



UNRISD

UNITED NATIONS RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

**China's Family Support System: Challenges and
Solutions under the Circumstances of Rural-Urban
Female labour migration**

Guifen Luo

Professor

**Social Security Research Centre of China
Renmin University of China**

The **United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD)** is an autonomous agency engaging in multidisciplinary research on the social dimensions of contemporary problems affecting development. Its work is guided by the conviction that, for effective development policies to be formulated, an understanding of the social and political context is crucial. The Institute attempts to provide governments, development agencies, grassroots organizations and scholars with a better understanding of how development policies and processes of economic, social and environmental change affect different social groups. Working through an extensive network of national research centres, UNRISD aims to promote original research and strengthen research capacity in developing countries.

Research programmes include: Civil Society and Social Movements; Democracy, Governance and Well-Being; Gender and Development; Identities, Conflict and Cohesion; Markets, Business and Regulation; and Social Policy and Development.

A list of the Institute's free and priced publications can be obtained by contacting the Reference Centre.

UNRISD, Palais des Nations
1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland

Tel: (41 22) 9173020
Fax: (41 22) 9170650
E-mail: info@unrisd.org
Web: <http://www.unrisd.org>

Copyright © United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD).

This is not a formal UNRISD publication. The responsibility for opinions expressed in signed studies rests solely with their author(s), and availability on the UNRISD Web site (<http://www.unrisd.org>) does not constitute an endorsement by UNRISD of the opinions expressed in them. No publication or distribution of these papers is permitted without the prior authorization of the author(s), except for personal use.

Abstract: Based on interviews with rural-urban migrants in Anhui and Sichuan provinces of China, this paper focuses on the coping strategies adopted by Chinese rural-urban migrant families to deal with the tensions caused by changes in generational care chains. By illustrating how and why the traditional family support system managed to survive and function in the circumstance of women's migration, a new pattern of generational contract has been identified. In response to the lack of support from the formal social security system, the migrating-mother households developed their own new coping strategies. The dependent children and the elderly were left in the countryside; the grandparents, who have maintained partially their capacity to work were in charge of the grandchildren. The young migrating couples reciprocated by giving their parents financial support, other material help and promises of better support in the future. The study demonstrates that this new informal generational support pattern renewed the badly weakened capability of family support. Moreover, the new pattern is not a simple replica of the old fashioned pre-industrial welfare nexus. At a more general level, the new generational contract can be seen as a model of interaction of traditional and modern society.

Keywords: China; Rural-urban female migrant workers; Traditional family support system; New informal generational support pattern

Introduction

Since the late 1970s, China has been undergoing a gradual transformation from a centrally planned command economy to a market-based system; this great transformation brings rapid economic growth and social changes. One significant aspect is that there has been an increasing number of rural-urban migrants, including massive numbers of rural women moving from their home villages to distant urban areas to find jobs. By 2003, the number of rural-urban migrant labourers was as high as 114 million, which accounted for over 20% of the total 500 million rural labourers (NBOS 2004)¹. At the beginning of the new millennium, about 50% of all migrant workers in China were estimated to be women (UNRISD 2005, 83). Rural-urban migrants shape the largest population movement during peacetime in China and perhaps the largest movement in the recent world history (Robert 2000).

The dual role of rural women as breadwinners and main caregivers within the family raises interesting questions about the impact of industrialization upon agrarian societies. Women's labour market participation is without exception linked to numerous issues of family responsibilities. In the case of China's rural-urban migration, both social science research and common sense tell us that there are conflicts between capitalist demands for the free movement of labour and traditional family care practices based on Confucian values. Under the current Chinese social security system, the family is supposed to be the main source of social support for rural residents and women play a vital role in this social security arrangement. When more and more rural women move to distant urban areas to get paid employment, the traditional chains of care responsibilities are challenged and changed. This study will show that this modern vs. traditional confrontation leads to a number of practical solutions where new circumstances are met with a mixture of reshaped traditional care arrangements and new kinds of generational care contracts. The practices offer some potential solutions for China's rural social security crisis. Therefore, exploring how rural women and their households deal with these conflicts, and what kinds of new social bonds are being created during this process are very important both theoretically and for policy purposes. The knowledge drawn from the study will hopefully contribute both to a better understanding of China's social security system, and to on-going discussions on the welfare state from a comparative perspective.

The family has been functioning as an overwhelming support system in many pre-industrial societies. If it is true that in most Western countries in addition to the family the church has traditionally also been a welfare provider (Kersbergen 1995), we could say that in China the family and kin system have for centuries acted as almost the only source of social support. Familism is characterized as the core of the Confucian ethic (Fei 1947, Liang 1990, Tu 1998) and a metaphor for Chinese social structure (Feng, Y. [1948]1985, Tu 1996, Jin, Y. 1986). Family has played a profound role in the formation of the Asian form of capitalism, in power politics, in creating social stability and in moral education in China (Tu 1996). Classical Confucian works have provided a strong normative basis for family relationships and inter-generational contracts prevailing in China. These relationships were described as the well-known *Wu Lun*, namely, the five basic relationships: ruler-subject, parent-child, husband-wife, siblings, and friends (Analects of Confucian 1990, 30/chapter 12.11). Since an individual was located in a well-structured network of human relationships, in *Wu Lun* systems, everybody was assigned duties and obligations, including mutual welfare responsibilities. With respect to narrow kin obligations and generational support patterns, the primary principle is the so-called *Fu Ci Zi Xiao* ethic, that is, father-goodness and children-filial piety. These values and normative principles concerning children's support for the elderly and intergenerational reciprocity have been sustained by Confucian ethics and legitimized by the

¹ Here the term 'rural-urban migrant' refers those who were migrated from their home villages more than one month during the year 2003. The number of the migrants was 90 million in 2001 (NBOS 2004).

Chinese authorities via both the formal laws and informal conventions (Xiao 2001, 174; Zheng 1997). Filial piety is considered by many people as one of the main moral and ethical principles guiding behaviour. The traditional notions of social welfare maintains their influence during the social transformation of the country after 1949 (Chan & Tsui 1997), the family currently play the crucial role in welfare provision in rural areas in particular. During the 1950s, the government introduced a Stalinist welfare model in urban society and ran generous social insurance programs for industrial employees (Chen 1996, 131-133; White 1998, 178; Hussain 2000). In contrast, the rural areas do not appear to exist the formal social security system. For the rural residents, the main source of protection come from the family.

In social policy research, the important role of the family and familism in the social security system in contemporary China has been emphasized by most, if not all, studies on this subject. This more or less established and accepted distinction has been captured in the notion , of the “East Asian welfare model” (Goodman & Peng 1996, 193; White and Goodman 1998), or the “Confucian welfare system” (Jones 1993, Lin, K. 1999), characterized by a strong reliance on the family as the locus of social welfare and service delivery. However, there are contested views as to trajectories of social change in this welfare model. Both classical ‘industrial functionalism’ and post-modernism predict changes in the model. In his statement on the convergence theory, Harold L. Wilensky (2002, 5) draws strong conclusions about the net effect of industrialization on the family itself and its support capacity in modern society: ‘... the massive structural changes associated with industrialization have brought major changes in family size, composition, functions, and lifestyles.’ At the same time he declares that, ‘... it also reduces the family motivation and resources to care for aging parents and to meet the risks of invalidism, sickness, job injuries, and other shocks.’ Against this background, fundamental changes in the traditional Chinese welfare arrangements are to be expected in the wake of industrialization. With this assumption in mind, I explore what has happened to the traditional family support systems in the process of de-agrarianization in rural China, in particular in the context of female migration.

Under the current circumstance in rural China, supporting elderly parents is considered to be the unquestioned duty of adult children, especially sons. It is expressed by the old saying ‘having sons for old age support’. Taking into consideration that rural women usually move to their husbands’ families when they get married, the sons and daughters-in-law have traditionally been given the duty of giving support to the elderly parents and parents-in-law in rural areas. Despite the fact that women were subordinated to men in the Confucian “ideal” family (Tu 2001), under the traditional welfare model women have played a key role in fulfilling welfare responsibilities within the family. However, the deepening and ever accelerating marketization in China over the past two decades has pushed more and more rural men to seek non-agricultural jobs in distant cities. This rural-urban migration is changing the profile of the family support system. The traditional family-based welfare arrangement is facing increasing challenges. On the one hand, from the women worker’s point of view, there are severe tensions between the desire for the free movement to cities and the demands of traditional family responsibilities. On the other hand, the dependent family members, both the children and the elderly who are left behind in the countryside, are excluded from the formal social protection system and are exposed to the risk of lack of care due to the departure of the main care provider. One link in the chain of care is missing and needless to say this causes problems and tensions that must be somehow solved.

This paper focuses on the coping strategies adopted by the migrant families to deal with the tensions caused by changes in generational care chains. To be more specific, I try to answer to the following questions: How are rural family support systems functioning under the circumstances of female labour migration? What has happened to the traditional generational contract in this process of rapid economic and social change? What kind of welfare arrangement have been developed among the households from which women are migrating in order to meet the care deficits caused by their

absence and the new demands brought forth by market forces? What is the role played by social policy in this complex set of forces?

In this paper, the concept of the ‘rural migrant worker’ refers to a group in the Chinese labour force who move between rural and urban areas, who seek and find temporary jobs in non-agricultural sectors in the urban areas, and who when out of work return to their home villages and engage in farming again. According to China’s *Hukou* household registration system, this group of labourers maintains permanent rural resident status whenever and wherever they work. In the Chinese literature, both in scientific analyses and in policy documents, a rural–urban migrant without a *Hukou* is considered to be a ‘floating rural labourer’ (*Nongcun liudong laodongli* or *Nongmin gong*) instead of a ‘migrant labourer’. In this paper, I use the term ‘migrants’ in line with the mainstream understanding of this term in migration studies.

The data used in the paper were collected during 1999 and 2000 in Anhui and Sichuan provinces² of China as part of a research project on rural-urban migrant workers in China – ‘Study on Out-Migrants and Return Migrants’ (SOMRM). The project was conducted by the Research Center for Rural Economy, Ministry of Agriculture, from 1997 to 2001. The author of the paper was a member of the research team³. The data for the project was collected using case interviews and sample surveys. The analysis of this paper relies primarily on the case interview material.

The interviewing strategy was designed to collect distinct information about out-migration and return-migration experiences at the individual and village level (Bai, N. and He, Y. 2002). 344 individual informants and twelve village focus groups were selected from four counties located in Anhui and Sichuan. All in all, among the 344 individual interviewees, there were 129 female respondents. In terms of counties, villages and individuals the cases were selected non-randomly⁴. Interviews were conducted in 1999 and they were organized on three levels: individual rural workers, village leaders, and county government officials. A semi-standardized interview technique was applied in the all interviews: questions were typically asked of each interviewee in a systematic and consistent order; however the interviewers were expected and allowed to probe far beyond the

² Province Profile (as of 2001):

Sichuan province is located in the southwest of China; population of 86 million; it has the fourth largest population of the 31 provincial regions in China; 9000 thousand hectares cultivated land which accounts for approx. 7% of total national area; 5250 Yuan/person (about 530 Euro/person) per capital GDP—the highest is 37400 Yuan/person (about 3740 Euro/person) in Shanghai and the lowest is 4200 Yuan/person (about 420 Euro/person) in Gansu province; composition of gross domestic product: primary industry 22%, secondary industry 40%, tertiary industry 38% (national average of composition of gross domestic product: primary industry 15%, secondary industry 51%, tertiary industry 34%).

Anhui province: located in the south-east of China; population of 63 million; it has the eighth largest population of the 31 provincial regions in China; 6000 thousand hectares of cultivated land, which account for about 5% of total national area; 5200 Yuan/person (520 Euro/person) per capital GDP; composition of gross domestic product: primary industry 23%, secondary industry 43%, tertiary industry 34%.

Source: NBS (National Bureau of Statistics of China) (2002), China Statistical Yearbook 2002.

<http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/>

³ the author of the paper, as a member of the research team was responsible for the study of the female workers of the project, and with other members of the research team conducted interviews in Anhui province. Preliminary results were published in China in 2001 and 2002, in Finland in 2005.

⁴ According to Stanley Lieberman (1992, 115), the choice of cases for study is itself critical and requires great thought about the appropriate procedure for choosing them. A case study approach was applied in an attempt to follow Lieberman’s advice. In order to guarantee the representativeness of the data, the scheme of case selection designed by the project team abides by the following rules (He & Bai 2002): A case study approach was applied in an attempt to follow Lieberman’s advice. In order to guarantee the representativeness of the data, the scheme of case selection designed by the project team abides by the following rules (He & Bai 2002):

- (1) Cases apportionment: first we selected two representative counties separately from Anhui and Sichuan province, and then we selected three representative villages in each given county.
- (2) The criteria of selection for case counties: one requirement was that the number of out-migrant workers accounted for at least 20 % of county’s total labour force in 1998. There should be a long history of out-migration records compared with other counties and the county should be a typical agricultural county (indicated by gross value of agricultural output) and at the median or average level in terms of economic development (indicated by per capita disposable income) and natural resources (situation about farm land, irrigation etc.) within the province.
- (3) The criteria of selection for case villages: the proportion of out-migrant workers in a village should exceed the average proportion in the given county. The village should also display a relatively long out-migration record. The three villages selected represent different stages of economic development measured as per capita disposable income, and the villages are poor, rich and middle-income localities. There were twelve sample villages in total.
- (4) Within the village, individual interviewees were selected on the basis of a quota sampling procedure according to their migration experiences. Twenty-five interviewees in each village including at least fifteen with returnees were conducted. Among the interviewees there were five female returnees. In addition there were five who had never migrated and five relatives to those who were current migrants were interviewed. There were at least seven female respondents in total in each village. In principle, the interviewees belonged to the ‘labour force’, i.e. the villagers were between 16 and 60 years of age for male, and 16 and 55 years of age for female.

answers to the standardized questions (Berg 1995, 33). At the individual level, the predetermined questions concentrated on interviewee individual and family experiences in the out-migration and return-migration process. A broad range of aspects of migration experiences were involved, mainly including the reasons for out-migration and migrating home, opinions on working and living conditions in cities and the gains, difficulties, problems and changes related to migration. The information on each case usually formed a distinct story, which the respondent relayed to the interviewer. Most of the individual interviews were conducted at the respondents' home.

Information from village and county government officials was collected using focus group interviews. At the village level, focus group interviewing was conducted in each of the 12 villages, and interviews usually consisted of three or two village leaders depending on the village in question. The information collected from the county government officials mainly covered data on the local economic development situation, local policies relevant to rural labour mobility, and so forth.

The paper is organized as follows: The information presented in the next section will serve as the background in which the story of changes of family support are taking place. Following that, the practices and capacity crisis of family support in rural China which take place in the circumstances of changing socio-economic background will be illustrated, concentrating in particular on the generational support patterns developed by the female migrating-mother households, and analyzing how this new pattern deals with the capacity crisis of the traditional system. Then, the characteristics of the newly emerging generational contract will be identified, and I shall try to offer some explanations as to why the pattern works. The penultimate section explores the nature of government's social policy in terms of the development of policy goals and its implications for both traditional welfare institutions. The final section will draw conclusions and offer discussion.

Social security poverty of rural-urban migrant families in cities

Although most researchers have argued that China's social security system was already established in the early 1950s when the first nationwide unified formal social insurance program was introduced (Chow & Xu 2001; Saunders & Shang 2001; Wong 1998; Zheng 1997; Kong 2001), until now, there is no nationwide program covering all residents in China. In fact the Chinese social security system is a fragmented system characterized by inequity and incomplete coverage (Saunders & Shang 2001). Social security provisions have been segmented along the lines of a rural-urban divide and all schemes are confined to either the urban or rural residents (Hussain 2000). On the other hand, from the rural resident's point of view, the social security system is an arrangement that is biased towards urban citizens and almost all main social security measures are designed to protect solely the urban labour force and residents. For the rural residents, including a great number of migrant workers, the main source of security comes from their own labour capacity and their families. The formal social security provisions existing in rural China are sparse. Aside from the so-called disaster relief program which aims to mitigate extreme poverty caused by serious natural disasters, the government introduced a marginal social assistance scheme which was limited to the most destitute people, mainly those who had no means of living and no family from whom they could get support (MOCA 2000). Furthermore, the rural social assistance scheme was and still is largely operating at the grassroots level and financed by the villagers themselves. In fact, the voluminous rural population is not covered by any formal statutory social security system and is excluded from social protection.

During the era of the centrally planned economy, the Chinese government rigidly controlled labour mobility and migration, especially the residence changes from rural to urban areas and job transfers from farming to non-agricultural work. It was almost impossible to migrate from rural to urban

areas, except with permission rarely given by the authorities. This control has functioned through the household registration system (Hukou system), which is a unique institutional arrangement that strictly segregates rural and urban areas (Cai 2003). The Hukou system was set up in the mid-1950s. It functioned as a domestic passport preventing rural residents from entering cities, and rural labourers were excluded from working in non-agricultural sectors⁵. Under this system, an urban Hukou membership was required in order to stay in cities and get employment. The urban Hukou status included a series of social entitlements (Song, Huang & Liu 2002) like food quotas, jobs assigned by government, as well as associated social security benefits such as old-age pension, free housing and free health care. Hukou membership also guaranteed privileged access to urban public services such as education.

Since the economic reforms started in the late 1970s, the system of the centrally planned economy has changed in many respects. Up to the mid-1980s the rigid controls on rural-urban migration were gradually eased. As a consequence of the market-oriented reforms in labour policy in particular, food and housing provision in urban areas, employment, housing conditions and food supply regulations in cities were gradually changed. Hence, more and more rural labourers are able to move to cities to find employment. This movement led to the so-called phenomena of 'the surge of a floating rural labour force' (*Mingong Chao*) (Du & Bai 1997, 2; Cai 2000). Until 2000 the central government tried to introduce some policy changes and made attempts to abolish some local discriminatory regulations (Song, Huang & Liu 2002). However, pervasive legal restrictions for rural-urban migrants still exist. Under current policies, rural-urban migrants have access to some occupations in urban areas, but nevertheless they are just like 'foreign labourers' (*Wailai mingong*) working in the cities, and only in very few cases can the rural resident status be changed to urban status. All in all, this means that the majority of rural migrants remain excluded from the urban social security system (Luo 2000, Song, Huang & Liu 2002). Despite the fact that most of the rural-urban migrants are no longer self-employed farmers as they have become employed in non-farming sectors, they are still treated as rural residents in terms of their social identity and continue to be marginalized as secondary workers in the urban labour market. Policymakers still assume that migrant workers have some means of social security because, at least in theory, they own farmland in their home villages. Hence, the majority of migrants are still not covered by mandatory urban social security programs. As a result, migrant workers and their families suffer social security poverty in cities, they do not have social rights—to even basic health care, old-age pension, work injury insurance or educational rights for their children in cities.

When we take a closer look at a special group, the rural female workers and their families, the situation regarding social security becomes even worse. Due to the fact that migrants are not covered by mandatory social insurance programs, and employers are not required by law to make any social security contributions, the female migrant workers are left on their own. Moreover, the local city governments regard the migrant workers simply as labourers rather than residents, and therefore they are socially excluded from the surrounding urban society. It is usually impossible for migrant women to live together with their families when in cities. As a consequence, the dependent family members, both the children and the elderly, have to be left behind in the countryside. The case studies we have conducted for this research show that in order to earn the necessary income in the urban labour market, female migrant workers suffer various job security and social security problems. Concerning family care issues, for example, as migrants and their children do not qualify for public services or welfare benefits provided to urban residents, children of rural migrants can not join urban children's care centers and public schools, unless the parents pay an enormous fee. Usually the fees for child care and education are too expensive for migrants to afford. The majority of our respondents, including male interviewees, complained that they were not financially able to afford such large amounts of money. As a result, most female migrants leave their children in the

⁵ The primary purpose of the system was to control rural residents move to cities. For city people there were no formal barriers to move to countryside.

home villages in the care of the grandparents. In the case that the female migrant workers do take their children with them to the city, instead of sending them to care centers mothers have to take the children who are below school age with them to work and keep an eye on them while they work. It is not unusual to see this kind of scene at rural migrants' tiny business booths in cities. When the children reach school age, the typical process is for the mother and the children go back to the village.

The situation of female migrant workers and family support issue are somewhat contradictory: on the one hand they are faced with all the risks which accompany an industrializing society, on the other hand, their social security is based on traditional safety-nets and the crucial issue is whether or how long this situation can be sustained.

The Changing capacity of the rural family support system

It is widely assumed that the Chinese traditional family support system is a multi-tiered institutional framework of security (Zheng 1997, Hou 1991) which is composed of three lines (Leisering, Gong & Hussain 2002, 75). The first line is composed of immediate family support usually provided by the family members who live in the same household or in close vicinity and share a common income. The second line is formed by the extended family, which pools various social risks that go beyond the first security line. The last and more expanded risk pooling institution constitutes the kinship network.

In contemporary rural China, family support systems remain the primary welfare production unit, however, the socio-economic transformation has nullified two security lines—the extended family and the larger kin network. This change has a strong impact on the capacity of the family support system. In present-day rural China, the capacities of family support are shaped mainly by two factors. The first is the economic resources a family has at its disposal. The main resource is the farmland which a household possesses, factually or nominally, and its products (Chen & Han 2002, Wen 1999, Zhao & Wen 1998). The second factor is the family structure (Xu 2001, Wang 2000); both reflect long-term social-economic transformation processes, on the one hand, and are directly associated with social policy on the other.

First of all, the role that land previously played, as a reliable economic foundation of family support, has shrunk (Wen 2000, RTMA 1995, Tao 2002). This is linked to the processes of de-agrarianization and marketization. Chinese agriculture has developed in such a way that the income from farming is contributing less and less to farmers' income. It has been a long-term trend that agricultural income takes up a decreasing portion of farmers' total income (Du 1997b, 179; Bai & He 2002, 153) as one would expect and as has happened historically in many countries. Given the fact that subsistence agriculture barely provides sufficient products and income to guarantee the welfare of all family members, in order to get by, rural households have to find new financial resources to compensate for the decrease in income from agriculture. Non-agricultural activities are usually alternative ways of securing the capacity of family support.

Secondly, it was commonly assumed that the traditional Chinese family support was directly connected to the extended family and kin systems (cf. Zheng 1997, Hou 1991). However, there seems to be a paradox between the existing rural household structure and the support pattern. While the rural family maintains its functions as the primary welfare provider, the traditional household structure has been eroded since 1949 - a consequence of the socio-economic transformations that rural society has been undergoing. Among other socialist restructuring movements that have been carried out in the country, the setting up of cooperatives in the 1950s and the later introduction of communal property eroded the traditional societal fabric and the economic foundation of kinship (Qin 1999, Xiang 2001). Although there are different estimates as to the extent to which the extended family de facto existed in traditional China, what is clear is that there are very few

instances of such families in contemporary rural China. At the beginning of the second millennium, the size of an average household was 3.7 persons in rural areas, and 3.1 in urban areas (CPSY 2001). Nowadays, in rural areas as well, the common residential pattern is a nuclear family and, only a few households contain extended families with three generations living under the same roof (Wang 2000, Chen 2000, Xu 2001).

In terms of welfare arrangements, in the present context the family is responsible for welfare provisioning in contrast to the much broader responsibility of the kin network in earlier times. Regarding the systems of support for the elderly, according to customary practices the elders were supposed to live in their own households as long as they were able to care for themselves; usually the elderly couples took care of each other, and stayed in the labour force as long as their physical condition allowed them to do so (Wang & Xia 1994, Chen 1996, Liu 1996, Chen 2000, Wang 2000, Xu 2001). In these cases children usually provided some complementary support, including financial aid and food supplies and according to the traditional rule these duties were imposed on the son's family. When the elderly parents became weaker and unable to care for themselves, usually after the death of a spouse, the widow or widower moved in with his/her son's family. The elderly person became dependent on his/her children and, de facto, it was the wife of the son who was responsible for the care of the dependent elderly parent-in-law.

Generally, with regard to the changing capacity of family support, the burning topic is the consequences faced as a result of children's reduced capacity to provide the elderly with the support and care they need. It is argued (Liu 1999, Chen & Silverstein 2000, Tao 2002) that rural-urban labour mobility aggravates the crisis of rural family support. The majority of rural-urban migrants and would be support providers are young; while the young are migrating, a great deal of dependent elderly people are left in the countryside. Female migration particularly is supposed to destroy the fabric of traditional family support.

However, the present study indicates that the situation is not that simple and not that gloomy. The interview data show that families are capable of inventing new care arrangements. Among the migrating-mother households—the husbands/fathers of children are also gone to cities to work in these cases—a new and commonly practiced family support strategy, which could be called the 'new mutual generational support pattern', is evolving. According to the interview data and stories, the real support issue for young migrant couples, particularly migrant mothers with dependent children, is the care needed for the children that they want to leave behind, rather than the care for the elderly. The reason for this is clear: the parents of most young migrants are not that old and they can take care of themselves, they are still stay in the labour force. The outlook for children is more precarious. As rural-urban migrants and their children are not entitled to urban public welfare services, the migrant children are not accepted into urban public child care facilities and public schools. Therefore, most migrant mothers (migrant couples with children) have to leave their children in the countryside and ask the grandparents to take care of them. As mentioned previously, most rural elderly people currently maintain and live in their own households independently and are responsible for managing their household tasks by themselves (Xu 2001) and are engaged in agricultural activities as well as other kind of work. Therefore, although the mother-in law is traditionally available to provide day care for the children, taking care of the grandchildren is not an unavoidable duty for them. In other words, as a consequence of having to look after their own households they are in a position where they can refuse to take responsibility for other people's (i.e. their children's) households. Of course, care-giving within the household involves practical obligations as well as giving love and affection (Ngan & Wong 1995). For the purpose of this paper, I shall avoid the issue of familial emotion, and discuss the issue of responsibility. For grandparents especially the grandmothers—the main care providers for the children—taking care of the children is likely to be an extra task rather than a responsibility; therefore, if a young mother (or young couple if you like) wants to go to the city, she has to be successful in persuading the elderly person left behind to take on the task of looking after their grandchild. Among the households

interviewed, the common practice is for young couples to send extra money to their parents to compensate for the childcare work. The 'extra money' is a small amount of cash which the migrant couples give to their parents in addition to the money sent to cover the child or children's living expenses; it also contributes towards the shared support imposed on the brother's (son's) family.

From the elderly person's point of view, the extra cash can be seen as a kind of 'wage' for the care of the grandchild. They can also expect to receive gifts on top of the regular cash payment when their migrant children visit the home village or when they return from the city, usually in the form of food and clothing. These gifts have a very important symbolic function and they indicate good familial relationships, especially between daughters and parents-in-law. Maintaining good relationships between generations is crucial in guaranteeing that the elderly get proper support and care when they become weaker and more dependent. The aim of these gifts can be interpreted through Marcel Mauss's (1990 [originally 1925]) argument that there is no such a thing as a free gift. There are always elements of demand for reciprocity. 'Social contracts take place in the form of presents; in theory these are voluntary, in reality they are given and reciprocated obligatorily.' (Mauss 1990, 3) Thus, there is a great degree of reciprocity that gift-giving symbolically indicates and fortifies. The gift giving visualizes social contracts and obligations. The exchange of various gifts is a thread that knits society together, enchants common norms, shared identities, reciprocal solidarity and economic ties.

The following story of an elderly woman who was taking care of her grandchildren represents a common pattern related to the previously discussed issues, and therefore, I recite it at length:

Huaqi is 46 years old and lives in a village located in Sichuan province with her 49 year-old husband and 5-year-old grandson who is the child of her oldest son. She works as the female leader of her village. Huaqi has two sons, both of whom are married, and both of the sons and the daughters-in-law are working in Chengdu, the capital of the province. The 25-year-old son and his wife have been in running a cloth business since 1993, and their 5-year-old son is left in the village to be cared for by Huaqi. The younger 23-year-old son and his wife are tailors and they have been working together with their uncle since 1994. They have a son who is less than one year-old; as the baby is too young to be left in the home village, the parents take care of him. When the baby grows up a little, they will leave him to be looked after by the grandparents as well. Huaqi herself got married in 1972. Two years after the marriage, Huaqi and her husband moved away from her mother-in-law's household and had some grain for food and a room to live in. At that time they were very poor, often even lacking in food. Huaqi's father-in-law died several years ago and her mother-in-law lives with one of her brother-in-law's families. Huaqi and her husband give their old mother 200 kg rice per year as their token of support.

Huaqi had been raising pigs for over 10 years before they moved into a new house in 1998; as the work was too dirty for life in the new house, she gave up it. Her husband does not farm either and manages rental affairs of their other houses and sometimes helps her to look after the grandson. Her household income consists mainly of their sons' remittances, the rent payment from the two other houses they own (240 Yuan, approx. 25 Euro per month), and her wage (100 Yuan, approx 10 Euro per month). She and her husband have been taking care of one of the grandsons, and next year the other grandson (the son of her younger son) will be left with them to be taken care of. Huaqi considers that 'our sons and daughters-in law have quite strong sense of filial piety, so I am pleased to take care of the children for them.' 'Both sons' families send remittances to us (Huaqi and her husband), the flat we inhabit now, which costs 80 thousand Yuan (about 8 thousand Euro) was bought by our elder son.' Although her economic situation is just average in the village, she is quite satisfied with her current life, and feels sure that she will be looked after by the sons' families when she and her husband get older and weaker and can not

manage on their own (cases of interviews F1-202, The data set of 'A Study on Out-Migrants and Return Migrants', 2000, Beijing).

In fact, this household has totally moved away from the agricultural sector yet they are still deemed as rural residents under China's household registration system. The number of such cases is ever increasing in many rural areas. In this transfer process, the younger generation migrate to cities and get long-term jobs and the elderly remain in the countryside even though they are no longer engaged in agricultural activities.

The above story is quite a harmonious one. However, there may be strong tensions involved in these kinds of chains of care. In fact, it is a widespread phenomenon that familial conflicts occur within households (Wang & Xia 1994, Wang 2000, Xu 2001). The interview material collected from both village leaders and individual respondents show that conflicts usually revolve around disagreements over how the support and care responsibilities for the elderly parents should be divided between the sons' families. About 20 % of the women interviewed claimed that they experienced this kind of problem. The material from focus group interviews with the village leaders indicated that: 'the son's household tends to take on a smaller share of their financial responsibilities compared to other brothers for their parents because of financial pressures in their own households'. In some cases, where 'disputes on providing support to the parents become very acute, young couples even attempt to avoid providing support for their elderly parents' (village interview F3, F1, Z1, Z2, W1 & S2, The data set of 'A Study on Out-Migrants and Return Migrants', 2000, Beijing). Not surprisingly, in these cases the support and care for the elderly are usually not guaranteed due to each of their son's household tending to shift the responsibility to the other. However, disputes over how support should be shared out among the adult children, and the consequent decline in support for elderly parents is only one phenomenon of the rural family support crisis. The essential underlying issue is that the position and role of both the older generation and younger generation in the family support system have changed, and this structural change results from the transformation in land ownership. The story behind this transformation in contemporary rural China is a topical issue. However, it is not the aim of this paper to give a detailed analysis of the relevant factors and processes⁶. The discussion here is narrowed down to the welfare consequence of these changes, in particular, the impact of the transformation of farmland ownership on the capacity of the family to give support.

Under the pre-socialist (pre-1949) private land ownership system, which was practiced in traditional rural China, the older people, as the heads of the family, controlled the family property - mainly the right to own land - and had the power to determine the rules of inheritance. Different members of the family as a welfare institution provided support to other family members (Yang 1965, 65; Zhao & Wen 1998, Xu 2001, Zhang, J. 2001). Under this welfare arrangement the old parents controlled the financial resources, namely the farmland and the farm products, and they were the decision-makers when it came to delegating welfare responsibilities and distributing benefits within the family. In this contract-like situation where the young family members depended on their parents or other senior kin members in terms of the financial resources, they in turn provided care for the old people of their kin. The elderly had strong power-resources (decisions about inheritance, for example) at their disposal. Based in this mutual support arrangement, the old generation provided financial support and the younger generation the care work.

⁶ For a discussion on collectivisation in rural areas during the period of before reform, see Wen, T. (2000), *A Study on Rural Economy System in China: Rethinking the Problems of China's Rural Society Over the Century*, China Economy Press. Cheng, S. (1999), *Rural Development in China: Theory and Practice*. Renmin University of China Press. Yang Xiaokai (2004), *Bainian Zhongguo Jingjishi Biji: Cong Wanqing Dao 1949* (Economic History in China: *From the Late Qing Dynasty to 1949*). <http://www.sinoliberal.com/scholar/china%20history%20of%20modern%20economy%200.htm>.

For a discussion on rural policy reform, see Song Hongyuan & etc. (2000), *Gaige yilai zhongguo nongye he nongcun zhengce de yanbiao* (*Agrarian and Rural Economic Policy in China's Reform Period*). Beijing: Chongguo Jingji Chubanshe China Economy Press. Reisch, E. (1992), Land reform policy in China: political guidelines, in Vermeer, E.B.(eds) *From peasant to entrepreneur: growth and change in rural China*. Pudoc Wageningen. Zhou, F.(1992), Stability first! Chinese rural policy issues, 1987-1990, in Vermeer, E.B.(eds) *From peasant to entrepreneur: growth and change in rural China*. Pudoc Wageningen.

However, the socio-economic foundation of this family support system was undermined with the creation of the new socialist state and the Communist party when they introduced Stalinist collectivization in the rural areas after 1949 (Duan 2001, Jiang 2002). Some researchers praise this form of collectivization and its achievements highly (Guan 2001, Patnaik 2003). For instance, Utsa Patnaik (2003, 39) argued that 'much of China's good growth, reduction of rural poverty and excellent performance on the human development indicators can be traced back to the initial egalitarian land reform and its consolidation through the decentralized units like cooperatives and the later commune system up to 1980.' However, from the perspective of social security outcomes, farmland collectivization can be seen as the cataclysm for the erosion of the traditional family support system. Collectivization made it impossible for family support systems to maintain their capacity. While the farmland collectivization transformed the traditional non-alienable family ownership rights into collective property controlled both by village leaders and governments, it also changed the roles of both the elderly people and their adult children under the traditional welfare arrangement. Collectivization deprived the old people of their power and control over economic resources in the family support institution. This turned the relationship between the giver and receiver within the family support institution upside down. Parents lost their financial resources that fortified their power over other family members, and hence their ability to claim care and support in old age. They thereby became dependent on the benevolence of their children, mainly their sons' family. It was no longer the young who relied on the old, but rather the old who relied on the young for a living. Therefore, the collectivization of the socio-economic structure shifted family support from a two-way welfare provision system to a one-way support arrangement. The altered structure of the traditional family support system, on top of widespread poverty among the rural households, diminished both the willingness and the capacity of young adults to provide support for their elderly parents. The 'classical intergenerational contract implied that the young would care for the aged in exchange for the transfer of wealth' (Esping-Andersen 1999, 41); when the aged are deprived of the wealth and have nothing to transfer to the young in exchange for the care, family support becomes uncertain.

The situation also appears to have changed in the case of rural women workers' migration. According to the generational care pattern followed in migrating-mother households, old people in particular the grandmothers are restored to the role of welfare givers by caring for their grandchildren and by receiving monetary resources from their own children for providing childcare. This set-up serves as an alternative to the traditional land ownership arrangement which has vanished. On the other hand, these practices also encourage the younger generation to improve the support they give to the elderly. The opinion of the interviewees may illustrate the cases which are in the process of changing (case W1-301, 45-years-old male villager): 'migrants have a great deal of filial piety and do respect their parents'. The reasons are complex; some examples include 'increased income and being affected by urban resident's manner of treating old people'. But among them, the most important incentive for filial piety is the fact that 'young migrants fear that their parents will not help them to take care of the children if they do not treat them as well as possible. In particular when there are several young couples working away from the home, they must try their best to show more filial piety to their parents in order to persuade the older people to help them to take care of their dependent children.' In this display of filial piety, gift-giving plays an important role in the Maussian sense. One could therefore argue that it is through care-giving that the older generation especially the grandmother seems to have regained some of its power resources.

Here the priceless childcare that older parents are in the position to provide for their children secures financial resources derived from the children (Chen & Silverstein 2000). For older people especially older women it seems unfair that after fostering their own children, they now face another round of nursing and caring. However, the opinion of a 46-years-old female villager

represent rural elderly' attitude toward the issue: 'most older people want their children to migrate to cities to find job', in order to 'make some money and make the household get out the poverty. I hope my children will going out when they finishing their school, I'd like to take care of my grandchildren someday when I have.' (The interviewee has two children, 19-years-old daughter and 16-years-old son, both were in school when interview was conducted.) (case F1-302, The data set of 'A Study on Out-Migrants and Return Migrants, 2000, Beijing). In fact, given the exhausted support capacity of rural households, this new pattern of exchange appears as the only possible means by which the two parties, the welfare receivers and givers within the family, can improve the well-being of the entire group. The elderly are able to get some extra money to live on and young people are given the opportunity to try and adapt their livelihood strategies to a capitalist economy that is producing industrial and service jobs mostly in urban and distant places.

So far, I have demonstrated under which principles the new generational contract makes it possible for the family support system to renew its capability: rural female worker's migration presents a possibility for the family support pattern to reshape the relationship between the elderly and their adult children, and therefore updates the mutual welfare provision arrangement in the new socio-economic situation.

As to what extent this new pattern works efficiently de facto, the responses of the village leaders and the farmers interviewed on the questions of the impact of female migration on family support in their villages will be illustrated. On the subject of family support in female migrant households, the responses were surprisingly positive. The common remarks were that: 'among the migrant households, particularly in female migrant cases, familial conflicts that arose from discussion about family support had drastically declined'. This was mainly due to 'the improved financial situation among the female migrant households'. As a consequence of improved parent-child relationships and the harmonious life of the family, 'support for the elderly improved noticeably' (village interview F3, F1, Z1, Z2, W1 & S2, The data set of 'A Study on Out-Migrants and Return Migrants', 2000, Beijing). Thus, for instance, when talking about family support among villagers, the village leaders of Daisi village in Sichuan province said: 'compared to non-migrant households, young couples of migrant families displayed much more filial piety.' The most visible evidence of this appears in two aspects. One is that 'there are fewer quarrels among sons' households over how to share support responsibilities for their old parents and the informal agreement about the support ratio are fulfilled well. Previously they quarreled about the support because they were too poor.' The second one is that 'the relationship between daughters-in-law and mothers-in-law appears to have improved greatly in female migrant households. Besides providing the agreed financial support to the elderly without dispute, now many young migrant women often buy additional gifts for their mothers-in-law when they return to the village. The migrant families get more earnings, so they have the capacity to provide better support for the elderly.' (Village interview V-F1; the data set of 'A Study on Out-Migrants and Return Migrants', 2000, Beijing).

A response to this topic given by a female worker who had returned home may illustrate the point from the perspective of migrant children: 'People have hearts; no matter how far from their parents they live and work, they always manage to support them. If somebody gets higher earnings when working outside the village, they can give much more to the parents. Staying in the village could mean better care for the older people when they need it, but on the other hand, if that were the case they would have less money and suffer from poverty.' (case Z1-103, 44-years-old female returned; the data set of 'A Study on Out-Migrants and Return Migrants', 2000, Beijing). Thus, there is a trade-off between the old values and the intensification of care and economic resources.

The messages given above suggest that economic poverty is the main factor restraining farmers' households from performing family support duties. This leads us to another important issue, which is acknowledged and to some extent emphasized by most researchers (for example, Xu 1997, Yue

2001, Adamchak 2001), namely, the impact of the so-called 'one-child policy' and the changing family structure regarding family support. Some studies argue that the 'one child one family' policy as well as the changes in the household structure impair the families' capability to provide support and care for the elderly (Liu 1999, Zhang, Q. 2001). Moreover they argue that the migration of rural young adults is the cause of the weakening of rural family support. However there are counter-arguments as well. Some studies demonstrate that the rule of one child per family was never implemented in the countryside - not even in principle. Only two provinces (besides the four municipalities) carry out the 'one child one family' policy in rural areas among the 31 provincial regions (Guo & et al 2003). Throughout China, approximately 35% of the total population enforce the 'one-child policy', and 36% of couples got formal permission from the authorities for the birth of their second child, and 1.3% of couples for the third child (Zeng, Y. 2004). Therefore, the so-called 'one-child policy' may not correspond to reality, and the change in age and household structure in rural China have not been as strong determining factors for rural family support crisis as they are often deemed to be, at least they will not be in the forthcoming two or three decades (Chen 2000).

As to the impact of rural women's migration on family support, given the fact that the rural elderly over 60 years of age usually have more than two children, and that not all children migrate to distant cities, the caregiver shortage is not a serious problem for those migrant families. Moreover, the majority of rural-urban migrants are young (the sample survey of the research project showed the average age of the migrants is 28 years of age), and their parents are usually in their early fifties and in good health. This condition means that the elderly are able to carry out the tasks of 'family care' (Zhao, C. 2002, Hou & Luo 2002). Hence the crucial reason for the support crisis of rural family comes from both the lack of economic resources within the households, and from the financial dependency of elderly people upon their children rather than their dependency for personal care (Zhao, C. 1997, Chen 2000). As a matter of fact, as most rural elderly people have no monetary pension benefits, financial problems constitute the real source of crisis. As income from off-farm jobs has become indispensable for rural households in maintaining their support capacity, the family strategy is such that the young migrate to cities in order to gain non-agricultural earnings. The old live in villages and take care of their grandchildren while receiving financial support from their migrating children in return. It is as a result of this strategy that the financial capacity of the family support system has been renewed, and the traditional system has managed to maintain its function, despite the fact that the size of the household and the manner of residence have changed significantly.

Transformation of the generational contract

The generational support pattern adopted by migrating-mother households is not simply the 'pre-industrial welfare nexus' in nature, although it certainly reflects a two-way generational interchange of welfare only within the families (Esping-Andersen 1999, 53-54). In actual fact, as an updated version of the traditional measure, the Chinese case presents certain aspects of the dynamic relationship between the pre-industrial institutions and the demands of modern society. In the following section some explanations as to why this pre-industrial welfare arrangement has been updated in the case of female workers' (mothers) migration are offered.

Here the concept of a 'new social space' is used to refer to the construction of welfare nexus in the new pattern of family support. The idea of a 'social space' was used by researchers in migration studies (Rosaldo 1988, Biao 1999, 215-250). Their studies found that migrants usually create their own system in the process of settlement; this system is known as a 'new social space'. In this social space migrants have their own lifestyles, values, rules of behaviour, and networks, and the new practices are distinct from their original and destination societies. This means that the new social space is not integrated very well into the established structures (Biao 1999, 216, 240). In the

Chinese case, due to the lack of institutional support, the rural-urban migrants have created their own formal and informal systems in order to protect themselves (Skeldon & Hugo 1999, 340). The updated generational support pattern practiced in migrating-mother households can, in terms of welfare provision, be regarded as one aspect of the new social space in the world of migration. Being excluded from the formal social security system has meant that migrants' have to find new ways of dealing with the problem of support for dependent children and elderly parents. The traditional measure of generational interchange of welfare opened up possibilities for them to create their own social space for carrying out the family responsibilities. This issue is similar to the situation that has occurred in some Western welfare states when private welfare programmes have been introduced at a time when the public sector had neither the economic nor political capacity to respond to the demands of social security. In such instances, these demands will be met in the private sector (Kangas & Palme 1993). In rural China, the situation is a little different. There are no public sector benefits and the private sector is not functioning well. Therefore, only traditional measures are available for migrating-mother households. However, if we look at these practices more closely, we can see that there are some aspects that are distinct from the typically traditional path. It is in this sense that I apply the idea of a new social space to describe changes in the institutional aspects of this updated support pattern, as well as the interaction between current and traditional practices.

The first noticeable feature is that the practices of migrating-mother households in this new social space alter the role and status of rural women in the family support system, resulting in a change in the balance of power in the intergenerational family relations for support. Under the traditional family support system, major decisions on support arrangements were made by adult sons or other senior male members (Ngan & Wong 1995). Women were submissive and used to serving their husband as well as their family, and caring for the family members was regarded as their real duty. So, although women, especially when they became someone's wife and consequently daughter-in-law, were obliged to be the primary caregivers and had no opportunity to voice an opinion on these matters. Women's lives were simply 'a labour of cultural obligations' and they received little appreciation for their care-giving work they did (Ngan & Wong 1995). New practices enable young rural women, even those who have independent children, to go out and take on off-farm employment. Their earnings from non-agricultural activities shift their position from the less respected caregivers to an important financial supporter of the families. Noting that the crisis of rural family support mainly results from the lack of economic resources, the changing role of female migrants not only promotes the elevated capacity of the system but also implies changes in the traditional institutions in terms of power structure. The interview data indicate that in most migrant households, women are considered to have a right to take part in decision-making in issues relating to support for the elderly and children and do not only carry out their traditional obligations. In reality, wives' attitudes towards the care of their parents-in-law are often the most crucial and in most cases affect the destiny of independent elderly family members. To some extent, young women now are both primary caregivers and primary decision-makers in the new social space.

The same implication can be indicted from the perspective of grandmothers who are taking care of the grandchildren. The common understanding of China's rural-urban migration model is that the Chinese case, to a certain extent, can be explained by developmentalist theory which assumes that migration decisions are a part of family strategies to raise income and insure against risks (Huang 1996, Cai 2000, Guan & Guo 1997). Migration decisions are made by households instead of individuals in order to benefit whole families' particular household economic gains (Bai & He 2002, Du 1997b, RTMA 1995, Zhou 2001). The new pattern of generational contract take place in the context of the household migration model and it is an important issue in family decision-making. The messages obtained from the interviews show that the grandmothers participated in family decision-making in issues relating with migration as well as children care, 'after counsel

with my families, say parents, husband and mother-in law, we decided to leave for the city' is a common response concerning women's migration decision (cases of interviews W1-105, F3-112, F3-111, Z1-105, W3-114, The data set of 'A Study on Out-Migrants and Return Migrants, 2000, Beijing). The message implies that the grandmothers are the participator in household migration decision. In this context the family support arrangement is unable to achieve without grandmother's promise to take care of the grandchildren. The grandmothers as decision-makers play a strong role and thereby negotiate their power under the household migration decision model. In addition, according to Confucian ethics, ideally for women, playing a strong role in domestic issues was assumed the active fulfillment of life, therefore contributing to the collective good was deemed as a means of practicing women's power rather than weakness (Tu 2001, 202).

Secondly, the new pattern increases the extent of welfare exchange between the adult children and their elderly parents via family support. In the traditional model, family members worked in the same household-based agricultural unit and the issues of the generational contract simply involved welfare arrangements between the generations within the family. This implied that income redistribution between the old and young generations occurred in a relatively closed space of kinship. The new support nexus hurdles the boundaries of the traditional family economy sphere. From the side of younger generation, this care pattern frees younger workers, especially female workers with dependent children, from the subsistence-based agricultural sector enabling them to get better paid off-farm jobs in urban areas miles away from their home villages. The migration allows rural younger generations to share in the opportunities and benefits offered by urban economic development and these added financial sources guarantee a great capacity for family support.

From the point of view of the elderly especially the grandmothers – who are taking care of the children, this arrangement enables the rural elderly who are unable to be engaged in competitive urban labour markets to get their share of benefits in the development towards market-based economy. As rural residents are not eligible for public social support, the social security system makes no contribution to the masses of rural elderly. When they lost their earning capacity by moving to urban areas as migrant labourers, they became deprived of access to the benefits of the economic development, both in terms of direct income and in terms of pensions. Under the new support pattern developed by the migrating-mother households, the older parents can share a much bigger portion of the income which their migrant adult children gain from non-agricultural employment. A response to this topic given by a 57-years-old female villager who was taking care of her 7 years grandson may illustrate the point from the perspective of elderly parents, in particular the grandmothers: 'the households have the migrants no longer suffer from poverty', because 'the young people, the sons, the daughters-in-law and the daughters are working in the cities, they can get better wages than they work in countryside.' (case W3-201, The data set of 'A Study on Out-Migrants and Return Migrants, 2000, Beijing). Here, the remittance and other material support the migrant children provide the elderly parents with not only represent the traditional vertical reciprocity, but also a financial input of resources from outside the family. In this sense, in the 'new social space' the welfare exchange between the migrant children and their parents in the countryside is not only redistribution between generations but also between the wealthy urban and the poor rural areas. In this sense, the model seems to work as long as there are huge disparities between urban and rural areas; when they are evened up the model dissolves.

Thirdly, there are two interesting alternatives observed in migrating-mother households regarding the care arrangement for their dependent children. One is that in some cases the grandfather is also engaged in care activities, usually if the grandmother is unable to carry out the task due to bad health, for example, or if she is deceased. The other one is that some young migrant couples leave their children to the wife's parents instead of husband's parents as was the norm in the traditional order. The main reasons for this are the absence of husband's parents – deceased or in bad health -

or there are several sons who have migrated and the grandparents are too busy to care for all of the grandchildren., Although there are only a few cases among the interviewees, this option was also out of question under the traditional order, especially in the countryside. These practices suggest that changes have not only taken place in the role of women but also in the role of elderly parents. The traditional form of family support was characterized by two rules: the first rule was that the care-giving always was the responsibility of women, and the second, that the bringing up of children was an affair for the husbands' family, and the wives' parents were never involved. In traditional thinking and practice, the daughters, once married, were considered to be a part of their husband's households. Daughters' children were not regarded as the offspring of her original family and it was seldom that grandchildren were taken care of by the grandparents on the wife's side. However, these principles and practices seem to fade away under the current practices of migrating-mothers households. Even though they apparently offer an alternative rather than being the primary option for young migrating couples, the practices reflect some fundamental changes in the core of traditional values and behavior. Those changes also have a profound effect on the resources of family support; in particular, they expand the source of caregivers. All of these aspects have profound implications in understanding changing values and behavior of rural residents in the de-agrarianization process.

In response to the lack of state protection, migrating-mother households have developed their own 'social space' in welfare provision, and the pattern of generational support appears to work well to some extent. However, this is only a partial representation of a picture that has many elements. After all, this pattern is a kind of pre-industrial measure and effective only within certain kinds of family strategies. The generational interchange of welfare can work within the migrating households but is not an option for every household. The obvious limitation of the pattern presents itself in the three aspects: the first is that the new pattern cannot be effective for families with weak labour resources; the second is that illiterate grandparents do not meet grandchildren's education needs; the third is the problems of the psychological well-being of migrating mothers and children left in the home village.

In the first instance, the family has traditionally been the main locus of pooling life-course risks of individuals (Esping-Andersen 1999, 41), and obviously it is not good at dealing with risks caused by the transformation of the whole society. This transformation affects the whole family. If we say that migrating-mother households successfully 'internalized some social risks by pooling resources across generations' (Esping-Andersen 1999, 37), this family self-help strategy creates risk pooling only with certain preconditions. From the point of view of the elderly, the practice does not enable them to avoid dependence on their children. The elderly are not dependent either on their savings accumulated throughout their working life or on the farm products (Leisering, Gong, & Hussain 2002, 80), but rather on the income of their migrating children. This means that the support level and the guarantee for the elderly are dependent on the earning power of their migrating children. Only the elderly parents who have migrant children with greater earning powers or several migrant children are guaranteed to receive support, and thereby lower their risk of falling into old age gloomily. When migrating children, especially daughters-in law, fail to find relatively well-paid jobs in urban areas, get ill, or have work injuries, the new pattern does not work and therefore the 'pension' of the elderly parents is reduced and their future becomes more uncertain. On the other hand, when it comes to the younger generation, in particular women with dependent children, the precondition for them to go out is that they have at least one parent who is in good health and willing to look after their grandchildren. In other words migrating women's capacity to exert their earning power is decided by the labour power or care-giving capacity of the elderly. According to our interview data, it is rarely the elderly who refuse to take care of their grandchildren; the usual grandparent-related factors which prevent female workers from migrating is the absence of parents, and in some cases the old parents themselves are in need of care. In these cases, female workers' earning power through participation on urban labour markets is diminished, and consequently the

opportunities to strengthen the financial capacity of the family are limited. This implies that the practices are to some extent still based on the traditional generational contract, and therefore the pattern can only be effective in cases where households have, according to Esping-Andersen's (2002, 29) terminology, strong labour resources, and obviously not in 'work poor families'.

In the second case, illiterate grandparents who do not meet the criteria of modern society cannot provide their grandchildren with education and cultural capital due to their own lack of these resources. In most cases, among the migrating-mother households which practice this support pattern, the grandparents are only responsible for taking care of the grandchildren's daily needs, such as feeding and clothing them while the matter of the children's education is not a part of this informal care contract. The grandparents simply play the role of caregiver not 'tutor'. 'The lack of parental help and supervision with children's studies' becomes 'a serious problem for migrant households' (W9-07, W2-114, F1-108, F3-111, W1-105, S2-101, S2-202, S3-116, The data set of 'A Study on Out-Migrants and Return Migrants', 2000, Beijing). The story recounted by a 36-year-old female returnee who migrated with her husband is a representative both of the situations mentioned above: 'I was pleased that I went out, because I was able to earn money outside the countryside. Why did I leave? Simply to earn money! My household needed money badly, needed money to buy farming tools, fertilizer, and farm chemicals; it needed money for children's school fees, for elder parents-in-law support and for many other things.' During the period of the migration, 'we left our 6-year-old son with the grandparents in the home village. But one year later, we found that it was difficult for the grandparents to educate and discipline our son.' Besides this, 'the grandparents themselves were in need of care, so I had to return to village.' Her husband is still working in a construction team in Xinjiang when interview was conducted (case of interviews Z1-105, The data set of 'A Study on Out-Migrants and Return Migrants', 2000, Beijing). With regard to the 'quality' of bringing up the children, the common strategy of the households is for the informal contract on grandparents who are fostering to only cover pre-school children. This strongly suggests that in the family intergenerational care pattern, love and affection are not sufficient; social, cultural and educational capital is also needed. In order to guarantee the children a proper upbringing, migrating mothers usually quit their jobs and return to their home villages when the children reach school age. Thus the new-space arrangements described above are applicable only to the pre-school children.

Moreover, there are potential problems regarding the psychological well-being caused by this pattern. With regard to the impact of the practice of migrating-mothers leaving their dependent children behind with the grandparents on female workers, some researchers argue that due to the female migrants being less likely to be constrained to household work in urban areas than in their rural homes, they have greater opportunities to use the characteristics that contribute to labour productivity in the urban labour force (Zhu 2002). Others even assume that those female workers have the best of both worlds: they can enjoy the earnings and freedom that are often denied women in traditional Chinese families, without the double burden that bogs down so many other working women (Pieke 1999, 7). This is probably true in terms of the efficiency of commodified labour. However, if we consider the issue from the perspective of the humanistic psychological well-being of the children and migrant mothers, the argument could be just the contrary. In fact, our interviewees frequently expressed their anxiety about the negative impact on the psychological well-being of the children who are left behind with the grandparents while their parents are working in urban areas: 'lack of discipline and the possibility of the influence of bad manners for instance, aside from the education problems due to absence of the parents' supervision' (W9-07, W2-114, F1-108, F3-111, W1-105, S2-101, S2-202, S3-116, The data set of 'A Study on Out-Migrants and Return Migrants', 2000, Beijing). As to the psychological well-being of the migrant mothers who have to leave the children in the home village, almost all the cases show that they suffered rather than gained pleasure from these arrangements. A 28-years-old female returnee's experience is not an unusual case: 'I and my husband worked in 5-6 factories one after another in Guangdong province from 1994 to 1998, while the grandparents

look after our 2-year-old daughter in the home village.’ During their migration, ‘I and my husband were only able to visit our home village and see our daughter and parents once, and could only stay with them for two weeks. I was badly homesick.’ She said: ‘I liked that well paid job in cities, I was also quite satisfied with that position, but I had to give up the job and return to the village’, because ‘my daughter had reached the age where she needed education and the illiterate grandparents did not have the ability to provide any.’ Her husband is still working in Guangdong when interview was conducted (case of interviews F3-111, The data set of ‘A Study on Out-Migrants and Return Migrants’, 2000, Beijing). These situations suggest that the pre-industrial pattern which exchanges welfare within the household only functions under certain conditions, and suffers as a consequence of problems in industrial society.

Interaction of social policy, traditional family support pattern

From the perspective of industrial functionalism the development of the modern social security system is determined by the process of modernization or structural differentiation (Wilensky 2002). For instance, Flora & Heidenheimer (1981, 8) interpret the welfare state ‘as a general phenomenon of modernization, as a product of the increasing differentiation and the growing size of societies on the one hand and of processes of social and political mobilization on the other.’ According to Flora & Heidenheimer (1981, 8), the growth of welfare state ‘is an answer to the growing needs and demands for socio-economic security in the context of an increasing division of labour, the expansion of markets, and the loss of security function by families and other communities.’ Meanwhile, Wilensky (2002, 211) insists further that ‘the welfare state is one of the great structural uniformities of modern society’. Based on an examination of the development of social security in the 22 richest countries, including 19 rich democracies and 3 communist regimes, Wilensky argues that although they vary greatly in civil liberties and civil rights, they vary little in their general strategy for constructing a floor below which no one sinks. The richer these countries became, the more likely they were to broaden the coverage of both population and risks.

China’s case appears not to fit so well into this industrial logic, and the socialist state has never accepted the ideas of the welfare state nor followed the welfare state’s practice on the process of industrialization. Instead of the welfare state China has developed an ‘economic state’. According to Chen Sheying (1996), the Chinese state is characterized by its economic function. Compared to welfare states which are deeply committed to providing welfare for their residents, Chinese governments concentrate in practice intensely on economic administration and ignore residents’ social welfare needs in principle. However, the idea of the ‘economic state’ does not mean that all social security issues are always ignored by the Chinese government, ‘Actually, once they make up the major economic loss, or if they sense that the social problems will threaten their economic ambition or even political ruling, it is not so hard for them to sharply increase social spending by relocating the emphasis of funds appropriation, though they may still not be interested in the welfare state doctrine.’ (Chen 1996, 271) The function of social security in maintaining social order in the context of socio-economic transformation has been a prosperous field in social policy study. Richard M. Titmuss (1974, 48) points out in his notable model of social policy, the residual welfare model, one objective of social security is to function as a means of social control and maintain law and order. Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward (1993) analyze the history of public welfare system in the prevention of social disorder in the United States, and argue the role of social policy as a guarantor of social peace. In the Chinese case, it is widely recognized among Chinese policy makers and researchers that social policy can serve as a peace-maker, especially in rapid social transformation processes (Song & Gao 2001, Zheng 2002). As a consequence, in practice, the primary function of social policy has been to maintain social stabilities (Guan 2001), and the development of a social security system is to a great extent in response to immediate political and economic pressures (Saunders & Shang 2001).

If we trace the shape of China's social security system which emerged with the process of state industrialization, we find that the objective of the system always served both the political control and economic development strategy exerted by the government. Although welfare programmes have changed greatly during different periods, the general goals of social policy keep the same trajectory in several developed stages; that is, institutionalized social security systems simply provide very limited protection to residents at the level that, in Peter Baldwin's terms (1990), is both the necessary economical minimum and the lowest level as determined by politics. In other words the basic objective of social policy is to maintain social stability and guarantee fulfillment of state's industrial strategy. As in other East Asian countries, social policy in China is constantly secondary to economic policy (Tang & Ngan 2001). As a part of the state's overall transition, the development of a social security system has been guided by a logic which has had to suit the requirements of state's industrialization strategy or market economy (Luo 1993). In contrast, improving social justice and providing basic social protection to all residents have never become direct objectives of social policies.

From the beginning of the 1950s, institutional social security was designed to serve the state's rapid industrialization strategy and was heavily biased towards state industrial sectors and only involved groups which were politically and economically important. Therefore, occupation-based labour insurance benefits—the core programs of social security system—became the privilege of industrial workers and state employees in urban areas. This was the norm until recently. In the 1980s, along with the overall economic transformation, the objectives of the social security reforms were adjusted to fit in with the market reform of the state industrial sectors. The primary intention of urban welfare scheme rearrangement was to liberate state enterprises so they could pursue purely economic objectives (Zhou, X. 2000). Moreover, welfare programmes were redesigned to be dovetailed with the aim of improving labour productivity (White 1998, 179). Since the 1990s, as a result of the explosion of social conflict caused by increasing social gaps between well-off and the worse-off groups, the Chinese government realized that proper social policies were necessary to maintain social stability. Therefore the party-state appears to be more aware of social needs than ever before; however, it is not in a position to concentrate unrelentingly on the 'unproductive issues'—that is, the welfare of its residents. The general goal of social policy is to concentrate on maintaining political control and economic growth rather than improving residents' well-being or social justice (Guan 2001, Sun, L. 2002). As a consequence, institutional social security benefits are still socially regressive in the sense that 'to him that hath shall be given' that is, the industrial labour and urban residents which constitute a small part of the society 'get'. The other much larger sectors of the society—rural populations and migrant workers—are excluded from the security system (White 1998, 187).

If we examine the objectives of China's social policy from a developmental perspective, which links economic and social policies within the framework of a planned development processes, it might be at least a reasonable option for the government to maintain a balance between economic development and social protection, even though this may not be the best way to deal with the welfare issues affecting all residents. The developmentalist perspective regards economic development as a desirable and essential element in social welfare (Wang, X. 2002, Tang & Ngan 2001); according to developmentalism, there should be a creation of organizational arrangements at the national level that harmonize economic and social policies within a comprehensive commitment to sustainable and people-centered development (Midgley 1999). In this sense, some analysts argue that China's social policy programs, in particular the existing social insurance policies, have several advantages: they facilitate economic development and foster social integration. In addition, all things considered, an economically and socially viable social security system will support the economic development of the country in the twenty-first century (Tang & Ngan 2001). However, this judgment is only from the perspective of the party-state goals and the beneficiaries protected by

these schemes. If we keep in mind the fact that the overwhelming majority of the population lack basic social protection, it is hardly possible to draw the same conclusion.

Meanwhile, in the domain of Western social policy studies there are other perspectives attempting to understand the interrelationship between the “economic miracle” and the underdeveloped social protection which have emerged in East Asia. Among them, for instance, there are some that explain a model in which achieving sustained economic growth without proper social welfare is a kind of “social dumping”. The social dumping policies refer to the model which intentionally forestalls the development of welfare state schemes in order to keep social benefits low, or to retrench existing schemes during rapid economic development (Esping-Andersen 1996, 261; Hort & Kuhnle 2000). Gordon White and Roger Goodman (1998, 18) point out, when assessing the cost of the social protection programmes from the perspective of the governments measured in monetary terms, East Asian welfare systems appear to be cheaper than Western equivalents. Some studies demonstrate that some East and South-East Asian countries have introduced social security programmes at a lower level of ‘modernization’ than Western European countries (Hort & Kuhnle, 2000). This argument implies that there is no reality, considering the social dumping policies in those countries. However, in China’s case, given the fact that the state is still reluctant to expand institutional social security to the largest sectors of society, which are perceived as politically and economically unimportant after the industrialization initiated half century ago, and the ‘economic miracle’ has still come around in recent decades, the Chinese model stands out as an excellent example for having a ‘social dumping’ policy.

Reality suggests that, from whatever perspective we try to explain social policy development in China, it is the survival of the traditional family networks in rural areas that makes it possible for the party-state to leave most of the social protection issues of the rural households off the agenda, and concentrate welfare resources disproportionately on the urban state sectors. The present study illustrates how the institution of traditional family support adapted to the new situation in order to cope with the challenge of decreasing capacity. However, it would be misguided to assume that the existing rural family support system is robust enough to resist social dumping policies indefinitely. Existing family support in rural China, in particular the pattern practiced among migrating-mother households, reflects the complex responses both from the traditional institutions and the rural female workers to the paradox of the policies designed and implemented by the party-state during the industrialization process.

As for the survival of traditional family support: ‘the inherent nature of traditional family is not considered by the dogmatic communists as congruent with the proletarian idea of selflessness and their ultimate goal of communist society’ (Chen 1996, 31). In addition, some basic functions of the family were systemically externalized outside the household by party-state policies, yet the provision of welfare was left totally in the hands of the family. The fact that there are no alternative agencies providing social security in rural society forces the rural households to try to internalize the costs of social security by pooling resources across generations within the family. However, the problem is that the households have lacked the financial strength needed to take the burden. On the other hand, the social dumping policies, which arise as a result of both the ideological and economic objectives the party-state pursues, have meant an intentional delay in the process of the demolition of rural family support networks. The new pattern practiced by migrating-mother households is an example of the survival of the traditional system in the wake of state failure.

When it comes to the issue of the dynamic interaction between the state social policies, families’ welfare responsibilities, and rural women’s non-agricultural labour-force participation, it is widely recognized that when the working woman has to work in modern labour markets, she can no longer walk out the back door and hoe the corn alongside her children, and the modern tension between work and family emerges (Wilensky 2002, 10). In the case of Chinese rural female workers, there

are indeed conflicts between women's labour market participation and the care duty for family members, in particular problems concerning dependent children. However, the evidence also proves that massive rural-urban migration by female labourers does not necessarily make the situation worse; under these circumstances, female workers' non-agricultural employment injects new elements into the traditional family support system and permits it to continue to be an option in the new situation. In contrast, social dumping policies puts rural female workers in a position of dual disadvantage both in terms of out-migration opportunities and social security entitlement. Concerning the out-migration, as the state does not play any role as welfare provider in rural areas and just leaves the duty to the family, the heavy family responsibilities makes it difficult or totally impossible in some cases for rural women to move to cities and get non-agricultural jobs. Regarding the social security poverty, it is simply due to the exclusive institutional arrangements which deprive rural migrant workers of their welfare entitlements and also make their children suffer as a consequence of the failure of the arrangement. Moreover, besides the lack of social security entitlements, the worse aspect of the issue is that there are no opportunities for migrants to exert political pressure and influence the shaping of policies related to their crucial social welfare entitlements and benefits. Facing the institutional leviathan, individual female migrants are in such a weak and helpless position that they cannot appeal to any given formal agency to manage the social risks resulting from their urban labour market participation. The only approach available again is the family strategy: internalize risks within the household, even if their families do not have the capacity to absorb the majority of them.

With a shaped national goal of industrialization and a social dumping security system having been implemented over the past five decades, China's economic efficiency-oriented social policy has reached a crossroads. These welfare arrangements performed reasonably well until recently in terms of the government's objectives. However, if we look at the real welfare situation at the rural family and female worker level, it turns out that those policies are de facto social dumping policies and lead to crises in rural family support. Under China's policy making framework, however serious the crises, or however strong those structural pressures may have been, neither of the two were transformed into statutory social protection autonomously (cf. Kangas 2000). It seems that an overall reshuffle of the objectives of social policy and, more profoundly, institutional changes are needed to maintain the sustainable function of family support. The crucial question here is to what extent the policy changes will be manageable.

In reference to re-identifying the objectives of social policy, if we consider that precious ideological and institutional heritage retain an influence despite the fact that 'the continued hegemony of the Chinese Communist Party may well require political leaders to control potentially fractious mass constituencies by means of welfare benefits' (White 1998, 194), it is hardly feasible to expect the policymakers to fundamentally be able to shift the basic principle of policy strategy rapidly. In addition, other constraining factors also constrict the trajectory of policy formation. Among them the lack of ability of the government to manage the system and the social trust issue; in other words, the government's moral deficit is the crucial problem when it comes to shaping an effective social policy, and also in the task of leading the reformed social security system soundly.

In the Western welfare state discourse much attention has been given to the state structure and the state's administrative capacity for carry out reforms (Orloff & Skocpol 1984, Skocpol 1992; Immergut 1992, Evans, Rueschemeyer & Skocpol 1985). A central argument in these state-centered studies is that in explaining cross-national differences in social policies we must not only look at the political power relations but rather analyze institutional and administrative aspects of the state. For example, Ann Shola Orloff and Theda Skocpol (1984) in their comparison of the United States and England argue that due to the lack of efficient state bureaucracy, the planned social policy reforms were undermined in the States, whereas the more centralized bureaucracy in the U.K. was able carry through the corresponding reforms. In Western countries, particularly the Nordic countries

universal welfare is the norm, there are strong, welfare-oriented governments which are motivated by the idea that one of the important functions of the state is to redistribute income and provide protection for the citizens. Thus, in small, homogeneous Nordic countries it is significantly easier for the central governments to carry out the reforms they wish to (Kangas & Palme 2005).

This administrative issue is more than true for China and it effectively blocks the implementation of any nationwide social policy program. In China, a strong government and a great number of officials are undeniably present. However, it is a control-oriented framework and the state's activities are more focused on social control than the provision of services and welfare to citizens (Wang [1948]1981, Chen 1994, CE 1992, Wu, J. 2003). In the sphere of social security, particularly in rural China, neither the local government framework nor the skills of official's live up to the administrative qualifications needed for successful implementation, not to mention long-term planning and anticipation of the future of social policy programs. The current government administration in rural china is simply not designed to deliver welfare benefits and social services. Besides this general question of government incapacity, there are huge technical problems, such as the absence of an efficient taxation system, lack of management and supervision of social security schemes, effective labour market information systems, and so on. Any major changes in the social security program in rural China will be impossible due to problems caused by these elements. Given the enormous size of the rural population and the vastness of the countryside, creating an efficient system will be a complex and long-term task.

An additional problem is connected to social trust. In China it is a major issue that social insurance funds have been misused. Due to loopholes in fund management, there have been numerous examples of pension funds being misused or diverted by local governments for other purposes, resulting in huge losses to the funds and deficits in financing (Chow & Xu 2001). In that sense, Beijing administers a corrupt and inefficient bureaucracy (Friedman 1995, 337), not surprisingly this situation has created an atmosphere of suspicion and undermines social trust. The lack of trust, for its part, means that it is difficult to collect taxes and raise funds necessary for the running of social security schemes.

It is for these reasons that, the radical change in the social security system in order to include the entire rural population is institutionally ruled out in the short or medium term. And so, what kind welfare programs are affordable and accessible for both the government and rural residents in the foreseeable future? The 'family support' policy seems to be the most effective national initiative. This policy strategy should include comprehensive and integrative measures to ensure the family support system is sustentative in the future. Considering the key role of women in these welfare arrangements, in particular the migrant female labour, guaranteeing rural female workers' equal social security entitlement should be emphasized by means of statutory social insurance. A compulsory universal social insurance for rural migrant workers seems to be the practicable policy solution.

The evidence displayed previously in this paper show that rural females' non-agricultural employment and market income are directly associated with the improvement of the family support capability. The mutual-support pattern practiced among migrating-mother households can be seen as a potential trend towards maintaining the welfare function of the traditional institution in the de-agrarianization process. To promote this developmental trend, the role of social policy must encourage rural women's labour market participation and guarantee their income security, hence allowing them and their households to accumulate strong resources to cope with financial crises which are incurred within the system of family support. It has been proven that the following three forms of social risks are the greatest threats to potentially hit the migrant female workers and their family: work injury omnipresent in industrial work; falling into economic poverty due to high medical expenses; being fired or forced to quit a job and lost income due to motherhood duties.

Thus, protection against new social risks and the guarantee of income security by means of statutory social insurance programmes are urgent issues among other basic social security needs both for migrant workers and the dependent children and older parents. It has been proven that this policy strategy would be in the interest of reinforcing the capacity of family support system and easing the tensions caused by changes in generational care chains, thereby improving well being of rural women, including the grandmothers. In addition, various institutional restrictions connected to *Hukou* household registration system which block rural migrants access to urban public services and welfare benefits should be eased. In short term, the goal of social policy reform should aim to empower rural-urban migrants and their families to obtain equal social security entitlement, in particular migrant children's equal educational rights in cities imminently.

Addressing the problem of child care and elderly care in rural China, a more basic need will do be some kind of social security equalization between the rural and urban residents. In every respect, the Chinese social security system can be regarded as an arrangement that creates and maintains societal inequalities. It will be a long-term task to set up an equal and universal social security system in China.

In sum, if the capacity crisis of traditional family support in rural China is set to continue with the expectation that China's social policy goal will be adjusted somewhat in line with the idea that 'citizens aren't assumed to be too involved with things going wrong' (Giddens 1998, 163), the effective social policy will be implemented in order to provide basic support.

Discussion and conclusion

The present paper focuses on the coping strategies adopted by the migratory families to deal with the tensions caused by changes in generational care chains. To be more specific, the paper explores how and why the traditional family support system managed to survive and function under the circumstances of female workers' migration.

The paper illustrates that in comparison to their urban counterparts, rural-urban migrant workers are more exposed to social security poverty. The female migrants and their families have no civil rights in cities and they are totally excluded from the surrounding urban society. One of the extreme problem the female migrants face during their stay in cities is how to carry out the family care responsibility. Being excluded from the formal social security system has meant that migrants have to find new ways of dealing with the problem of support for dependent children and elderly parents. The updated traditional measure of generational interchange of welfare opened up possibilities for them to create their own social space for carrying out the family responsibilities.

The paper also examines the dynamic interaction between traditional welfare institutions, state social policy, and the requirements of the industrial society in the context of rural women's migration. Family support has been the basic and most fundamental institutional welfare arrangement in China, especially in rural areas. Since 1949, the societal-economic foundation of this traditional system has gradually been eroded by the party-state's economic and social policies. In the meantime, farmland collectivization implemented in rural China since the 1950s has put a strain on the financial resources intended for family support on one hand, and changed the nature of mutual support which is crucial to maintaining the function of welfare transfer between generations within the households, on the other hand. All of those changes have directly resulted in a continuing decrease in the capacity of family support and as a consequence crises are emerging.

The massive surge of rural-urban female migration also contributes to changes in family support and the generational contract within the rural households. Contrary to the common assumption, present study illustrates that the problems do not turn out to be worse when rural women are

involved in non-farm employment in distant factories or cities. There is a concern that the process of industrialization has weakened traditional norms of filial piety, and that labour mobility reduced both the willingness and the capacity of younger generations to support their elderly parents as argued by Wilensky (2002) and other Chinese scholars. No evidence was found to support this argument in my research. The present study indicates that the real crisis of rural family support lies in the lack of financial resources, and the main welfare arrangement problems for female (mother) migrant households are caused by child care issues. Responding to the lack of support from the formal social security system, the migrating-mother households developed their own strategy in order to cope with the situation. The dependent children and the elderly, who have at least partially maintained their capacity to work and take care of their grandchildren, are left in the countryside - the grandparents in charge of the grandchildren. The young migrating couples reciprocate by providing financial and other material help, and make promises that there will be improved support in the future. This new generational support pattern renewed the badly weakened capability of family support on two dimensions: one is that women's off-farm earnings meant an increase in the financial resources for family support; the other is that by migrating, the working-mother helps to restore the mutual support principle which had been wrecked by state policies.

Furthermore, the informal generational support contract practiced among migrating-mother households is not simply the old fashioned pre-industrial welfare nexus; it reflects an update in the nature of a traditional institution in the new societal-economic situation. Among the changes in rural residents' values and behavior in respect of the new family support pattern, two aspects are important. One is that the role and status of rural women (daughters-in-law and grandmothers) in the new pattern is shifting from previously being that of 'family labourers' without decision-making rights, to being both the primary caregiver and the primary decision-maker. Another updated aspect is that the new generational support contract increased the extent of welfare exchange between the generations, and enabled the elderly who live in the countryside to indirectly share the benefits of economic development. Whilst recognizing the functions of this informal arrangement it must be acknowledged that this traditional measure has long had its weaknesses. In the case of the care pattern adopted by migrating-mother households, it simply improves the situation of resource-strong, especially human resource-strong, families.

Moreover, it is the state's policies that have shed doubt on the continual viability of this informal arrangement. The Chinese party-state's social policy resembles the East Asian model in which welfare programs are overwhelmingly introduced by those in power rather than as a result of popular demand (White & Goodman 1998, 14-15). As a result of the enthusiasm of those in power pursuing industrialization at any cost, China has ended up with a social dumping social policy strategy. The goals of these policies are focused on economic growth and political stability, deliberately ignoring rural residents and mobile labourers' urgent need for basic social security. In actual fact, it is those social dumping policies which exhaust the capacity of the traditional welfare institution and make rural family support systems increasingly fragile. As long as social dumping policies are maintained, crises in the rural family support system will exist.

Considering the unwillingness of the government and the administrative incapacity of the state, it is impossible to expect ground-breaking policy changes in the short and medium term. The potential adjustment on the objective of social policy should be 'the reinforcement of family support'. In addition, if social security is recognized in its fullest sense, it is dependent in the final instance not only on governments but also on families and communities, both formal and informal (Jones 1993, 213). Particularly in a country in which the traditional informal systems have not yet been destroyed, a policy reinforcing family support could be a reasonable solution.

At a more general level, the case of China calls into question industrialization logic of welfare state development. Contrary to the idea that economic growth and industrialization will lead to welfare

state expansion, this study confirms that in the case of China, the industrial and economic growth over the last couple of decades have not been reflected in the welfare state policies.

Acknowledgements

This paper draws on my PhD thesis on the situation of migrant rural women in China.

Support for my study was provided by a grant for a research position in the Department of Social Policy at the University of Turku, Finland from July 2000 to December 2005. The thesis is a sub-project in the research program 'Challenges of Modernization and Globalization for Chinese Social Policy' financed by the Academy of Finland. I am exceedingly grateful to my financiers. A debt of gratitude is owed to numerous people in Finland, in particular I would like to name Professor Olli Kangas, the leader of the research project, Professor Klaus Mühlhahn at the University of Turku, and Ismo Söderling, Director at Population Research Institute for helpful comments and/or encouragement on earlier drafts of the thesis. I have greatly benefited from the teamwork in the research group which conducted the fieldwork in China that forms the empirical basis of this paper. In addition, I would like to thank Shahra Razavi and anonymous reviewer for valuable comments and suggestions regarding an earlier version of this paper.

References:

- Adamchak, D. J. (2001), The effects of age structure on the labour force and retirement in China, *The Social Science Journal* 38 (2001) 1-11.
- Baldwin, P. (1990), *The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the European Welfare State 1875-1975*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Berg, B. L. (1995), *Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Science*. Allyn and Bacon. Boston, London, Toronto, Sydney, Tokyo, Singapore.
- Biao, X. (1999), 'Zhejiang Village' in Beijing: Creating a visible non-state space through migration and marketized traditional networks, in Pieke, F. & Mallee, H. (eds) *Internal and International migration: Chinese perspectives*. Curzon Press.
- Black, C. E. (1976), Introduction, in Black, C. E. (eds) *Comparative Modernization: A Reader*. The Free Press, A Division of Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. New York.
- Cai, F. (2003), *Migration and Socio-Economic Insecurity: Patterns, Processes and Policies*, International Labour Office, Geneva, July 2003, ISBN 92-2-113590-X.
- Chan, R. K. and Tsui, M. (1997), Notions of the welfare state in China revisited, *International Social Work* Vol. 40, 177-189 (0020-8720;1997/04).
- Chen S. (1996), *Social Policy of the Economic State and Community Care in China Culture*. Ashgate, Aldershot, Brookfield USA, Singapore, Sydney.
- Chen, X. & Silverstein, M. (2000), Intergenerational social support and the psychological well-being of older parents in China, *Research on Aging* Vol.22 Issue 1, January 2000, pp43-66.
- Chow, N. & Xu, Y. (2001), *Socialist Welfare in a Market Economy*. Ashgate Publishing Limited, England.
- Croizier, R. C. (1976), Medicine, modernization, and cultural crisis in China and India, in Black, C. E. (eds) *Comparative Modernization: A Reader*. The Free Press, A Division of Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. New York.
- Esping-Andersen, G. (1999), *Social Foundations of Post-Industrial Economics*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Esping-Andersen, G. (2002), A Child-Centred Social Investment Strategy, in Esping-Andersen, G. with Gallie, D., Hemerijck, A. & Myles, J. (eds) *Why We Need a New Welfare State*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Fukuyama, F. (1995), On the Possibility of Writing a Universal History, in Melzer, A. M., Weinberger, J. & Zinman, M. R. (eds) *History and the Idea of Progress*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Giddens, A. (1998), in Giddens, A. & Pierson, C. *Conversation with Anthony Giddens, Making Sense of Modernity*. Polity Press, UK.

- Goodman, R. and Peng, I. (1996), The East Asian welfare states: peripatetic learning, adaptive change, and nation-building, in Esping-Andersen (ed.) *Welfare States in the Transition: National Adaptations in Global Economies*. London: Sage Publications Ltd.
- Hemerijck, A. (2002), The self-transformation of the European social model(s), in Esping-Andersen, G. with Gallie, D., Hemerijck, A. & Myles, J. (eds), *Why We Need a New Welfare State*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Hort, S. E. O. & Kuhnle, S. (2000), The coming of East and South-East Asian welfare states, *Journal of European Social Policy* 2000 Vol 10 (2): pp162-184.
- Huntington, S. P. (1976), The change to change: modernization, development, and politics, in Black, C. E. (eds) *Comparative Modernization*. The Free Press, A Division of Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. New York.
- Hussain, A. (2000), *The Chinese social security system*, final report: PRC social security program for the Asian Development Bank, Beijing 2000.
- Jones, C. (1993), The pacific challenge: confucian welfare states, in Jones, C. (ed.) *New Perspective on the Welfare State in Europe*, London, Routledge.
- Kangas, O. (2000), From workmen's compensation to working women's insurance: institutional development of work accident insurance in OECD countries, ZeS-Arbeitspapier Nr. 10/ 2000, Universität Bremen.
- Kangas, O. & Palme, J. (1993), Statism eroded? Labour market benefits and the challenges to the Scandinavian welfare states, in Hansen, E. J., Ringen, S., etc. (eds): *Welfare Trends in Scandinavia*. M.E. Sharpe: New York.
- Kersbergen, K. V. (1995), *Social Capitalism: A study of Christian democracy and the welfare state*. Routledge, London and New York.
- Leisering, L., Gong, S. & Hussain, A. (2002), *People's Republic of China, Old-Age Pensions For the Rural Areas: From Land Reform to Globalization*, Asian Development Bank 2002, Publication Stock No. 090802, Philippines.
- Lin, K. (1999), *Confucian Welfare Cluster: A Cultural Interpretation of Social Welfare*. Acta Universitatis Tamperensis 645.
- Mauss, M. (1990), *The Gift: The Form And Reason For Exchange in Archaic Societies*. London: Routledge.
- Midgley, J. (1999), Growth, redistribution and welfare: toward social investment, *Social Service Review*, March: 3-21.
- Ngan, R. & Wong, W. (1995), Injustice in Family Care of Chinese Elderly in Hong Kong, *Journal of Aging & Social Policy*, Vol. 7(2) 1995, pp77-94.
- Patnaik, U. (2003), Global capitalism, deflation and agrarian crisis in developing countries, in Razavi, S. (eds) *Agrarian Change, Gender and Land Rights*, United Nations Research Institute For Social Development, Blackwell Publishing.
- Pieke, F. (1999), Chinese migrations compared, in Pieke, F. & Malle, H. (eds) *Internal and International Migration: Chinese Perspectives*. Curzon Press.
- Piven, F. & Cloward, R. (1993), *Regulating The Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare*. NY: Vintage Books.
- Robert, K. (2000), Chinese labour migration: insights from Mexican undocumented migration to the United States, in West, L. and Yaokui Z. (eds) *Rural Labour Flows in China*. Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley.
- Rosaldo, R. (1988), Ideology, place, and people without culture, *Cultural Anthropology*, 3 (1): 77-87.
- Saunders, P. & Shang, X. (2001), Social security reform in China's transition to a market economy, *Social Policy & Administration*, Vol. 35, No.3, pp.274-289.
- Seguino, S. (2002), Gender, quality of life, and growth in Asian 1970-90, *The Pacific Review*, Vol.15 No. 2, 2002: 245-277.
- Skeldon, R. & Hugo, G. (1999), Conclusion: Of exceptionalisms and generalities, in Pieke, F. & Mallee, H. (eds) *Internal and International migration: Chinese perspectives*. Curzon Press.

Tang, K-L. & Ngan, R. (2001), China: developmentalism and social security, *International Journal of Social Welfare* 2001: 10: 253-259.

Titmuss, R. (1974), *Social Policy, An Introduction*. Edited by Brian Abel-Smith and Kay Titmuss, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.

Tu, W. (1996), Confucian traditions in East Asian modernity, in Tu, W. (eds) *Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity: Moral Education and Economic Culture in Japan and the four Mini-dragons*, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, USA.

Tu, W. (1998), An alternative vision of modernity: from a Confucian perspective, *Harvard China Review*, Magazine Online summer 1998, Culture & Society Volume1, Number 1.

UNRISD (United Nations Research Institute For Social Development)(2005), *Gender Equality Striving for Justice in an Unequal World, Policy Report on Gender and Development: 10 Years after Beijing*, UNRISD Publications.

[http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/\(httppublications\)](http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/(httppublications))

White, G. (1998), Social security reforms in China: towards an East Asian model? In Goodman, R., White, G. & Kwon, H. (eds) *The East Asian Welfare Model*. London: Routledge.

White, G. & Goodman, R. (1998), Welfare Orientalism and the search for an East Asian welfare model, in Goodman, R., White, G. & Kwon, H. (eds) *The East Asian Welfare Model*. London: Routledge.

Wilensky, H. L. (2002), *Rich Democracies: Political Economy, Public Policy, and Performance*, University of California Press.

Wong, L. (1998), *Marginalization and Social Welfare in China*, Routledge, London and New York.

Xu, Y. (2001), Family Support for Old People in Rural China, *Social Policy & Administration*, Vol.35, No. 3, July 2001, pp307-320.

Yang, M.C. ([1945]1965), *A Chinese Village: Taitou, Shantung Province*. Columbia University Press, New York and London.

Zhu, N. (2002), The impacts of income gaps on migration decisions in China, *China Economic Review* 13 (2002) 213-230.

Works in Chinese

Analects of Confucian (1990), *Lun Yu, in Sishu Wujing*, Song Yuan Ren Zhu (in *The Chinese Classics*, Song dynasty version [960-1279 A.D]). Beijing: Zhonghua Shu Ju 1990.

Bai Nansheng & He Yupeng (2002), 'Huixiang, haishi waichu? Anhui Sichuan liangsheng waichu laodongli huiliu yanjiu' (Return to Native Place or Immigrating to Big cities for Working? A study on the phenomena of farmer-labour's returning home from the cities), *Shehuixue Yanjiu (Sociological Research)*, 2002 (3), pp64-78.

Cai Fang (2000), *Zhongguo Liudong Renkou Wenti (Study on China 's Floating Population)*. Henan Renmin Chubanshe (Henan Renmin Press).

Chen Caixia (2000), 'Jingji duli caishi nongcun laonianrn wannian xingfu de shouyao tiaojian' (Economic independence and the well-being of rural old people), *Renkou Yanjiu (Population Study)*, No. 2 (2000).

Chen Xiwen & Han Jun (2002), 'Nongmin tudi sheyongquan liuzhuan xu jiji wentuo' (Issues of of farm land transform), *Renmin Ribao (People's Daily)*, September 9, 2002, No. 9 page, Beijing.

Chen Caixia (2000), 'Jingji duli caishi nongcun laonianrn wannian xingfu de shouyao tiaojian' (Economic independence and the well-being of rural old people), *Renkou Yanjiu (Population Study)*, No. 2 (2000).

- Chen Yiping (2001), 'Guanyu wailai renkou de anzhi wenti in Guangzhou' (Finding a place—settlement strategies of migrants in Guangzhou), in Ke Lanjun (Gransow, B.) & Li Hanlin (eds) *Dushi Li de Cunmin: Zhongguo dachengshi de liudong renkou (Villagers in the City: Rural migrants in Chinese metropolises)*. Beijing: Zhongyang Bianyi Chubanshe (Zhongyang Translation and Edit Press). Pp251-279.
- CPSY (2001), *Zhongguo Renkou Tongji Nianjian 2001 (China Population Statistics Yearbook 2001)*. Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe (China Statistics Press).
- Du Ying (1997b), 'Jiben Qushi he Zhengce Tailun' (Trend and policy), in Du Ying & Bai Nansheng (des) *Zouchu Xiangcun (Going Out the Countryside)*. Beijing: Jingji Kexue Chubanshe (Economics Press).
- Du Ying & Bai Nansheng (des) (1997), *Zouchu Xiangcun (Going Out the Countryside)*. Beijing: Jingji Kexue Chubanshe (Economics Press).
- Duan Qinglin (2001), 'Zhongguo nongcun shehui baozhang de zhidu bianqian' (Institutional transform of social security in rural China), *Ningxia Shehui Kexue (Ningxia Social Science)*, No. 1(2001), pp22-30.
- Fei Xiaotong ([1947] 1985), *Xiangtu Zhongguo (From the Soil)*. Beijing: Shenghuo, Dushu, Xinzhishi, Sanlian Shudian (Sanlian Press).
- Feng Youlan ([1948] 1985), *Zhongguo Zhexueshi Jiashi (A History of Chinese Philosophy)*. Beijing: Beijing Daxue Chubanshe (Beijing University Press).
- Guan Xinping (2001), 'Quanguohua beijingzhong de zhongguo shehui zhengce' (China's social policy in the context of globalization), in Tang Jun (eds) *Shehui Zhengce: Guoji Jingyan yu Guonei Shijian (Social Policy: International Experiences and Practices in China)*. Beijing: Huaxia Chubanshe (Huaxia Press). Pp19- 26.
- Guo Zhigang, Zhang Eerli, Gu Baochang & Wang Feng. (2003), 'Cong zhengce shengyulv kan zhongguo shengyu zhengce de duoyangxing' (Fertility and Family Policy in China), *Renkou Yanjiu (Population Study)*, No.9, 2003.
- Hou Hongrui & Luo Guifen (2002), 'Nvxing laodongli de waichu yu huiliu' (Going out and return back of female migrant workers), in Bai Nansheng & Song Hongyuan (eds) (2002) *Huixiang, Haishi Jingcheng? Zhongguo Nongcun Waichu laodongli Huiliu Yanjiu (March Forward to the City or Return Back to the Country: A Study of the Returned Rural Labours)*. Beijing: Zhongguo Caizheng Jingji Chubanshe (China Financial and Economic Press). Pp101-128.
- Hou Wenruo (1991), *Shehui Baozhang Lilun yu Shijian (Social Security Theory and Practice)*. Beijing: Zhongguo Laodong Chubanshe (China Labour Press).
- Jiang Changyun (2002), 'Nongcun tudi yu nongmin de shehui baozhang' (Farm Land and Social Security in Rural China), *Jinji Shehui Tizhi Bijiao (Comparative Study on Social and Economic System)*, Vo.1 (2002), pp59-55.
- Jin Y. J. (Yaoji) (1986), *Zhongguo Lishi Chuantong yu Xiandaihua (Chinese Tradition and Modernization: The Selected Works of Jin Yaoji)*. Taiwan: Youshi Wenhua Zhuanye Gongsi (Youshi Press).
- Kong, Jingyuan (2001), 'Yanglao baoxian zhidu gaige de fengxian yu fangfan' (Reform of the old-age insurance system: possible risks and preventive measures), in Song Xiaowu (eds) *Zhongguo Shehui Baozhang Tizhi Gaige yu Fazhan (Report on the Reform and Development of China's Social Security System)*. Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Chubanshe (Renmin University of China Press). Pp43-58.
- Liang Shuming (1990), *Zhongguo Wenhua Yaoyi, Liang Shuming Quanji Disanjuan (Essence of Chinese Culture, Collected Edition of Liang Shuming Vol. 3)*. Shandong Renmin Chubanshe (Shandong Renmin Press). p85.

- Liu Gengchang (1999), 'Woguo nongcun jiating yanglao zunzai de jichu yu zhuanbian de tiaojian' (Changing base of family support in rural China), *Renkou Yanjiu (Population Study)*, No. 3 (1999).
- Liu Conglong (1996), 'Fazhan yi Ziwo baozhang weizhu de nongcun shehui yanglao baoxian' (Self-reliance of the elderly and Rural Pension Programme), *Renkou Yanjiu (Population Study)*, No. 6 (1996).
- Luo Guifen (1993), 'Fengxian yu anquan: shichang jingji zhongde shehui baozhang zhidu' (Risks and security: social security system in market economy), in Li Yining (Eds) *Shichang Jingji Xinzhiyu (New Order of The Market Economy)*. Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Chubanshe (Renmin University of China Press). Pp185-289.
- Luo Guifen (2000), 'Zhongguo shiye baoxian zhidu de gaige shijian ji pingjia' (Unemployment insurance reform practice in China), in Yang Weimin & Luo Guifen (eds) *Shiye Baoxia (Unemployment Insurance)*. Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Chubanshe (Renmin University of China Press).
- MOCA (Ministry of Civil Affairs) (2000), *Zhongguo Shehui Fuli (China's Social Welfare Handbook)*. Minzheng Bu Bian (Ministry of Civil Affairs), Beijing.
- NBOS (2004), *2003 Nian Nongcun Waichu Wugong Laodongli 110 millions (The Employment of Rural Mobile Labourers 2003)*, Nongdiao Zongdui (Rural Survey Team of NBOS). <http://www.sannong.gov.cn/fxyc/ldlzy/200405270846.htm>.
- Qin Hui (1999), 'Chuantong zhongguo shehui de zairenshi' (The revaluation of traditional China), *Zhanlue yu Guanli (Strategy and Administration)*, No. 6 (1999), Beijing.
- RTMA (Research Team, Ministry of Agriculture) (1995), '1994: nongcun Laodongli kuaquyu liudong de shizheng miaoshu' (Description of rural labour force mobility in 1994, *Zhanlue yu Guanli (Strategy and Administration)*, No. 6 (1995).
- Tao Yong (2002), 'Ergyuan jingji jigou xia de zhongguo nongmin shehui baozhang zhidu toushi' (Social Security of Rural Residents in The Context of Dual Social Structure), *Zaijing Yanjiu (Financial Research)*, No.11 (2002).
- Song Hongyuan, Huang Huabuo & Liu Guangmin (2002), 'Nongcun laodongli liudong de zhengce wenti' (Policies on Rural labour force mobility), in Bai Nanshen & Song Hongyuan (eds) (2002) *Huixiang, Haishi Jingcheng? Zhongguo Nongcun Waichu laodongli Huiliu Yanjiu (March Forward to the City or Return Back to the Country: A Study of the Returned Rural Labours)*. Beijing: Zhongguo Caizheng Jingji Chubanshe (China Financial and Economic Press). Pp 163-188.
- Song Hongyuan & Liu Guangmin (2002), 'Huixiang chuangye qunti de fenxi' (Research on returnees' enterprises), in Bai Nanshen & Song Hongyuan (eds) (2002) *Huixiang, Haishi Jingcheng? Zhongguo Nongcun Waichu laodongli Huiliu Yanjiu (March Forward to the City or Return Back to the Country: A Study of the Returned Rural Labours)*. Beijing: Zhongguo Caizheng Jingji Chubanshe (China Financial and Economic Press). Pp129-148.
- Song Xiaowu & Gao S (2001), 'Zhongguo shehui baozhang tizhi gaige: zhuyao jinzhan, yanjun xingshi yu zhengce jianyi' (Social Security system reform in China: achievement, challenge and policy advice), in Song Xiaowu (eds) *Zhongguo Shehui Baozhang Tizhi Gaige yu Fazhan (Report on the Reform and Development of China's Social Security System)*. Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Chubanshe (Renmin University of China Press). Pp3-40.
- Sun Liping (1992), *Chuantong yu Bianqian: Guowai Xiandaihua ji Zhongguo Xiandaihua Wenti Yanjiu (Tradition and Social Change: Modernization Study)*. Harbin: Heilongjiang Renmin Chubanshe (Heilongjiang Renmin Press).
- Tu Weiming (2001), *Dongya Jiazhi yu Doyuan Xiandaixing (Confucian Values and Pluralism Modernity)*. Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Cgubanshe (China Social Science Press).

Wang Mei & Xia Zhuanling (1994), 'Beijing zhongqingnian jiating yanglao xianzhuang fenxi' (Research on family support in Beijing), *Renkou Yanjiu (the Population Study)*, No. 4 (1994).

Wang Xiaoqiang (2002), 'Chengshihua yu jingji zengzhang' (Urbanization and economy growth), Beijing: *Weilai yu Xuanze Canyue Wengao (Views: Future and Choice)*, No.5 (2002).

Wang Y. C. (Yicai) (2000), 'Jiating yanglao, tudi baozhang yu shehui baoxian xiangjiehe shi jie jue nongcun yanglao de biran xuanze' (The combine of family support, land security and social insurance in the rural area), *Renkou Yangjiu (the Population Study)*, No. 5 (2000).

Wen Tiejun (1999), 'Bange shiji de nongcun zhidu bianqian' (Institutional Transformation in Rural China in the Latest Half of Century), Beijing: *Zhanlue yu Guanli (Strategy and Administration)*, No.6 1999.

Wen Tiejun (2000), *Zhongguo Nongcun Niben Jingji Zhidu Yanjiu: Sannong Wenti de Shiji Fansi (A Study on Rural China's Fundamental Economic System: Rethinking of the Rural Problems)*. Zhongguo Jingji Chubanshe (China Economy Press).

Xiang, Jiquan (2001), 'Jiazu de biaoqian yu cunzhi de zhuanxing: guanyu jiazu zai woguo xiangcun zhili zhong de zuoyong de yixiang hongguan kaocha' (Changing network of the kin and the transformation of social control at village level), *Zhongguo Nongcun Yanjiu 2001 nian Juan (China Rural Research 2001)*, Wuhan: Zhongguo Huazhong Shifan daxue Zhongguo Nongcun Wenti Yanjiu Zhongxin (China Rural Research Centre of Huazhong Normal University).

Xiao Qunzhong (2001), *Xiao yu Zhongguo Wenhua (Filial Piety and Chinese Culture)*. Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe (Renmin Press).

Xu Qin (1997), 'Nongcun de Jiating yanglao nongzou duoyuan' (How Long It Will Go: Family Support in Rural China), *Renkou Yanjiu (the Population Study)*, No. 6 (1997).

Yue, S. (2001), 'Woguo renkou laolinghua qushi jiqi duize' (Aging Trend in China and the Policy Response), *Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Fuyin Baokan Ziliao: Shehui Baozhang Zhidu (China Renda Social Sciences Information Center: Social Security System)*, No. 5 2001. pp13-17. Beijing.

Zeng Yi (2004), 'Shengyu zhengce xu Pingwen Guodu' (The possibility of family policy change), *Zhongguo Renkou Xinxi Wang (CHINA POPIN)*.
http://www.cpirc.org.cn/yjwx_detail.asp?id

Zhang Jinchang (2001), 'Zhongguo nongcun yanglao baozhang zhidu baogao' (Challenges of family support for the old in rural China), in Chen Jiagui, Lv Zheng & Wang Yanzhong (eds) *Zhongguo Shehui Baozhang Fazhan Baobao 1997-2001 (China Social Security System Development Report 1997-2001)*. Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxia Chubanshe (Social Science Documentary Press). Pp 234-267.

Zhang Qingwu (2001), 'Teda chengshi zanzhu renkou xianzhuang de yanjiu: yi Beijing shi weili' (Research on situation of temporary residents in Chinese metropolises: the example of Beijing), in Ke Lanjun (Gransow, B.) & Li Hanlin (eds) *Dushi Li de Cunmin: Zhongguo dachengshi de liudong renkou (Villagers in the City: Rural migrants in Chinese metropolises)*. Beijing: Zhongyang Bianyi Chubanshe (Zhongyang Translation and Edit Press). Pp 165-173.

Zhao Changbao (1997), 'Shuchudi: waichu jiuye dui nonghu ji shequ de yingxiang' (Impact of the rural-urban migration on the farmer household and the rural community), in Du Ying & Bai Nansheng (eds) *Zouchu Xiangcun (Going Out the Countryside)*. Beijing: Jingji Kexue Chubanshe (Economics Press). Pp127-158.

Zhao Changbao (2002), 'Waichu, huiliu yu xiangcun shehui bianqian' (Out-migration, return, and rural social change), in Bai Nanshen & Song Hongyuan (eds) *Huixiang, Haishi Jingcheng? Zhongguo Nongcun Waichu laodongli Huiliu Yanjiu (March Forward to the City or Return Back to the Country: A Study of the Returned*

Rural Labours). Beijing: Zhongguo Caizheng Jingji Chubanshe (China Financial and Economic Press). Pp 77-100.

Zhao Yaohui & Wen Guanzhong (1998), 'Zhongguo nongcun shehui baozhang yu tudi zhidu' (Social Security in Rural China and the Farm Land System), *Hongkong Zhongwen Daxue Zhongguo Yanjiu Fuwu Zhongxin Wang* (*The Chinese University of Hongkong*).
http://www.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/wk_wzdetails.asp?id=1869.

Zheng Gongcheng (1997), *Lun Zhongguo Tese de Shehui Baozhang Daolu* (*The Characteristic Chinese Road of Social Security Development*). Wuhan: Wuhan Daxue Chubanshe (Wuhan University Press).

Zheng Gongcheng (2002), 'Zhongguo shehui baozhang: zhidu bianqian, pinggu yu fazhan' (Reform of social security system in China), in Zheng Gongcheng (eds) *Zhongguo Shehui Baozhang Zhidu Bianqian yu Pinggu* (*Social Security System Transformation in China*). Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Chubanshe (Renmin University of China Press). Pp 1-76.

Zhou Xiaochuan (2000), 'Shehui baozhang yu qiye yingli nongli' (Social security and the profit of the enterprises), *Shehui Jingji Tizhi Bijiao* (*Comparative Study on Social and Economic System*), No. 6 (2000). Beijing.