and challenge for the Summit process was not for a "quick fix" but for substantial improvements over the medium and longer term.

In looking forward to "Copenhagen Plus Five", Disney proposed two ways to get "value-added" out of the Summit, involving strategies of broadening, on the one hand, and sharpening, on the other. Broadening refers to the Summit's emphasis on "creating an enabling environment": on interconnectedness, and on the need to address the underlying causes of poverty and exclusion. Of these causes, discriminatory economic and political environments merit particular attention. For example, Summit documents draw attention to the adverse social impact of short-term speculative activity in international financial markets, which diverts resources from genuinely productive enterprises and deters governments from pursuing long-term policies that would enhance sustainable economic development and foster social cohesion. It is also important to deal with the tendency for loopholes and distortions in taxation systems to discourage long-term private and public investment in ventures that would provide jobs and strengthen communities. The third problem area is free trade, where, as underlined recently by UNCTAD, efforts should be made to ensure more even-handedness between developed and developing countries.

Pursuing these and other macro-economic issues will require CSOs to familiarize themselves with areas which may seem complex and uncongenial, and to take a constructive approach towards the potential benefits of economic development and private enterprise. It will also mean developing the capacity and courage of the non-governmental sector to research and

propose economic policies that will prevent further pain and social damage — even where these policies are unappealing to their own donors. Finally, CSOs will need to learn how to engage with a range of international actors and processes that are outside their traditional sphere of interest: the WTO, the Group of Seven/Group of Eight (G-7/G-8), or sub-regional trade groupings such as Mercosur or the Southern African Development Community.

In the political arena, the Summit focused on the United Nations system, non-governmental bodies and civil society. Within the United Nations, the organs that were expected to be of most significance in Summit follow-up were ECOSOC and the Commission for Social Development, though these have advanced little. Progress is further impeded by the G-77 members' preference for large bodies within the central system of the United Nations, rather than considering other means through which they might influence its work. ICSW is one of the only CSOs that has focused on ECOSOC and the Commission for Social Development, but lack of serious commitment within these organizations to developing their global roles in relation to an enabling environment makes it hard to justify expending further scant resources on working with them. CSOs are already beginning to look more to the non-United Nations bodies, such as the G-7/G-8, the Bretton Woods institutions, the OECD and the regional and sub-regional groupings. The question is whether to urge these institutions outside the United Nations system to expand further into the area of social policy, or to persist in trying to strengthen the ECOSOC structure.

A crucial aspect of improving the international political environment is to strengthen the opportunities for CSOs to interact with intergovernmental institutions and processes. This may require them to focus more on achieving timely access to their own government negotiators, rather than concentrating unduly on mass undifferentiated accreditation to large international organizations, rigidly unified submissions, or formal addresses to emptying rooms. Indeed, the mass accreditation of national or local CSOs to intergovernmental institutions may weaken their overall legitimacy and effectiveness, at least at the global level. That might well be the net consequence of the trend toward giving the same access and legitimacy to highly unrepresentative CSOs as to those with well-established member organizations worldwide.

The Summit and other major conferences have kindled interest in establishing global or regional organizations that would "represent" civil society, or at least in convening a "representative assembly" of civil society, perhaps as a parallel to the United Nations General Assembly. The first risk is that the crucial and distinctive strengths of civil society (namely its diversity and flexibility) would thereby be lost. The second is that efforts to preserve and develop responsive governments might be weakened if it were implied that CSO selection processes were on a par with general and democratic elections.

The process of sharpening our focus on social development requires the identification and monitoring of progress (or lack of progress) towards meeting the Summit's priority outcomes, according to credible indicators. Some CSOs tried to get the Summit to agree to a "top 10" list of priority targets for achievement by specified dates. It was agreed, however, that each country should define absolute poverty and set a target date for eliminating it. Only a few countries have done so — a clear target in itself for CSO lobbying. But the United Nations Inter-Agency Task Force on Basic Social Services for All has now developed 10 principal targets. Its work would be strengthened if, instead of developing other indicators and priorities, CSOs and others were now to join in promoting and monitoring these 10 targets. If they were met, poverty would in fact be eliminated.

The Summit documents also reiterate general goals already enshrined in the United Nations Charter, such as full employment, but without giving a workable and measurable definition for them — thus impeding their translation into credible priorities. CSOs could seek to work

on a definition of full employment, or persuade the Commission for Social Development to do so. They might also usefully develop a sustained campaign to promote the UNDP's Human Development Index (HDI) as a summary measure of national well-being and good governance. Such an index is inevitably imprecise, and it would be better to assess changes over the medium term than to invest in ever more sophisticated and detailed refinements, or draw too many conclusions from short-term changes. Nevertheless, the HDI has been of immense significance in capturing the growing sense that national development and human well-being cannot be measured solely in terms of GDP.

A final area in which CSOs must work to monitor progress is that of human rights. The Summit documents emphasize the importance of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Political Rights, and of the United Nations committee responsible for monitoring and promoting observance of the covenant, which relates to matters such as food, housing and employment. At present, countries often do not fulfil their obligations to report regularly on the extent to which these rights are being observed. The position of many CSOs is that the covenant should be "given teeth" by linking its provisions with the international targets agreed at various United Nations conferences and summits, for instance in the field of universal primary education. Thus a country that failed to meet such an agreed target would also be in breach of the covenant. The covenant would also provide a valuable focus for CSOs to mobilize support, present written and oral submissions, and generally increase public awareness of the international machinery that is already in existence.

CSOs could also contribute to ensuring that the regional and sub-regional biennial review meetings, established at the Social Summit, from which individual countries can draw strength if their own national capacity is weak, are supported, publicized and presented with reliable information. ICSW proposes to initiate or support a CSO forum before each such governmental meeting in order to stimulate and focus discussion. This is a practical (and affordable) way for the CSO community to contribute to building up and maintaining momentum on the Social Summit follow-up.

Looking to Copenhagen Plus Five, one possible approach which CSOs might support would be to appoint an independent commission to report to the 2000 review. Another would be for NGOs to unify their activities from 1999; ICSW will be running a series of seminars around the world to help to generate such a focus. There are dangers in moving too rigidly towards the organizational consolidation of civil society, thereby converting it into a quasi-governmental force that will be dominated by its stronger members. It may be far better to establish and strengthen purposeful alliances and linkages around shared priorities, seek the greatest efficiency in working together and retain the diversity that characterizes the sector.

During discussion following Julian Disney's presentation, **Inge Kaul** outlined the major areas in which the UNDP is currently seeking to focus its efforts on poverty eradication. One of these is staff training, in order to raise the organization's own capacity in this area. The UNDP has also set up a platform for discussing the 1997 **Human Development Report**, which introduces new measures of poverty, with CSOs and others. This has occurred despite the feeling in some quarters that the area of social statistics does not require refinement. Another UNDP initiative is the preparation of national human development reports, of which some 75 are in progress.

The UNDP is not looking at poverty in isolation, but seeking to introduce poverty as a cross-cutting issue in sustainable development, gender, employment and so on. Thought is also being given to innovative forms of poverty eradication, and to ways of decelerating the reproduction of poverty: poverty prevention. In addition, the UNDP is also looking at new kinds of development financing and new ways to increase the pool of available resources. The 20:20 initiative is one such method, as are the various micro-credit schemes around the world.

These experiences and ideas would be available to governments trying to set out a national poverty eradication strategy. This is related to a re-examination of development co-operation, both to see what could be done in order to make aid resources more available to poor countries and to promote poverty eradication within OECD countries themselves. The final area in which the UNDP has been active is that of inter-agency co-operation, without which very little can be achieved. While it is critical to move ahead on all these fronts, it is nevertheless more realistic to expect real progress over a period of two decades than to think that progress can be visible within the short space of two years since the Copenhagen Summit.

Session Two — Mobilizing Resources for Social Development

Introducing discussions on realistic and innovative ways to mobilize resources for social development, **Eveline Herfkens**, Chairperson of the session, stressed the need first to improve the use of existing resources. The tendency to tie bilateral aid to procurement, or for aid to be subject to changing donor fashions or hobbies, entails waste and also dilutes any lasting consensus among governments on defining real development priorities. Furthermore, aid should focus on countries that are poor, and on those that are "deserving" in the sense that their social policies are sound. Conditionality should not be oriented exclusively toward meeting economic targets, as was the practice under the old Washington Consensus, but should be related instead to the quality of social policies in the countries concerned.

Second, the impact of multilateral aid on social development should be improved. The changes noted in the World Bank's 1997 **World Development Report** really began six years ago, with its report on poverty. Since then, the Bank's rhetoric has certainly improved, though actual spending patterns have not necessarily kept pace — even if they do now meet the 20:20 target in terms of investment in health and education. It is important not to be mesmerized by such figures. The 20:20 target is not a ceiling, nor does it mean that the money is being spent optimally. In addition, the NGO community could place far more pressure on the Bank to ensure that its lip-service to social issues translates into better practice.

Third, within the United Nations system there is real waste. The various agencies compete with each other, "mission creep" and overlap set in, and there is often resistance to efforts to co-ordinate the work within a common purpose. This occurs not only in agencies, but also within intergovernmental machinery. Nor is it unusual to find that member governments are projecting their own interdepartmental problems onto the system. For instance, a country's social affairs ministry may have disagreements with its own economic affairs ministry on issues of trade and social development. But the battlefield becomes Geneva, in the relations between the WTO and the ILO, rather than settling things at home.

Fourth, an increasing percentage of official development assistance has over the last 10 years been dedicated to humanitarian issues. There are currently too many actors involved, and too large a proportion of limited available resources is being focused on humanitarian assistance at the expense of long-term structural development. In Europe and North America, as elsewhere, development aid has been reduced in the public eye to humanitarian aid. This is a dangerous trend because it ignores the fact that most people are not trying to survive conflict, but simply trying to survive; and at the same time, it undermines the constituency for long-term development aid.

Further, it is important to consider the use to which each country's own resources are put. An examination of public expenditures reveals the extent to which resources and subsidies, national and international, are — or are not — truly benefiting the poor. Often, such resources tend to percolate upwards to the middle classes. In the Netherlands, real efforts have been made to ensure that public spending is "targeted" at those who genuinely need it. As far as government income is concerned, even before tax reform is considered, the main problem to be addressed is often that of poor tax-collection systems.

In terms of new and additional resources for social development, the debate on Special Drawing Rights is already dead and there is only a limited constituency for instruments such as the Tobin Tax. But within the sphere of debt reduction, IMF gold sales may have more potential to generate an additional source of income. Here it should be noted that the way various international NGOs (such as Oxfam) have campaigned for debt reduction, without at the same time insisting on the need to find additional sources of funding (required to cover the cost of cancelling debt), has had very negative consequences. At present, most donor countries are paying for debt reduction initiatives from their existing aid budgets, thus reducing what is available for other countries or purposes. So essentially, it is other developing countries (many of which are also very poor, but have continued to service their foreign debt) that are paying the price. The question about debt reduction is not whether to do it, but how: who pays, and who benefits? Again, many of the NGOs that campaign on debt issues initially argued for unconditional debt write-offs for all highly-indebted least developed countries. But in the case of former Zaire, for instance, this might simply have increased the personal wealth of the former president. Debt reduction *must* therefore be linked to some form of conditionality.

Finally, the Chairperson noted, there are signs that the pendulum is now beginning to swing once more in favour of official development assistance. Both the United Kingdom and Sweden plan to increase their aid budgets, and it should be possible to translate the growing awareness in Europe and elsewhere of issues concerning social cohesion and social values into a broader expression of international solidarity. There is a direct relation between the efforts a country makes to promote national solidarity and its willingness to get similarly involved on an international scale. In fact, opinion polls in the Netherlands and elsewhere consistently show that the general public would be willing to dedicate a higher percentage of their taxes to development co-operation than currently allocated by their governments. Lack of "political will" is often used as a pretext for inaction. The real question here is why politicians themselves lack the will to articulate these views in terms of policy — an area ripe for greater NGO lobbying and activity. In addition, there is room for non-traditional donors from Latin America and Asia to develop assistance programmes. When Dutch development co-operation began in the 1960s, the Netherlands had a lower GDP per capita than some countries that are currently classified as emerging economies.

However, if developing countries are to have the means to invest in people, they must not be marginalized in the global economy. Trade and investment are critical for countries to acquire such resources. It is therefore disturbing to see how unbalanced trade liberalization has been over the last decade. While there is free access to all markets for information technology products, the least developed countries still face serious problems in terms of access to markets for basic commodities.

Key Financial Initiatives at Global and National Levels — Inge Kaul

Taking up the topic of *new* resources for development, and particularly the role of the private sector, **Inge Kaul** stressed the need to move beyond concepts of corporate philanthropy to consider the potential for linking social progress with profit. It is not enough simply to bemoan the lack of resources for development, as is often done within the United Nations and elsewhere. Resources themselves are not the problem. The world is far richer than ever before, with worldwide income having grown seven-fold in the last 50 years. Even taking population increase into account, global income has still more than doubled. So why is the international community so poor when it comes to development? Some have focused on the need for budgetary restructuring, or on the need to cut military expenditures and even certain subsidies. Yet the private sector is now responsible for generating three quarters of the world's income. And since it is unlikely that sustainable human development goals can be achieved

simply through tinkering with the existing frameworks, the challenge is to get access to private finance and ensure that it is better harnessed to social development objectives.

There is a widespread assumption that private finance and development do not mix. However, it is worth recalling how thinking about physical infrastructure has changed over the last 10 years. The construction of roads, dams, and so on used to be left to the technical experts with advice from economists on cost-benefit ratios. Today, it would be impossible to proceed without also taking into account the social and environmental impact of such projects. So, why allow financial infrastructure to be designed only by the financial "whiz kids"? Why not ask how today's financial instruments and institutions affect development? Given the tremendous growth in financial markets, the time has indeed come to ask about their social dimensions.

The cover design of the 1992 **Human Development Report** illustrated in the form of a champagne glass that the richest 15 per cent of the world's population, which is concentrated in the North, enjoys 85 per cent of its wealth and economic opportunities, and vice versa. In pursuing the theme of private finance for development, Kaul's ambition is to perforate this glass so that the wealth at the top indeed flows through all social classes the world over.

What do financial markets and institutions look like today? In fact, much has been achieved, for some, through economic liberalization. And this should enable money to move from capital-rich countries to opportunity-rich countries, which are mainly in the South. Current economic growth rates are twice as high in developing countries as in the industrialized North. The removal of controls over capital flows is *potentially* good for development. The total stock of assets traded in global markets has risen from US\$ 5 trillion in 1980 to US\$ 80 trillion today, a 16-fold increase. National stock markets have emerged worldwide, from 50 in 1987 to 125 today. Much of this money flows to developing countries. For instance, between 1990 and 1997, such flows went up from US\$ 40 billion to US\$ 240 billion. It is true that 80 per cent of these flows go to only twelve developing countries. But this is because the others still pose too high a financial risk, or have insufficiently developed markets.

It is also often claimed that the current financial flows to developing countries are unsustainable. This is not so. An increasing number of developing countries are indeed becoming credit-worthy and receiving good investment ratings. Further, there is an expanding pool of money becoming available in the industrialized countries. For instance, pension funds alone could potentially add US\$ 50 billion to the money available for investment in developing countries. The Tobin Tax initiative *is* still under discussion, albeit not in a public way, one reason being that the liberalization of markets also makes it desirable to ensure uniform standards of taxation worldwide.

How can still greater private investment be encouraged? First, it is important to get outside the existing somewhat closed circles of development professionals and find ways to set up joint initiatives. One such attempt is called "Money Matters — Private Finance for Development". Launched at the Social Summit, this project brings together national and international policy makers and international development organizations, as well as private fund managers. The latter do indeed have a keen interest in development. This is, of course, motivated primarily by the higher growth rates in developing countries; but also by the awareness of the need to reduce risk factors by promoting further development. The first challenge is to see how best to link the availability of this money with development co-operation, and to enable developing countries to manage any such funds wisely. The second challenge is to see how far it is possible to ensure that such investment does not simply produce growth for its own sake, but that it enhances sustainable human development.

Reality is sometimes more innovative than theory, and Money Matters takes its cue from this. One interesting initiative already taking place is the "bundling" of small-scale credit needs in order to make them accessible to large financial managers. For instance, both the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and BancoSol in Bolivia have moved into issuing bonds, essentially becoming wholesale purchasers of credit, which can then be sold by them at the local level. Grameen is also proposing the idea of debt-for-micro-credit swaps, whereby in countries in which debt reductions or write-offs are being considered, the resources so released should be targeted at the micro-credit sector. A second initiative concerns the recognition of new assets. Here, the inspiration is drawn from the housing sector in the United States in the 1970s. As the country faced a serious housing shortage, "mortgage-backed securities" — whereby the promise of repayment of a housing loan was viewed as an asset — were used to make funds available for additional loans within the sector. Similar initiatives have now sprung up in developing countries, and in areas such as solar energy. Finally, while many investments have a short time horizon, there are ways to encourage financiers to take a longer term view. Countries such as Chile, Colombia and South Korea have imposed a small national tax on capital flows. Capital flows might improve by offering tax incentives for profits derived from longer term investment and incorporating these within existing quarterly company performance ratings.

The overall aim in bringing in greater private financing for development is to release public funding for those sectors in which it is vital. But the first goal of business is to make money. Social responsibility needs to come as much from the consumer as from public regulatory measures, for instance through eco- or social labelling. The whole area of capacity building is also extremely important, equipping people and organizations to understand banking and investment markets better. That said, the role of the government in pulling private enterprise in the right direction remains critical — to set standards, supervise, monitor and perhaps offer subsidized or collateral bonds. Bringing *in* private finance certainly does not mean that government should be pushed *out*.

Networks for Mobilizing Human Resources — Cees Hamelink

Cees Hamelink further underscored the need for a firm and principled framework to regulate the private sector, particularly in the area of new information and communication technologies which, by definition, cross national and other frontiers. Many proponents of the Global Information Infrastructure (GII) do seem to believe that "casino capitalism" and electronic technology will somehow advance the social agenda, leading to better health care and education, full employment, sustainable development and participatory democracy. Undeniably, the networks and forms of communication that are emerging today have great potential. The question is how to realize this potential and create alternatives to most existing channels of communication whose purposes are simply commercial. At least three major obstacles lie in the path.

The first is the reality within which these networks develop: the New Global Communications Order that was first being discussed in the 1970s. The emerging information and communication sector already represents some 25 per cent of world trade, yielding US\$ 1.5 trillion each year. An unprecedented wave of mergers is further increasing this trade. By the twenty-first century, it is widely anticipated that most of the world's information will be produced by some six major conglomerates.

Moreover, the Internet is more likely to become the world's largest medium for advertising and brain-damaging "infotainment" than a vehicle for messages about social development.

The second major obstacle is that this industry enjoys the active support and protection of most governments worldwide. For instance, a WTO agreement signed by 68 governments in January 1997 removes the right of these governments to establish national policies to

encourage citizens to participate in the Net, since these would be defined as "anti-competitive" under the terms of the agreement, and would be considered to impose undue burdens on foreign competitors. An industry spokesman hailed this agreement as opening a new wave of mergers — and, ultimately, monopolies.

The third and immense obstacle is the massive disparity in access to such technology. The figures are always disquieting. The world has one billion telephones, over three quarters of which are used by only 15 per cent of the world's population. Fewer than 6 per cent of the world's computers that provide access to the Internet are to be found outside North America and Western Europe. To reverse this will require enormous resources. For example, to get 15 per cent of the Filipino population onto the Internet would require an investment of over US\$ 12 billion. To improve telephone density in sub-Saharan Africa from the current 0.47 to one for every 100 inhabitants would require at least US\$ 10 billion. Even to make the Internet universally available within the United States would require a massive investment in the technology itself.

The United Nations Secretary-General has accepted a report on this issue by an inter-agency administrative committee and has agreed that electronic communication is of concern to the United Nations. It is critical that this be seen as a political and not merely a technical problem. Serious disquiet within some of the United Nations specialized agencies, such as WIPO, the ITU and UNESCO, needs to be articulated and addressed more openly. We must urgently rethink the wisdom of deregulatory policies and totally liberalized information markets. We must review the relevance of public funding and public responsibility for what will become the world's largest network and infrastructure. While efforts are going on to leverage more private funding for development, here is a case of too much private (and largely unaccountable) funding. For as things currently stand, and with the blessing of the G-7 nations, the construction of the largest infrastructure the planet has ever witnessed — the global super-information highway — will be accomplished solely through private funding and will remain entirely in private hands. This must surely rank as an example of a most serious abdication of governments' public and collective responsibilities.

Social actors have invested great energy in women's issues, the environment and human rights, but less in the field of communication. An International Platform for the Democratization of Communications has recently been created, as has the People's Communication Charter movement. But these are still little known, and largely running to catch up with events. In terms of how to go about reversing current trends, so that they contribute to social development, the present scenario is grim. This enormous challenge is one that must involve governments and multilateral agencies, as well as ordinary men and women worldwide in order to create an appropriate cultural environment for future generations.

Other speakers emphasized the need to get beyond invocations of a "lack of political will" and to examine the precise sources of the resistance to sustainable human development, manifested through a worsening of the situation of many millions of people. As rapid changes in the field of communication show, the issue is less one of technical advance than of the growing inequality in access to the benefits that technological change can bring. If private corporations are to be socially responsible — though their main purpose is to make profit — then specific criteria must be developed in order to hold them accountable for their behaviour. Economic growth and the pursuit of profit does not automatically lead to an improvement in the quality of human life. The task for development professionals and others is to set out appropriate norms for socially responsible business behaviour in the future.

Session Three — Learning from Successes in Social Development

Posing the question of *how* to learn from success, **Mary Chinery-Hesse** stressed the importance of first defining what constitutes success in social development. It is common to use measurable indicators — relating to health, education and so on. However, certain non-measurable indicators are equally or more important, and affect people and societies in different ways. Human rights, and issues of freedom and governance, cannot be separated from social development. Exclusion and marginalization are difficult to measure, but lie at the heart of social development as defined at the Social Summit. How can these realities be captured and understood in relation to what is perceived as success?

For instance, experience in Africa over the last 20 years has been marked by structural adjustment, intended to stabilize the economies of the sub-Saharan region. Results have been mixed. The policy focus has been on economics rather than on the social sectors, for which funds have been severely cut. The process has caused real hardship and distress, even leading to social disturbances and to widespread demoralization. Yet people must be fully part of any economic recovery process. Their positive energy is critical to sustainable development. Quality of life indicators must therefore be looked at alongside economic indicators, for while an economy may be performing well in macro terms, this "success" may mask extensive human suffering and latent social unrest. Some African countries have achieved economic "success" through the barrel of a gun. And studies by the ILO have shown the impact that public investment decisions have on the social sector. To deviate from an emphasis on human resource development, health and education can have damaging long-term effects on a society's future potential to develop. Rates of return on investments are only one side of the coin; involving the workforce in such investments is the other.

For adjustment programmes to be sustainable, they must balance the social and the economic, giving high priority to human rights and freedoms. This raises the question: should economic success be sought at any cost? The economic pie may grow, but there may be nobody to eat it if the process of producing it has been a destructive one. This takes us back to the issue of confusing means with ends.

Successful Experiences: Historical, Political, Economic and Cultural Dimensions — Dharam Ghai

Examining the ingredients of success, **Dharam Ghai** reported on a comparative study undertaken by UNRISD entitled "Social Development and Public Policies: Lessons from Successful Experiences". This research sought to understand why six low per capita income countries (and one state within a federated country) — Chile, China, Costa Rica, Cuba, Kerala, Sri Lanka and Viet Nam — have been so successful in certain areas that are critical to social development, principally health and education, along with gender equity, poverty reduction and social security. The study took place against the background of a world in which 14 million children under the age of five die each year. Of the world's one billion illiterate adults, 600 million are women. Over 300 million children receive no schooling, and 1.5 billion people lack access to health services.

Yet the state of Kerala, India, for instance, which has one of the world's lowest per capita incomes, has a life expectancy of 73 years, which is comparable to that in the world's richest countries; similarly Chile's is 74 years, Cuba's is 75 years, and Costa Rica's is 76 years. All seven cases under examination have adult literacy rates of over 90 per cent, which is similar to that of many richer nations. All have universal primary education, with no gender discrimination in this respect. The fertility rate in Kerala is 1.8, and in Cuba is 1.7 — lower than in several industrialized countries. Each of these countries or states shows a high level of gender equity; in some, women have higher social indicators than men. The social and

economic status of women has been shown to have a positive correlation with overall performance in social development; and this synergy is strongest in cases where social programmes are focused on meeting the needs of women. The study thus demonstrates that high infant mortality, high adult illiteracy and gender inequity are not inevitably associated with a low per capita income, and it seeks to identify some of the practical elements that might help to reverse the situation elsewhere.

The UNRISD research sought to explain the superior social performance of these countries in terms of an integrated political economy approach. This included attention to historical and cultural factors; the role of political ideologies, parties, and social movements; the resources allocated to social programmes; the institutional framework for organizing and delivering social services; and economic efficiency. It also involved disaggregating information by gender.

What lessons can be drawn from these findings? The first is that there is no single explanatory factor underlying success. The cases vary immensely in terms of history, religion, cultural characteristics, ethnic diversity, political systems and backgrounds, per capita income, economic structure and growth rates. However, four common factors can be said to underpin their achievements.

1. A strong governmental commitment to the *universal* provisioning of basic social services. This is not the monopoly of any one kind of political system, but has been achieved under everything from monarchy to communism, from authoritarian régimes to liberal multi-party democracies. Sometimes this has been the expressed priority of the régime in power, sometimes the achievements have been won through political competition.
2. The state has played a key role, albeit with wide variations in the institutional frameworks for the involvement of central, regional or local government; as well as in the relationship between the private and public sectors. For instance, in China most health and education services are provided by provincial government, while in Costa Rica and Cuba the central government plays a key role. In Kerala and, increasingly, in China and Viet Nam, there is a combination of private and public sector funding in the health and education fields, while in Chile, there is far greater private involvement in these sectors. However, in each case the state has assumed the principal responsibility for universal provisioning of basic services like primary health care, adult literacy and primary schooling. In none has the private sector alone been able to secure such universal provisioning.
3. While in some of the cases studied a substantial proportion of GDP was devoted to the social sector, in others the allocation was quite modest. What mattered more was *how* the money was spent. Each is characterized by the emphasis on *universal* provision of key basic services. Thus each has given priority to infant vaccination; professional or institutional care during childbirth; nutrition programmes for mothers, infants, and children; nation-wide clinics providing basic health services; mass literacy campaigns; and universal and free primary education.
4. In common with other developing countries, most of the cases studied have experienced periods of economic crisis. Cuba's GDP has fallen by nearly 60 per cent in the 1990s. Costa Rica went through a major economic crisis in the 1980s, as did Sri Lanka in the 1970s. In each case, however, these countries sought to protect their social programmes through the management of their stabilization and structural adjustment programmes. None of them sought to "roll back" the state at the expense of such achievements; and there was significant cross-party consensus on what constituted these achievements, and on their importance.

Beyond these shared elements, individual circumstances and approaches have varied widely. Four of the cases studied (Chile, Costa Rica, Sri Lanka and the state of Kerala) perhaps enjoyed some historical advantage in terms of social sector performance, in some cases dating

back over a century. Indeed, Kerala's advance in the nineteenth century was to an extent due to the role of an enlightened monarchy, taken forward by strong social movements that helped to eliminate religious and caste conflicts whose roots go back to ancient times. It might be said, then, that these countries have simply maintained their early lead. But it is still necessary to understand what factors contributed to that lead. On the other hand, others in the study, such as China and Viet Nam, were among the world's poorest countries 50 years ago, with very high levels of infant mortality and illiteracy, and low levels of schooling and life expectancy. It was the socialist revolution, with its emphasis on equality and universal access to basic services, which was at the root of their success.

In essence, we see that it *is* possible for very poor countries to achieve health and educational indicators that match those of countries with 100 times their per capita income. Finance is not a key constraint since most of the social programmes in question are not massively expensive; though if social progress is not backed up with good economic performance, questions of sustainability do inevitably arise. State capacity may be a limiting factor, and sometimes skills, but these are problems that are relatively easy to overcome. Economic growth may be slow, and the economy dominated by agriculture, but these characteristics do not in themselves pose insuperable difficulties. In most cases, then, political commitment remains the central issue.

So while there exist cases of social success and economic failure, or social failure and economic success, success in both depends on integrating ends as well as means. For while economic development is only a means, social development is both a means and an end in itself. **Rehman Sobhan** also observed that most of the successes identified in the study were registered outside the logic of the market economy, and had been achieved through political agendas that had a social and public purpose, rather than simply the maximization of profit. This points both to the need to rethink the state, and to recognize the importance of ideas and values in the pursuit of social development.

The Challenge of Learning from Experience — Guy Standing

Returning to the question of how to define success in social development, **Guy Standing** addressed how earlier achievements can be maintained in the face of the rapid change and insecurity now facing many countries. It is unwise to use a small number of indicators as proxy measures of social success, especially if these are divorced from the social or historical context. To do so may lead to reading a single meaning into a statistic whose real significance varies considerably from place to place, and may thus misinterpret social realities. What is needed is to recover, or regenerate, a wider vision of success.

In terms of such visions, the period from 1945 until the mid-1970s saw the competing claims of welfare capitalism and state socialism — models which were variously exported to developing countries. In spite of their differences, both saw desirable society as being based on the interests of the *labouring man*, and the satisfaction of his basic needs and aspirations. In communist societies, men and women were expected to be in full-time wage labour for as long as possible, while welfare capitalism aimed at full employment and measured its own social success in terms of full-time male employment.

Common to both was the focus on the labouring man, with women's social progress implicitly measured in terms of how nearly they approached his status. Means and ends were confused in such a way that it was unclear whether employment was a basic need, alongside food, health and shelter. But these models can be seen in terms of offering *seven forms of personal security* (in addition to national security), each of which constituted a yardstick of "social success".

1. *Income security*: With their prime focus on the interests of the industrial working-class labouring man, both models offered minimum wages and a freedom of contract (as opposed to feudalistic practices). Welfare capitalism offered men in the labour market some form of social insurance, to cover interrupted earning power. The communist model organized "cradle-to-grave" social benefits associated with a collective workplace. Both aimed to reduce economic polarization, assuming that inequality would diminish with economic growth. In fact, both systems did see improvements in income security. But such success was unsustainable since its basic premises were unsound.
2. *Reproduction security*: Both welfarist and functional in origin, this covered basic rights to form families, and to have access to schooling and health services, as well as selective provision of training opportunities in order to enhance the capacity of the labour force. While much progress was made, this favoured men far more than women. Furthermore, there was a tendency to confuse schooling with education, and training with craftsmanship.
3. *Labour market security*: Both development models postulated the objective and the attainability of full (male) employment. In Western industrialized economies, such commitment did lead to almost full male employment (with measured unemployment rates of 4.5 per cent in the United States). However, as women asserted their right to equal economic treatment, this yardstick of success became a mirage.
4. *Employment security*: Aimed again at the labouring man, this offered protection against arbitrary dismissal from employment, imposed costs for making workers redundant, and provided benefits for workers losing jobs. This image of a society with everyone in secure employment was central to the communist system. In welfare capitalism, too, the edifice of social insurance rested on people being in stable employment. The contributions and entitlements basis of the welfare state is undermined if large numbers of people are only intermittently employed. However, as working patterns and priorities evolve, the focus on achieving employment security for a few may also impede thinking about the future of other forms of security.
5. *Job security*: While this relates to the former, it concerns access to specific occupations and jobs rather than employment in general. Employers as well as the state saw job security largely in functional terms consistent with mass production, and hence with long-term assignment to specific fields of endeavour. However, this form of security is increasingly unsustainable under pressures of globalization.
6. *Work security*: Institutional regulatory mechanisms to provide for health and safety measures in the workplace were, under both systems, intended to protect people from work-related illness and accident; and to provide compensation for victims. It is worth remembering that this is as important a benchmark of success in social development as more conventional measures, such as years of schooling.
7. *Representation security*: Both systems fostered the collective representation of workers as the only way to put effective pressure on élites, and thus to improve the absolute and relative position of labour. Regrettably, the communist system perverted this principle by making trade unions serve as organs of the Party. Elsewhere, trade unions were often the most progressive force for achieving greater security in a number of fields. Even so, their role has been largely limited to defending the position of the labouring man.

While there was consensus on the need to strengthen these seven forms of security until the mid-1970s, the meaning of "success" was being vociferously challenged by the 1980s. Some critics viewed the agenda of security as one that protected relatively privileged "insiders" or the "labouring aristocracy". To counter this, the *basic needs* approach to development defined success in terms of access by the poor to food, shelter and clothing. The *informal sector* became romanticized, particularly by those whose intellectual roots were in the social democratic tradition. A neo-liberal form of critique assumed intellectual hegemony in the 1980s and 1990s. This argued that much of what had passed for success was actually failure — and might even prevent success in the future.

The agenda of success based on the extension of security does entail problems. Security may induce passivity and a sense of "dependency", especially if it is used as a means of social control or when the chances to achieve independent competencies and standards of living are restricted. This occurred with state socialism. Meanwhile, critics of welfare capitalism have depicted sources of security as being sources of "rigidity". Neither system could handle or tolerate diversity, or could be applied to societies that are not based on the labouring man. The nature of the state was also problematic. The communist state could control, by limiting individual autonomy; but it did so at the expense of removing incentives for behaviour other than passivity or opportunism. The welfare capitalist state was unable to provide labour market and income security in the context of globalization. Policy makers came to believe that macro-economic policy should be used to control inflation, not to generate full employment.

Intellectually and politically, then, the 1980s and 1990s became an *era of insecurity*, with many forms of security being depicted as costs to be reduced, rather than as vital achievements. Reviewing the seven forms of security described earlier:

1. *Income security* was eroded, with tolerance of much higher levels of poverty and inequality, coupled with a shift in the nature of social protection.
2. *Reproduction security* was eroded by cuts in social spending, lower anticipated employment stability, and the intensification of technological change.
3. *Labour market security* was abandoned, with acceptance of much higher levels of unemployment.
4. *Employment security* was rejected by many analysts as a rigidity and labour cost.
5. *Job security* was seen as incompatible with flexibility and competitiveness.
6. *Work security* was eroded by more flexible labour practices, the pressure to cut labour costs, and the growing hostility to collective protection regulations.
7. *Representation security* was weakened by de-unionization and the marginalization of union federations in economic policy-making and supervision.

In the industrialized economies, the attack on security has come through *deregulation*, following the belief that regulations are justified only if they contribute to economic growth. Success is then seen in terms of how far policy can roll back the regulatory fence; and it is measured through tracking the level of inflation, the reduction of budget deficits, the decline of welfare provision, tax cuts and the extent of privatization. While the public sector used to be seen as providing security through services, transfers and protective regulations, such measures were eventually criticized for "crowding out" the private sector, which was in turn the *only* part of the economy supposedly capable of creating income and jobs. Even on its own terms, however, this new approach to success has been paid for through greater insecurity.

In developing countries, the shift in economic thinking has mainly taken the form of *structural adjustment programmes*, many of which have been adopted under actual or anticipated external pressure. Success has been measured in terms of reductions in the size and scope of the public sector, measures to ensure labour market flexibility, the creation of a central bank concerned overwhelmingly with controlling inflation, and ensuring national competitiveness. Already weak by comparison with the industrialized market economies, most systems to ensure the security of the individual in these countries have been pushed to the margin.

The ex-communist countries had a special brand of structural adjustment known as *shock therapy*. The overthrow of oppressive régimes there was a great achievement, raising *freedom* to a more prominent place in the definition of success. Freedom is at the core of human development, and while one cannot value freedom on an empty stomach, neither can one give meaning to human development without freedom and security: success must be measured in

part against improvements in both areas. Security without freedom leads to stagnation, and precludes success. Freedom without security leads to a Hobbesian world of chaos, where success is measured by survivors in their own image.

Shock therapy represented an idealized version of the market economy. Nobody could oppose liberalization, or the rolling back of an oppressive state. Liberty was thus easily equated with small government. Shock therapy entailed a sequencing of economic reforms in which price liberalization was to be followed by a stabilization policy, which meant making sharp cuts in public expenditure in order to squeeze out the inflationary pressures unleashed by price liberalization. For various reasons, including pent-up consumer demand and the existing monopolistic production structure, these pressures were intense. The stabilization and deflation package was therefore very severe, with resulting drops in output and incomes, rising poverty rates and soaring unemployment. The longer term cost of what critics have called *state desertion* includes a lack of investment in social services and in other parts of the state-owned economy.

Other "costs" are reflected in the fact that in the last decade, the life expectancy of men in Russia alone has fallen by seven years (and by one year among women), resulting in the largest differential in the world between the sexes: 58 years for men, and 72 years for women. The mortality rate of young men has risen by 68 per cent over the same period, and suicides have tripled. While the social tragedy affects everyone, men have borne the brunt of unemployment and displacement from their normal social roles, while women have proved better able to use and adapt their existing survival skills.

The third part of reform sequencing was the creation of a *social safety net* to assist the victims of the process by providing income security to cover the contingencies of a market economy. Initially, a mix of social insurance and designated "funds" were set up, including unemployment benefits. However, as demands rose along with poverty and unemployment, so contributions were falling due to the plunge in production and the drift of the economy into untaxed informal activities. This led to internal and external pressure to cut public expenditure and to "target" benefits and restrict entitlements. Furthermore, social policy itself was to be partially privatized, to produce a "two-tier" system whereby state benefits were to be used only as a last resort.

Next in the intended sequencing of reforms was *mass privatization*. But without adequate regulations, and with a weakened public sector, this process often allowed élites and insider groups (and even foreign advisers) to amass fabulous wealth and power. Asset stripping, according to some accounts, has been endemic. The success of the few is thus set against the economic insecurity of the majority.

What can we learn from these experiences? First, we see that as private provision grows, so the social consensus in favour of comprehensive public provision is eroded. Social welfare is only likely to be protected if the principle of solidarity is preserved, so that everyone feels they have a stake in the system.

Second, it is clear that "targeting" is a euphemism for cost-cutting, which is a prescription for more intensified insecurity. At best, the social safety net has large holes through which many of the poor drop into destitution and, in many cases, premature death.

Third, deregulation itself needs to be regulated, and this takes time. Simply scrapping old rules and introducing new ones can result in the rise in informal activity mentioned above, while there may also be a serious loss of trained and experienced professionals from a poorly-paid and insecure public sector into better remunerated private employment.

Fourth, insecurity and societal fragmentation bring the dangers of mass recidivism on the one hand, and social implosion on the other. In the former, we might see a growing number of people looking to populism and authoritarianism as the answer to the pervasive economic opportunism of an unbridled market economy. This might result from the massive enrichment of a minority, with endemic insecurity and dysfunctional social protection systems consigning a substantial minority to social exclusion. Some have already depicted the transition as a matter of "losing a generation", seeing the elderly as dispensable. This cynicism is deplorable. But it remains true that internationally, no index or measure of societal success has taken into account the condition of society's older members.

Thus, success in Eastern Europe depends on where the observer stands. For society, the great success is political democracy. For the privileged, it is economic freedom. In the 1980s, fear changed sides. Those on the edges of official society succeeded in finding their voice, and said that enough was enough. The tragedy of the 1990s is that there has not yet been any corresponding improvement in the living conditions of the majority. Fear has changed sides once again, and those on the edge of society have found the political democracy and economic freedom they won to be the illusions of the epoch.

The challenge today is to generate a vision that balances security with dynamic efficiency, so that such dynamism is based on distributive justice. This depends on ensuring that the voices of the insecure, the losers in society, are represented and heard. Without this, there is little chance of social as well as economic success. But if these voices come together, then there are real grounds for optimism.

Session Four — Ethnic Diversity and Social Harmony

Introducing UNRISD's comparative research on ethnic conflict and development, and ethnic diversity and public policy, **Yusuf Bangura**, Chairperson of the session, drew attention to the intimate connections between these subjects and that of social integration, as defined at the Social Summit. It is hard to place a figure on the number of ethnic groups around the world, in part because there are both objective and subjective criteria by which an ethnic group can be defined. For instance, the former might include a common language, religion, territory or cultural history, even though not all of these attributes are equally shared among a given group of people. Subjective criteria reflect the ways in which people might want to define themselves: for instance, one group of Ibo people in Nigeria chose to change its ethnic identity after the civil war. A further factor is that ethnicity changes over time. The same groups have not always been in their present locations, and some ethnic groups have disappeared, while others have emerged. Finally, people have multiple identities. In a multi-ethnic setting, people may be able to trace different lineages even within one family.

Given the problems of defining ethnicity, some have sought to use language as the single most important factor; and there are some 8,000 language-based ethnic groups worldwide, most of them co-existing with others in 185 nation states. With economic globalization and the growth in international migration, even nations which previously considered themselves homogeneous are now multi-ethnic. Some have maintained that these processes will lead to greater homogeneity and uniformity in terms of language, religion and cultural practices. A more balanced view might be to recognize the co-existence of certain homogeneous factors (such as institutions and values), along with the opportunities to promote ethnic and cultural identities beyond national frontiers. For example, although the Internet empowers the already powerful, it also opens up new communication possibilities among groups who were previously remote from each other and permits them to transcend the specificities of their own ethnic boundaries.

The human management of ethnic diversity has been mixed. At one extreme is genocide, dating back to the European expansion into the Americas or Asia, and seen also in the

Holocaust, as well as more recently in Rwanda and Burundi. Then come models of separation and domination, the clearest example being that of the apartheid régime in South Africa. Separatism and secession form another way of handling ethnic diversity, as in the cases of Eritrea, Bangladesh and the break-up of the former Soviet Union. Benign integration, for instance through inter-marriage, migration and social interaction, does not depend on any form of compulsion to come together. For instance, the Fulani and Hausa people in Nigeria are now so inter-mingled that they speak of a Hausa-Fulani identity. Another form of managing ethnic diversity is through local autonomy, civil rights and power sharing — one of the most successful examples of which can be seen in Switzerland. By contrast, countries such as the United States, in common with most liberal Western democracies, have dealt with ethnic difference not primarily through power sharing among autonomous groups, but through promoting individual civil rights and competition.

The question of ethnicity has become very prominent with the collapse of the Soviet Union and of authoritarian or totalitarian systems in Africa. Prolonged economic recession, and the demise of institutions that were able to safeguard society, have brought ethnic cleavages to the fore. Two major dilemmas then arise. The first revolves around the principle of universality — the long-standing aspiration to create a world in which ethnic, religious and other divisive social cleavages play no part in determining public policy and in shaping human interaction. Two powerful instruments of universalism have traditionally been the market and democracy. These can be seen as aiming to remove the legal barriers to equality. However, not everyone starts out with the same resource endowments; labour markets are often structured in ways that benefit some, but not others; and social stratification means that certain groups have been "put down" or oppressed in ways that make it hard for them to compete in an open manner. The market and democracy are therefore, in practice, very blunt instruments for handling the complexities of ethnic diversity.

The second dilemma arises from the responses to such inequities. Redistributive policies, for instance, may focus on proportionality, affirmative action and constitutional arrangements for minorities, power sharing within national institutions, and the introduction of multi-cultural education. However, while such policies may be successful in removing some of the distortions of the market, efforts to redistribute resources might also benefit certain groups, or members of those groups, at the expense of others. The special arrangements themselves might encourage the formation of new interest groups and rent-seeking behaviour which would tend to impede better expressions of energy and creativity. A further problem is that such arrangements can tend to reinforce ethnic boundaries rather than enabling them to be overcome.

The challenge is to combine a merit-based market system and democracy with institutional mechanisms to address distortions inherent in most redistributive arrangements, and in particular to minimize the risk of creating vested interests around these policies. Redistributive schemes and policies need to be subject to periodic review, so that they can be adapted or dropped when they cease to be appropriate, or once their targets have been met. The goal is to ensure that the principle of universality is sensitive to ethnic diversity, without allowing those rights and institutions that were crafted in order to protect weaker groups to fall captive to divisive ethnic interests.

Economic, Social and Cultural Policies — Ralph Premdas

Underlying the question of ethnicity, **Ralph Premdas** stressed, are a number of social processes, the understanding of which is the key to developing the best mechanisms and arrangements for dealing with the problems that arise. There are no absolute success stories in this field. Nevertheless, certain economic, social, political, cultural and ethical ideals may help to bring about positive solutions to conflictual ethnic diversity.

Cultural pluralism has been associated with internal strife that has often spilled over borders, destabilized international peace and security, and contributed to humanitarian crises. Such strife has been the most frequent source of open armed conflict in recent years, accounting for some four million deaths in 1993-1994, and for most of the world's 40 million or so refugees and displaced persons. All but five of the 23 wars raging in 1994 were based on communal rivalries or ethnic challenges to the state. The central issue is to establish a widely acceptable, just and democratic government where there are such deep levels of distrust. It might be said that the state is very much to blame for many such conflicts. The boundaries of most Third World countries were arbitrarily defined by others, so that peoples who had lived separately for centuries found themselves sharing a common border. The colonial period was characterized by divide and rule policies, so that by the time independence was obtained, many such communities had not evolved a working relationship that would enable them to co-exist. However, short of destroying the state, the basic task is to design a framework of government that will accommodate the divergent claims of respective communities for equity and autonomy, as they see it.

Peaceful accommodative practices appear to be rare and are seldom lasting. Rather, the most prevalent policies and practices in dealing with ethno-nationalist challenges point to domination and repression. But multi-ethnicity and cultural diversity persist and can rarely be entirely erased or suppressed. And most multi-ethnic states have, in fact, evolved a pattern of inter-communal regulation, though this tends to undergo periodic crises and breakdowns. Thus, insights into how to solve current problems are more likely to be found in a country's own history than in alien imports. This is the case because policies to regulate and resolve such crises are not merely technical or neutral devices, but embody a contest over cultural claims as well as symbolic and material values. The solutions are, therefore, as culturally bound as the problems.

According to Premdas, ethnicity can be defined as collective group consciousness that imparts a sense of belonging derived from membership in a community that is bound putatively by common descent and culture. Belonging is as vital a human need as food, drink, security, freedom of movement. Without it, an individual feels, in the words of Isaiah Berlin, "cut off, lonely, diminished, unhappy". People cannot develop without belonging to a cultural community, such as an ethnic group. And it is this profound need to belong that explains why inter-ethnic strife is often so irrational, passionate and ruthless, and persists even after material needs have been met.

Accommodation must be based on certain agreed principles, taking as a point of departure the recognition by each community of the right of the other(s) to exist within the boundaries of the state. However difficult to concede, this recognition is a symbolic as well as a substantive affirmation of a willingness to co-exist in a shared membership in the nation. Territorial sharing can be so arranged that it accommodates diversity and separation without destroying the integrity of the state. Nevertheless, equality may be a problem where a history of asymmetrical distribution of privileges has become embedded in institutions and customary practices. What is important is a guaranteed undertaking in public policy to overcome such forces so that equal opportunities are available to all, and so that imbalances will not persist indefinitely. Equality is intimately tied to participation and access to collective decision-making in all aspects of state behaviour, and also relates to the recognition of the cultural symbols and practices of each community. Recognition of the intrinsic self-definition of a group is as important as equality of access to resources. Public events such as official state ceremonies, or the celebration of festivals and holidays, should thus embody respect for each community. Finally, whatever charter of understanding binds various peoples and communities together, it must be marked by a *sense* of fairness. What is perceived as fair in any given circumstance is not only bound up with the distribution of material assets, but also

has psycho-social dimensions. Only the people involved can be the ultimate arbiters of what, for them, constitutes fairness.

Public policy can play a central part in either aggravating or ameliorating conditions for inter-ethnic peace and harmony, and contributes most to the disparities and discrimination against alienated communal sections in the majority of multi-ethnic states. Many contend that inter-ethnic conflict is a function of inequity, and that if resources are fairly and predictably allocated among groups within a given context (through such devices as quotas, proportions or shares) such conflict will be resolved. Obviously, the distribution of resources is important. However, it does not in itself explain (or resolve) inter-ethnic crisis. Since human beings establish their identities primarily *by comparison* with others, equity is psychological as well as material: it is about how people *perceive* things. People's claims and their perception of equity are wrapped around their own sense of history and their own cultural symbols. It becomes less important that a group rationally understands that its behaviour is inimical to its own interests, than for it to ensure that its ethnic adversary not be advantaged over it in any way. Resource allocation is thus a cultural event, and so must engage with the cultural formation and identity processes of each community.

It is commonly argued that one way to accommodate a multiplicity of ethnic communities within the state is through a policy of multi-culturalism. There are two variants to this. The first revolves around a shared understanding and recognition of multi-cultural symbols, at the same time that leadership, public offices, resources, posts and space are equitably apportioned. Countries that manage their policies in this way include Canada and the United States, each of which has settled values and institutional structures. The second variant applies to situations in which there are no such shared values, and where social cleavages are deep. Here, multi-culturalism must be a strategy that embodies power sharing, not merely the decorative or band-aid concessions to the festivals, diets or dress of different groups. Countries such as Nigeria, India and Fiji fall into this category.

Rather than partition or secession, a federal structure allows for power sharing at a central level, with many devolved powers. In some cases, such as the European Union, power may be devolved to regional bodies (not necessarily governments) that sometimes cross national boundaries. Regionalism may have some potential to defuse territorially-bound conflicts, by enabling people to see their destiny in a larger arena. In the case of Northern Ireland, for instance, the situation might be quite different if, instead of negotiating with the British state, the parties were negotiating with the European Union. The image of two spiders in a bottle depicts the nature of bipolar conflict. But if they are released from the bottle, their horizons would expand and the conflict might be defused. Another approach might entail corporate representation, which would also allow communities to find expression within a body that offers them access and voice. Negotiation, and occasionally third-party or international intervention, may be needed to resolve cases where collective rights are invoked and then used to deny the rights of certain individuals, sets of people or members of other groups.

Institutions and Mechanisms for Power Sharing — J. 'Bayo Adeganye

'Bayo Adeganye stressed that such power sharing is the antithesis of the zero-sum or "winner takes all" implications of majoritarianism. Furthermore, to produce civil peace in deeply divided multi-ethnic settings, democracy (or any attempts to institutionalize it) must adopt non-majoritarian principles of power sharing. Four basic characteristics of power sharing have been identified by Arend Lijphart: executive power sharing among the representatives of all significant groups; a high degree of internal autonomy for groups that wish to have it; proportional representation and proportional allocation of civil service positions and public funds; and a minority veto on the most vital issues. These characteristics formed part of a set of proposals for a post-conflict South Africa. Power sharing theories have been concerned as much to provide a vehicle for transition from existing war to envisaged peace as with

preventing and reducing conflict. Transition processes in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Mozambique, South Africa and Uganda, and perhaps also Angola and Liberia, were anchored in power sharing and other structural and constitutional mechanisms for achieving accommodation and peace settlements among leaders of major groups in conflict. Power sharing featured prominently in strategies for ending the conflicts between the Tuareg groups and the Black Africans in Mali and Niger; and it has also been critical in facilitating transition processes in Central America, parts of former Yugoslavia and Cambodia. In the case of Northern Ireland, it is expected that an eventual peace settlement will entail some such arrangement.

Conversely, Nigeria has not been a successful case of power sharing, as shown by the proposal to introduce a "rotational presidency" formula. In fact, since the annulment of the 1993 presidential election results, Nigeria has not known peace; and this formula was a concession made in order to pre-empt further disintegration by acknowledging the essentially multi-national nature of the state. Other "failed" cases of power sharing experiments include Cyprus (1960-1974), Lebanon (1948-1975), Malaysia (where the Malay exert hegemonic control over other constituent groups) and the Sudan (1972-1983).

Power sharing is a constitutional device. However, the constitution may have little value if it is not derived from the political, social and economic conditions in which it is embedded. One of the problems with power sharing has precisely to do with the difference between the letter and the practice of the law. In the case of Rwanda and Burundi, for instance, we need to ask what territorial factors are at play. For if these were converted into "Hutuland" and "Tutsiland" as the so-called George Moose solution proposes, geographical separation would be introduced into the equation, which would necessarily involve measures such as partition and mass population transfers — whether forced, voluntary, or both — and perhaps even "ethnic cleansing". However, earlier experiments with power sharing in both countries have run counter to the "genocidal political culture" that has now taken root. For power sharing to work means seeking to transform that political culture, through education, in order to bring about a shared commitment to — or felt need for — inter-ethnic accommodation and co-existence.

A number of lessons have been learned since the Social Summit. The first concerns the continued relevance of the old insights about the insufficiency of formal constitutional procedures and institutions for sustaining (as well as gauging) governmental stability in deeply divided cultures. Constitutions are empty if they are not related to the political and social environment. For instance, the 1993 Arusha Peace Agreement for ending the Rwandan civil war made explicit reference to the effects of the structural adjustment programme there, implying that these effects might make the government's political task even harder.

The second lesson concerns the need for a minimum public performance capacity in order to sustain even the best-intentioned institutions and mechanisms for ethnic conflict resolution. Such performance is measured by how well, and how swiftly, a government can address the basic "human security" needs of all. This capacity may be very limited in the aftermath of war. After all, a "collapsed" or "failed" state is so termed because it lacks the capacity for executing the basic functions of statehood (such as establishing and dispensing justice, regulating foreign relations, administering the machinery of state, creating and maintaining public order, and promoting the general welfare). Its capacity in these areas may be further undermined by structural adjustment programmes that erode public capacity, as well as creating pressures and contradictions that make it difficult to sustain power sharing arrangements in debt-distressed political settings, such as those facing many non-industrialized multi-ethnic nations.

Third, traditional methods of managing conflict have concentrated on formal constitutional arrangements alone. However, many power sharing governments in post-conflict states are

faced with having to undertake post-war reconstruction while at the same time implementing market-style austerity measures. Such a combination of pressures impedes peace building. Tying programmes of peace building, including programmes for promoting reconciliation between erstwhile warring parties, to the macro-economic categories of adjustment or "market"-driven forces, may rekindle tensions and violent conflicts, thereby further crippling the legitimacy of the power sharing government.

Fourth, it has become clear that while power sharing arrangements of inter-élite accommodation are indispensable for achieving transition from armed conflict, they are inadequate for maintaining post-conflict stability, and may in fact become destabilizing in the immediate post-transition phase. These governments typically last for only about four years before they collapse and have to reorganize. For example, the Government of National Unity (GNU) that facilitated the transition from apartheid to multi-racial democratic rule in South Africa has since collapsed, with the withdrawal of the National Party from the African National Congress (ANC)-dominated government. There are many factors behind the inherent instability of such power sharing arrangements in post-conflict settings, including frustrated expectations, suspicion, exclusionary behaviour, or the miscalculation by certain leaders of the costs and benefits of conflict resolution that had informed the bargaining and negotiating process. Whatever the reason, it is not unusual to find former ethnic guerrilla groups eventually withdrawing from participation in a power sharing arrangement and resuming the armed struggle. This raises the question of who came to "own" the transition process as such — an issue heightened where the exclusionary nature of political representation on which government rests does not correspond to the form and level of mobilization previously achieved.

The fifth lesson is that the recurrent issues in ethnic conflict resolution and management are those which affect all multi-ethnic states. These include setting up a power sharing framework of government, with an emphasis on balanced representation, creating representative bureaucratic and military organizations, preventing the passing of discriminatory laws and regulations, establishing effective and impartial judicial and policing structures, granting regional autonomy and self-government where it is sought, and correcting inequality or past injustice through redistributive budgetary policies. Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland have conventionally been seen as "classic" cases of power sharing along such lines. However, many countries in the non-industrialized world face numerous complicating factors, especially when the pressures caused by the social effects of debt, economic liberalization and adjustment coincide with existing ethnic cleavages.

At the heart of successful power sharing lies the human security that former United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Ghali's **Agenda for Peace** defined as the core of peace building in a post-conflict setting. The insecurity of élites is often one of the root causes of conflict; and peace building has everything to do with respect, compromise and negotiation. Peace and security are not merely about finding military solutions to conflict. Rather, they are about resolving problems such as access to power, wealth and welfare; and about helping people and communities to have (or regain) jobs, education, income, food, health and social security, personal safety and freedom. Institutional arrangements towards power sharing are, of course, important. Similarly, it is vital to invest in reconciliation and confidence-building initiatives. But experience shows that unless "human security" provisions form part of the strategy for managing ethnic conflicts, formal agreements alone are not a sufficient condition for bringing about sustainable peace.

Session Five — Social Cohesion: Healing the Wounds of War

Aleya El-Bindari Hammad, Chairperson of this session, reiterated the importance of the Social Summit in its focus on people, revealing the faces behind the numbers, and reflecting the shift in thinking about rights and privileges from a concern for national sovereignty

towards respect for fundamental human rights. The Social Summit brought these into a Programme of Action that provides a framework for connecting action with the benchmarks of progress.

And yet many people's lives are surrounded by violence. This poisons their daily experiences and hopes for the future with fear and insecurity. The nature of violence and conflict are no longer those which in the first half of the twentieth century characterized battles over "nationhood", or which relied on weapons of mass destruction. Today's wars take the shape of border conflicts, ethnic confrontation, civil war and internal strife. Concepts of nationhood are being replaced by ethnic, religious and minority identities — fuelled by increasing inequities, jobless economic growth and the abuse of power. In spite of the international arms trade, the weapons used to fight such wars are often the *machetes* and firearms of times past. Most disturbingly, mercenary activities have, with the trade in narcotics, become one of the major ways to gain quick access to massive wealth. New and powerful structures and institutions of violence have been born of this easy access to fortune, from the ghettos to the highest levels of business and government. The principle of profit has contributed to the rise in modern forms of slavery, trafficking in people and human organs, and the like.

The flagrant denial of human rights — the existence of appalling poverty at the feet of extraordinary wealth and inhumanity on an inconceivable scale — is the true root of violence, sinking further into the soil and fabric of society when such inequities go unchallenged. The situation confronting the world calls for a different kind of diagnosis and new kinds of therapy. Far more subtle and creative approaches to the problems of conflict and peace are needed than those employed during the Cold War era: reason as opposed to fear and irrationality, peace and harmony over conflict and violence. In terms of "healing the wounds of war", it is important to recall that the Hippocratic Oath urges healers to do everything in their power to *prevent* illness and suffering. The idea of prevention is a seminal concept that represents an amalgam of hope and possibility: that misery is not a mandate of fate but a condition that can be treated, sometimes cured, or even prevented.

How can the cycle of violence be halted, and the process of healing and reconciliation begun? Experience shows that it may be a lone individual whose courage in saying "enough is enough" inspires others to join them. It may be the result of quiet diplomacy, far from the glare of high-profile fire-fighting approaches. It may be the determination of those who believe that a common point for dialogue might bring the conflicting parties together, as illustrated by the "health as a bridge for peace" experience. Just as the cycle of disaster involves many disciplines, so prevention calls for a symphony rather than a solo performance by a single profession, or a single sex. Diplomats must be joined by doctors, educators, scientists, economists and others in shaping a better world out of conflict. Women, who bring life into the world, and who are often among the first victims of conflict, should also be among the first to sit at the negotiating table.

When the poorest and most disadvantaged have been enabled to move out of their situation of vulnerability, this has helped to defuse conflict. When financial institutions and the private sector also share responsibility for social integration, poverty reduction and an improved quality of life for all, more stable and harmonious societies are created. This dignity and self-worth gives a value to human life that goes beyond the mere cost of doing so, as Juan Somavía has already remarked.

Promoting Reconciliation at the National Level: The Lebanese Experience — Fahima Charaf-Eddine

What is, or might be, the role of government in promoting social reconciliation in the wake of war? In a detailed examination of the case of Lebanon, **Fahima Charaf-Eddine** explored the limitations as well as the achievements of government intervention. In the 1960s, Lebanon

enjoyed economic success and high standards of living, along with considerable freedom of expression and association. For this reason, the country was also seen as a place of refuge within the Arab world, the birthplace of the Palestinian revolution. However, the social and political equilibrium proved too fragile to sustain internal and external attack, and war broke out in 1975. This was to change the face of Lebanon: what began as a political conflict ended up as a confessional war, each involving both internal and external elements. Mutual understanding across the various divides was made impossible by the continuing war, and the Israeli invasion in 1982 put an end to what remained of normal social life. In response, the religious confessions took on essentially military structures, and Lebanon as such almost ceased to exist. With events in Lebanon being ever more determined by external forces, the people of Lebanon began to reflect on the country's future, their own identity and national liberation.

Thus various Lebanese groupings came together in a 1989 accord that, in spite of many efforts on the part of the government itself, marked the true beginning of the long search for peace. It was a fateful year, given the Gulf War, the fighting within Iraq, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the opening of the Madrid Conference on the Middle East. In fact, the accord was not implemented until 1990. It reflected a universal desire to put an end to the war, and to seek an *entente nationale* — as opposed to social integration — in recognition of the diverse communities that comprise the country. Reconciliation required broad-based participation by all the confessions and other citizens' groups within the newly-formed government, which dedicated itself to the most pressing issues of reconciliation: destroying the barriers between neighbourhoods, opening up freedom of movement, recalling arms and dissolving the militias. It proved incapable, however, of resolving the issue of the displaced. This remains the war's open chapter, affecting over 800,000 people of every confession — one-quarter of the 1991 population. Some of these people are in the south, and remain displaced owing to Israeli occupation. But most are "confessional refugees" whose situation is complex and easily manipulated, while solutions are hard to finance. Overcoming the legacy of destruction of a 17-year war requires more than a change of government. It calls for a change of vision.

The second post-war government was short-lived. Under the present régime, the attempt to create an *entente nationale* became less important than efforts to create a new political and economic vision. Economic recovery was the key to resolving the problem of the displaced, and hence to reconciliation. So what of *entente nationale* today? In spite of the Prime Minister's international reputation, we need to examine more closely the social, political and economic crisis now facing Lebanon. The government's economic vision is based on exaggerated claims about globalization — in particular its role in peace and conflict resolution — and excessive faith in the liberalization of markets. In Lebanon, economic reconstruction has been seen as the key to success, which has in turn led to a relative neglect of public services such as education. This is critical in a context in which most schools were either destroyed or occupied by refugees. Health is equally important in a country where half the population has no form of medical insurance, and where public health services are absent or deficient. Housing is an even more difficult issue, given that it relates to the question of refugees and displaced persons.

Reconciliation also concerns the balance between various powers. Here, the government has seen itself as the sole economic and political player, and so has rejected any efforts to become a genuine government of *entente nationale*. Part of what was the opposition is now in power, and the remaining part (such as nationalists or intellectuals) is rife with internal divisions arising from the war. Thus the opposition is unable either to influence public opinion or to present a coherent alternative to the government. Lebanon is in grave crisis, as the extensive boycotts of the 1992 and 1996 elections show. Many Lebanese saw abstention as the only way to express their concern — above all the Christian community, where only about 6.5 per cent of the electorate turned out. The leaders of this community are vociferous in expressing

their dissatisfaction with what is going on, and with the peace process itself. The government might have gained more legitimacy had it authorized local-level elections, but it failed to do so. These have now been delayed until 1999. All this is compounded by the so-called troika or tripartite presidency, an arrangement that allows the three presidents to share power as well as profit. It is a very long way from *entente nationale*.

How might the course of regional peace processes either facilitate or hinder reconciliation within Lebanon? In fact, the breakdown in these processes is already having negative effects. Economic recession becomes an easy pretext for political repression. Political freedoms, and freedom of expression, are under threat. According to a 1996 survey, 30 per cent of the Lebanese population is poor: unemployment is high, and there are no forms of social protection. Job creation ought to play a central role in reconstruction, and yet the government has sought neither to promote employment, nor to assist industrial workers or rural producers. However, without the incorporation of all the confessional groups and other social actors, reconstruction and reconciliation cannot be achieved. Erasing the so-called "green line" that divided Lebanon during the war was simple. In the cities, people quickly learned to mingle, shielded by their anonymity. This was not so in the small towns and villages, where people know who the killers of their loved-ones were, and have refused to allow them to settle. Some dare not return. Some have been killed. Formal reconciliation alone is not enough: people need also to recover their land, their homes. What they need most of all are the guarantees for their safety that would be provided by the equitable and fair distribution of resources, and integration into national life.

Community Initiatives for Restoring the Social Fabric — Matthias Stiefel

Reconstruction and reconciliation are among the threads that make up the social fabric. Exploring the role of community initiatives in this regard, **Matthias Stiefel** identified three major fallacies that beset international assistance to war-torn societies. The first is to see conflicts and wars simply as humanitarian disasters, and not in terms of the dynamic evolution of societies, and of the systemic or temporary dysfunctions that prevent them from creative and constructive resolutions. This leads to the false assumption that peace and solutions for rebuilding can be brought in from the outside — and to the consequent diminishing of the essential role of local actors and communities within this process. The second fallacy is to focus on physical reconstruction, the rebuilding of economic production capacities, the regeneration of markets and regulatory instruments, and the establishment of appropriate state institutions and the rule of law. Recent years have seen a concern to rebuild the institutions of civil society within this framework. Yet while these are necessary, they cannot succeed without **reconciliation**: the healing of hearts and minds. This critical area is generally overlooked — and it is also the one in which success is hardest to achieve. The third fallacy is to assume that the healing process is a short exercise that can be planned and squeezed into set timetables, corresponding to the bureaucratic frameworks of international assistance. This disregards the political, cultural and spiritual time frame that is proper for each process, each society. Rebuilding a society that has been ravaged by war takes not just years, but generations.

In what ways, then, should international actors — and particularly international assistance programmes — engage? Stiefel argued that there are two main principles to be observed. First, as we know, physical health is not simply the absence of disease, but also the presence of a functioning healing process. The same is true for institutions and societies. Peace and development are not so much the absence of conflict, as a function of the ability to address conflicts and other problems in a constructive way. External assistance can help, just as a medical intervention can help someone who is unwell; but its capacity to destroy or undermine local efforts is greater than its capacity to rebuild. Solutions cannot be imported. The key actors are to be found within, at the local and national level. People have a tremendous capacity not merely to survive, but also pragmatically to overcome adversity. To

overlook this, as national governments and international assistance programmes so frequently do, is to undermine the capacities that people already have. The Eritrean port of Massawa, for instance, was completely destroyed by the Ethiopian air force at the end of the war as an act of revenge. It has been completely rebuilt — not with government or international resources, but with those of local people and the external remittances they were able to mobilize. In Mozambique, a complex power sharing arrangement between FRELIMO and RENAMO has led to "double" or "parallel" administration — a highly conflictual and unstable situation. Furthermore, millions of refugees and internally displaced persons were forced to return. Nevertheless, within two years these people had returned to their homes with very few security problems. Similarly, the problems associated with demobilized soldiers afflict the cities and urban centres, not the countryside — where they have been absorbed back into their own communities. New as well as traditional forms of civil society emerge to fill the vacuum left by the disappearing or ineffectual state. In Somalia, for example, women's groups and traders are revitalizing local economies, thus creating the material basis for peace, in ways that might have been inconceivable before — especially since women were among the most virulent in promoting the conflict.

This does not mean that we should idealize or romanticize the capacity of grassroots or civil society actors. That would be to sacrifice the state on the altar of neo-liberalism. The élite needs to feel, and be, responsible and accountable for its actions. The Old Testament Book of Judges concludes its catalogue of catastrophe and social disintegration, "In those days, there was no king in Israel: every man did that which was right in his own eyes": in other words, it describes a nation in which there was no legitimate or spiritual authority. In reality, the state must provide the framework for reconstruction and reconciliation.

The second main principle that should guide international action is that there can be no lasting resolution of conflicts, and no lasting reconstruction, without reconciliation. Experience from the War-torn Societies Project shows that this coming together, this communication, is a crucial (but not sufficient) precondition for sustainable peace. Reconciliation has become an amoeba-like word that means all things to all people, and serves as an umbrella for a multitude of things. Essentially, it means the ability to come back together, and to find the space for dialogue that is erased by conflict. From such dialogue must come *forgiveness*: a mutual act of liberation or catharsis that is more powerful and often less attainable still. This does not mean forgetting, for memories cannot be forgotten while they are still painful. They will stop hurting only with forgiveness. A common assumption is that time will heal painful memories. This is not so. Rather, time carries such pain from generation to generation. It is also wrongly thought that forgiveness and reconciliation replace *justice*. In the latter, the focus is on punishment. It is, therefore, an unequal and to some extent unilateral process. In forgiving guilt, the accent is on *healing* and mutuality: both the perpetrators and the victims need this equally.

Third, in terms of external actors and international assistance (which may include both the public and private sector), reconciliation is not so much a question of what they do or do not do, but the ways in which their engagement is framed. For example, when the Irish government decided to support housing construction in Rwanda (shortages being one of the sources of conflict), it situated the project in a mixed Hutu and Tutsi community. This forced these groups to come together in building houses which both needed — an experience that helped to inch them along in a process of reconciliation. A project that might have been equally good in technical terms, but which favoured one group over the other, would have poured oil on the simmering fires of conflict. The implications of these principles for the policies and practices of international assistance programmes are little short of revolutionary. Observing them could enable far more to be achieved, in a far more respectful and empowering way, than is currently the case.

Pursuing the concept of forgiveness, **Georgina Dufoix** added that this is a troubling notion precisely because it requires an individual act of courage. The culture of forgiveness has always been seen in terms of its spiritual dimensions; today, the national and international media play an important role in cultivating and accelerating a culture of vengeance and hatred. The role of Radio Mille Collines in Rwanda in fomenting ethnic tension is well known. Historically, and in personal terms, the human capacity to forgive is essential. This does not mean forgetting, nor does it signify impunity. A personal act of forgiveness does not preclude the need for a society to seek justice. It is nevertheless deeply significant, both at an individual level and in collective terms. It requires great strength and maturity to look the past in the face, and to decide not to retain any feelings of rancour. As **David Drucker** emphasized, violence and conflict are located in people and in social relations, and they are very hard to eradicate. Similarly, the kind of "revolutionary change" that is required starts from within, and in the institutions of which we form a direct and influential part: this must be a point of departure for changing the wider structures.

Drawing on recent experience in South Africa, **Neela Ghai** referred to the important role of religious leaders in recasting the original Truth Commission as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The idea had been for those involved in atrocities committed under the apartheid régime to disclose their experiences, and so become eligible for amnesty under specific legal provisions. At the outset, the white community was in a state of denial, not accepting that their government or members of their community had been in any way implicated in torture, killings and other violations. Reconciliation between the communities is fundamental to the future of a country such as South Africa. Yet serious questions arise. A fund is being set up to help victims and their families. But to what extent can such violations be evaluated in material terms? And, more fundamentally, to what extent does the state have the right to remove from an individual citizen the right to legal redress? The parents of those who were killed in the course of defending their rights were not involved in establishing the terms of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission; and this is the first time that what happened to their sons and daughters has been openly admitted, and the perpetrators identified. There is a large gap between the readiness of many ordinary people to forgive, and the legal processes of hearing testimony (sometimes *in camera* in order to conceal the involvement of leading figures from the previous régime) and granting amnesty. How can a culture of forgiveness be cultivated in such a setting, particularly for those who do not have a religious faith that might sustain them in doing so? And, as **Richard Stren** commented, how can a governance-enabling environment be created that would reinforce and reproduce the moral leadership of charismatic individuals such as Nelson Mandela or Jomo Kenyatta?

Drawing on UNRISD's research on Cambodia as well as on extensive experience in Nicaragua, **Peter Utting** questioned the term "post-conflict society". Both countries had been assumed by the international community to have "returned to peace" following peace accords and elections respectively. In reality, conflict and violence have continued or even intensified, though perhaps in different forms. No longer the monopoly of armies, conflict becomes dispersed throughout society either as criminal violence or through the operations of small armed groups. What is the international community doing to create an environment that would enable peace and rehabilitation? At present, the environment is actively *disabling*. Rapid liberalization and structural adjustment programmes dismantle the state just at the historical moment when a strong public sector is most needed. High interest rates, set to control the money supply and reduce inflation, tend to put small producers out of business. Rapid demobilization of thousands of men who are accustomed to a culture of violence (and usually still in possession of arms) takes place without the creation of alternative livelihood possibilities. International aid is rapidly reduced, as the cessation of formal hostilities and lack of media attention suggest that the problem has been resolved. Or large-scale aid programmes are imposed on local realities, failing to meet priority needs or to strengthen local institutions. Major problems derive from the psychological consequences of conflict and displacement.

International agencies have tended either to ignore local understandings of and approaches to this problem, or to apply inappropriate Western bio-medical therapeutic models. The role of local institutions, such as traditional healers or spiritual leaders, has been largely overlooked.

A better understanding of these contextual issues might provide an insight into the phenomenon of *returned war*. **Bayo Adekanye** maintained that reconciliation may not be sustainable without material redistribution — changes in hearts and minds are not enough to sustain people through hardship and injustice. Amnesty may be conferred at a political level, but this does not in itself resolve the causes of the conflict; the macro-economic framework of structural adjustment may make it harder to find such resolution. Citing the case of the War Tribunal for former Yugoslavia, **Trevor Davies** further suggested that justice may need to precede reconciliation and forgiveness, while **Jacques Baudot** stressed that the causes of conflict are to be found in external and structural factors, not solely within the purview of individuals and states. This points to the importance of reinforcing existing mechanisms (particularly those pertaining to the universality of human rights) and enriching the culture of international diplomacy upon which the United Nations is founded. **Elizabeth Baumgartner** warned that while it is easy to criticize international aid efforts, the prime task must be to use the genuine concern and energy that are aroused — even by the use of "human pornography", the degrading images of helpless victims — to shape more appropriate aid interventions.

In summing up, **Aleya El-Bindari Hammad** reiterated the importance and complexity of the issues raised and recommended that UNRISD convene a two-day symposium dedicated to the subject. This should involve people with direct experience in conflict and reconciliation efforts: from "victim-survivors" of war and conflict to those working in the International Court of Human Rights. At the same time, far more attention should be focused on educating the media about the many types and levels of experience in this field. Finally, greater efforts should be made to develop multi-faceted responses that build on the strengths of specialists in different areas, rather than assuming that particular issues are the monopoly only of certain institutions or professions. If the reform of the United Nations is to have any purpose, it must be to ensure that our co-ordinated action makes us more than the sum of our many parts.

Session Six — Stemming the Fragmentation of Cities: Community-Based Approaches to Urban Social Problems

Introducing a discussion concerning micro-level experiences in confronting the problems of mega-cities, **Georgina Dufoix**, Chairperson of the session, stressed that a clear conceptual framework is what gives coherence to otherwise disconnected local-level actions: what might be called concrete concepts. A key question is whether people identify with the state or with their own locality alone. Given the weakening of the nation state, as well as the need for new forms of governance (particularly at the local level), and the social, cultural and political pressures posed by massive growth in urban populations, it is clear that without constructive relationships at least between communities and local authorities, cities could become the geographical flash-points of future conflict.

Building Local Democracy: Lessons from UNRISD Research — David Westendorff

David Westendorff outlined current collaborative research at UNRISD on partnerships involving states, local authorities, NGOs and voluntary organizations. This is focused particularly on experiences of local-level empowerment and participation, on which the implementation of the Social Summit Programme of Action and Rio's Agenda 21 attempt to rely. An effort is being made within the UNRISD project to analyse examples of decentralized governance in practice, from the perspective of civil society organizations in some of the world's largest cities, such as Chicago, Mumbai (Bombay), Johannesburg-Soweto, Lima and São Paulo. These settings show stark contrasts — for instance between wealth and misery,

innovation and decline — but are also giving rise to many experiments in decentralization, local democracy and community action on the part of people who are vulnerable and excluded. The case studies reveal many different forms of collaboration between local authorities and community organizations, some "bottom up", and others instigated by elected officials or senior public servants. In São Paulo, for instance, the first Workers' Party mayor tried to implement a participatory budgeting process, allowing community organizations the chance to review budgeting procedures and resource allocation, and to propose their own projects for public financing. In Chicago, a coalition of neighbourhood organizations and NGOs representing low-income black and Chinese groups has been negotiating with city and private developers to prevent the destruction of their communities and homes through "urban renewal".

However, experience to date suggests that the overall impact of community organizations within the policy arena has been slight and very fragmented. By and large, governments propel the process, while local groups respond to and implement aspects of it. Urban NGOs may have greater scope to lobby upwards and organize downwards, and thus catalyse deeper change. But true partnership between community organizations and local authorities is rare. Even effective collaboration often depends on clientelist support from highly placed officials. Without the institutional supports that buttress relationships between the state and civil society organizations — such as administrative regulations and norms protecting and promoting the rights of communities to organize themselves, and mechanisms to give such groups access to critical information and decision-making structures — partnerships remain fragile. Further, a process of co-optation can begin once a community organization assumes responsibilities for delivering and managing "public services", weakening its representative capacity. Finally, the wider economic and ideological environment is not conducive to effective community organization. The urban poor are frequently cast as part of the problem, rather than a symptom of inequalitarian social and economic systems. With ever greater pressures on them, and less "space" within which to organize collectively, communities are more easily divided.

Under what conditions might poor urban communities be able to establish the partnerships envisaged in the Programme of Action? UNRISD research has given rise to the four following practical suggestions:

1. the creation of constitutional and legal structures to protect and promote such partnerships;
2. investment in capacity building for community organizations, NGOs and local authorities, including training and regulatory structures to enhance internally democratic practices;
3. the inclusion of participatory action-research (PAR) in the education of planners, architects and urban management specialists, to make this standard operating procedure for diagnosing needs and formulating policy; and
4. the allocation of resources at the local level, to enable community organizations to develop the necessary skills to share decision-making responsibilities with local authorities.

Between Poverty and Development — Jaime Joseph

Reiterating the need for new forms of governance, politics and ethics, **Jaime Joseph** described how communities in the northern cone of Lima have, as elsewhere in Latin America, had to organize in order to satisfy their own basic needs. In Peru, levels of urban poverty have risen since 1993, while rural poverty has slightly declined, notwithstanding the political violence of recent years. This has been the trend despite rapid economic growth measured in terms of GDP: in essence, then, production and poverty have risen together.

The Lima metropolitan area has become ungovernable. In response, people have looked to their own strength, creativity and potential. In the 1960s and early 1970s, they organized to get land and build their habitat. In the process, they became *social citizens*. In response to the

economic crisis of the 1980s, they formed community kitchens and "glass of milk" (*vaso de leche*) cells — over 4,000 such kitchens exist in Lima alone, involving some 140,000 women. Community committees have also been set up to meet local health needs in the face of environmental deterioration and the lack of affordable health care. People must even create their own jobs. Today, street vendors account for about one third of Lima's economically active population. At a national level, some 75 per cent of the working population is employed in micro- or small enterprises — half of which are in low-income urban areas. At the same time, urban violence, drug abuse and social decay are on the rise, while inhabitants increasingly tend not to demand rights, but to beg for favours.

How can NGO researchers and social promoters best support what these people and communities are already doing, in ways that empower them for the even more complicated challenges ahead? Joseph suggested working toward the following goals:

- *Getting beyond poverty relief to integral human development:* Peruvian activists intend to use economic development (not merely redistribution) as a means to the social, political, cultural and spiritual development of both individuals and societies. This means moving beyond the "assistentialism" to which social development is now sometimes reduced.
- *Reversing the tendency towards depoliticization:* The almost total lack of effective political expression in urban Peru means that there are no mechanisms through which to ensure that micro-action has a macro-level impact. The political system of representative or delegative democracy has, in Peru, become even more inoperative than before. The will to participate in politics is being eroded. How, then, should intellectuals engage in such an apolitical scene? And how can NGOs avoid slipping into the role of consultants and technical agents, unable to contribute to enabling people to find alternative democratic models of development?

Eight promising lines of action are described below.

1. *A systemic approach to poverty relief:* Such an approach aims to respond to people's basic needs by helping them to analyse various problems and find the relations among them. Then it is easier to go beyond their immediate sphere of action and to collaborate with other groups. For instance, women in community kitchens have now begun working with farmers on environmental issues, sharing their political and social experience. This creates new public spaces, brings together unfamiliar interlocutors, and gives new scope to solidarity-based community action.
2. *An integral approach to development:* The Social Summit stressed that economic and social development are inseparably linked. This can be taken to mean that the individual and society are both the starting point and the objective of development. Therefore, it is important to produce methodologies that enable people to form a holistic and systemic view of development.
3. *Local self-centred (autocentrado) development:* Here one looks at the links between the local (or micro-), the intermediate (meso-) and national or international (macro-) levels. People need to achieve positive results in their own working context, but this impact is amplified if they can reach the regional or sub-regional level where decisions are made and development plans are formulated.
4. *The importance of creating new public spaces:* Development and democracy-building processes in low-income urban areas require certain pre-conditions: a reasonably consolidated civil society, especially at the community level; resources (human, economic, natural) that can support integrated processes of growth; a functioning local government (often municipal); and technical or professional support, usually from NGOs or universities. New, public (not necessarily state) scenarios must be created from which participatory democracy can emerge. These are spaces in which people can potentially

- respond to the challenges of environmental degradation, violence and delinquency, and can promote education for integral development.
5. *Strengthening state and local government:* To move from poverty relief or survival strategies to more integrated development, the need for effective state and municipal government becomes palpable.
 6. *Developing tools for communication:* Popular empowerment cannot happen without communication tools that enable people to develop their own information systems and databases. The Internet provides an excellent opportunity to promote South-South and North-South networking. If these tools are not at the disposal of poor people, then information will simply become another indicator of poverty.
 7. *Creating qualitative, subjective development indicators:* There is a growing body of positive experience with methodologies that help people to create not only their own quantitative indicators of development, but also more qualitative or subjective ones. These enable people to discover and strengthen the links between various dimensions of their experience. In this regard it is important to note that some Peruvian NGOs have produced a "human development report", whose future editions will be produced in progressively participatory ways.
 8. *Improving training:* This refers not just to technical matters, but also to efforts to help people acquire a more global view of the issues, as well as to consider strategies for development and building democracy. The Social Summit called for investment in human capital, but without defining it. Our focus is on a new form of leadership, going beyond executive definitions ("a person who gets the job done") towards a vision of a person who can draw out and enhance people's own capacities, and help them move beyond the limited and immediate concerns of "the local", in order to express and embrace a shared vision of development.

Lessons from the City in Promoting Solidarity and Renewal — Richard Stren

It is important for these positive and politically challenging experiences at the local level in urban areas to begin to appear on and shape national and international agendas. As **Richard Stren** noted, very few of those involved in development are centrally concerned with urban experiences. Researchers and agencies alike have rather taken an attitude of "benign neglect", despite the fact that up to 55 per cent of the world's population lives in these "dense and functionally complex and interdependent settlements". Analysing the reasons for this, Stren identified two main intellectual trends. First, there is, in some quarters, an "agrarian bias", which basically holds that development should first take place in poor rural areas rather than in the relatively well-developed cities. Promoters of this view see cities as parasitic, sapping a country's potential and preventing resources from reaching the most needy. This in spite of growing urban poverty. Second, environmentalists have tended to depict cities as black holes of increasing pollution and destruction of resources, whose growth endangers the future of the planet. Notions of the "ecological footprint" — the argument that cities are intrinsically voracious and parasitic consumers — have been very influential. Such arguments tend to overlook the many advantages of urban living. These include the lower population growth associated with urbanization, as well as more efficient use of energy (for example, for heating and transport). There has therefore been an unwillingness to recognize that since cities are here to stay, the challenges they pose cannot be avoided — and indeed must be addressed.

On the other hand, cities are also the site of many new approaches to change that have not yet been adequately recognized. These are being conceptualized in at least three ways. First, there is what Jaime Joseph called the "political space" approach. This defines emerging organizations and initiatives as essentially political in nature, and it is having a major effect on how people deal with their problems. However, since the focus of analysis has tended to be on the state, on centralized organizational forms and hierarchical government, the new initiatives that are emerging at a sub-national and local level have been overlooked. The rules of political life are changing, but in ways that are not understood because they do not conform

with our image of politics or our framework for understanding it. One example is that of "decentralized co-operation" between municipalities in the North that are forming alliances with cities in the South, without any mediation by central government.

A second approach to urban development is the so-called "new localism". Emerging from the United States, but also becoming stronger in European and Southern countries, this reconstruction of relations between the public and private sectors refers to new coalitions among business and industrial élites, city managers and mayors for the purpose of attracting international investment. These sectors seek to change their ways of planning and business practices, perhaps even incorporating environmentalists in order to develop a more harmonious or consensual approach. Investment is seen to require cohesion and solidarity. While this is a creative approach to taking advantage of the opportunities created by globalization, it does depend on there being a sufficient initial resource base. For many poorer cities, this does not exist.

Finally, there is the concept of "social capital" invoked by Jaime Joseph, which originated in sociology. This refers to the social experience, as opposed to economic assets, that groups of poor people need in order to survive. It can be measured in terms of social networks and associational life, behind which lie trust, reciprocity and an ability to conciliate with other groups. Protecting these capacities is often essential to people's well-being.

The importance of these three approaches is reflected in research being conducted under the auspices of UNESCO on the "social sustainability" of cities. Sustainability, in other words, is not merely about a combination of economics and ecology; but it is also social. Cities can develop cultures and organize policies that are conducive to social sustainability when organized groups work in an integrated way for long-term improvements in the quality of life for all segments of the population. Within this hitherto neglected sphere, North and South have a great deal to learn from each other. None has any exclusive patent on how best to handle the social conflict that appears everywhere, albeit in different forms.

Ten studies make up the UNESCO research project, each of them carried out by local research teams. Their results so far point to three positive trends. First, there is a virtual explosion of new forms of participatory and democratic forms of governance in many parts of the world. In Latin America, for example, where military dictatorships ruled for many years, new mayors are being elected for the first time. This is the case in Mexico City, the most populous urban area in the Western hemisphere. Such changes have a huge impact on the exercise of politics, and on what people understand as local, because this becomes a process in which they participate. In both South Africa and Brazil, there are new ways of incorporating stakeholders in the operations of government. Even the case of participatory budgeting referred to by David Westendorff, which may have seemed like a failure in São Paulo, was later used more successfully in both Belo Horizonte and Porto Alegre.

Second, there are cases in which local policies deal with the social and cultural diversity of cities in a humane way. For instance, Toronto and Montreal have found different ways to support the poor through provision of low-cost housing that is dispersed throughout the city and not concentrated in single neighbourhoods, as well as through income supplements and high-quality public transport systems. These policies have had the effect of defusing conflict and promoting interaction among different social groups.

Third, groups that are being further marginalized through processes of global economic integration are beginning to recombine within what might be called a new informal economy. Within this, some gain, although many others lose. Apart from criminals and drug dealers, those who gain often include poor women whose imagination and social networks allow them to develop entirely new clusters of activity. An increasing range and number of organizations

are coming together within this sphere; and as they reach a critical threshold they can begin to press for local policies shaped to their needs.

Overall, the social decomposition or disarray characteristic of structural adjustment programmes worldwide is now being contested in the urban arena by movements and initiatives seeking to establish new and more adaptive solidarities. Further, this contestation and reconstruction is occurring at the level of local space (or jurisdiction), however defined. The many new meanings associated with local politics signify a new terrain for political and institutional reform. This, in turn, is important for the theory and practice of social development.

Closing Remarks

Globalization, Solidarity and Public Policy — Nitin Desai

It is always difficult to keep momentum going after a major international conference, such as the World Summit for Social Development. For while everybody wants to be part of a high-profile event, very few maintain that interest in its aftermath. In this respect, I would commend UNRISD for maintaining the same level of commitment during the follow-up as it did during the preparation of the Social Summit itself. This commitment is absolutely vital.

The Social Summit was a pioneering conference in several respects. Other events such as Rio, Vienna, Cairo or Beijing were, to some extent, taking up issues that were already on the table. But the Social Summit was unique in being as much a Summit about *ideas* as about programmes. For that very reason, the process of follow-up also needs to reflect the fact that this Summit sought to change people's ideas about development. Second, it was a Summit about *values*: the issue of shared values played a far more prominent role in Copenhagen than it has done in other fora. This is not to say that shared values were absent from the other major conferences. However, the Social Summit was distinguished from these by seeing such values as the very basis for national and international co-operation. Third, the Social Summit was an attempt to shape the development *programmes* of international organizations and national governments.

In the realm of ideas, the impact of the Social Summit has been significant. For instance, the high-level segment of ECOSOC has just focused its attention on the issue of globalization. Many regard the processes of globalization as irreversible. My own view, however, is that the role of the United Nations in development arises precisely because these processes are not irreversible. Were this not so, there would be little point in continuing. We should recall that this is not the first time that rapid global integration has taken place. The last 20 years of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth constituted a period when, in terms of trade or finance, the world was integrating as rapidly as it is now. This was, of course, a very one-sided integration, a one-sided interdependence: in a word, imperialism. That form of globalization eventually collapsed under the incompatible ambitions of national élites.

Today there is clear evidence that similar difficulties lie ahead for this current wave of globalization. The stumbling block this time is the impact of globalization on inequalities and inequities within and between nations. This can be seen in relation to concerns about the impact of unemployment within industrialized countries. There are changes in how people feel about the benefits of trade liberalization today as compared with five years ago. In developing countries, we see persistent or worsening poverty. Internationally, we see a growing gap between the countries that are "making it" and those which are not. It has been said that the real divisions are no longer between the North and the South, but between the winners and the losers on both sides.

Thus current processes of globalization contain as many inherent dangers as did earlier attempts to integrate the world economy. The Social Summit had this issue at the heart of its agenda; and it is a subject that requires serious intellectual and practical work. This does not imply a search for what has been called "paradigms lost", but rather a willingness to question whether the paradigm of a market-based, liberalizing world with rapid technological development and growing interactive communication is the *only* paradigm. Here, I would compliment UNRISD on its work in identifying the limitations of this paradigm and in considering how to address its negative consequences. Further, I would stress that while Western liberal (social) democracies have sometimes been assumed within the United Nations to be the norm, we must remember that the greater part of the world is not Western or liberal, nor are most countries social democracies. This is the reality in which we work, and which we must understand at a conceptual level. The war-torn societies described in an earlier session are not framed by the dominant paradigm. Therefore, before proposing programmes of development, we need to apply the following truth test: will they work in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda or Sierra Leone, or in many other countries I could mention?

This brings me to my second theme — that of values. One of the Social Summit's greatest achievements was to bring back into our political vocabulary the word solidarity. More people talk today about solidarity, and the obligations that arise from it, than in the past. The Social Summit was also important in getting us to recognize that we are not unencumbered individuals who enter a liberal democracy, or a liberal market economy. We bring with us loyalties to places, to persons, to institutions. We have obligations which arise not simply from our conception of rights, but also from our conception of ourselves as human beings. That is what solidarity is all about. One of our great challenges is to translate this legitimation of solidarity into a basis not only for organizing society at a national level, but also for organizing relationships between nations — even at the level of practical procedures. I cannot say that we have achieved an enormous amount in the two years since the Social Summit, but I can say that in the realm of values there are a number of us who are concerned to promote the idea of solidarity both within ECOSOC and elsewhere.

As for programmes: the Social Summit was not "heavy" in terms of new programmes. There are some, for instance the efforts within the United Nations system to place the eradication of poverty at the centre of its work, reflected in the reorientation of the World Bank and in the programme of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), which has endorsed the target laid down in the Social Summit. I also believe that poverty eradication is a major national concern in many countries, though it is not always translated into practical policy. Admittedly, the impact of the Social Summit is in most cases still at an early stage, though some 80 countries are in the process of developing National Strategies for the Eradication of Poverty. Nonetheless, countries can and will do much more in future to promote employment, social integration and other unfinished agendas.

Let me conclude by placing the Social Summit within the broader context of reform of the United Nations. I began by saying that the work of the United Nations arises precisely because the processes of globalization are not irreversible and can run aground. And in many ways, the cycle of United Nations conferences in the 1990s can be thought of as an attempt to define a role for public policy in a world in which large areas that used to fall within the public sphere have now been assigned to the market. Environmental protection, population growth, social development, human rights, the condition of human settlements, the advancement of women: these are issues which will not be taken care of simply by removing barriers to the operation of market forces. They will require intervention in the market, and interventions in the operation of a globalizing world. Taken together, the cycle of conferences has set out to define a paradigm that takes adequately into account the vital role of public policy at both national and international levels. I look forward to the continuing involvement

of UNRISD in this exercise, since we still have a long way to go before we find the right answers. Thank you very much.

Agenda

Wednesday, 9 July 1997

9:00 - 9:30 *Inaugural Session*

- Opening Statement — Dharam Ghai
- Post-Copenhagen: Personal Reflections — Juan Somavía

9:30 - 11:15 *Session One — Implementing the Copenhagen Agenda: Achievements and Disappointments*

Chairperson — Dharam Ghai

- The Response of the International Community — Jacques Baudot
- National-Level Social Policies in Developing Countries — Rehman Sobhan
- National-Level Social Policies in Industrialized Countries — J.N.M. Richelle
- Initiatives from Civil Society — Julian Disney

Half hour of general discussion

11:15 - 11:30 Coffee break

11:30 - 13:00 *Session Two — Mobilizing Resources for Social Development*

Chairperson — Eveline Herfkens

- Key Financial Initiatives at Global and National Levels — Inge Kaul
- Networks for Mobilizing Human Resources — Cees Hamelink

Half hour of general discussion

13:00 - 14:30 Lunch

14:30 - 16:00 *Session Three — Learning from Successes in Social Development*

Chairperson — Mary Chinery-Hesse

- Successful Experiences: Historical, Political, Economic and Cultural Dimensions — Dharam Ghai
- The Challenge of Learning from Experience — Guy Standing

Half hour of general discussion

16:00 - 16:15 Coffee break

16:15 - 17:45 *Session Four — Ethnic Diversity and Social Harmony*

Chairperson — Yusuf Bangura

- Economic, Social and Cultural Policies — Ralph Premdas
- Institutions and Mechanisms for Power Sharing — J. 'Bayo Adekanye

Half hour of general discussion

Thursday, 10 July 1997

9:00 - 10:30 *Session Five — Social Cohesion: Healing the Wounds of War*

Chairperson — Aleya El-Bindari Hammad

- Promoting Reconciliation at the National Level: The Lebanese Experience — Fahima Charaf-Eddine
- Community Initiatives for Restoring the Social Fabric — Matthias Stiefel

Half hour of general discussion

10:30 - 10:45 Coffee break

10:45 - 12:15 *Session Six — Stemming the Fragmentation of Cities: Community-Based Approaches to Urban Social Problems*

Chairperson — Georgina Dufoix

- Building Local Democracy: Lessons from UNRISD Research — David Westendorff
- Between Poverty and Development — Jaime Joseph
- Lessons from the City in Promoting Solidarity and Renewal — Richard Stren

Half hour of general discussion

12:15 - 12:45 *Closing Remarks*

- Globalization, Solidarity and Public Policy — Nitin Desai

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**Advancing the Social Agenda: Two Years after Copenhagen
9-10 July 1997, Palais des Nations, Geneva**

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Further Reading: Selected UNRISD Publications*

Session One

Implementing the Copenhagen Agenda: Achievements and Disappointments

- **After the Social Summit — Implementing the Programme of Action**, Report on the UNRISD Seminar (Geneva, 1995), 1995.

Session Two

Mobilizing Resources for Social Development

- **Globalization and Civil Society: NGO Influence in International Decision-Making**, Riva Krut, Discussion Paper No. 83, April 1997.
- **New Information and Communication Technologies, Social Development and Cultural Change**, Cees Hamelink, Discussion Paper No. 86, June 1997.
- **Globalization and Citizenship**, Report on the UNRISD Conference and Public Meeting (Geneva, 1996), 1997.

Session Three

Learning from Successes in Social Development

- **Social Development in the Developing World: The Challenge of Policy Performance**, Report of the CIDA-UNRISD-IDRC Seminar on Social Development and Public Policies (Ottawa, 1996), 1996.
- **Social Development and Public Policy: Some Lessons from Successful Experiences**, Dharam Ghai, Discussion Paper No. 89, October 1997.
- **Social Development and Public Policy: A Study of Some Successful Experiences**, edited by Dharam Ghai, UNRISD with Macmillan, forthcoming.

Session Four

Ethnic Diversity and Social Harmony

- **The Search for Identity: Ethnicity, Religion and Political Violence**, Yusuf Bangura, Occasional Paper No. 6, November 1994.
- **Ethnic Diversity and Public Policy: An Overview**, Crawford Young, Occasional Paper No. 8, December 1994.
- **Ethnic Conflict and Development: The Case of Fiji**, Ralph R. Premdas, UNRISD with the Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations at the University of Warwick and Avebury**, 1995.
- **Ethnic Conflict and Development: The Case of Guyana**, Ralph R. Premdas, UNRISD with the Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations at the University of Warwick and Avebury**, 1995.
- **Ethnic Conflicts and the Nation-State**, Rodolfo Stavenhagen (ed.), UNRISD with Macmillan**, 1996.
- **The Accommodation of Cultural Diversity**, Crawford Young (ed.), UNRISD with Macmillan, forthcoming.
- **Ethnic Diversity and Public Policy**, Crawford Young (ed.), UNRISD with Macmillan, forthcoming.

Session Five

Social Cohesion: Healing the Wounds of War

- **Transition to What? Cambodia, UNTAC and the Peace Process**, Grant Curtis, Discussion Paper No. 48, November 1993.
- **Between Hope and Insecurity: The Social Consequences of the Cambodian Peace Process**, Peter Utting (ed.), 1994.
- **After the Conflict: A Review of Selected Sources on Rebuilding War-Torn Societies**, Patricia Weiss-Fagen with the assistance of Paula Uimonen, 1995.

- **The UN and Complex Emergencies: Rehabilitation in Third World Transitions**, Jonathan Moore, 1996.
- **Children of War: Responses to Psycho-Social Distress in Cambodia**, Jo Boyden and Sara Gibbs, 1997.

Session Six

Stemming the Fragmentation of Cities: Community-Based Approaches to Urban Social Problems

- **Gender and Urban Social Movements: Women's Community Responses to Restructuring and Urban Poverty**, Amy Lind and Martha Farmelo, Discussion Paper No. 76, June 1996.
- **Their Choice or Yours: Global Forces or Local Voices**, edited by David Westendorff and Krishno Dey, Discussion Paper No. 79, October 1996.
- **Citizens, Local Government and the Development of Chicago's Near South Side**, David C. Ranney, Patricia A. Wright and Tingwei Zhang, Discussion Paper No. 90, November 1997.
- **Organizaciones comunitarias de base y gobiernos locales en Lima metropolitana**, Jaime Joseph, forthcoming.

UNRISD Publications for the Social Summit

Books

- **States of Disarray: The Social Effects of Globalization**
English, French and Spanish editions, 1995.
Korean edition, UNRISD with Hansong Publishing Co.***, 1996.
Arabic edition, UNRISD with Al-Faris Publishing and Distribution**, 1997.
Chinese edition, UNRISD with Peking University Press**, 1997.
Russian edition, UNRISD with Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences, forthcoming.
- **Adjustment and Social Sector Restructuring**, Jessica Vivian (ed.), UNRISD with the European Institute of Development Research and Training Institutes and Frank Cass**, 1995.
- **Social Futures, Global Visions**, Cynthia Hewitt de Alcántara (ed.), UNRISD with Blackwell**, 1996.
- **Welfare States in Transition: National Adaptations in Global Economies**, Gøsta Esping-Andersen (ed.), UNRISD with Sage**, 1996.

Conference Reports

- **Ethnic Violence, Conflict Resolution and Cultural Pluralism**, Report of the UNRISD/UNDP International Seminar on Ethnic Diversity and Public Policies (New York, 1994), 1995.
- **Adjustment, Globalization and Social Development**, Report of the UNRISD/UNDP International Seminar on Economic Restructuring and Social Policy (New York, 1995), 1995.

Occasional Papers

- OP 1 **Social Safety Nets and Adjustment in Developing Countries**, Jessica Vivian, July 1994.
- OP 2 **Globalization and Social Integration: Patterns and Processes**, Dharam Ghai and Cynthia Hewitt de Alcántara, July 1994.
- OP 3 **Is There a Crisis in the Family?**, Henrietta Moore, July 1994.
- OP 4 **Social Integration: Institutions and Actors**, Marshall Wolfe, November 1994.
- OP 5 **Transnational Corporations: Impediments or Catalysts of Social Development?**, Eric Kolodner, December 1994.
- OP 7 **After the Golden Age: The Future of the Welfare State in the New Global Order**, Gøsta Esping-Andersen, December 1994.
- OP 9 **Migration, Displacement and Social Integration**, Nicholas Van Hear, December 1994.

Briefing Papers

- BP 1 **Social Integration: Approaches and Issues**, March 1994.
- BP 2 **Illicit Drugs: Social Impacts and Policy Options**, November 1994.
- BP 3 **Environmental Degradation and Social Integration**, November 1994.
- BP 4 **Structural Adjustment in a Changing World**, December 1994.

* This list includes some, not all, of the Institute's publications on these themes. For a complete list of UNRISD publications, please contact the Reference Centre at the address on the back cover, or consult <<http://www.unrisd.org>> for an on-line list. Please order publications marked ** from the commercial co-publishing partner indicated. Please order the English edition of *States of Disarray* from Earthscan. All other publications can be ordered from UNRISD.