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**ETHNIC CONFLICT AND DEVELOPMENT:
THE CASE OF GUYANA**

by

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Preface

The United Nations Research Institute for Social Development initiated a global research project on Ethnic Conflict and Development in late 1989. Seventeen studies covering major outbreaks of ethnic conflict in different regions of the world have been undertaken by an interdisciplinary network of scholars. The first major output of the project - a study on Kurds - has just been published.* Several others are being processed for publication, with the remaining scheduled for completion before July, 1992. The project is being coordinated by Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Research Professor at the Centre for Sociological Studies of El Colegio de México.

Since the initiation of the project, the topic has acquired increasing importance with the spread of ethnic violence in Eastern Europe and the previous Soviet Union and the resurgence of xenophobia in Western Europe directed against ethnic minorities. The purpose of the research project is to gain deeper understanding of the causes, patterns, processes and consequences of ethnic conflicts and the effectiveness of a range of cultural, political, constitutional and economic policies to prevent or resolve such conflicts. The studies are therefore addressing the following issues: the historical origin and the evolution of ethnic conflicts; the interests and motives of the major social actors; the role of economic, cultural, social and political factors; the responsibility of the state, the political parties, voluntary associations, religious groups and other organisations; the relationship with the broader development process; the nature of external interests; and policies and mechanisms to prevent, contain or resolve the conflicts.

The paper by Ralph Premdas, Department of Government, University of the West Indies, Trinidad, and Visiting Professor, Centre for Developing Area Studies, McGill University, Canada, contains a comprehensive analysis of the origin, evolution and consequences of ethnic conflict in Guyana. It draws upon his forthcoming monograph on the subject. The scene of one of the most protracted and virulent ethnic conflicts in the Third World, Guyana has paid the price in a breakdown of its political system, devastation of its economy and a rending of its social fabric.

The origin of the ethnic problem in Guyana goes back to the early colonial period when Indian workers were imported to work on the sugar plantations and in the rice fields in place of the freed African slaves. From the outset, the diverse ethnic groups - the Europeans, Africans, Indians, Amerindian and the mixed - were segregated by residence, occupation and cultural differences. Of the two major groups, Indians forming 50 per cent of the population in 1970, lived predominantly in rural areas and worked on plantations and family plots, while Africans accounting for 33 per cent of the population, lived mostly in urban areas and were employed in the public service and private companies.

The author analyses the dynamics of ethnic conflict between these two groups in terms of predisposing and triggering factors. The predisposing factors were cultural pluralism, occupational and residential differences

* *Le malheur kurde*, Gérard Chaliand, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1992.

and lack of overarching institutions. The triggering factors which ignited the ethnic conflict were colonial manipulation and super power rivalry, introduction of mass democratic politics, the nature of the electoral system and competition for resources. The early colonial policy perpetuated ethnic distinctiveness through occupational and residential segregation. Nearer the independence period, the United Kingdom and the United States, as part of their cold war strategy, exploited existing tensions to encourage the growth of ethnic based parties by supporting "moderate" and marginalising "radical" strands in the political movement.

The gradual extension of the suffrage during the colonial period inaugurated the era of mass politics. In the first election the two major ethnic groups united under the banner of a single party to press for independence. This was the high point of ethnic harmony and solidarity. But it soon gave way to ethnically-based political parties under the strain of leadership rivalry, conflict of economic interest and colonial manipulation. The tensions were further exacerbated by the winner-take-all nature of the electoral and the political system which lacked any mechanisms for power sharing and consensual decision-making. Adding to the difficulties was the ethnic competition for public sector jobs and for allocation of public resources.

The integrating mechanisms provided by a common education system, a common language and the Creole culture evidently proved inadequate to counter the appeal of the ethnic factor. Instead the country witnessed a slow descent to the ethnicisation of the political system, the social institutions and economic policies. This contributed to escalation of violence, intensification of repression and collapse of the economy. In the words of the author, the country had gone beyond the "collective insanity threshold".

Efforts are now being made to undertake economic reform, introduce a pluralistic democratic system and combat the forces of ethnic hatred. It is to be hoped that in this endeavour the Guyanese society and the external community would draw appropriate lessons from the catastrophic consequences of ethnic based politics of the past three decades.

Dharam Ghai
Director

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Intense ethnic conflict has bedeviled Guyana since the mid-1950s when the colony's local leaders, facing the prospect of political independence from the metropole, formed their own communally based parties and competed for political power. The impending departure of the colonial power inserted new questions and uncertainties about the coexistence of the country's ethnic population segments. Lacking a broad base of consensual values, the immigrant society that was created by the demand for cheap labour to work on the plantations had to invent one. Most critically, the emergent post-colonial leadership had to forge into existence a governmental order that was at once democratic in order to accommodate the fears and interests of its disparate cultural parts. It was here, in a false start, that the promise of a prosperous and peaceful future seemed to have floundered. The transfer from Britain of a political scheme that included competitive parties locked in a zero-sum contest to control the Parliament and the politics of the state, led to diverse inter-communal rivalry that wreaked havoc on the unity of the society. Once communal politics was launched, the political parties seemed to have lost control over its direction. Competitive partisan politics anchored into the sentiments of the respective communities exacerbated sectional divisions. Over a period of nearly four decades the result was an impoverished country run by a repressive régime. How this happened is the subject of this short study. The paper attempts to examine the structure of the ethnic phenomena as its patterns have been revealed in the case of Guyana. The categories of analysis into which the paper is divided reflect a number of critical questions which were beaten out at a United Nations Research Institute for Social Development workshop convened in Geneva in February 1990. However, the substantive content of the study follows the theoretical thinking on ethnicity of this researcher.

I. Ethnic boundaries/ cleavages/rankings

The operational definition of ethnicity used in this work includes three components: collective consciousness, bases of affinity and behavioral propensities. Above all, ethnicity refers to group consciousness, that is, a sense of identification with a larger community. Often, that community is bound by certain putative commonalities such as a common language, race, religion, tradition, region, etc. or several of these together. It is not important that objective scientific facts bear out the validity or accuracy of any of the claims to these commonly apprehended cleavages. Neither is it significant that these cleavages be always maintained and be consistent. Behaviourally, ethnic groups seek the fulfilment of their objectives in terms of claims to symbolic and material gains in relation to other groups. Ethnic structures are not permanent but are sustained in malleable form shaped by commonly perceived experiences, a shared consciousness, and a variety of rational, mythical and instrumental goals.

As can be seen, the ethnic phenomenon is a hydra-headed creature alive with sociological form, psychological consciousness, political claims and religio-symbolic mysticism. In my mind, it is derived from the innate need of the human creature for community expressed dialectically in contradistinction to rival claims or other similar communities. It is

relational and conflictual, positively and negatively charged, and in perpetual movement. It is at once community-building and annihilating, fulfilling and frustrating. It bears its own internal logic, compelled by its own internal needs, and once it has picked up its own momentum it may deny everything that it once stood for at its inception. To some, it can be a marauding monster while to others it embodies the finest creative spirit of a community. It is clearly a very complex phenomenon and, as such, a working definition can only be a tentative heuristic device that constantly requires re-examination and revision.

In Guyana, the ethnic structure of the population has been set forth in an orthodoxy of categories depicted in table 1 below.

Table 1
Guyana 1970 population

Ethnic Group	Population	Percentage
Black (African)	227,091	30.7
East Indian	377,256	51.0
White	4,056	0.5
Portuguese	9,668	1.3
Mixed	84,077	11.4
Chinese	4,678	0.4
AmerIndian	32,794	4.4
Other	576	0.7
Total	740,196	100.0

Source: Government Information Service, Georgetown, Guyana, 1970.

In Guyana, the ethnic groups are bound individually by a common consciousness of group identity supported by a common putative physical type, cultural tradition, religion and history, in quest collectively of certain goals such as claims to jobs, political power and protection from other groups. An Indian or African knows who he/she is in terms of communal membership; using certain social and physical markers, he/she can identify others who share the same community; and he/she can tell what he/she wants and fears. Our research shows how subjective ethnic groups and their boundaries are in practice. Ethnic group membership is not a theory to the ordinary person, but a practical map that defines the environment with built-in expectations and rules for survival.

As a subjective psychological system, ethnic membership for the Guyanese is charged with conflictual interpretation of group enemies perceived through the prism of stereotypes. Part of boundary affirmation consists of separating the internal qualities of one's group from that of other groups. The Indian or African is an entity in antagonistic relation to each other. Daily acts confirm communal membership in dietary preferences, friendship networks, ceremonial and religious practices, etc. All of this takes place astoundingly in the midst of other ethnic groups. A symbolic language with its own nuances of communication is created in daily intercourse to affirm group solidarity and reject strangers. Outward relations cleverly conceal inner intrigues in a tapestry of deceptive cordiality.

The context of intergroup rivalry defines the tightness of ethnic claims and boundaries. In Guyana, where a highly polarized ethnically bifurcated system emerged in the wake of zero-sum competitive elections and ethnic repression, a social context of intense tension is normal. Underlying the ritual claims of being a cross-communal government, the People's National Congress (PNC) régime presides over an order fraught with ethnic suspicion, fear and distrust. In the vice of an ongoing inter-communal contest, ethnic boundaries have remained remarkably rigid.

After independence when the British left, Guyana inherited a population structure that contained two major unranked ethnic groups. Indians (about 50 per cent of the population) and Africans (33 per cent) mobilized around *de facto* ethnic parties which ironically claimed socialist labels. Indians were largely rural dwellers, bounded by a separate set of values from the urban Africans, and until most recently tended to be farmers and sugar plantation workers. Residential, occupational, customary and racial cleavages together established a deeply divided state. Each group feared the other; each disparaged the other through a complex set of stereotypes.

The multiple reinforcing set of cleavages was moderated in some ways by a commonly shared school system in which English was the language of instruction and by a so-called "Creole" culture which permitted interaction between the two groups. Each section, while organized around virtually uni-ethnic voluntary associations and political parties, was submitted to a barrage of socialist rhetoric espoused by both of the major parties. The socialist claims which represent a class horizontal organization of society never succeeded in re-aligning the ethnic vertical cleavages of race, religion, culture, etc.

In an environment of rising ethnic tensions the interplay between centrifugal divisive forces and centripetal unifying factors resulted in the paramount effects of the former. The political context of intense communal rivalry permitted little leeway in ethnic boundary deviation. Indeed, as ethnic party politics intensified, communal deviants were sorted out for "special attention". During the 20-year period from 1955 to 1975 when ethnic conflict between Indians and Africans intensified, most of the Chinese, Europeans and Portuguese, as well as the educated and skilled of all ethnic sections, migrated from Guyana. This left a situation in which the two ethnic groups, constituted mainly of lower income members, confronted each other over the privileges of posts, power and political control of the state.

The fear of ethnic domination marked inter-ethnic relations. In the end, one group did seize power through its ethnic preponderance in the army, police and urban unions, thereby converting an unranked ethnic system into one that was ranked. In all of this, as will be described later, inter-communal rivalry was assisted by foreign actors whose role was decisive in a perpetuating ethnic conflict.

A remarkable event that attests to the persistence of ethnic boundaries in contexts of crisis refers to the behaviour of Guyanese groups overseas. Indian and African migrants in London, Toronto and New York are no longer hedged in by exclusive residential, occupational and value cleavages. Neither are they living in geographical conditions where they are either contiguous or constitute major population clusters. Without these bases of

support one would expect that ethnic identification derived from the Guyana context would erode and disappear. The contrary is true. The ethnic rivalry continues overseas and fuels the tensions back in Guyana. All of this suggests important limits to the theoretical view that ethnic attachment tends to disappear among persons of higher socio-economic categories.

II. Ethno-genesis: Emergence of ethnic conflict

From the empirical evidence, several factors and forces seemed to have come together to lay the foundations and trigger the ignition of ethnic conflict. It will be useful to classify these factors into two categories: predisposing and igniting or triggering.

The predisposing factors point to the foundation on which a multi-ethnic state is formed and to the lack of overarching understandings to regulate peaceful contact and exchange among these groups. The igniting or triggering factors refer to the role of incidental and manipulative forces on the predisposing factors literally bringing the raw inflammable materials of cultural diversity to fire and conflagration.


In Guyana, the predisposing factors of cultural diversity were laid at the very founding of the multi-ethnic colonial state. From the time of European settlement, a succession of new immigrant inhabitants were added to the aboriginal peoples constituted of several tribes. The demand for cheap and abundant labour to supply the requirements of plantation production of cotton and sugar served as the single most significant force that accounted for the fabric of the new state. The Amerindians quickly succumbed to the rigours of plantation regimentation and alien diseases requiring the European colonizers to tap new sources of labour. This came in successive waves from Africa, Asia, China and various parts of Europe itself, including the Azores. Over nearly two centuries, the multi-ethnic plural state was formed and assumed the particular shape of communal specialization and separation. Specifically, the Amerindians, Europeans, Africans and Indians were settled into virtual compartments marked by occupation, residence and culture. The tiers of the separate settler groups were united by the existence of a number of privately owned sugar plantations, a common controlling colonial power and its administrative apparatus, and an imperial order that legitimated conquest, subjugation and exploitation of Third World territories and peoples.

The pattern of internal settlement followed the logic of labour supply and exploitation for plantation production of sugar for metropolitan destinations. Hence, there was no need or desire to establish a society endowed with communally cross-cutting co-operation and integrative norms and institutions. Guyana was a colony of exploitation not of settlement. The colonial powers did not operate on the basis of erecting a long-term viable and autonomous state. They had no interest then in fostering inter-communal and cross-ethnic links among the various communities that were imported into Guyana. Implanted in the same territory, the immigrants and the remaining Amerindians (who were consigned to reservations) interacted from their discrete occupational and residential enclaves mainly in relation to the demands of plantation production of sugar. They also tended to view and evaluate each other from the dynamics of their own internal communal values and beliefs.

A. **The predisposing factors** then can be classified as: (1) cultural pluralism; (2) lack of co-operation and overarching values and institutions; and (3) internal communal beliefs of the separate sections. It is clear that these factors did not emerge all at once but developed into distinctive features that defined essential structural elements of the state over time. The predisposing factors closely resemble Clifford Geertz' "promodal attachment" which is described as "one that stems from the given - or more precisely as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed givens - of social existence".

B. **The triggering-igniting factors:** The factors that triggered ethnic conflict were clearly identifiable but occurred at different times during the evolution of the problem. These factors were: (1) colonial manipulation; (2) introduction of mass democratic politics; (3) rivalry over resource allocation; and (4) imported political institutions adopted at independence. In order to understand why all of these factors which came into play at different points in the evolution of the communal conflict could be classified as "triggering", it is necessary to conceive of the problem cumulatively. At various times, a particular triggering factor deposited a layer of differentiation which in turn provided the next step for the deposit of a new layer of forces to the incipient and accumulating crisis. At various points, these accumulations could have been neutralized if not entirely reversed. It is for this reason that the idea of a trigger is suggested; the idea is that there was nothing automatic about the transition of the next stage. To be sure, it would appear that, after a number of successive reinforcing deposits of divisive forces, a critical mass in momentum would have been attained so that every issue becomes inflammable. The state is then in perpetual war expressed in perennial ongoing tensions which periodically explode into ethnic violence. This is often quelled and a normal poise of peaceful tension resumes until it explodes again. Figure 1 offers a graphic exposition of this process. Ethnic conflict in Guyana as elsewhere seems to be underlaid by ongoing tensions which periodically explode into violence.

Figure 1
Levels of triggers (A, B, C, D, E)



- Towards a cumulative ascent
- Each trigger leaves a residue acted upon by the next trigger
- Point "E" is critical mass (violence)

(a) **Colonial manipulation**

When slavery was abolished in 1838, the sugar companies required an alternative source of cheap and abundant labour to sustain the profitability of the plantations. The emancipated Africans demanded higher wages; the plantocracy refused. Indentured labourers, mainly from another part of the British Empire, were then imported. From 1838 to 1917, over a quarter of a million Indians from India were recruited for plantation labour in Guyana. This was the first important act of colonial and planter manipulation, encapsulated appropriately in the doctrine of divide and rule, which at once laid the foundation of greater cultural diversity and antagonism between Africans and Indians. To the African, the Indian was the cause of depressing their claim to the value of their labour. He quickly came to despise the Indian "coolie" for voluntarily enslaving himself for a pittance. The Indian saw the African through the prism of Indian internal caste values, as not only culturally if not racially inferior, but lacking in understanding of the plight of Indian indentureship.

Kept apart occupationally and residentially, each group with its own residual values and traditions, the Indians and Africans soon accepted the definitions of themselves through the British values which became dominant. Thus, to the first layer of trigger that fuelled Indian-African antipathy was added a second layer of self-definition forged on the emergent Anglo-centred colour-class system of stratification. The English colonists saw the Indians as industrious, compliant and culturally superior to the Africans. They saw the Africans as lazy, rebellious and imitating of English ways. These stereotypes were compounded by perceptions and evaluations which Indians and Africans developed on their own from their own values, and from experiences with each other. Cumulatively, then, we witness the laying of new deposits of antipathies which will at once become predisposing and triggering factors in the emergent ethnic interface between Africans and Indians.

After a century, the 1800s and early 1900s witnessed the slow and compounding accumulation of the results of colonial manipulation, residential and occupational divisions, value differences and stereotyping. It is during this period that the foundations of the ethnic boundaries would be firmed up around the formation of communally bound voluntary associations and distinctively different cultural practices. Not only would Africans and Indians be demarcated and compartmentalized by the reinforcing multiple cleavages of residence, occupation, values and stereotypes, but so, too, would the Chinese, Portuguese, Amerindians and English colonists. Segmentation became total and pervasive. To be sure, a few shared practices were emerging to facilitate the economic exploitation of the colony. These included a "creole" pidgin language (mainly assigned a lower value in relation to the English language and spoken mainly by Africans and Indians) and an incipient educational system which would become more significant after the First World War. The countervailing centrifugal forces of division, however, prevailed for nearly a century without much modification.

(b) **Liberalization of the suffrage**

The introduction of the suffrage by stages to enfranchise the non-white sector of the population in the colonial decision-making process would provide the new layer of triggering devices that promoted ethnic conflict. The "democratization process" can be conceived as occurring in two stages each with a separate ethnic effect. In the first stage, as the colonial government

lowered the property and other requirements for obtaining the right to vote, a small group of middle class Africans and mixed races gained the franchise. This meant both an ethnic and class category entered the political picture. At the ethnic level, the lowering of the franchise requirements witnessed the entry of many Africans and mixed races (of African-European ancestry) into the political process. This group, even though it utilized an appeal on behalf of the plight of all non-whites, saw itself antagonistically related both to Europeans (whom they emulated) and the masses of Africans and especially Indians (whom they despised). The emergent African-mixed race bourgeoisie saw itself as the legitimate inheritor of the mantle of British rule in a manner that militantly excluded all Indians and lower income Africans, who together were deemed uncultured, uneducated and uncivilized. It was this middle class group that later mobilized and organized Africans and mixed races against Indians in the quest to monopolize the allocation of jobs and other colonial benefits. An Indian middle class with similar exploitation motives would later appear. In this it will always be necessary to apprehend the emergent struggle over colonial succession in terms of both ethnic and class factors. We shall return to the interplay of these forces later. The important point to note at this stage of our analysis is that the first extension of the franchise engaged a new group with ethnic as well as class exclusivist perspectives. The ethnic factor was significant for it served as a mobilizer of communal supporters in the service of class interests of the Africans and mixed race bourgeoisie.

It would not be until after the Second World War that dramatic changes would inaugurate the period of full-fledged mass democratic politics. Universal adult suffrage, introduced in 1950, meant that the non-white middle class leaders required a new type of politics to maintain their privileges. This was not easy since two kinds of political mobilization had occurred simultaneously, one class orientated and the other ethnically inspired. At the class level, Indian and African workers were organized into unions for industrial action against the managers and owners of plantations and factories. However, because of the occupational differentiation that had developed in the colonial structure, the emergent trade unions were preponderantly uni-ethnic in composition. Therefore, at the class level of popular mobilization there was organization of workers into unions, but at the communal level, such organization and mobilization were erected around ethnic affinities. Almost invariably, the leadership of these unions was in the hands of the middle class. The problem that this posed for analysis pertains to the prospect of ethnic workers unifying their efforts across the communal divide so as to establish wider collective efforts against employers. It was clear that, while communal dispositions were embedded structurally in the colonial order, an opportunity was now available to modify and recast allegiances so as to transform the society away from its ethnic moorings.

There are moments in what would appear to be an inexorable march towards establishing a tightly organized and compartmentalized communal order when opportunities for structural change avail themselves. It is not inevitable that the colonially divided communal system should be permanent. Ethnic boundaries are notoriously fluid in rapidly changing environments; ethnically oriented organized life can at least be modified so as to submit communal claims to cross-pressures from functional class interests. It is not suggested that either communal or class cleavages will prevail as the salient organizing principle of a multi-ethnic society. What can best be

hoped for in the face of the failure of assimilationist theories of ethnic integration is some sort of social structure that embodies a variety of cross-pressures which moderate the irrational combusive properties of ethnic mobilization and conflict.

In the period immediately following the Second World War, an independence movement, which had caught the popular imagination across ethnic lines, was successfully launched. It was socialist in orientation so that its appeals addressed the economic interests of workers; its mobilization was cross-communal, successful in part because of the multi-ethnic leadership and in particular the joint leadership of the movement by an Indian and African. The People's Progressive Party (PPP), formed in 1950 and led by Indian Cheddi Jagan and African Forbes Burnham, and comprised also of a number of Chinese, European and mixed race leaders, successfully won the 1953 general elections, the first under universal adult suffrage. Examination of the election results showed a distinct pattern of Indian-African co-operation in all electorates giving the PPP victory in 18 out of the 24 constituencies.

In the 1953 PPP victory, the trajectory of tightly compartmentalized ethnic parties was arrested. It was a moment of opportunity to re-cast at least at the political level the dominant role of ethnicity in political organization and mobilization. Once the political levers were wrestled away from colonial power, it was possible to re-cast institutions and practices so as to encourage cross-communal co-operation and coexistence. The direction of public policy under a cross-communal party could move away from ethnically inspired employment and resource allocation practices which the colonial power had utilized to maintain control over the Guyanese people. Much of this, however, could only be achieved by a unified leadership in a popular mass party committed to alternative paths of development. The task would be gargantuan flying at every point in the face of old communal habits and structural dispositions. It was the purpose of the PPP to do this even though its vision was to establish a class society in place of one bounded by ethnic allegiances. Even if its vision of cross-communal unity was misinformed by its understanding of the ethnic factor, it could nevertheless establish cross-communal organizations and policies that would modify and restrain the role of sectionalism in practical life.

The PPP, however, would squander this opportunity at nation building and the imperialist colonial power would seize the opening presented by an internally divided PPP leadership to destroy the multi-ethnic basis of the independence movement. Dr. Jagan and Mr. Burnham, serving symbolically as the dual-headed integrated leadership of the independence movement, were ambitious persons each with his own version of socialism. The independence struggle temporarily submerged their differences which resurfaced after the momentous elections of 1953 were won. Jockeying for pre-eminence while at the same time challenging the colonial power with radical policies meant that a divided party attempted to confront a very resourceful and still powerful colonial enemy. After 133 days in power, the British evicted the PPP from office by military force and suggested that the more extreme communist views of Jagan invited such action. This played on the internal division of the PPP suggesting that a more moderate position such as espoused by Forbes Burnham would be acceptable to the British.

Evicted from office, the PPP was split right down the middle between Jaganite and Burnhamite factions. Each faction sought to assign blame on the other for the British intervention. Jagan and Burnham formed their own parties each seeking to capture the mantle of cross-communal support and legitimacy that the old unified PPP enjoyed. Instead, the separate parties each headed by its own ethnic leader succeeded in obtaining the support of only its respective ethnic community. With this, Guyana was launched into a period of ethnic mass-politics that exacerbated and institutionalized communal divisions.

For our purposes, it is important analytically to sort out the role of three precipitating factors that triggered the onslaught of unprecedented ethnic confrontation and conflict in Guyana after the breakup of the PPP. The first factor relates to personal ambition taking precedence over the objective of cross-communal unity. To be sure, in going his separate way and forming his own party, each leader imagined that he could mobilize cross-communal support. The quest for personal power, however, blinded them to the role of the bi-ethnic leadership of the original PPP as the critical symbolic factor that mobilized Indian-African support for independence. As the two leaders, each as head of his own party, organized to compete for votes in new elections, their grassroots mobilization inevitably assumed an ethnic flavour. Each accused the other of racism. They were both believed. The new parties became uni-ethnic in composition even though each projected a socialist image and appointed a façade of cross-communal élites in their leadership.

The second triggering factor that can be discerned in the breakup of the PPP and the beginning of a new level of mass ethnic politics was the role of the colonial power. To Britain and the West in general, the PPP, as an avowed Marxist-Leninist party, was a threat. The internal leadership differences between Jagan and Burnham were known. The manner in which to neutralize the threat posed by the socialist movement was to strike it at its fragile ethnic underbelly. The role of international actors with their own interests cannot be underestimated in the ethnic conflicts of the Third World. The Guyana case illustrates this point well.

The third factor which is significant in this episode of ethnic division relates to the role of the important political institutions. This point is taken up in greater detail in another part of the paper. Suffice it to note here that once the two separate parties were established after the leadership split, the institutional arena of competition for power involved an electoral and legislative system based on zero-sum competition. Competitive ethnically based parties were not encouraged by the institutional order to share power. As soon as the contest assumed an inevitable communalist structure, the socialist rhetoric of each party notwithstanding, the interests of Indians and Africans were cast in terms of ethnic domination. A zero-sum competitive contest drew a picture of ethnic conquest in electoral victory. It meant that the vanquished party represented an entire communal segment that could be victimized and discriminated against, suggesting scenarios of internal colonialism and genocide.

(c) Competition over resource allocation

It is difficult to locate precisely the moment when the question of ethnic shares became an issue in the struggle among the communal sections. In a sense, the entire colonial pyramidal ethnic structure not only embodied

resource allocation but explained its existence. This is credible in relation to European dominance of the state. However, the relations between Africans and Indians in their conflictual expression cannot be easily dismissed as derived from competition over scarce resources. If, however, the argument is made that economic material factors explain Indian-African antipathy, the evidence to buttress this position comes abundantly from claims to jobs and privileges that Africans and Indians have made against each other from the moment of Indian entry in the society and their migration from rural areas to towns for government jobs. Indians were cast in the role of the late comers who diluted the entitlement of the Africans. When Africans became acculturated to English ways and accepted Christianity and the English school system, this gave them entry into public service positions and to the many urban-based jobs in the private sector. Indian acquisition of English education came relatively late and only after Africans had already consolidated their hold on the lower level positions available to them in the public and teaching services. Indian-African conflict can therefore be explained by this competition over public jobs and general public resource allocation.

If it were true that this material basis was the explanation of communal conflict, then one would expect that, with enough jobs being created, this competition and conflict would diminish and disappear. The evidence from the Guyana case suggests that, in many occupational sectors where jobs were plentiful, African-Indian antagonism persisted. Transposed overseas and no longer in competition with each other over jobs and resources, Guyanese Africans and Indians continue the ethnic feud with even greater intensity. Despite all of this, it is clear that scarce resources and competition over jobs did play a role as a triggering factor in sustaining the conflict. In particular rivalry between middle class Africans and Indians reared its head at various points in the conflict, suggesting that this factor commanded a significant position in separating Africans from Indians. In the light of the evidence it would seem justified to suggest that this material factor be placed in an important explanatory category in relation to the genesis and sustenance of the conflict. However, too many other factors were also at play and these must be incorporated in any theory of the **ethnogenesis** of the problem.

III. Issues

Does an ethnic conflict depend on issues to survive? The Guyana case suggests a negative answer to this question. Issues have varied and evolved over time. After the ethnic arousal has attained a certain critical mass over its cumulative life, it seems to derive an internal dynamic of its own, feeding on any and all issues, transforming and ethnicizing them in its own image.

At the outset, several issues were articulated to offer fuel for the formation of ethnic consciousness. The relational and, specifically, the oppositional nature of ethnic consciousness implies contact between groups of people. The contact itself need not be provocative; it seems that the very idea of difference and diversity in a world of limited territory, scarce resources, envy, suspicion, the quest for power, prestige and influence, etc. together ignite inter-group consciousness and differentiation.

When the multi-ethnic state was being formed in Guyana, the various groups were thrown immediately into a conflictual situation charged with power relationships. The European planters and administrators had seized power and imposed an order based on the superordination of their interests. The Europeans saw themselves as different as well as superior. Slaves and indentured labourers were population groups with different languages and customs subordinated by the interests of the Europeans. Hence, at the very beginning, the issue of inter-group domination and the problem of equality were embedded in the social system. Throughout Guyana's colonial history, this issue would feed ethnic consciousness not only separating the European section from others, but also accentuating internal group consciousness among the other immigrant groups because of the colour-based stratification system.

When the colonial power was being evicted as independence approached, a new contest had emerged between the two major ethnic groups, Indians and Africans, over the sharing of power and privileges. Control over the state and resource allocation became identifiable issues that assumed an ethnic form as well as a class dimension. Common class interest across communal lines had evolved in an incipient way at various points in Guyanese history. It had, however, to survive within an environment of ethnic and communal divisions. The ethnic factor was always the more evident, and not necessarily always the more powerful, of the two.

Ethnic differentiation was politicized in the implanted stratification system. It gave rise to what is referred to in Guyana's context as "the race issue". Racial ranking and discrimination were always issues in Guyana, but with the departure of the colonial power, it became an issue of civilizational and cultural supremacy between Indians and Africans. The instrumental contest over resource allocation seemed to be subordinated to the rivalry between the two cultural clusters. Each saw itself superior to the other, even though each implicitly accepted the Europe-centric value order left by the colonizers. Neither group has retained enough traditional values from the Old World to represent its ancient civilizations. Each was broken and persisted with an amalgam of residual traditional values and whatever else was available. To be sure, Africans and Indians developed configurations of institutions and practices which had set them apart, but they were also linked by a bastardized creole culture representing the inter-mixture of their colonial experiences.

The claim to "racial superiority" was a persistent underlying issue; it was juxtaposed with ritual assertions of the need for equality. Whatever issues have arisen, it always seemed to be indirectly impregnated with this rival tension between "ethnic superiority" and "universal equality". Rivalry over civil service jobs for instance, is carried out under the silent claim of one group to the public service as its ethnic territory and the claim of the other group to equality. Africans see their control of the public service as offset by Indian predominance in business and agriculture. This creates a sort of territorial and sectoral equality. Objectively, this may carry much merit, but the issue illustrates how this tension of ethnic particularism interweaves with the motif of equality in many issues.

IV. Private organizations: Political parties and voluntary associations

As the immigrants uprooted from Africa, Asia and elsewhere started to settle down in their respective residential areas, it was almost inevitable that the voluntary associations that they formed around cultural, social and economic pursuits tended to be overwhelmingly, if not wholly, from their own communal section. Especially in cultural and religious associations, this was emphatically the case. Even the Christian churches became preponderantly uni-ethnic in membership with most Africans adopting the religion of their oppressor. In those Christian congregations which contained a number of Europeans, *de facto* segregation in seating arrangements and the administration of religious services occurred. Africans formed a League of Coloured Peoples. The Hindus and Muslims also established their own cultural associations, such as the East Indian Association. The Chinese, Portuguese and English did the same. In the social and cultural areas, voluntary associations were therefore almost entirely uni-ethnic in composition.

In the economic arena, again this pattern of ethnic differentiation prevailed but with some important modifications. Since ethnic segmentation was in part erected around occupational differentiation, the membership in the emergent trade unions in the twentieth century displayed this social-industrial feature. Hence, the urban unions were almost entirely African while the rural sugar field unions were Indian. But there were a number of occupational categories that drew upon both Indian and African membership such as the public service and a number of job categories in the private businesses. At one point in its evolution, the public service reflected the colour-class stratification system in its allocation of jobs so that Europeans occupied the highest echelons followed by mixed races, then the Africans and, at the bottom tier, a few Indians. Overwhelmingly, and especially in the twentieth century, the public service was staffed by Africans. This was to be expected since they quickly availed themselves of English education. In time, they began to regard the public service as their own exclusive preserve, similar to the Indian presence on the sugar plantations and rice fields. However, an increasing number of Indians joined the public service after the Second World War. When the Public Service Association was formed into a junior and senior component, it enlisted all public servants regardless of ethnic affiliation. In the private sector, especially on the staff of large multinational corporations, Indian, African, Chinese and other ethnic members could be found. Many of these persons were organized in the same unions. However, most private sector companies were small operations mainly run by Indians and Chinese. These were uni-ethnic in their workforce and usually not unionized. Overall, in the economic sphere, the largest number of Indians and Africans were, however, found in Indian- and African-dominated unions.

When mass political parties emerged, namely the unified PPP of 1950, jointly led by Jagan and Burnham, its support included nearly all the unions. In fact, the founding of the original PPP was based in part on a strategy of co-opting the unions to the rank of the party. The way this was done however is important. Dr. Jagan was the *de facto* leader of the biggest Indian sugar workers' unions, GAWU, and Mr. Burnham was the President of the urban-based apex multi-union organization called the BGLU. Together, these two unions contained most wage unions in Guyana. The building blocks of the independence movement were therefore constructed

on the ethnically fragmented unions which were brought into alliance in an omnibus PPP. The unions came together almost federally under the PPP but they never fused or lost their predominant ethnic identities.

When the original multi-ethnic PPP split apart into separate multi-ethnically based parties, each gathered under its wing its own ethnically composed unions. The connection between ethnic parties and all the voluntary associations was systematically cultivated by interlocking political personnel and leadership. Hence, key leaders in the main cultural and economic associations occupied key positions in their respective ethnically oriented parties. The ethnic overlap in voluntary associations and the political parties became comprehensive as the ethnic rivalry of the parties in Guyana intensified. The tier of voluntary associations (which in integrated societies tend to be constituted of interlocking and cross-cutting functional memberships) in Guyana served not to moderate communal conflict, but to accentuate it.

During the 1960s, when the PPP-PNC struggled over control of the government, each side used its unions to cripple the party in power. During the period of Burnham - PNC dictatorship commencing in 1968, the situation had changed from Jagan's unions boycotting and striking against the régime to nearly all unions joining forces to do so. This did not mean, however, that the workers dismantled their ethnicized union structures, but, suffering together, they pitched tents separately but to conduct a unified attack on the government.

As the PNC became unpopular even among its own communal sections and lost control of most of its own ethnic unions, it resorted to a unique tactic to counter this event. It established a large number of front associations with its own loyal personnel to support it. This has occurred not only in the unions but even among the major voluntary associations. Hence, two sets of economic and cultural associations exist in Guyana, one clearly lacking mass support and serving as a front, and the other possessing a genuine representative membership. Whenever the government wanted to show that its positions were grounded in support, it would call forth its front organizations to endorse its positions. The ridiculous extent to which this has been carried includes the establishment of rival Hindu, Muslim and Christian associates which are recognized by the government to speak for all the Hindus, Muslims and Christians.

V. The state and ethnicity

From the inception of the colonial state in Guyana, its operations were converted into an instrument in the service of European planter and imperial interest. The state was neither neutral nor representative. It became imbued with the proclivities of the colour-class system of stratification and was plainly ethno-centric as well as racist. It presided over an order that was unequal and unjust, but more significantly in terms of our research interest, it institutionalized practices which laid the cornerstone of communal conflict.

Several policies of the state founded a society that was unintegrated and conflictual. First, the conquest of the territory was by force; this gave those who ruled an order that did not seek consent for its legitimacy or

survival. Second, the colonial state deliberately imported a multi-communal population and settled them in a manner that pitched them against each other. Third, the state anchored its routines of stability on a colour-based stratification system that ignored the interest of most of the population. Finally, the state was rendered into a dependent appendage of a European overseas metropolitan centre for its survival and prosperity. In sum, the state utilized its monopoly of violence to enforce an economic, social, cultural and political order to promote the needs of a minority European interest. It would be a capitalist state with the pre-eminence of Europe-centric values as the measure of achievement and rewards.

When Guyana obtained independence, the state apparatus that was bequeathed to the local rulers was the most highly articulated and developed set of institutions in the entire society. It had great authority, resources and employment opportunities. The state was larger than the society. Anyone who captured it could overwhelm the society bringing it to the service of its own particular interest. Civilian institutions were weak and fragmented and have rivalled the state as a countervailing force. The churches were many, the political parties were divided, and the multinationals who controlled most of the land were acting in perfect unison with the state. In fact, the state was really an embodiment of colonial state interest and the economic interest of the multinationals. They acted together with the established Christian churches playing the role of junior partner.

The main rival political parties each representing one or the other of the major ethnic groups recognized the value of capturing the government as the method to control the state apparatus in its entirety. State power was so overwhelmingly powerful, concentrated and centralized that it could be used as an instrument of ethnic domination, even genocide.

When Guyana became independent in 1966, and in 1968 when the PNC captured the government through fraudulent elections, it proceeded to convert the state into an instrument of its own middle class interest acting ostensibly on behalf of its communal section. The police, army, secret services, judiciary, public service, etc., were purged of political enemies who usually were also mainly from the opposing ethnic group. The allocation of the budget was geared to extract resources from an ethnic segment to support the state. In 1970, when the PNC declared Guyana a "Cooperative Socialist Republic" and in the next five years proceeded to neutralize 80 per cent of the economy, it enhanced astronomically the resources and capabilities of the state even more emphatically than the colonial state. The phrase "fragmentation of the state" has been used to describe the period of Guyana's history when the state became an instrument of ethnic domination and repression. Many analysts argue that the state, acting on behalf of one communal group, in fact mainly served the interest of a small élite. There is much evidence to support this view. Overall, for our purposes, it is important to note that the overdeveloped state became a ready tool for ethnic oppression (Hintzen and Premdas, 1982).

VI. The internationalization of ethnic conflict

The ethnic conflict in Guyana has been internationalized in peculiar ways. The Cold War setting made Guyana significant because of its location in the Western Hemisphere. Fidel Castro's breaching of American hegemony

in the region not only encouraged similar socialist conversions in the Western Hemisphere, but by the same token, caused the Americans to intensify their efforts to extinguish all forms of left-wing radicalism in their sphere of influence.

The Jagan-led PPP in Guyana was a self-declared socialist formation with strong Soviet sympathies. When Jagan became Premier of Guyana after the 1961 elections, he declared that Castro was one of the greatest liberators of the twentieth century. His régime traded with Cuba thereby flouting the American decision to control and quarantine Castro's ambitions. This invited the Americans to destabilize the Jagan régime. To do so, the strategy adopted was to play on the internal ethnic division that existed within Guyana. Both the Americans and Soviets entered into the Guyana scene. In effect, while external actors entered the Guyana political fray in pursuit of ideological interests, they indirectly encouraged and exacerbated ethnic conflict by providing resources to the respective parties. Hence, when one party came to power with international help, it in effect elevated to power one ethnic group over the other.

The ethnic conflict in Guyana was internationalized at another level. Indians and Africans outside the Caribbean began to take an interest in the conflict from the perspective of imported ethnic affinity. In the case of Guyana, this has not attained the enormity of support that certain ethnic groups, such as the Catholic Irish in North Ireland, the Tamils in Sri Lanka, the Sikhs in Punjab, etc., receive from contiguous and overseas ethnic supporters. Yet, despite its limited international spillover into other systems, the African-Indian conflict has enrolled ethnic partisan supporters at various international organizations and forums.

With over one third of Guyana's population overseas from where the conflict continues to be enacted, the rival domestic communities have enrolled new sources of help. These overseas groups have established newspapers, radio and TV shows, cultural and associational networks and all of these are linked to the struggle in the homeland.

To resolve the impasse created by mutual intransigence and persistent ethnic conflict with its attendant diversions of scarce resources for security needs, the conflict resolution mechanism of partition has been suggested for Guyana. To divide the country into two self-governing territorial parts is a form of ultimate alienation ending in divorce and the sharing of properties. Unable to live peacefully and happily in the same house, the partners who were forced into colonial wedlock, could decide to part company by mutual consent.

At various times after the two ethnically based party leaders disagreed and formed their own communally oriented organizations, partition of Guyana has been suggested as a solution. More recently, a new group has commenced a series of actions to forcibly divide the country into ethnic compartments. This is secession and it is a solution harboured by some ethnic militants in Guyana. Either by consent or by force, it amounts to the same thing, the territorial division of the state as a means

VII. Partition, secession and mass migration

of settling the ethnic conflict by establishing relatively homogeneous ethnic blocs.

The quest for partition or secession has not assumed an organized form in Guyana. No party or organized group has been formed to pursue the goal of separatism or partition. The suggestions have tended to come from a few individuals and even though its appeal has had some popular sympathy, the territorial division of the country has never gathered organized momentum. The two major parties have eschewed the issue and even condemned it. The one case of an armed attempt to secede by the Americans in the Rupununi region adjacent to the Venezuelan border has been as quickly suppressed as it arose. Venezuelan intrigues at dismembering Guyana's territory have also led to attempts to instigate rebellion in Guyana's Essequibo region. In both cases, in the Rupununi region and in Essequibo county, the externally supported efforts at secession have capitalized on ethnic alienation in Guyana.

An immigrant society such as Guyana lacks deep roots to sustain a demand for a "separate homeland", a concept that seems to accompany demands for partition or separatism. Disgruntled Guyanese have preferred to migrate mainly to North America in droves rather than to struggle for a separate territorially based ethnically "purified" homeland. Emigration routes have been relatively accessible so that this has tended to diffuse international pressures for either a decentralized state or a divided one. From New York and certain places in Canada, however, a new agitation for separatism has started. It is difficult to tell where this is going.

Population movements in the face of persistent and impoverishing ethnic conflict have assumed the form of either voluntary migration or forced expulsion. There are occasions when these two categories are, in fact, the same. In the case of Guyana where over a third of the population has emigrated, many who are Indians argue that their lives had become so difficult under an ethnically oriented repressive régime that their voluntary departure was in fact tantamount to forced expulsion. Guyanese of both African and Indian descent have, however, migrated in large numbers to the more lucrative economies of North America. In a number of cases, it is difficult to tell whether the migration was prompted more by ethnic repression or by the attractions of a better material life.

The moral equivalent of separatism or partition for the emigrant is the establishment of a virtual ethno-cultural residential enclave in the host state. Guyanese communities have proliferated in North America and Britain. In them, ethnic and communal networks have been established sustained by ethnic stores, newspapers, festivals, inter-marriages, etc., which are authentic replicas of similar events in the home country. Strong linkages exist between the overseas ethnic communities and the political parties back home. Frequent travel back and forth, like pilgrimages, sustains the organic complementarity of these communities with the mystiques of the old country. In many ways home is romanticized especially when winter arrives in these overseas communities. In other ways, these overseas groups are more intransigent in their ethno-nationalist sentiments. Few of them seek reconciliation with their ethnic adversaries. For them the war continues by other means, in other places.

In general, then, partition, secession and mass migration are interlocking events all attesting to the degree of alienation that attends protracted ethnic conflict. Each is disruptive. In Guyana, while neither partition nor secession has received sustained organized support by an underground guerilla movement, the fact of mass migration attests equally to a bewildering form of uprooting that creates another level of ethnic discontent that sustains the ethnic strife at home.

Collective ethnic violence has occurred in civil war proportions in Guyana. In the 1963-1964 period as the two major political parties confronted each other over the control of the government, their communally based supporters engaged in widespread physical violence against each other. In many ethnically mixed villages where a preponderance of either Indians or Africans resided, ethnic violence or the threat of it occurred against the minority group. This led to the migration of these minorities from these villages adding to the intensity of self-segregated communal residential settlements in Guyana.

For many Guyanese, the civil war marked by ethnic violence was a traumatic event that led to irreversible commitment to communal solidarity. While it was true that throughout Guyanese history African and Indians maintained tense relations between them marked by mutual suspicion and covert hostility, the outbreak of physical violence seemed to have crossed a psychological threshold of no return to cross-cultural cordiality. This is rather strange in many ways since Africans and Indians had always lived in a state of malaise, much of it, however, moderated by the facts of their residential, occupational and value separation. Each side developed a set of stereotypes through which it negatively evaluated the other. Despite this, both sides tended to interact peacefully in their economic transactions.

For all practical purposes, Guyana like many ethnically segmented societies is perpetually at war with itself. Surrogates for physical violence suffuse the system. These encompass such forms as rivalry in the celebration of their respective religious holidays, competition in business and government, etc. Stereotypes tended to belittle and separate entire communal sections serving as a sort of quiet victory of the mind over the opponent. However, they tend to dehumanize ethnic enemies and set the stage for violence against the opponent. When mass politics was introduced and ethnically based parties emerged, these underlying stereotypical antipathies were harnessed into instruments of mass action. The new collective forces accentuated ethnic hostilities. Competition at elections tended to provide the occasion for these antagonisms to be vented openly; often political campaigns seemed like military engagements. All of this pushed the society periodically to the brink of violence.

A number of mechanisms, however, tended to restrain the conversion of latent hostility into the overt use of physical violence. At the governmental level, this included the coercive forces which when not ethnicized could deter the outbreak of violence. However, where these forces were composed mainly of one of the contending ethnic groups, as in Guyana, they added fuel to the fire of ethnic strife rather than quelled it. At the societal level, certain

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internal forces serve to limit the incidents of violence. The fact that only few residential places in Guyana had an equal distribution of Africans and Indians provided for stability. Once a minority knew that it could be overwhelmed by the majority in a village or town, this limited provocative behaviour and averted confrontation. This factor, as well as outright self-segregation into distinct ethnic communities, best explains why open physical ethnic violence in Guyana was so sporadic. Urbanization and mass politics increased contact between groups, thereby increasing the opportunities for conflict and violence.

A new level of ethnically oriented physical violence was unleashed when in 1968 the communally based PNC government, with police and army support, rigged the elections. The legitimacy of the government was lost and opposition challenges mounted. Over the next decade the size of the coercive forces and expenditures for them increased 1,000-fold. What emerged was a state apparatus that sought to maintain its power and control by repressing its communal enemies. The Burnham régime did not go about physically exterminating its ethnic enemies. Rather, a system of terror was established to control the behaviour of its opponents. State institutions such as the courts and civil service were ethnically politicized and converted into instruments of communal discrimination.

State terror and the threat of violence were met by ethnically inspired oppositional sabotage of the economy. Since the economic system during colonial times was crafted so that there was a coincidence of economic specialization and ethnic concentration, this meant that, unless all segments co-operated, the economy would fall apart. Hence, African control of the public service was utilized as the lever to destabilize the Indian-based Jagan government, while Indian control of the sugar and rice industry was used to sabotage the African-led Burnham government. Economic independence invited mutual sabotage.

The impact of persistent Indian strikes and boycotts in their sector accompanied by mass migration and the loss of essential skills from Guyana, reverberated adversely on all ethnic groups alike. Economic collapse imparted universal suffering. African workers who, like Indian workers under the Jagan government, had supported policies of discrimination soon felt the full brunt of a diminishing economy and a bankrupt government. When they went on strike for more pay and for job security, the state apparatus turned its coercive arsenal against them all. Suddenly, in this situation, an ethnically divided situation was beginning to assume a class flavour. Several well known Afro-Guyanese persons, including Dr. Walter Rodney, appeared on the political scene and sought to organize both Indian and African workers against the PNC state apparatus. Rodney had tried to show that the Burnham régime had successfully used African-Indian antipathy to retain power while benefiting the interest of the middle class section of the population.

For a while it seemed that Rodney had made a remarkable breakthrough in converting a highly articulated ethnicized structure into a class struggle. Indian workers and Indians generally rallied to Rodney who was African. Many, if not most, African workers defied the PNC régime and rallied to Rodney's Working Peoples Party. Rodney was on the verge of overturning the PNC government when he was assassinated and several of his colleagues were cut down by physical violence conducted by the state's coercive forces.

Several critical points are deserving of analysis in these events. First, it is noteworthy that a régime that established its support among its communal sections tended to reward mainly its ethnic middle class supporters and neglect its lower income sympathizers. Second, alienation that was almost exclusively confined to Indians soon spread to all adversaries of the régime so that state repressive force became cross-communal. Third, in the midst of widespread suffering caused by the breakdown of the economy and bankruptcy of the government, Indians and Africans rallied together under the joint Rodney-Jagan leadership to overthrow the PNC government. Fourthly, after Rodney's assassination, the *status quo* ante marked by ethnic antipathy was restored. Finally, while both Indians and Africans opposed the PNC government, each wanted a predominantly Indian or African régime respectively as the replacement.

When the régime unleashed its violence against its own communal members, it did so as if they were misguided and had betrayed ethnic trust. The communal members of the régime who opposed the government were made special objects of terror and violence. They were treated as traitors with a sort of passion and hate that only brothers can concoct against each other.

IX. Power-sharing and domination

The colonial state in Guyana was constituted of a hierarchical ranking of ethnic groups with the European section occupying the dominant position. Through a colour-class system of stratification, the skewed distribution of values and statuses was rationalized and regulated. As long as the European retained his pre-eminent position, African and Indian rivalry was restrained. To be sure, both the African and the Indian felt that he was superior to the other. However, these were private judgements. Each group had been etched into the ethnic mosaic so that spatial contact was limited and occurred over resources that they did not share. The separate ethnic compartments provided territorial zones and a buffer against direct rivalry. Kept apart, conflict was limited and restrained.

As independence approached, it became practically evident that the European section would lose its pre-eminence. How Indians would relate to Africans became a source of anxiety. Already, Indians had started to acquire Westernized skills and education. Some had started to claim jobs in the public and teaching services. Intimations of inter-sectional conflict were already appearing in the period immediately after the Second World War. How power and privileges should be distributed between these two dominant groups was, in some ways, an open issue. The British political institutional model, if adopted, would have meant zero-sum competition for political office and the application of achievement criteria in the competitive allocation of public service jobs.

In the independence movement spearheaded by a popular bi-ethnic leadership, the opportunity availed itself for a formula for sharing office and splitting the civil service jobs and government projects. The People's Progressive Party headed by Jagan and Burnham was however more preoccupied with winning the first general election under universal adult suffrage than with inventing a formula for sharing office. Besides, it was not clear that the PPP would win the elections. Moreover, the popular euphoria in political campaigning submerged all fears and anxieties connected with

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future competition for jobs and resources between Africans and Indians. The issue of power sharing and resource allocation raised at that time could also have caused unnecessary internal friction in the independence movement.

For all these reasons, no attempt was made to develop a formula for ethnic sharing. This is a familiar situation which was also enacted in Trinidad in 1986 when a joint Indian-African party captured the government. Almost immediately after victory over the antecedent régime, the independence party was engaged in divisive squabbles over power. Because the jockeying was between the two major ethnic leaders, the rivalry assumed a communalist connotation to followers. As the internal struggle continued, correspondingly the mass following was divided. Soon the situation got out of hand, literally there was a loss of control. In the Guyana case the opportunity to establish a stable formula for power sharing was overcome by mass sentiment for the ethnic leaders. Once fed into popular emotions, the chances of rational solution are greatly diminished.

In Guyana, power sharing and resource allocation through some sort of ethnic proportionality were lost to a new order marked by open zero-sum rivalry. After this, the fear of ethnic domination became part of the vocabulary of inter-ethnic interaction. Stated in this way, the stakes in the competition became co-terminus with both the survival of an ethnic group and the state itself. Through a few fortuitous events, the African section acquired power and retained it through the armed forces and fraudulent elections. Therefore, ethnic repression and discrimination ensued and was met by collective ethnic retaliation. A spiral of violence and counter-violence has created a situation in which all prosperity ceased. An unranked system was converted into a ranked order. The theme of ethnic domination pervades all inter-ethnic relations.

The impact of ethnic conflict can be analytically examined in relation to four dimensions of development:

1. Politics: specifically, issues related to unity, stability, legitimacy, political participation, and human rights are looked at here.
2. Economics: items related to per capita GNP, strategies of development, basic needs (food, clothing, shelter, nutrition, education, etc.) are examined.
3. Socio-cultural: the categories examined here relate to problems of cultural community and identity, tolerance and inter-ethnic co-operation.
4. Psychological: in particular, features such as mental health; a sense of well-being, self esteem and security; self-respect, etc.

1. The political dimension

There are few political gains that can be identified as a result of the persistent ethnic conflict in Guyana. On the positive side of the accounting ledger, it could be argued that ethno-nationalist rivalry has produced a deeper and more sensitive awareness in all communities of the demands and complaints of each side. In Guyana, these complaints have pointed to ethnic discrimination that has been practised surreptitiously in both the private and public sectors with regard to employment and budgetary allocations. When the Indian-based PPP was in power, the African-based PNC accused

the ruling régime of adopting a strategy of development that favoured rural residents, who were preponderantly Indians. Similarly, the PPP accused the PNC government of using ethnic criteria in civil service appointments. On the surface, both of these claims were correct, and, in turn, not only have they led to disclaimers of discrimination, but also to a number of actions to correct the problem. In this area, the issue of discrimination raised fundamental questions over the distribution of state benefits and private sector advantages to all ethnic groups. The use of achievement criteria and the free market became contentious issues as against ascriptive quotas and planning in the equitable allocation of society's values to all ethnic groups.

Another beneficial effect of the ethnic conflict has occurred in the evolution of former ethno-nationalist identities for organized political action. Whilst on one hand, this organizing and articulating dimension has had its extremist expression in the formation of militantly intolerant intra-communal organizations, it generally has permitted a clearer and more structured expression of a group's demands and interests. In Guyana the ethnic conflict has coherently structured, organized and articulated the interests of the respective sections. All of this is not to suggest that internal divisions, repression and violence have not accompanied this process.

The arguably positive political effects of ethnic conflict are counterposed by overwhelming evidence of negative political impact. As illustrated in the Guyana case, the first list of potential casualties relates to the loss of régime legitimacy, national unity and the deepening of instability. The absence of a body of overarching values shared by the country as a whole led to the development of sectional institutions including political parties and private armies. The competition for the scarce values of the state was not limited and moderated by a body of shared understandings over the structure of the economy and polity. Every major issue assumed the form of a fundamental challenge to the society at large. The ethnically bound parties encapsulated this polarization of competition in Guyana. In the end, because of intransigence in achieving a compromise, neither of the two major parties accepted the other as capable of representing its interest in government. The zero-sum electoral system in which the winner took all of the benefits and powers of the government was tantamount to a military victory over the ethnic opponent. A deeply divided state, lacking in cross-communal legitimacy, fraught with antagonism and fear, was therefore erected. Discriminatory state policy was met by opposition sabotage; this was repeatedly enacted from issue to issue, so that in a spiral of intensifying confrontations, the society literally burst asunder at its ethnic seams. Underlying much of the inter-ethnic struggle was fear of communal domination. Neither side trusted the other with its future and each in turn sought to capture the government for self-protection. The need for self-preservation, in part, explained the seizure of power and the rigging of elections by the PNC. In the end, the casualty was the loss of the vote and democracy with it.

To maintain order in the face of persistent challenges to its legitimacy, the ruling régime increased its security forces and repressed its ethnic adversaries. The security and coercive forces, now overfed and claiming massive chunks of the budgets, got out of control. In Guyana, they constituted the frontline of régime survival and therefore their excesses were tolerated by those who governed. The fact that one ethnic group controlled the government and another was in opposition imbued the entire security exercise with genocidal intent. Human rights were abridged and their

infringement became a normal part of political life. States of emergency were routinely proclaimed. Ethno-political activists were habitually assembled, harassed, jailed, beaten and tortured. Most of the ethnic opponents however, migrated. Once the political conflict was militarized, calls for guerilla action and secession emerged and became strident. The Guyana case points to pervasive human rights violations, accompanied by calls for partition and external intervention.

If, at some point, the opposition to the communally based government begins to gain cross-communal support, then, as in the case of Guyana, these cross-communal persons are submitted to a fearsome and brutal form of persuasion to return to the ethnic fold. In Guyana, cross-communal opposition has ebbed and flowed without significantly modifying the basic ethnic polarity in the state.

2. The economic dimension

In no area are the adverse effects of ethnic conflict more evident than in the economic life of the country. The economic devastation can be directly traced to what can be appropriately designated as an "ethnic nuclear bomb". In the case of Guyana, a once promising and prosperous country has been turned into the Western Hemisphere's poorest state, now surpassing Haiti's pitiful condition. The biggest industry and the biggest aspiration of those Guyanese who have remained is emigration, simply to get away from it all. Over a third of the population, perhaps over a half, has left; they are the best educated and skilled. In the aftermath, a comatose economy continues to receive injections of external aid treating the ailment as an economic issue. The misdiagnosed patient continues to die slowly. Ethnic conflict can become an irreversible cancer.

Perhaps the most crucial aspect of the economy of the typical multi-ethnic plural society created by colonialism consists of its ethnic specialization and complementarity. The Guyanese economy illustrates this phenomenon well. The specialized parts of the economy - the sugar, bauxite and rice industries and the public bureaucracy - were each the *de facto* preserve of one or another ethnic group. These parts had to be co-ordinated for production to occur and political order to be maintained. In turn, this meant inter-ethnic co-operation amongst the ethnicized trade unions was essential. Put differently, because of the interdependence of the specialized parts, each of the major producers of either a product or service could sabotage and sink the entire economic ship. This in fact did happen.

As the two major political parties, the PPP and PNC, representing Indians and Africans respectively, after 1955, vied for office, their intransigence spilled over into acts of economic non-co-operation against one or the other that acquired the government. Hence, when Jagan's PPP was in power, the predominantly African public service, unions and police force engaged in strikes and other acts of non-co-operation bringing the economy to a virtual halt. Similarly, when Burnham's PNC was in power, the predominantly Indian sugar workers mounted strikes and rice farmers curtailed production as acts aimed against the government with devastating paralysis of the economy.

A second area of economic activity that embodied a critical aspect of the ethnic conflict related to the coupling of democratic politics with the

choice of economic strategy. In a democratic set up, political leaders devised strategies of development that would in part satisfy the needs of their followers if the régime in power wanted to retain office. While this might be regarded as a reasonable and rational aspect of democratic politics as a whole, in the particular case of multi-ethnic societies with ethnically based parties this pattern of behaviour tended to be locked into the ethnic proclivities of the society. In Guyana, the choice by Jagan of an economic strategy that emphasized agricultural production and rural development, although it could be vindicated by sound economic reasoning, entailed the emphasis of expenditures on Indians who were mainly the rural residents. Similarly, when Burnham's PNC announced that it was "Cooperative Socialist Republic" bent on nationalizing most of the economy and putting it under state-controlled co-operatives, this was interpreted by Indians as an attempt to bring more of economic interests and assets under the African-staffed public service. In effect, the economic strategies, even when they could be justified in terms of technical and ideological criteria, were oriented or seemed to be oriented around ethnic preferences.

A highly ethnicized society sees everything through an ethnic prism. Even when it is not so, an issue often becomes one by prophetic fulfilment as the out-group withdraws its co-operation leaving a particular policy in the hands of the other ethnic groups. For instance, budgetary allocations by the Jagan government to reclaim land and redistribute it to the public at large were seen as intended for Indians. Africans were therefore reluctant to participate, resulting in the programme's domination by Indians. Similarly, the Burnham government's choice of co-operatives as the appropriate policy instrument for equitable production and distribution in a socialist society was seen by Indians as a strategy designated for the benefit of Africans. Indians boycotted co-operatives which in turn became mainly African. Hence, in all economic areas - budgetary and project allocations, taxation and investment policy, export and import - every economic action and policy of the government in power was seen in ethnic terms. This reinforced the ethnic specialization in the economy and bred the very conditions that perpetuated the ethnic strife.

It is important to note in all of this that neither the PPP nor the PNC projected itself as a communalist party. Each had developed a sophisticated party manifesto with a clear definition of programmes justified in non-ethnic terms towards building a socialist society. While each did this, at the same time the grassroots party organizations surreptitiously peddled a different line of ethnic solidarity and loyalty. It was the intention of each party to first consolidate its ethnic support and then to attempt cross-communal conversions. Where both parties did this simultaneously, the result was a stalemate in the erection of rigid ethnic blocs.

The effects on development of the perception that a party in power merely represents the interest of its communal members have been a major cause of economic devastation. Non-co-operation and sabotage by the out-section perversely became the primary purpose in practically all actions, but especially in the tangible areas of economic activity. That each side would in the end lose and be impoverished did not seem to matter. The contest assumed the form of a game of denial compelled by an inner suicidal obsession to assert group solidarity, win or lose. Once unleashed in the state, the collective ethnic monster overwhelms all sanity and subverts the very survival needs of its adherence in the demand for ethnic solidarity, security and ascendancy.

The economic cost of ethnic rivalry has reverberated in every tangible area of life in Guyana. In the domain of basic economic needs, the fall in aggregate production of sugar, bauxite, rice and other items critical to the economy meant that less revenues were available to the government to provide standard services in the area of health, transport, education, etc. Increasingly, in the teeth of ethnic tensions, the budget was allocated to build the army, police and secret services. The tense climate of ethnic struggle discouraged both foreign and local investments. Most of these investors were non-Africans, many Indians, and they saw in the government's co-operative socialism a threat to their capital investment. Foreign aid also dried up as the struggle in Guyana was seen less in ideological and more in communal terms.

Over a period of two decades, stemming directly and indirectly from the intensifying ethnic conflict, social and economic well-being plummeted to depressing levels. The economy ceased to grow, indeed, it experienced persistent negative growth and practically collapsed. Indians in the sugar industry under PPP leadership mounted strike after strike so that Guyana, once a virtual sugar plantation that exported sugar for its survival, started at various points to import sugar and failed to meet the lucrative EEC quotas for sugar export. Similarly, the rice industry was crippled. Most Indians who controlled the rice production either migrated or curtailed production. The public service controlled by Africans fell into disrepute and, with its treasury empty, the public servants sought part-time work.

In effect, the economy became a battle ground for ethnic rivalry. The Guyana government under the PNC borrowed extensively from multi-national bodies but in an economy that was slowly pulverized into shambles with production plummeting in all sectors and industries destroyed, the external debt rose and could not be repaid. The infrastructure of roads, telephones, electricity, water supplies and sea defences all fell into grave disrepair so that daily life became predictably miserable. The Guyana currency underwent repeated devaluations and a large black market emerged. It is generally argued that the official currency and economy have been replaced by a black market of massive proportions. In all of this, the underlying ethnic structure, with its antagonisms, has not been altered. Glimpses of combined inter-ethnic solidarity have appeared but have not persisted. With new elections scheduled, mass ethnic mobilization has reappeared.

3. The socio-cultural dimension

Never really a national society but possessing at various times incipient elements of a shared culture (sometimes referred to as "a creole culture"), the Guyana state became even more clearly bifurcated as a consequence of protracted polarized ethnic politics. Some social theorists, such as Raymond Smith at the University of Chicago, have rejected the plural society model as an accurate portrayal of the social structure of the multi-ethnic states of the Third World. They point to the existence of a number of communally shared institutions and practices which have welded the Guyana population into a loosely integrated society, albeit with strong centrifugal forces simultaneously at work. Among those integrated institutions identified were the school system, the colonial laws, plantation life and economic exploitation, the colour-class stratification system, a number of voluntary associations with cross-ethnic membership, a creole

language, and a body of shared practices found in Western dress, music, some foods, and a number of games such as cricket. Together these seemed to have eddied up to a cluster of autonomous practices which were shared by all ethnic groups.

Even if it were true that something of a shared locally derived "creole culture" had emerged by the early 1950s, it is generally conceded that after ethnically based rival parties emerged by 1955, over the years of intensifying polarized conflict, this practically destroyed all these shared institutions and practices.

The social cost of persistent ethnic strife has been the destruction of the rudimentary forms of inter-communal sharing and the continued deepening of inter-ethnic distrust and rivalry. The social and cultural fabric became inevitably frayed. Those voluntary associations which had even a small sprinkling of inter-ethnic membership dissolved into uni-ethnic structures. It has been argued by some developmental theorists that co-operation is the most significant variable in strategies for social and economic transformation. In the Cooperative Republic, co-operation was sadly lacking. Ethnic conflict pervades all parts of the polity, society and economy.

Religious revivalism increased as each group sought to shore up its solidarity by a new commitment to its cultural practices. The ecclesiastical bodies of the Hindus, Moslems and Christians, became *de facto* ethnic structures in support of their communal sections. Religious and cultural revivalism was enlisted into the ethnic struggle and cultural chauvinists emerged with a new importance in this fractured social system.

As the PNC régime became increasingly an ethnically élitist governing group and presided over an economy that deteriorated dramatically, inter-ethnic trade unions and a group of inter-ethnic political adversaries to the régime arrived on the scene. Some of these actually became effective. Such was the case when Dr. Walter Rodney entered into Guyana's politics. After his assassination, some of the cross-ethnic groupings have persisted but in a significantly enfeebled form. Below the surface, inter-communal groupings persisted, and a veritable civil war in ethnic sentiments resumed. The economic crisis in some ways brought all Guyanese together, but in other more salient respects, it accentuated the ethnic divisions.

4. The psychological dimension

The Guyanese who had been submitted to the intensifying tensions of ethnic compartmentalization became a twisted, paranoid people. A stressful environment had been created, unconducive to healthy human development. It was not marked by ordinary struggle, but by hate, jealousy and a single-minded obsession with subjugating and destroying the ethnic enemy. The stereotypes each Guyanese carried embodied traits which dehumanized entire communities. Distrust and deceit, cordiality underlaid by hypocrisy, became operational norms of life.

Ethnic identity, to be sure, had been affirmed. But this raises the fundamental question about how much ethnic or communal identity is enough for importing a sense of psychological belonging. Is there a threshold of too much ethnic solidarity when it becomes pathological and suffocating?

I think protracted ethnic conflicts can engender a level of solidarity that over-saturates the need for belongingness. After a certain threshold of solidarity intensity is attained, a new set of adverse effects which negate the initial value of group cohesion are brought into play. The threshold to which I refer can be called "**the collective insanity threshold**". When group consciousness attains a certain critical mass, it thereafter destroys the carriers themselves.

Ethnically inspired collective insanity destroys the human perceptual apparatus, distorts all messages and breeds a system of behaviour that destroys adaptation for a healthy fulfilling survival. In Guyana, human creatures who were capable of love and spiritual sharing have been turned into mass instruments of hate. From this comes pervasive high blood pressure in the population, short tempers, widespread emotionally related illnesses, which together make life difficult not only between communal groups but within the groups themselves. From this environment, have arisen several apocalyptic personalities and spiritual groups which have exploited the weak personality that has come to typify the Guyanese citizen. The communal parties are not just political aggregates of citizen interests; they are truly cultural institutions and psychiatric clinics. They are centralized around the personalities of their leaders who offer psychological redemption.

What kind of personality is best suited for development? It is clear that the crippled personality that is born of protracted ethnic conflict is not in any way appropriate for bringing into being a wholesome society. Integral human development is therefore denied in societies caught in the vice of ethnic strife. The Guyana case illustrates this well.

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