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Ethnic Violence, Conflict Resolution and Cultural Pluralism

Report of the UNRISD/UNDP International Seminar on Ethnic Diversity and Public Policies,
(New York, 17-19 August 1994)

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Acknowledgements

UNRISD is grateful to UNDP for support and co-operation in its preparatory work for the World Summit for Social Development - of which this seminar was an important part. Thanks are also due to the co-sponsoring institutions, and to Professors Rodolfo Stavenhagen and Crawford Young, co-ordinators of the UNRISD research projects on Ethnic Conflict and Development, and on Ethnic Diversity and Public Policy, respectively. At UNRISD, Adrienne Cruz, Josephine Grin-Yates, Birgitte Sorensen and Jessica Vivian were responsible for organizing the seminar, with assistance from Myra Kare at UNDP. The present report was prepared by Crawford Young with Laura Jenkins and Jessica Vivian, with editing by Jenifer Freedman, and proof-reading and layout by Rhonda Gibbes.

Preface

In August 1994, more than 150 leading policy makers, academics, development experts, representatives of non-governmental organizations and journalists met at the United Nations in New York to debate new approaches to ethnic conflict and ethnic accommodation in diverse societies. The seminar, designed to provide input into the preparatory process for the World Summit for Social Development, was organized by UNRISD in co-operation with UNDP, and was co-sponsored by the International Centre of Ethnic Studies, International Alert, Minority Rights Group and the United Nations University/International Programme on Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity.

The theme of the seminar is one of the most important issues of our time, not only because of the resurgence of ethnic violence in recent years, but also because almost all countries in the world have become irrevocably multicultural and multi-ethnic. The processes of globalization are constantly reinforcing the multi-ethnic character of our societies, and there is thus no escape from learning to live together in peace and civility. Fortunately, an increasing number of countries are beginning to appreciate and value the richness and strength imparted by cultural and ethnic diversity.

The seminar was designed to promote discussion of a range of key issues confronting multicultural and multi-ethnic societies. Through a mixture of case studies and historical and thematic treatments, the seminar progressed from a discussion of the history and dynamics of ethnic conflicts to a consideration of creative approaches and mechanisms for conflict resolution, including third-party intervention by official and non-official sources. The agenda then moved to an analysis of the role played by public policies in mitigating ethnic tensions and promoting accommodation and pluralism. The media have come to play an increasingly powerful and visible role in political, social and economic affairs, and a special session was arranged to discuss the role of the media in ethnic conflicts.

The seminar then discussed a wide spectrum of policies ranging from constitutional guarantees of human rights to arrangements for devolution and sharing of power; from state investment, expenditure and resource allocation to affirmative action policies; and from assimilation to cultural pluralism especially with regard to language, religion and education. Some of these themes were discussed in connection with two groups of people in particular: ethnic minorities in North America and Western Europe, and indigenous and tribal peoples around the world.

The following report highlights the discussions and the main policy implications of the seminar. It discusses the nature of ethnicity and the reasons for the recent upsurge in ethnic conflict. It points out the paradox of ethnic identification: ethnicity typically becomes most destructive when it is threatened; therefore, in order to reduce ethnic tensions it is necessary to protect people's rights to form ethnic loyalties, and not to repress ethnic identification. This does not mean, however, that policies entrenching ethnicity in formal social and political structures should necessarily be put in place. Ethnicity naturally evolves, and in the process previously important ethnic markers become insignificant, and new bases for identification are created. This is a process that is difficult to regulate, and it is usually a mistake to try to do so.

The report also points out the potential and limitations of third-party intervention in ethnic conflicts, indicating some of the warning signs of impending conflict and windows of opportunity for intervention - the time during which preparations for violence are being undertaken. Once conflict has broken out, the process of conflict resolution is accelerated when the external actors are either neutral to the conflict or united in their approach to it.

However, external intervention is relatively unsuccessful where it attempts to define and enforce external solutions to the conflict, rather than to serve as a facilitator of negotiations between the combatants.

The report then discusses policy approaches that facilitate ethnic accommodation in diverse societies. Constitutional engineering is one of the most obvious responses to ethnic diversity. The report argues that electoral formulas in particular are relatively easy to negotiate and to amend, and that more attention needs to be paid to designing more truly representational electoral systems. Cultural policies should support cultural pluralism to the greatest extent possible, although in some cases cultural autonomy conflicts with individual rights. Economic policies should take into account effects on different ethnic groups, especially when different groups are traditionally associated with different sectors of the economy.

Finally, the report suggests that, to promote peaceful relations between different ethnic groups in a diverse society, it is essential to provide the conditions that encourage all groups to feel a shared interest in the society as a whole - to support, in other words, the creation of a sense of civic identity. This is an identity that cannot be forced on people, but that they must adopt themselves. They are most likely to do so when they feel that their society respects and meets their common needs, including their need for a sense of ethnic identity.

The summary report is followed by the texts of the opening address to the seminar, given by the President of the United Nations General Assembly, Samuel R. Insanally, and the keynote address given by Ali A. Mazrui, Director of the Institute of Global Cultural Studies at the State University of New York at Binghamton.

February 1995

Dharam Ghai
Director

Acronyms

ILO	International Labour Organisation
NGO	non-governmental organization
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNRISD	United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

Seminar Report

Introduction

On 17-19 August 1994, the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) held a seminar on Ethnic Diversity and Public Policies. Over 150 leading policy makers, academics, development experts, representatives of international and non-governmental organizations, and journalists met at the United Nations in New York to discuss the resolution of ethnic conflicts and policies for the accommodation of ethnic diversity.

The seminar included both panels and discussion. The panels allowed participants to focus on specific countries as well as on broader themes. Participants included experts on Rwanda and Burundi, South Africa, Senegal, Mauritius, Bosnia, Northern Ireland, Malaysia and Pakistan, as well as various other countries in the Caribbean, the Middle East, Western Europe, the former Soviet Union, Latin America and North America. Panel themes ranged from the role of the media in ethnic conflict, to particular forms of ethnic distinctiveness - such as indigenous peoples and immigrants. In the pursuit of practical ways to accommodate ethnic diversity and avoid ethnic violence, several panels addressed the impact of political, legal, social and economic policies, as well as third-party interventions.

Prior to the seminar, a number of case and thematic studies were prepared. The seminar then provided an opportunity to disseminate these findings and to attempt to synthesize experiences across countries. In spite of the controversy and sensitivity of many of the issues discussed, there was a surprising amount of consensus among the various participants in the seminar. The importance of preserving human life as well as human diversity was a common concern and many people agreed on such points as the importance of grassroots level policy formulation and conflict resolution.

The seminar on Ethnic Diversity and Public Policies formed part of the preparatory work for the World Summit for Social Development, to be held in Copenhagen in March of 1995. Of the three Summit themes - the reduction of poverty, the generation of productive employment and the enhancement of social integration - the seminar most explicitly addressed the last, yet the discussions proved that all three themes had ramifications for alleviating ethnic conflict. For example, several of the studies presented suggested that resource distribution played a role in ethnic dynamics. And participants noted that, in cases of ethnic diversity, "social integration" should not mean suppressing tensions but, rather, finding mechanisms to resolve them.

Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict

For the purposes of the seminar, ethnicity was defined quite broadly to include ethnic, racial and religious issues. The focus was on intra-state or secessionist ethnic conflicts, although inter-state conflicts can also have "ethnic" dimensions. Nearly all nation states have internal ethnic diversity, but each situation is unique, precluding universal policy prescriptions. The number, size, geographic distribution and degree of mobilization of communal segments; the relationship of ethnic diversity to other forms of social differentiation and hierarchy; the cultural definition of the state itself and the content of its text of legitimation as "nation" - all shape the roster of policy options conceivable. Nevertheless, a number of transferable policy lessons can be drawn from a careful examination of case studies.

It is important not to let concern about ethnic violence overshadow the positive aspects of ethnic identity. The world benefits from diverse cultures and individuals are enriched by the sense of community that ethnic identification can convey. Thus ethnicity in itself is not a "problem" to be solved; rather, the destructive manifestations of ethnicity caused by particular circumstances are what need to be addressed.

Ethnicity and Social Identity

An understanding of the nature of ethnicity, as well as of the origins and evolution of ethnic conflict, is essential for an understanding of ways to address and prevent such conflicts. Ethnicity, of course, is only one of the many ways in which people identify themselves: family, community, nation, class, occupation, gender, age and other group characteristics also form different layers of identity. People constantly change the focus of their identity, depending on where they are, what they are doing and whom they are with.

But ethnicity is distinct from other identifying characteristics in a number of ways. Ethnic diversity is a feature of virtually all societies, but how such diversity is perceived and the importance attached to it are constantly changing. The same ethnic markers - physical characteristics, cultural practices or religious beliefs - may be virtually ignored in one society, while they are considered extremely significant in another. As Liah Greenfeld noted, the significance attached to ethnic differences rarely corresponded to objective differences. Collective memory of historical inter-ethnic relations is influenced by present circumstances and objectives.

Furthermore, ethnicity - perhaps more than other types of identity - has the potential to become totalizing, that is, to displace other loyalties and obligations and become the central basis of identity. At times, some segments of a society may choose to place primacy on ethnicity, so that people, whether of the same ethnic group or not, feel constrained to submerge their other identities and submit to the cultural traits of the dominant group. In such circumstances, ethnic conflict becomes likely: people's identities and alliances take on a single rather than a multiple focus, leading to a deepening and hardening of social divisions. Because of this capacity to claim primacy over other types of group loyalties, ethnicity can be a deeply emotional form of mobilization. The ties that bind individuals belonging to different ethnic groups - those of place of residence, occupation, class or gender, for instance - lose their hold, allowing a demonization or dehumanization of those considered to be "the other" that would not be possible if more flexible and holistic types of social identification were maintained.

In extreme cases, other groups are characterized almost as if they were a different species, leading, in the worst instances, to a double standard of morality, atrocities and genocide. Ethnicity becomes a powerful mobilizer when ethnic distinction is believed to be genetically given and unchangeable, and thus to necessitate eternal conflict. While it is important to recognize that this is how ethnic conflict is seen by many involved, ethnicity should not be reduced to eternal, genetically determined difference. Participants in the seminar offered many interpretations of ethnic identity. Some, such as Rodolfo Stavenhagen, stressed that ethnic discourse met deep psychological needs, leading to the strong passion associated with ethnic conflicts. Others pointed out that it was useful to recognize the cognitive element of ethnic identity, which opened up possibilities for change. In this view, what groups consider to be their collective memory is often a function of their current social relations, social status and political aspirations. This has important policy implications: if collective memory is not lodged in some sort of "objective" history, it is not immutable and is thus not a perpetual stumbling block to progress in ethnic relations.

Varieties of Ethnic Diversity

Ethnic diversity arises under a variety of circumstances and along a number of lines. Some of the cases considered at the seminar included religious groups, racial groups, immigrants, refugees and indigenous peoples. There are unique dynamics associated with each of these types of ethnic diversity.

The expertise of some of the panellists was in the area of religious conflict. Hanan Mikhail-Ashrawi, for example, in her discussions of the Palestinian-Israeli struggles and negotiations, noted the distinct nature of a conflict over myth and history, in which each version of reality was mutually exclusive. Religious cleavages were distinguished by the way conflict could be imbued with spiritual overtones. Appeals to sacred texts and authorities could reinforce social divisions and conflict was often seen in zero-sum terms.

Physical characteristics, such as skin colour and other attributes often described as racial, are more physically immutable than religious and cultural differences. However, since the salience of a particular difference depends on societal rather than biological factors, racial differences may be relatively unimportant in some societies. Nevertheless, some of the most powerful ideologies of difference are based on physical characteristics. As Peter Li described, "visible minorities" were often blamed for economic problems and were the target of hate groups.

Immigrant groups are distinct from many other types of ethnic groups in that territorial autonomy is seldom a consideration for them. Sarah Collinson pointed out that immigrant groups were often largely of a particular class, such as the working class. Their segmentation into a sector of the economy may reinforce their cultural distinctiveness from the rest of society. Some members of immigrant groups also have a distinct juridico-political status - if they are not yet citizens. The experience of leaving a homeland may also generate a sense of exile and a powerful longing for return.

Such a mentality may also be a characteristic of refugee groups. Conflicts characterized as ethnic may be sparked by rapid population changes - although refugees and residents could be of the same ethnic stock and still clash, noted Valery Tishkov. Refugees are not only a tragic consequence of ethnic conflict - they may also be participants in renewed conflict, as in the case of the Tutsi refugees/fighters.

Indigenous and tribal groups almost everywhere occupy the lowest positions in political, social and economic hierarchies. These groups might have more recognition and organizational infrastructure internationally than locally, Rodolfo Stavenhagen suggested. Because these groups may follow distinct development paths, they are frequently viewed domestically as impediments to national development and integration. The General Assembly of the United Nations has defined "social integration" as one of the three main agenda items structuring the work of the 1995 Social Summit. This should not be equated with the homogenization of such groups. Indigenous and tribal groups often had distinct relationships to the land, for example, as noted by Lee Swepston, which was one reason why indigenous issues were often related to development strategies. Common indigenous demands include self-definition and legal status, territory, recognition of culture and some degree of autonomy. These are often, in fact, legally given rights that have been ignored.

In addition to distinctions among various types of ethnicity, countless other variables come into play in a given case. For example, ethnic distinctions such as race, language or religion, and other distinctions such as class, may either cross-cut each other or reinforce each other - affecting the degree of social segmentation in the society. Historical factors also play a role.

Various colonial histories, forced migration due to slavery or migrant labour importation, among other experiences, profoundly shape ethnic dynamics.

The needs of marginalized communities - including many immigrant, indigenous and racial groups - should get particular attention when policies to respond to ethnic diversity are developed. In recent years, there has been a resurgence of racism and sporadic acts of violence directed against ethnic minorities in some countries in Western Europe. In North America, despite many commendable public policy initiatives in the past, minorities of colour continue to be victims of discrimination. Immigrants need security of legal, social and economic status. In addition, every effort should be made by government authorities and institutions of civil society to combat discrimination and provide opportunities through legislative action and public education. The media have a special responsibility and can play a key role in this sphere by giving marginalized groups a public voice and by avoiding the perpetuation of stereotypes or the repetition of hate rhetoric. These proposals are of special significance to indigenous peoples; it is thus important to design policies with regard to indigenous groups that recognize their unique rights and needs, such as control over their land and some degree of cultural and political autonomy.

The Upsurge of Ethnic Conflicts and Violence

In recent years numerous ethnic, religious and racial conflicts have belied predictions that "development" would dissipate ethnic loyalties or that the end of the Cold War would lead to world peace. This upsurge in ethnically based conflicts has been caused by a number of factors, including the very ones that were expected to have the opposite effect. First, with the end of the Cold War, less attention has been given to containing conflict within the spheres of influence of the superpowers. The post-Cold War rise in ethnic conflict is thus due, in part, to definitional changes, since similar conflicts had previously been interpreted within the Cold War paradigm of bipolar blocks. Second, severe social and economic disruption in much of the world has resulted in widespread poverty, unemployment and insecurity, especially in Africa, Eastern Europe and the former USSR. The failure of many socialist and developmentalist states has led to disillusionment with development policies and ideologies, and a loss of state legitimacy. René Lemarchand commented that, in most instances, violent ethnic conflict was the result of the collapse of the state, rather than the cause of the collapse of the state.

With the decline of the state, there has been a decline in civic-based forms of identity - in the degree to which people belonging to different ethnic groups also see themselves as members of a civic body with common goals and aspirations. The declining authority of the state has left openings for civil society that have been filled by a wide range of organizations and activities, including ethnically based movements. Civil society, too, has a role to play in promoting civic identity. Some organizations promote civic identity and maintain ethnic identity, since these identities can co-exist, but others engage in more intolerant and destructive ethnically based activities.

It is important to note that not all conflicts that seem to be ethnically based can be explained so simply. It is easy for policy makers and the media to attribute violence to ancient tribal hatreds and ignore the contemporary precipitants of conflicts. All conflicts have several dimensions and it may do more harm than good to classify so many contemporary conflicts as "ethnic". The seminar participants pointed out the danger of the media or policy makers reducing a conflict to its ethnic dimension, for this could have an impact on those fighting in the conflict itself. It could also lead to policies that ignore the underlying roots of the tensions. Several felt that a conflict might be mishandled if its ethnic dimensions were unduly emphasized.

Participants generally agreed that we should look carefully at the present, and not just the past, to explain the current ethnic strife. Some, such as Claude Ake, felt that the rise in ethnic conflict was a phenomenon of late modernity, a reaction against rational, material culture. Many pointed to the important role of ethnic power brokers, who tried to "outbid" each other in the strength and extremity of their ethnic rhetoric. Some thought of ethnic conflict in terms of cycles of rising and declining tension. At times, tensions might be thought of as going into a period of incubation. At other times, historical changes might lead to the end of one cleavage but the possible emergence of another. Most seemed to agree with Rodolfo Stavenhagen that it was useful to think in terms of a variety of predisposing and triggering factors rather than single causes of ethnic conflict.

One such factor seems to be the nation state's ineffectiveness at meeting basic human needs, which leads to social insecurity that sets the stage for social tensions. As Gus Edgren and Juan Somavía stated at the opening session of the seminar, future security in the world would require a shift of focus from a narrow notion of state security towards concern for human security, by bringing issues such as poverty, unemployment and environmental degradation into the realm of security concerns. The upsurge in ethnic conflict today is proof that security defined narrowly in national or military terms may be ineffective, or even counter-productive, without a long-term global commitment to promote human security.

The Nature and Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict

The imperative to protect ethnic diversity does not oblige a state to artificially maintain or permanently entrench ethnicity in social structures or policies. Ethnicity naturally evolves and groups often assimilate with other groups or form new ones, in the process making previous ethnic markers insignificant and creating new bases for identification. The state cannot and should not try to regulate this process. The best course it can take is to present a complementary basis for identity - a civic identity - by creating the conditions that allow all groups within society to feel a sense of common purpose and mutual respect.

Ensuring the rights of all groups to have some voice in government, to engage in certain cultural practices and to advance through education and employment is essential for the growth of this mutual respect and civic identity. In other words, the state's primary concern should not be the "problem" of ethnic conflict itself, but rather the problem of the conditions that lead to it.

When attempting to formulate approaches to dealing with ethnic conflict, it is important to recognize that many societies have successfully dealt with ethnic diversity for some period of their history. A breakdown in ethnic relations typically comes either when negotiated bargains are broken, or when policies do not recognize and adapt to changing ethnic structures and relations. Since ethnicity is constantly in a state of flux, any ethnically diverse country must constantly adjust to the changing societal structures and relations it experiences.

It is also important to recognize that the absence of violent conflict does not necessarily mean that ethnic accommodation has been achieved. A pattern of peaceful domination of one group by another is a typical one. Of course, peace obtained through enforced domination is particularly prone to breakdown.

Another important lesson from recent conflicts is that violence between combatants belonging to different ethnic groups does not necessarily constitute an ethnic conflict. In fact it is quite possible - and, where previous ethnic relations have been relatively harmonious, quite probable - that the majority of the members of each ethnic group do not participate in the

conflict and do not identify with the combatants in ethnic terms. But the beginning of such a conflict is a dangerous time: the combatants are likely to use their ethnic differences both as a justification for the conflict and as a means of mobilizing support. If they are successful in portraying the conflict in ethnic terms, they will be able to convince individuals not previously involved that their interests, and perhaps their survival, are at stake. It is at this point that polarizing forms of ethnicity may be created or resurrected and that collective memory may be called upon to justify aggression. It is therefore essential that conflicts not be automatically judged to be ethnically based and that all the voices of the ethnic group in contention be recognized and recorded, rather than privileging the most radical views. The media have a great responsibility in this, while non-governmental organizations and activist groups can be key actors in recognizing the legitimacy of and maintaining support for ethnic moderates.

When examining case studies of ethnic conflict, the seminar participants faced the problem of deriving general lessons from specific cultural contexts and historically unique moments. John Darby mentioned several possible ways to identify groups of conflicts that share certain characteristics. For example, it might be useful to look at conflicts in a given region. Alternatively, there may be common themes across different conflicts, such as the dynamics of post-colonial cases or the particular issues associated with indigenous peoples. Finally, it might be possible to compare stages along a continuum of conflict, from pre-violence through a cessation of violence. To this end, it would be essential to look at successful cases of ethnic accommodation, in which violence was ended or successfully avoided. When violence occurs, the gulf between the contending parties may be so great that no immediate resolution is possible; in such instances, the best available policy may be containing or limiting the scope of violence until evolving circumstances provide an opportunity for resolution. The recent progress in Northern Ireland provides an example of the potential of such a containment approach.

In many cases, there are clear transitional stages between the beginning of the escalation of tension and the outbreak of violence, and warning signals that precede full-scale conflict. At such transitional moments, interventions have the greatest potential: we need to distinguish between "conflict" and "violence" and try to deal with conflict in the pre-violence stage. Violence needs psychological preparation; genocide begins with a stage in which one group starts to define another in terms that make its elimination desirable. An ethnic group may either be demonized and dehumanized, or it may be portrayed as an immediate threat. Propaganda plays a crucial role in this psychological preparation for violence. Censorship of such propaganda was discussed by participants, but many felt that a better alternative would be to monitor and counter propaganda with a more balanced presentation of ethnic groups and their aims.

Violence also needs material and institutional preparation: arms must be obtained, in many cases armed forces and command structures must be created and their members trained. This preparatory stage can also be monitored, countered and sometimes prevented - with strict control of arms sales and military mobilization, for example.

State Public Policies

When examining what can be done on a national level to promote ethnic accommodation and prevent ethnic conflict, it becomes necessary to address the nature and role of the state. Probably no states are completely culturally neutral; they necessarily reflect the differential power of the groups that make up society.

However, many states consider themselves neutral arbitrators between contending claims. Thus there is a need to acknowledge the difficulty of state neutrality. At the same time,

however, there is a great variation in the degree to which states attempt to be neutral and the explicit objective of neutrality does make a very great difference in the state's ability to promote ethnic accommodation. Alternatively, the development of international norms concerning the need for equitable treatment of all ethnic groups can help discourage overt bias on the part of states against certain groups (such as national minorities and indigenous peoples).

The formulation of public policy is further complicated by the fact that the complete resolution of ethnic tensions is a Sisyphean task, a goal that can never be reached. Ethnic relations and ethnicity itself are constantly in flux; there are therefore no single, all-purpose solutions to ethnic conflict. In addition, policy options are constrained by a number of factors: by the historical circumstances of the country; by the need to pursue goals other than ethnic accommodation and by the constraints of the democratic framework within which most governments now operate - all of which can limit the policy options available and the ability of the state to carry them out. For these reasons, the state can often only make changes incrementally.

There are several policy options at the state level that have the potential to alleviate ethnic tension and conflict. These include political, cultural and economic formulas, some of which work in tandem. It is important to emphasize domestic policies that accommodate ethnic diversity and discourage the intensification of conflict and the outbreak of violence, rather than concentrating on international policies of intervention after the fact. The international community can have an indirect role to play in this by spreading research findings and institutionalizing norms that can influence domestic policy choices - such as respect for minority rights, for instance. Many seminar participants felt, however, that there were important limits to the organizational capabilities and resources of the international community in undertaking more direct intervention or imposing and enforcing measures to end ethnic conflicts.

Political Formulas

A wide variety of democratic electoral systems can facilitate ethnic accommodation in diverse settings. The choice of an electoral system affects ethnic dynamics along several dimensions. First, some electoral systems might make it possible for previously politically excluded minorities to achieve representation in a legislative body, perhaps through a proportional representation system. The system in Mauritius, for example, in which seats are granted to "best losers", is a way to help smaller groups gain representation. A second desirable outcome, which does not always go hand-in-hand with the first, is for electoral formulas to produce representatives that command the effective support of their community, rather than those that are co-opted members of smaller groups - in other words, for groups to achieve genuine voice or influence in political processes.

Electoral systems should also be designed to create incentives for co-operation and moderation among ethnic groups. Some preferential voting systems offer incentives to co-operate: the necessity of competing for another ethnic group's second choice vote discourages inflammatory ethnic appeals during elections. Geographical distribution requirements for votes may also encourage more broad-based appeals. Finally, electoral systems should, if possible, avoid entrenching ethnic identities, as in separate electorates; minorities should be allowed to cast votes along ethnic lines in one election and in another choose to vote along other lines. Cumulative voting schemes show great promise in this regard. Balancing these goals is tricky and electoral systems perform differently in different situations. Nevertheless, this is one of the more easily manipulable political formulas, especially in times of political transition. At the very least, policy makers should be aware that universal suffrage is not

enough and that there is much diversity among democratic electoral systems; this can have profound implications for the nature of politics in an ethnically diverse country.

Another political formula to accommodate diversity is based on a "ruling committee" made up of members of the various ethnic groups. Along the lines of a consociational model, the ruling committee is a power sharing arrangement, although groups do not necessarily have symmetrical power. This model, discussed at the seminar by Ralph Premdas, depends on co-operation and negotiation between élites. Breakdowns can occur due to leaders jockeying for personal power and trying to "outbid" each other through extreme ethnic appeals. Failure to specify the exact terms of an agreement or failure to implement an agreement due to political costs can also lead to breakdown. Power sharing through a ruling committee is facilitated by formulas that encourage moderation in ethnic appeals, such as some of the electoral formulas discussed above.

The nature of the leadership is critical in this type of arrangement.

Federalism is another type of formula for ethnic accommodation. Where geographically feasible, a possible federal formula is ethnic territorial autonomy and a multi-ethnic centre. Such a compromise can avoid open conflict and satisfy groups that would otherwise exit from the political process. Federalism not only gives groups a degree of control over territory - often an important consideration - but may also provide a framework for a degree of cultural autonomy, such as control over the schools in a region. For large and culturally complex countries, such as India, federalism may be essential. Even where communal groups are not territorially segmented, as in Malaysia or the United States, the possibility of voice is increased by the many places it can find expression. Moreover, the diffusion of ethnic interaction in the political sphere over many arenas averts the kind of polarization possible if there is only a single, zero-sum struggle for power at the centre. Disadvantages of federalism include the potential for ethnic tensions between states or provinces; discrimination against migrants from other regions, such as "sons of the soil" movements; and the fixed nature of federal boundaries, which compartmentalize a fluid social structure. There may also be self-determination or separation demands by federated units.

Military policy was also a topic of discussion at the seminar. If the state fails to control the military, conflict can be severe. If military coups have historically resulted in many benefits and few costs to the armed forces - as in the case of Burundi, discussed by René Lemarchand - the cycle of coups can be hard to break. The post-Soviet arsenal poses another threat that needs to be controlled. Finally, returned war veterans or young men whose adolescence has been spent in armed ethnic bands sometimes pose a threat to social stability. For example, according to Valery Tishkov, a key policy objective for the post-Soviet states should be the rehabilitation of the veterans of the war in Afghanistan and former Red Army personnel.

Once conflict has broken out, policies to facilitate negotiations should be in place. Nicholas Haysom likened an ideal negotiating team to a group including both "swans" and "pigs": swans floated and were willing to compromise and be creative, yet they could also be pushed around; pigs, on the other hand, stood their ground and were good at working out the details. There is room for debate over the pros and cons of having negotiations in the light of the media or behind the scenes. Publicized negotiations may push leaders to posture for their followers in public statements that limit the space for compromise. On the other hand, publicity may make negotiators more accountable to society.

Cultural Formulas

Cultural policy responses to ethnic diversity include policies dealing with cultural practices, religion, education and language. Formal education is one of the most promising ways to promote ethnic understanding and tolerance and to create a shared sense of civic identity that

transcends ethnicity. It is generally advisable that cultural policies be as supportive of multiculturalism as feasible; states need not be defined as unilingual, for instance, and freedom of religion is a right recognized internationally. In practice, however, there may be contradictions between cultural pluralism and individual rights that must be balanced. The resolution of conflict between collective rights and individual rights cannot follow any predetermined formula; rather, contending claims will have to be balanced on a case by case basis.

Cultural autonomy seems to be one of the most straightforward ways to accommodate culturally diverse groups, yet it is also one of the most contested types of policies. Cultural autonomy may not be compatible with individual rights, as when cultural practices compromise children's or women's rights as defined by the larger society or international human rights norms. When the new South African constitution was formulated, for instance, it was recognized that state support for certain cultural traditions would infringe upon the principle of gender equality. In the discussion of indigenous peoples, Liah Greenfeld noted that modern medicine might homogenize distinct cultural groups, but it might also save individual children's lives. In such cases the choice between integration and insulation became particularly contested. This debate was not resolved, but participants such as Chandra Roy noted that all involved in such situations would benefit by remaining adaptable and flexible, recognizing, for example, the value of a holistic approach to health.

Education policy is often a focus of debate among ethnic groups. Ideally, the twin goals of ethnic autonomy and reconciliation of ethnic groups can be balanced. For example, John Darby discussed Northern Ireland's policy initiatives, including equal funding for Catholic and Protestant schools, as well as a sector of non-religious schools and a new class for all students on cultural understanding. Clearly, education policy has great potential impact on the development of a sense of mutual respect and civic identity among young people.

Language policy is a related issue. In Mauritius, ancestral language instruction is included in the educational system, reflecting the country's motto, "unity through diversity". Makhtar Diouf noted that in Senegal the co-existence of several linguistic groups was facilitated by the recognition of several "national" languages in addition to one "official" one. Clearly the national recognition of diversity can take many forms, such as the national celebration of various ethnic holidays in Mauritius, mentioned by Vidula Nababsing. In addition to the value of preserving our world's diverse languages, literatures and cultural practices, such national recognition of cultural diversity can prevent groups from feeling that their culture and way of life are threatened, a feeling that can lead to desperate actions. Ultimately, national recognition of diversity through various cultural policies can contribute to civic nationalism, for such civic identity does not necessitate homogenization; rather, it is based on mutual respect of difference.

Economic Formulas

Economic policies have a considerable impact on ethnic relations. Countries that are successful in achieving rapid and broad-based growth tend to find it easier to accommodate the material claims and aspirations of various ethnic groups. However, rising prosperity may also intensify ethnic competition or hurt certain groups. On the other hand, policies that contribute to economic stagnation and decline, thus intensifying poverty and insecurity, are likely to exacerbate ethnic tensions and provide fertile ground for the operation of ethnic entrepreneurs. The distribution of resources, in addition to the absolute increase or decrease in prosperity, is a key factor in the rise of discontent. Strategies that increase economic inequalities, especially if they coincide with ethnic divisions, marginalize certain groups and exacerbate ethnic discrimination and tensions.

Where ethnic groups traditionally work in different economic sectors, they are often differently affected by economic policies and particularly by structural adjustment policies. Such policies may therefore aggravate ethnic relations even though they were not intended to have an ethnic impact. Economic policies may also be specifically designed to have different effects on different ethnic groups. Policies of ethnic preference, for instance, have been formulated with the intention of compensating historically or structurally disadvantaged groups.

Economies that have entrenched exclusive or disproportionate advantage for particular ethnic groups will need to be adjusted. As John Darby noted, equity issues can be one potent aspect of a multi-dimensional ethnic conflict, such as that in Northern Ireland. The promotion of more equitable life chances for the various groups in society should include policies such as equal access to public housing, to funding for education and to opportunities for employment.

In spite of such policies, ethnic hierarchies in many countries are resilient because they are reproduced through societal discrimination. In such cases, policies to measure and promote the economic advancement of specific disadvantaged groups have been implemented. Such policies have proven useful in a number of settings, including the United States and India, but they also have limitations. There is a broad range of such policies, from consideration of race as one positive factor among many in a hiring or college acceptance decision, to a percentage of reserved places in colleges or government jobs. In practice, preferential policies have tended to benefit disproportionately the élite in the targeted ethnic group and they can generate hostility from non-targeted groups, especially in conditions of economic decline. In such situations, it may be preferable to attack the roots of the problem through policies - such as universal literacy, consistently good primary education, access to health care and expanding training and employment opportunities - for all groups. Charles Kennedy noted that, in Pakistan, reserved posts in the public sector, civil service and education had lingered and expanded beyond their original purpose and had actually exacerbated ethnic conflict in that country. Moreover, instead of playing down the society's beliefs in innate ethnic differences, such reserved posts, said Kennedy, seemed to provide statutory confirmation of profound differences between the peoples of Pakistan.

Several participants stressed that policy makers had to recognize the differential effects of economic policies and consider issues of distribution as well as growth. Yusuf Bangura argued that economic restructuring could undermine values associated with social integration. He noted the high level of segmentation of the labour market, often along ethnic lines, in many African countries and its effects on social polarization. One characteristic of stable countries, he said, was their social guarantees for those worse off. Other participants, including Leo A. Despres, suggested that the state playing a smaller role would help avoid destructive ethnic politics. He noted that ethnicity tended to become politicized in cases where competition was taken out of the market and where the state had become the main source for the allocation of social resources. He suggested shifting more resources to market-based enterprises and human resource development.

Finally, and more generally, Mahbub ul Haq suggested that the state should use more resources for social spending than military spending. The assumption was that human development was the great social integrator. In keeping with the theme of moving away from a preoccupation with military security and towards human security more broadly defined, this recommendation entailed investing more in people to achieve ethnic and human security.

Several of the links between political, cultural and economic approaches emerged from the discussions. Federalism, for example, can facilitate cultural autonomy, although it is not always necessary for such autonomy. On a more general note, economic advancement may be

facilitated by a group's gaining some political voice in government and discrimination in the economic sphere may be weakened by a growth in mutual respect due to national recognition of various cultural practices. Clearly, governments need to include all three policy spheres in their plans, remaining aware that the policies they choose have interrelated effects.

Secession

The issue of secession touches on both domestic and international policies pertaining to ethnic diversity. Participants, including Crawford Young, called for state and international actors to reconsider the notion of "self-determination". Rather than involving "all or nothing" options, in which dissatisfied groups are forced either to remain within a dominant country or to break away completely, self-determination should be seen in terms of intermediate options. Asbjørn Eide felt that we should look for "softer" notions of self-determination. Many groups do not necessarily want to secede, but do want greater control of their own lives. In such situations, conflict resolution mechanisms, such as councils of minorities within states and international institutions for minorities to consult if not accommodated at the national level, show some promise. Federalism, too, seems to be an intermediate option, although federal units can also be dominated by one group. The question of whether federal units should be ethnic was brought up. Regional integration as an alternative to making states smaller and smaller was mentioned. It was generally felt that there should be options other than just proliferating nation states with the same assimilationist nation state ideologies.

Some participants were more critical of the whole framework within which questions of secession were debated - the nation state model itself. Ali A. Mazrui discussed the interrelated forces of the nation state model and Western civilization as cultural homogenizers, eroding human diversity throughout world history. Those sharing this perspective would be more pessimistic about the whole endeavour of state level policies to accommodate ethnic diversity, since the state itself is implicated in the demise of such diversity. Most participants felt, however, that states themselves were not homogeneous and had, to various degrees, been able to support ethnically mixed populations.

To conclude, those formulating policies must recognize that ethnicity and ethnic relations are multi-dimensional phenomena: they involve cultural practices, religious beliefs, political goals, security concerns and economic aspirations, among others. No single policy can respond to all these dimensions; policy responses to ethnic diversity may need to be co-ordinated and carried out simultaneously in political, economic and cultural spheres. In addition, the ethnic unit itself is not a single collective actor - it contains people of different class, age and gender, and sometimes even of different religion or cultural background. Policy makers should be aware that their policies will seldom affect all members of an ethnic group in the same way.

International Roles

The role of the international community in the prevention or cessation of injustice or violence along ethnic lines was a major concern of the seminar. Themes that dominated discussion included international norms, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the international media, internationally elaborated economic policies and programmes, and third-party or United Nations intervention.

International Norms

When noting the potential contributions of the international community to ethnic accommodation, and the limitations of such contributions, participants were generally positive about the role of international norms. Like many, Crawford Young was more optimistic about the positive effects of an international normative order than of more invasive tinkering with individual countries. To illustrate the growth of such an order, he cited the example of Diallo Telli, former Organization of African Unity General Secretary, who was brutally killed in prison in 1975 with little international notice or reaction; today such an action would spark international outrage. Likewise, international norms led to pressures on South Africa to change its apartheid régime.

One area that is particularly conducive to the development of international norms concerns the rights of children. Robin Hay noted the success of the Centre for Days of Peace in its promotion of humanitarian cease-fires for the purpose of carrying out immunization programmes for children. Universal compassion for children can supersede other divisions, making such cease-fires easier to negotiate. At one point, discussion turned to the potential of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and its applicability in many situations of ethnic conflict.

Other rights régimes have direct applicability to situations of ethnic conflict, such as human rights, minority rights and indigenous rights. Danilo Türk suggested that the United Nations pay more attention to the ethnic aspects of human rights violations, since two thirds of human rights violations involve ethnicity. International conventions on human rights, although very difficult to enforce formally, are increasingly able to influence the behaviour of actors in conflicts.

Because the effectiveness of norms is difficult to measure, it is easy to be pessimistic about the potential impact of normative order in the face of violence. Thus the possibility of norms "with teeth" was brought up. For example, René Lemarchand commented on the possibility of a tribunal with the power to punish crimes against humanity as a deterrent to ethnic violence; experiments of this nature in the cases of Bosnia and Rwanda bear observation.

International Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)

International NGOs can be particularly well suited to deal with situations of ethnic conflict. For example, although not interest-free, they can often play the role of neutral third party to a degree that states cannot. In spite of and in part because of their unique position as non-state actors, international NGOs must be aware of the sensitive nature of their interventions overseas. NGO representatives at the seminar emphasized the crucial nature of an incremental approach to NGO intervention. Robin Hay noted the potential of an NGO approach starting with limited cease-fires, for example, since this positive interaction could increase the combatants' trust in each other and the NGO.

Also very important is the international NGO's accountability to the local population. In many cases, international NGOs' linkages to local areas give them insights that foreign governments that are intervening would do well to heed. For example, ActionAid UK's Ian McFarlane noted that disproportionate aid to certain regions in Somalia may have exacerbated that conflict. International NGOs, which may be more likely than states to place humanitarian interests above military interests, can serve as watchdogs of "humanitarian" actions.

International Media

The media, noted Hanan Mikhail-Ashrawi, are no longer spectators but have become players in ethnic politics. The international media can play several positive roles vis-à-vis ethnic conflicts. Daniel Franklin enumerated several such roles. Reporters can act as whistle blowers, by covering ethnically motivated atrocities or giving the world early warning of incipient ethnic conflict. The media can mobilize international reaction through pictures, as in the cases of Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Somalia. Members of the media often develop expertise in various regions and offer salient critiques of government policy, such as a slow response to a crisis. The various branches of the media all act as a forum for policy options. Hanan Mikhail-Ashrawi noted the media's crucial role of serving as "witness".

Several suggestions came out of the panel on the role of the media. Members of the media should avoid oversimplifying the sources of conflict or facilely labelling them "ethnic". Reporters need to be timely in their whistle blowing role and avoid inaccuracies and biases. Why have the media had problems with these basics? Often reporters are pressured by the need to get the public's interest. Sasa Vucinic felt that, in much reporting, speed and simplicity seemed to win out over analysis and depth. At the beginning of an ethnic conflict, the media may portray it superficially as a conflict between "good" and "bad" actors - an approach that can feed into the conflict.

There was some debate over censorship of the kinds of ethnically inflammatory material that can be disseminated via the mass media. Some felt that monitoring hate radio in Rwanda, for example, would be beneficial, but the reactions to censorship proposals were generally negative. In practice, distinguishing between unintentional and malicious inaccuracies would be difficult.

Economic Policies

Several participants felt that international institutions should be more aware of or more sensitive to the possible impacts on ethnic tensions of structural adjustment and lending policies. Virulent conflict often occurs in times of declining opportunity and scarce resources. International organizations should take this into account when mandating economic policies that may involve austerity programmes and consider the political feasibility of economic programmes in given settings. Development programmes encouraged or sponsored by international agencies should be sensitive to the rights, ways and needs of indigenous peoples. Gus Edgren noted that these had an improving rate of success due to the increasing tendency to preserve traditional identities and natural resources.

Economic sanctions were brought up as a possible means of discouraging ethnic violence. The international isolation of the South African régime, for example, was essential in forcing it into negotiations; external pressures played both positive and negative roles in leading to the Palestinian settlement. The success of such sanctions seems to depend on both international and domestic factors. There must be not only strong and complete international consensus on the sanctions, but also internal support in the sanctioned country in the form of opposition groups that can gain from the sanctions.

Third Party or UN Intervention

Once ethnic conflict has broken out, third-party intervention is often called for - although the effective role of a third party may be quite limited. In most cases, the provision of space for negotiation is crucial for the beginning of conflict resolution and the process is accelerated when external actors are either neutral to the conflict or united in their approach to it. In the

case of the Palestinian agreement, for example, the neutrality of the Norwegian facilitators was important to breaking through the stalemate created by external advocates for each side.

It is also clear, however, that external intervention is relatively unsuccessful where it attempts to define and enforce solutions to the conflict, rather than serve as a facilitator of negotiations between the combatants. If peace is forcibly imposed, it will break down when the force is removed - as the experience from Somalia shows. Thus the external actors who exert the most power are not necessarily the most successful in conflict resolution. As discussed above, non-governmental organizations have at times proven able to encourage warring parties to accept incremental steps towards conflict resolution, including acceptance of the principle of third-party mediation.

There were several points on which the seminar participants agreed concerning third-party intervention in an ethnic conflict. First, if a settlement is forced or imposed - or if it is so perceived - the "peace" that results may be short-lived. Second, the neutrality of the third party is key; there is a great advantage to having an intervener without vested interest in the conflict. Ian McFarlane made several further suggestions: the local population's interests should come before the intervener's security goals; negotiation should always come before a military response; third-party responses should be automatic and timely, rather than ad hoc; and intervention strategies should, above all, avoid exacerbating conflict.

Civil Society and Civic Identity

Discussions at the seminar pointed to the significance of civil society institutions in any consideration of ethnic accommodation. For example, Ismat Kittani wondered about the length of the lag between taking apartheid out of the law and removing apartheid from South African society. Since to focus solely on the state and international institutions is to ignore the potential for ethnic accommodation within society itself, the suggestions and comments related to institutions and groups in civil society bear noting.

One major institution - the media - has already been discussed. Ralph Premdas pointed out that multi-ethnic voluntary associations could play an important role and should be encouraged. Ian McFarlane mentioned the role of women in the Somali peace process and encouraged further study of the roles of women in ethnic conflict and reconciliation - areas of research that have often been ignored. Universities were also mentioned, due to their potential as neutral meeting places for debate, but it was noted that they might also be a place where academics provided fodder for conflict. In this regard, Peter Wallensteen noted the importance of reading histories of the "other side" in an ethnically divided society. Clearly, many of these suggestions could facilitate the development of a civic identity.

An important step towards developing civic identity or a sense of civic nationalism is to reconsider the notion of the "nation state" and in the process soften nationalism's assumption of homogeneity. Within a diverse society, processes must be in place to encourage the questioning of stereotypes; this was essential in the "reconstruction of the 'other'" in South Africa, as René Lemarchand noted. Other ideas included John Darby's mention of classes on cultural understanding for children and Valery Tishkov's suggestion of training leaders in ethnic conflict resolution and developing background "orientation" publications for members of the mass media covering ethnic conflict. In addition to education, legal measures, such as Canada's Multiculturalism Act of 1988, show promise for developing civic identity. More controversial legal measures relating to the development of civic identity are legislating against hate propagandists, as in Canada, or outlawing ethnic parties, as in Senegal and elsewhere in Africa.

Paradoxically, in order for ethnic identity to develop the flexibility and tolerance necessary to move beyond its destructive and polarizing forms, ethnicity needs to be protected. It is precisely when ethnic or cultural identity is threatened that it becomes most important to people. When people do not feel free to express their ethnicity - through speaking their own languages, practising their cultural traditions and transmitting those traditions to their children, for example - they are less likely to develop a wider sense of civic identity or a feeling that they share common goals with the larger society. When a group faces the possibility of physical or cultural extinction, it may see resistance through violence as its only survival option.

Conclusion

The seminar on Ethnic Diversity and Public Policies made clear that it is possible to learn from past experiences, while recognizing that each situation is unique and that no universal policy prescriptions can be provided. There are some lessons, however, that can be put in general terms. Many participants stressed that it was not conflict itself that was the problem, but rather the lack of means other than violence to resolve conflict. If ethnic tensions were simply viewed as a problem to be repressed, they would not be recognized as a symptom of underlying problems, such as inequitable distribution or social discrimination. As Juan Somavía noted in his keynote address, integration did not mean suppressing tensions, but rather finding mechanisms to overcome them.

The most important lesson of these studies is that it is essential to provide conditions that encourage all groups in society to feel a shared interest in the society as a whole - to support, in other words, the creation of a sense of civic identity. This is an identity that cannot be forced on people but that they must adopt themselves - and they are most likely to do so when they feel that their society respects and meets their common needs, including their need for ethnic identity.

Opening Address by Samuel R. Insanally (President of the United Nations General Assembly)

Ladies and gentlemen,

In my inaugural statement to the 48th General Assembly, I saw fit to call attention to the many ethnic conflicts that have appeared in the aftermath of the Cold War. I noted at the time that the term "ethnic cleansing" - which has been used to describe some of them - was no more than a euphemism for genocide and the acquisition of territory by force. It has meant suffering and death for thousands of hapless victims who have been caught up in this new spiral of violence. We have only to watch our television screens each night to witness the most horrific forms of man's cruelty to his fellow man. Such is the enormity of these crimes against humanity that the sense of outrage that we as civilized beings must feel has been numbed. We stand idly by while ethnic diversity - that precious gift of creation - is trampled under foot by tyrants who have little or no regard for life or liberty.

In these times of moral and social degradation, we cannot but remember Burke's famous words: "When bad men combine, the good must associate; else they will fall one by one, an unpitied sacrifice in a contemptible struggle". The international community must therefore come together to curb such evils as ethnic conflict before they corrupt and consume the global body politic. With each passing day, the risk of further explosion grows, increasing the danger of extinction for entire peoples. Bearing this in mind, last December the General Assembly designated 1995 the Year of Tolerance. By the terms of resolution 48/126, the entire United Nations system, governments, and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations have been asked to contribute to its successful observance.

I therefore very much welcome this seminar which the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, jointly with the United Nations Development Programme, has organized to further study the subject of ethnic diversity and to develop possible policy approaches for consideration by the World Summit for Social Development which will be held in 1995 in Copenhagen, Denmark, and which will have as one of its three broad concerns the question of social integration. As evident from the background document and programme that were provided me, the organizers of the seminar have correctly recognized the complexity of the issue before its participants and consequently contemplate a corresponding complexity of policy outcomes. I am confident that, with such expert participation, the proposals you make will be eminently worthwhile.

As the programme suggests, we would do well to begin by attempting to comprehend the forces that generate ethnic conflicts. In each case it may be useful to look at historical antecedents in order to pinpoint the motivation toward violence. We may find that the cause lies in ancient animosities that fester and give rise periodically to a desire for vengeance. It may also be the legacy of colonialism or imperialism that distorted or destroyed natural frontiers and thus created the potential for division and conflict. More often than not, however, the cause resides in outmoded economic and social infrastructures that have traditionally provided fertile ground for the spread of hostility.

Some analysts have sought to categorize ethnic conflicts into three broad types - the irrendentist, the secessionist and the anti-colonial - but these are, in my view, too convenient a catch-all for the myriad manifestations of violence that occur throughout the world. As I have already suggested, ethnic conflict is often just a mask to cover the assertion of personal power and territorial aggrandizement. In the face of the barbarity of many of these conflicts, I am also led to wonder whether there is some atavistic trait in the nature of man that impels him to cruelty to other human beings. All of this is to say that the causes of ethnic violence are legion

and that only a multi-dimensional approach is likely to reveal the real origin of any particular conflict.

However, while diagnosis is important to the finding of permanent cures, many forms of conflict are so virulent that immediate palliative treatment is needed. Timely intervention can successfully contain and prevent violence from escalating. At least, this appears to be the philosophy guiding the United Nations to which the unenviable task of quelling many of these outbreaks is invariably given. The harsh reality that the organization must face in trying to satisfy the many demands for its intervention is that it is ill equipped in terms of both its structure and its resources to deal with these conflicts. Indeed, so overwhelmed is it by the proliferation of ethnic strife that its response on many occasions is usually ad hoc and inadequate. There is a clear and present danger that this imperfect approach will lead to a loss of the organization's credibility and render it impotent to deal with these threats to international peace and security.

The most obvious limitation of the United Nations is that it was conceived and constructed as an organization of independent and sovereign states. It is expressly forbidden by Article 2.7 of its Charter to "intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state". Thus, while it is fully competent to handle inter-state relations, it must be careful in its approach to intra-state matters. As experience has shown, the majority of ethnic conflicts have been intra-state rather than inter-state and consequently have not been easily susceptible to management by the United Nations. Operations such as those in Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia have blurred the lines of distinction between peace-keeping, peace-making and peace enforcement. The resulting confusion has brought charges of impropriety against the organization and created doubts about its bona fides in some of the actions it takes.

We cannot eat our cake and have it, however. We cannot on the one hand ask the United Nations to perform miracles and on the other curse it when it fails. The truth of the matter is that, as I remarked in an address to the Law School at New York University, nationalism is in many cases no longer a domestic dispute. There is in fact nothing new about the tension between internationalism, which the United Nations above all personifies, and nationalism. From the creation of the organization, it has been its internationalist mission to serve world order in a world of states that in many instances claim sovereignty as the consummation of their nationalism.

It may be safely posited that there is nothing really unprecedented or unenvisaged in recent activities such as have been seen, for example, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in Somalia. The Charter of the United Nations itself clearly subordinates the domestic jurisdiction principle to the authority of the Security Council to restore or maintain international peace or security. In this connection, I entirely share the view that has been expressed by the Secretary-General in his report, *An Agenda for Peace*. There, he acknowledges the current emergence of the security arm of the United Nations as "a central instrument for the prevention and resolution of conflicts and for the preservation of peace" and considers this development as the regaining of an opportunity to achieve the great objective of the UN Charter. The new role of the United Nations is a reclaiming and not a usurpation of its patrimony.

If I might, I would like to comment - albeit briefly - on the two instances mentioned, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Somalia, where the United Nations has been taken to task for its perceived encroachment on nationalism. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, any hostility to nationalism can by no means be charged to the United Nations. I would argue also that here we have seen a much clearer aspect of cross-border threats to the peace than has been present in some earlier interventions. Moreover, the peace-making dimension of the Security Council's action in calling on the Bosnian Serbs to accept the peace plan is hardly more in

substance than what the United Nations has done before particularly in the instance of the pre-Zaire Congo.

Similarly, there is also a remarkable resemblance between that operation and the Somalia situation today. In both cases, the United Nations found a peace-keeping role, dictated by internecine civil chaos, placing it in a position of taking military initiatives with major political consequences. The point can be made, however, in this comparison, that the attempted Katanga secession in pre-Zaire Congo, whose failure may have been assured by the United Nations intervention, was surely more plausibly a nationalist initiative than the contest between Somali clan leaders whose struggles can hardly be elevated to the status of nationalist expressions of the right to self-determination. Moreover, I do not think that in this day and age, the cry of nationalism should suffice to obtain exemption from the requirements of world order and those of respect for human rights and humanitarian law. For the survival of mankind, internationalism must be permitted, through the agency of the United Nations, to set binding parameters on nationalism.

Having attempted a defence of United Nations intervention in some intra-state conflicts, I would nevertheless accept the fact that the organization is by no means the ideal instrument for dealing with many of the problems that are laid at its door. With some 18 peace-keeping operations now deployed, any further engagements are likely to place an unbearable strain on its capacity and severely limit its usefulness. As the Secretary-General is frequently wont to complain, there are not enough resources at his disposal to undertake more operations in peace-keeping, peace-making and peace-building. The estimated cost of peace-keeping exercises is now somewhere in the order of three billion dollars a year. By comparison with the trillions of dollars spent annually on armaments, this sum would appear to be a small pittance. Yet while arms expenditure grows, the nations of the world appear reluctant to devote more resources to the prevention of conflict.

As President of the General Assembly, I have been very conscious of the limitations of the United Nations in this vital area of peace-keeping. Very early in my term of office, therefore, I sought to explore the possibilities that Chapter 8 of the Charter provides for regional organizations to assist the United Nations in the discharge of these important tasks. A meeting of the heads of relevant institutions was recently held in New York, under the auspices of the Secretary-General, to examine the full potential of inter-organizational co-operation in the maintenance of global peace and security. I was greatly heartened by the discussion that took place. It clearly revealed that many organizations could, in different ways, complement and reinforce United Nations action in several spheres.

Such co-operation could serve to create an extensive network of information and intelligence gathering and provide an early warning system for the prevention of conflict. An inventory of the capacities of the various regional organizations could clearly identify both their strengths and limitations and, in this way, help to achieve the required complementarity and co-ordination of effort. It was also felt that, in some cases, regional organizations could be well suited, by virtue of their proximity to the conflict, to play an important part in the search for a settlement. Homogeneity of membership could be more readily conducive to consensus and give intervention a more acceptable face. On the other hand, age-old hatreds, mutual suspicions and inequities of one kind or another could effectively rob a group of its cohesion and reduce its ability to deal with internal conflicts. It might be, too, that some organizations are not endowed either in terms of their mandate or resources to play any meaningful role. It thus becomes a matter of political and diplomatic judgement to determine the fine balance of co-operation that can be established.

As the seminar's programme rightly asserts, these and other forms of third-party intervention could and should be bolstered by appropriate public policies in multi-ethnic states, which are

specifically designed to obviate the risk of conflict. I am pleased to see that the value of political, legal, economic and social policies will be studied to enhance their future application. I would hope, too, that the role of education would also be given due attention since peoples that have not learned to live in harmony are likely to fall prey to dissension. For, as a former Secretary-General once said, "with all the convulsions in global society, only one power is left that can impose order on incipient chaos: it is the power of principles transcending perceptions of expediency. Anarchy in international relations" - and I would add in inter-state relations - "can only be avoided by a total renunciation of force". The peoples of the world must therefore be educated in the virtues of peaceful co-existence. The ethic of conflict must yield to the ethic of co-operation.

With the ending of the Cold War, the world has reached a landmark in its history from which can be seen a promising vista of peace and prosperity for all our nations. It would indeed be a great pity if this new wave of ethnic conflicts were to shipwreck our hopes of achieving these goals. We must therefore set our moral compass to chart a course that would weather the storms of ethnic conflicts. This seminar can do much to ensure that ethnic diversity remains the virtue that nature intended it to be rather than the vice that sometimes leads man to social degradation and to violence. I therefore wish your deliberations every success.

Ethnicity in Bondage : Is Its Liberation Premature?

Keynote address by Ali A. Mazrui

(Director, Institute of Global Cultural Studies and Albert Schweitzer Professor in the Humanities, SUNY Binghamton)

Two interrelated forces in world history have contributed towards the erosion of human diversity. One force has been the triumph of the nation state as a model of political organization; the other has been the wider impact of Western civilization as a whole on societies far and wide.

The nation state as a model was predicated on cultural homogenization. Far from a hundred ethnic flowers being allowed to bloom, these were often denied sustenance, and were sometimes brutally crushed altogether. The nation state was often culturally monopolistic. In Germany in the first half of the twentieth century, it even attempted to be genetically monopolistic. That was what the Holocaust was partly about, the Aryan purity goal.

In post-Ottoman Turkey, the nation state has tried to be linguistically monopolistic, denying legitimacy to the languages of other indigenous ethnic groups. The Kurdish language suffered in Turkey. Iraq tried to turn Kurds into Arabs; Iran to turn them into Persians. In the first quarter-century of post-colonial Africa, the concept of the nation state rejected the word "tribe", treated ethnicity as a political pathology, and erected constitutions that made little effort to accommodate ethnic loyalties. The UNESCO General History of Africa banned the word "tribe" from its eight volumes. All in all, the whole paradigm of the nation state was so committed to the principle of cultural homogeneity that ethnicity often retreated in shame. Ethnicity was indeed in bondage.

The other modern force that has eroded human diversity is the closely related one of the impact of Western civilization as a whole on societies far and wide. While Western liberalism itself values pluralism and diversity, few forces have done more to create uniformity in the world than Western culture. At the end of the twentieth century, many more people are dressing alike, eating alike, thinking alike and speaking Western languages than was conceivable at the beginning of the century. As the world has become more Westernized, it has become less diversified.

And yet it is precisely at the end of the twentieth century that ethnicity is at last trying to break loose from the confines of both the nation state and the inhibitions of Western civilization. A hundred ethnic flowers are indeed trying to bloom - but the short-term cost is high. Full many a flower not only weeps, but bleeds. In the short term, is the cost worthwhile? Or does the world have to get used to the idea that ethnic loyalties are here to stay and cannot be wished away - either by the ideology of the nation state or by the relentless erosion caused by Western culture? Or is the liberation of ethnicity premature?

Caught between this great complexity are two distinct sub-themes - the sub-theme of "ethnicity and labour" and the sub-theme of "ethnicity and language". Let us place them both within the wider configurations of Africa's experience.

Between Ethnicity and Labour

When Moshood Abiola won the Nigerian presidential election in June 1993, he was the first southerner to be elected executive head of state in the country's post-colonial history. In previous elections Nigerians brought northern Muslims into power. In June 1993 they still

brought back a Muslim victor - but this time he was a southerner. Did the military government of Ibrahim Babangida nullify the elections for those ethnic and regional reasons? Was Moshood Abiola denied the presidency because he was Yoruba rather than Hausa?

Abiola's biggest mistake of 1993 was in exaggerating the scale of Western hegemony in the world. On being denied the presidency, instead of staying at home to fight it out, he travelled to the capitals of the Western world to seek international help in the fight against the military government in Nigeria. Washington and London made small gestures. Abiola damaged himself seriously at home.

In 1994, a few weeks before he resumed his struggle for the presidency, Abiola was in Washington again. But this time he knew that the main battlefield had to be Nigeria. He telephoned my home and missed me. With the help of my wife, he tracked me down at a hotel at Lincoln University in Pennsylvania. He told me "I am going to Nigeria to become president. I will see you at the inauguration!" I was startled. In a sense I am still startled. But that phone call was also a lesson to me in political courage.

A few weeks later Abiola declared himself president of Nigeria at a rally in Lagos attended by thousands of people. It is true that he should have done that a year earlier. He had gambled in 1993 on Western hegemony and lost. But, on matters of principle, "better late than never"!

Abiola's electoral support had been multi-ethnic. But his support in the fight against the military régime came to be heavily Yoruba and based in the Western region. The fight has produced one remarkable phenomenon - the strike of the oil workers and their supporters in defence of Abiola. The strike became the most impressive utilization of labour power for democratic ends in the history of post-colonial Africa - regardless of whether or not the strike ultimately succeeded. Its capacity to sustain itself for many weeks and hold the nation's economy to ransom on an issue of national democratic principle has already earned it a place in post-colonial history.

In Poland under communism in the 1980s, the defiance of the trade union movement, Solidarity, was widely acclaimed in the Western world. The petro-labour strike in Nigeria in the 1990s in defence of democracy fired few imaginations in the Western world - in spite of the fact that Nigeria was several times the size of Poland in population, and was Africa's most populous country.

Lech Walesa became a household name in the West, and he won the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1983. Who knew the names of Nigeria's trade union leaders outside Nigeria? Were any of them likely to win the Nobel Prize for Peace?

The double standards of the world persisted, distorted by Western hegemony. What passed for heroism in Europe (i.e. Solidarity in Poland) passed for instability in Africa (i.e. the strike of Nigeria's oil workers). What was seen as martyrdom in Eastern Europe (harassment of Lech Walesa) was seen as another example of African tyranny when African democrats were victimized. The Western focus was disproportionately on who was killing democracy in Africa, and inadequately focused on who was fighting for democracy on the continent. African villains got more coverage than African heroes.

Between Ethnicity and Language

The "nation" part of the "nation state" was interpreted to mean considerable cultural homogeneity. The "state" part of the "nation state" was interpreted to mean considerable political centralization. The two forces of national homogenization and statist centralization

played havoc with ethnic identities. The state institutions regarded ethnic groups as a danger to the centralizing authority of the state. The new national consciousness regarded ethnic consciousness as a danger to national cohesion. A national language was encouraged at the expense of ethnic languages. In some cases the promotion of the national language was itself a form of oppression. Afrikaans in South Africa continued to be regarded as not only the language of the oppressor but also the instrument of oppression.

Curiously enough, the Hutu and the Tutsi spoke virtually the same verbal language and were engaged in very different non-verbal communication. Perhaps nowhere outside Rwanda and Burundi is there such a dramatic distinction between verbal convergence of Hutu-Tutsi communication and non-verbal divergence in Hutu-Tutsi communication. In Rwanda and Burundi they have a shared language but not shared communication. These are people divided by culture but not by language.

And yet which countries in Africa are giving ethnic languages recognition as the twentieth century comes to an end? By a strange twist of destiny, it is the most ancient of sub-Saharan African states - Ethiopia - and the most modern of the sub-Saharan states - South Africa.

- The government of Ethiopia after Mengistu Haile Mariam is decentralizing political authority to ethno-regional units with jurisdiction over language policy in their own areas. This has happened after many generations of Amharic hegemony.
- South Africa, in the wake of political apartheid, has conceded recognition to eleven official languages. This has happened after centuries of the victimization of indigenous languages.

Apartheid had tried to create homelands justified on the basis of racial characteristics. These were the *bantustans*.

- Is post-apartheid South Africa creating "lingo-stans" - islands of languages rather than islands of race? How does the trend towards lingo-stans relate to experience elsewhere in Africa?
- Is Ethiopia's experiment with devolution of power to the regions partly a case of empowering lingo-stans? Certainly the languages of the Oromo and ethnic Somali in Ethiopia have received greater legitimacy in the new Ethiopia than ever before.
- Zaire is sensitive to the need for some kind of system of lingo-stans. Its educational system recognizes pivotal regional languages - Chiluba, Kikongo, Lingala, Swahili. The languages have a special role in schools in their respective areas of Zaire.

In spite of these tendencies, linguistic nationalism in most of sub-Saharan Africa is exceptionally weak. Linguistic nationalism is the version of nationalism that is concerned about the value of its own language, that seeks to defend it against other languages, and that encourages its use and enrichment.

Africans south of the Sahara are nationalistic about their race, often about their land, and many are nationalistic about their particular "tribe". But nationalism about African languages is relatively weak as compared with India, the Middle East or France. In this generalization I include Africans in South Africa - I will elaborate on South Africa a little later.

If I am right that nationalism about languages is weak in sub-Saharan Africa, as compared with, say, India, what are the reasons? It is indeed relevant, but not adequate, to point out that most sub-Saharan countries are multilingual. Deciding which indigenous language to promote

as a national language carries the danger of ethnic rivalries. This is perfectly true. Any move to make Hausa the national language of Nigeria could precipitate a national crisis in Yorubaland and Igboland. Luganda would be strongly resisted outside Buganda in Uganda.

But India, too, is a multilingual country. And language policies have sometimes provoked riots. The original constitutional ambition to make Hindi (a northern language) the language of all India has understandably met stiff resistance in the South. Compromises have had to be made. In spite of the presence of so many languages in India - and sometimes because of it - linguistic nationalism is one of the political forces in the land.

Where Africa's languages differ from India's is partly a matter of scale. While the three major Nigerian languages (Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo) are spoken by some 20 million people each (Hausa more, others less), most African languages are spoken by far smaller numbers. In contrast, some Indian languages are spoken by up to one hundred million people. Hindi is spoken by several hundred million. In a multilingual society, does the scale of the linguistic constituency contribute to nationalistic sensitivity in defence of the language?

In addition to linguistic diversity and linguistic scale, there is the distinction between the oral tradition and the written. The overwhelming majority of sub-Saharan African languages belonged to the oral tradition until the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. There is no ancient written literature outside Ethiopia and the Islamized city states of East and West Africa. Without a substantial written tradition, linguistic nationalism is slow to emerge - although there are exceptions, such as the linguistic nationalism of the Somali based mainly on the oral tradition.

The main Indian languages have a long written tradition, with ancient poets and many written philosophical treatises. These help to deepen a propensity for linguistic nationalism.

But the written tradition can include one additional element - sacred literature. Because most African languages were unwritten until relatively recently, those oral languages do not have sacred scripture. Sacred scripture is itself an additional fertilizer for linguistic nationalism. Linguistic nationalism among the Arabs has been greatly influenced by the Holy Book, the Koran, as well as by great Arab poets of the past.

Finally, we must bear in mind that the humiliation of black people has been much more on the basis of their race than on the basis of their languages. African nationalism is therefore much more inspired by a quest for racial dignity than by a desire to defend African languages.

All these are massive generalizations with a lot of exceptions. Some Ethiopians were literate and sophisticated long before the written word was a common currency among the Anglo-Saxons on the British isles. Large sections of the Tanzanian population today have shown nationalistic attachment to the Swahili language. They write not just letters but poems to the editor as a matter of course.

And yet Africans describe their countries as being "English-speaking" and "French-speaking" in a manner in which ex-colonial Asia never does. Whoever speaks of "English-speaking Asian countries", like India, or "French-speaking Asian countries", like Viet Nam? Because sub-Saharan Africans are rarely linguistic nationalists, they are seldom resentful of their massive dependence on the imported imperial languages.

A politician may speak six indigenous languages fluently. If he or she does not speak the relevant European language, he or she cannot be a member of parliament in the great majority of sub-Saharan African countries.

To be head of state in Kenya, a candidate needs to be trilingual - competence in Swahili, in English and in one of the major ethnic languages of Kenya. Swahili is the trans-ethnic lingua franca at the grassroots level and the primary language of oral speeches at the national level. English is still the official language of documentation, the constitution, the judiciary and most of the debate in parliament. The most influential newspapers are also those in the English language. But, on the basis of experience so far, a Kenyan president has also needed a major ethnic constituency as the foundation of his political support. It is because of these considerations that a Kenyan president has so far needed to be trilingual.

A president of Tanzania, on the other hand, has only needed to be bilingual - with competence in Swahili and the English language. Proficiency in an ethnic language for a major politician in Tanzania has sometimes been more of a liability than an asset. At the very least neither Julius K. Nyerere nor Ali Hassan Mwinyi has needed ethnic languages for his ascent to the pinnacle of the political system.

Technically, a president of Uganda could be unilingual in the English language and get away with it. The country is so linguistically fragmented that many Ugandans are in any case multilingual as citizens - but would be quite prepared to accept a head of state who was unilingual in the imperial language of English, much as the people of Malawi once accepted Hastings Banda as their leader although he had lost competence in his native language and could only speak to the people in English.

In Kenya the official language of the constitution is English but the de facto language of electoral politics is Swahili. In Kenyatta's last years, legislation came before parliament in English and was debated in Swahili because the president insisted that Swahili was the parliamentary language of Kenya at the oral level. In today's parliament in Kenya, legislation still comes in English - but there is the flexibility of debating it in either English or Swahili.

Constitutions all over sub-Saharan Africa are written in a European language, making them unintelligible to the majority of the population. In the great majority of African countries the constitution has not been translated into an African language.

It is difficult to build a culture of constitutionalism in Africa if concepts like "civil liberties", "due process", "independence of the judiciary" and "habeas corpus" are never translated into the indigenous languages accessible to ordinary citizens. Constitutionalism becomes foreign as a system partly because it is completely alien linguistically. Banda spoke only English and became president of Malawi; there is no example in sub-Saharan Africa of a president who is elected to the presidency without a European language.

Yes, linguistic nationalism is weak in Africa south of the Sahara. Surprisingly, the two greatest exceptions are two peoples that are otherwise vastly different from each other - the Somali and the Afrikaners. It is arguable that they are the only ones who are true linguistic nationalists in sub-Saharan Africa. They are very possessive, defensive and proud of their languages and have regarded them as central to their cultural identity.

Do the similarities end there? The Somali are pre-eminently a people of the oral tradition, who did not even have an official orthography for the Somali language until 1972 when Siad Barre finally chose the Roman alphabet. The Afrikaners have had three hundred years of the written tradition, beginning paradoxically with texts written in the Arabic alphabet (which Siad Barre rejected in 1972). But this Afrikaans written tradition has been very limited. In reality Afrikaans was mainly an oral tradition until the nineteenth century.

The Somali have never attempted to impose their language on anybody else over the centuries. Afrikaans, on the other hand, is widely perceived by many South Africans not only

as the language of the former oppressor but also as the actual instrument of oppression. Many South Africans believe that Afrikaans was forced not only on millions of school children but also on rural workers, peasants, broadcasting media, domestic employees and simple neighbours in Afrikaans-speaking areas. Unlike the Somali language, Afrikaans was not simply defended against outsiders - it was imposed upon outsiders. Did Afrikaners carry linguistic nationalism too far?

Towards the Future

But this issue of language is tied to that other force hostile to ethnicity - the triumph of Western culture as a globalizing experience.

Western liberalism may be doctrinally in favour of pluralism - but Western culture destroyed the civilizations of the Western hemisphere and has put the civilizations of Africa and Asia under siege. The world is getting less diverse because it is getting Westernized. **The future may be post-modern but can it ever be post-Western?**

What is happening in the 1990s is a decline in the nation state with a temporary strengthening of Western hegemony. The two forces that have militated against ethnicity are themselves diverging - the nation state is under stress while Western hegemony is temporarily enjoying the fruits of a world with only one super power.

The nation state is being challenged at the sub-national level by such forces as religious militancy and ethnic assertiveness. But the nation state is also being challenged at the supra-national level by such developments as the European Union, the North American Free Trade Agreement, the Association of South East Asian Nations and other regional groupings in search of ways of pooling national sovereignties.

On the other hand, the West is triumphant because the Soviet Union has disintegrated, the Warsaw Pact has collapsed, China and Viet Nam are flirting with the market economy, India has returned to the fold of liberal capitalism, the United Nations is under Western domination, Africa is in disarray, and Latin America has returned to the cultural fold of Western civilization. (Latin America has always been culturally part of the First World but economically part of the Third World.)

The two enemies of ethnicity are pulling in different directions - the nation state is growing weaker, Western hegemony is temporarily more triumphant.

Is ethnicity better off or worse off as a result? Ideally ethnic forces should have been released when both the nation state and Western globalization were on the decline. And yet ethnic forces are being released midstream. It is in that sense that the emancipation of ethnicity is, to a certain extent, premature. It should have waited until Western civilization was truly on the decline, simultaneously with the decline of the nation state. Western civilization will decline in the twenty-first century.

And yet that premature emancipation of ethnicity may itself contribute towards the erosion of Western hegemony. What was once a victim of Western hegemony (ethnicity) may reciprocate in kind - a case of the biter bitten. Ethnicity was once diminished by Western globalization. Ethnicity has lived to help diminish the scale of Western globalist pretensions. Islamic militancy may challenge Western supremacy. Tribal identity may challenge the nation state.

The stream of experience meanders on In the vast expanse of the valley to time The
new is come and the old is gone And people abide in a changing clime!

Agenda

Wednesday 17 August

9.30 - 10.30 Opening session

Opening Statements: **Dharam Ghai** (Director, UNRISD, Geneva);

Gus Edgren (Assistant Administrator and Director, Bureau for Programme Policy and Evaluation, UNDP, New York)

Opening Address: **Samuel R. Insanally** (President of the General Assembly, United Nations, New York)

Keynote Address: **Juan Somavía** (Ambassador, Permanent Mission of Chile to the United Nations, and Chairperson, Preparatory Committee of the World Summit for Social Development, New York)

10.30 - 11.00 Coffee Break

Background

11.00 - 11.45 Ethnically based conflicts: Their history and dynamics

Chairperson: **Clarence Dias** (International Centre for Law and Development, New York)

Speakers: **Liah Greenfeld** (Boston University, Boston); **Claude Ake** (Centre for Advanced Social Sciences, Port Harcourt); **Rodolfo Stavenhagen** (El Colegio de México, Mexico City)

11.45 - 12.30 Discussion

12.30 - 13.45 Lunch Break

13.45 - 14.45 Conflict resolution and accommodation: Country experiences: Fiji/Guyana, Northern Ireland, ex-Soviet Union and Burundi/Rwanda

Chairperson: **Sarah L. Timpson** (Deputy Assistant Administrator and Director, Programme Development and Support Division, Bureau for Programme Policy and Evaluation, UNDP, New York)

Speakers: **Ralph Premdas** (Department of Government, University of the West Indies, St. Augustine); **John Darby** (International Programme on Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity, University of Ulster, Londonderry); **Valery Tishkov** (Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Moscow); **René Lemarchand** (Advisor, USAID, Abidjan)

14.45 - 15.30 Discussion

15.30 - 16.00 Tea Break

16.00 - 16.45 Third-party intervention

Chairperson: **Olara Otunnu** (International Peace Academy, New York)

Speakers: **Peter Wallensteen** (Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Uppsala); **Ian McFarlane** (ActionAid, London); **Robin Hay** (Centre for Days of Peace, Ottawa)

16.45 - 17.30 Discussion

Thursday 18 August

9.00 - 9.45 Lessons from struggles and negotiations: Palestine and South Africa

Chairperson: **Ismat Kittani** (Special Adviser to the Secretary-General, United Nations, New York)

Speakers: **Hanan Mikhail-Ashrawi** (Commissioner General, Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizens' Rights, Jerusalem); **Nicholas Haysom** (Legal Adviser to the President's Office, Cape Town)

9.45 - 10.15 Discussion

10.15 - 10.30 Coffee Break

10.30 - 11.15 Ethnic conflicts and the role of the media

Chairperson: **Karen Sughrue** (Vice President, Council on Foreign Relations, New York)

Speakers: **Daniel Franklin** (Washington Bureau Chief, The Economist, Washington, D.C.);

Hanan Mikhail-Ashrawi (Commissioner General, Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizens' Rights, Jerusalem); **Valery Tishkov** (Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Moscow); **René Lemarchand** (Adviser, USAID, Abidjan)

11.15 - 12.00 Discussion

12.00 - 13.15 Lunch Break

13.15 - 14.15 Public policies in multi-ethnic states: Overview and country experiences: Mauritius, Malaysia, Senegal

Chairperson: **Jan Loubser** (Director General, Scientific, Technical and Information Directorate Policy Branch, CIDA, Hull, Quebec)

Speakers: **Crawford Young** (Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, Wisconsin); **Vidula Nababsing** (Faculty of Social Studies and Humanities, University of Mauritius, Reduit); **Lee Poh Ping** (Faculty of Economics and Administration, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur); **Makhtar Diouf** (Department of Economics, Cheikh Anta Diop University, Dakar)

14.15 - 15.00 Discussion

15.00 - 15.30 Tea Break

15.30 - 16.15 The impact of political and legal policies on ethnic relations

Chairperson: **Chandra Roy** (Minority Rights Group, London)

Speakers: **Asbjörn Eide** (Norwegian Institute of Human Rights, Oslo); **Yash Ghai** (Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong); **Danilo Türk** (Ambassador, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Slovenia to the United Nations, New York)

16.15 - 17.00 Discussion

17.00 - 17.45 The impact of economic and social policies on ethnic relations

Chairperson: **Mahbub ul Haq** (Special Adviser to the Administrator, UNDP, New York)

Speakers: **Leo Despres** (Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana); **Charles Kennedy** (Department of Politics, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, North Carolina); **Yusuf Bangura** (Project Leader, UNRISD, Geneva)

17.45 - 18.30 Discussion

Friday 19 August

9.00 - 9.30 Migration and integration: Western Europe and North America

Chairperson: **Michael Cernea** (Social Policy and Sociology, World Bank, Washington, D.C.)

Speakers: **Sarah Collinson** (Royal Institute of International Affairs, London); **Peter S. Li** (Department of Sociology, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan)

9.30 - 10.15 Indigenous and tribal peoples

Chairperson: Michael Cernea (Social Policy and Sociology, World Bank, Washington, D.C.)

Speakers: Lee Swepston (Equality and Human Rights Co-ordination Branch, ILO, Geneva); **Rodolfo Stavenhagen** (El Colegio de México, Mexico City); **Petuuiche Gilbert** (Indigenous World Association, Ascomita, New Mexico)

10.15 - 11.15 Discussion (of the two previous panels)

11.15 - 11.45 Coffee Break

11.45 - 13.15 Closing Session: Visions for a world with ethnic diversity

Keynote Address: Ali Mazrui (Institute of Global Cultural Studies, State University of New York at Binghamton, Binghamton, New York)

Reflections on the Seminar: Crawford Young (Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, Wisconsin)

Ethnic Diversity and the Social Summit: Nitin Desai (Under-Secretary-General, Department of Policy Coordination and Sustainable Development, United Nations, New York)

Closing Remarks: Dharam Ghai (Director, UNRISD, Geneva); **Gus Edgren** (Assistant Administrator and Director, Bureau for Programme Policy and Evaluation, UNDP, New York)