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## **Responding to Protracted Displacement Using the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus Approach: Scoping Study**



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November 2020



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# **Responding to Protracted Displacement Using the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus Approach: Scoping Study**

November 2020

## **Executive Summary**

This scoping study has been commissioned by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to inform the development of a Theory of Change (ToC; UNRISD 2020) that illustrates the potential for their interventions, based on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace (HDP) nexus, to work toward longer-term solutions and to reinforce, strategic collaboration in situations of forced displacement in low- and middle-income countries. Contexts vary so target populations might, for example, include refugees and asylum seekers, internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees and stateless persons alongside host populations. The study was conducted by the United Nations Research Institute for Sustainable Development (UNRISD) between March and June 2020 and is based on a desk review and remote individual or group discussions with 50 people from UNDP, UNHCR and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

## **Key Findings**

### **Displacement**

The growing size of displaced and protracted displaced populations caused by an increasing number of prolonged conflicts and crises has precipitated a renewed emphasis on comprehensive responses that combine humanitarian, development and peace activities in an effort to prevent and mitigate the impact of forced displacement.

The international legal framework and guidelines to protect displaced groups provide protection, access to rights and assistance. Refugees have greater protection under international law than other displaced groups. How the legal framework is implemented depends on the status of the displaced group and the attitude of the host government and population. The legal framework underpins all interventions in response to displacement and should be mobilized through all sectoral responses to protected populations and enable them to access their rights.

The Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) provide an important framework for UNDP and UNHCR interventions into situations of forced displacement. They advocate a holistic approach drawing on the HDP nexus and stress the need to prevent crises from occurring as well as the need to address their impact and to support the development of national systems and governance.

The majority of displaced populations are hosted in low- and middle-income countries. The SDGs and the GCR emphasize the need for global partnerships to share responsibilities among developed and developing countries in addressing needs and mitigating the impact of crises, including forced displacement.

There is a lack of qualitative and quantitative data and analysis to inform policy and practice and to monitor and evaluate interventions. Little research is conducted to provide in-depth insights into situations of protracted displacement and the impact on displaced populations and their hosts.

### **The HDP nexus**

The rationale for and practice of linking humanitarian, development and peace interventions are not new and present challenges including fears of compromising humanitarian principles and space; and difficulties in coordinating and working across sectors because of different working practices, expertise, planning horizons and access to funding. Planning, sequencing and coordinating complex interventions in dynamic situations with large numbers of actors that have different agendas and objectives is time consuming and demands strong working relationships and mutual trust. Maintaining agility and flexibility to respond to changing circumstances when implementing large-scale, multisectoral interventions is problematic.

Despite the interest in the triple nexus approach and the apparent logic in addressing the humanitarian, development and peace issues surrounding protracted displacement simultaneously, there are few examples of success, and limited specific guidance on programmatic design and content for implementing the nexus.

The role of governments in HDP nexus approaches is unclear.

The scope of the peace pillar is yet to be agreed. Some argue that the peace pillar should focus on “soft” interventions only, such as social cohesion, governance and rule of law (RoL). Others argue that the peace pillar should be broader and include “hard” interventions such as security sector reform (SSR); disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR); and militarized peacekeeping efforts. The agreed scope of the peace pillar has implications for funding and coordination mechanisms to implement the triple nexus.

While many of the challenges and unknowns remain, the United Nations, its partners, and UNDP and UNHCR have made structural changes to break down the barriers between their humanitarian, development and peace interventions; created new coordination mechanisms; and instigated systems of information sharing, capacity development and sharing of expertise and research. For example, the UN Secretary-General’s Reform Agenda, the New Ways of Working (NWoW) initiative and the creation of the Joint Steering Committee to Advance Humanitarian and Development Collaboration (JSC) are designed to improve coordination and shared understanding. UNDP and UNHCR have developed a joint action plan, initiated staff exchanges and made specific commitments to the SDGs, the GCR and to working toward long-term solutions to protracted displacement.

Although donors have revised funding mechanisms to fund HDP nexus approaches more effectively, new instruments and initiatives often complicate oversight of funding availability and distribution, and reflect donor agendas, often limiting funding flexibility.

Financing the nexus remains challenging as the alignment of humanitarian, development and peace funding is complicated by administrative and organizational barriers. Besides flexible multiyear funding, which remains the exception rather than the norm, best practices concerning nexus financing are still to be developed.

Despite the absence of a shared vision for the HDP nexus and questions over its feasibility and programmatic content, there is a strong consensus among supporters of the nexus about the best practice processes for its implementation. Principles for implementation include conducting joint analysis, developing context-specific interventions, adopting long-term sustainable approaches, focusing on prevention and peace building, developing effective coordination and leadership, identifying suitable funding mechanisms and undertaking joint research to inform programming and monitor progress.



## **Contextual challenges**

There are many contextual challenges to operationalizing the HDP nexus, not least because protracted displacement is often found in situations of chronic crisis. Main challenges include:

- the reluctance of host government and populations, for political and socioeconomic reasons, to include displaced populations in national and local systems;
- the lower standards that may be found in national systems and service provision than those provided by UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations—transitioning displaced populations to these may be impossible, unethical or expensive, and time consuming if systems are upgraded;
- a particular difficulty in moving from humanitarian to development approaches when there are limited legal livelihood and employment opportunities open to displaced populations; and
- tensions that may exist between host and displaced populations.

## **UNHCR-UNDP collaboration**

UNDP and UNHCR have a history of working successfully together in situations of displacement through individual programmes such as the Transitional Solutions Initiative (TSI) and regional responses such as the Syria Crisis Response (Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan, 3RP).

Successful UNDP-UNHCR collaborations occur when there is strong leadership creating a positive working relationship between the two agencies, particularly at the country level. In addition, to achieve success, the context must permit innovation and the pursuit of longer-term solutions to displacement. Appropriate, adequate and timely funding must be available.

There are examples of regional, national and local interventions by UNDP and UNHCR that could be described as adopting a triple nexus approach because they contain all the HDP elements (such as the response to the Syria Crisis in Lebanon) or because they have the potential to support a nexus approach and longer-term solutions (such as the registration and provision of legal identity documents for refugees in Malawi).

Little independent analysis of the effectiveness of these joint HDP-related interventions exists but some are forthcoming: for example, on the joint UNDP-UNHCR Support Afghanistan Livelihoods and Mobility (SALAM) project in Afghanistan, while the UNDP Regional Hub in Amman is also developing lessons learned from the 3RP. OECD will publish a study on HDP nexus interventions later in 2020.

UNDP and UNHCR are already developing areas of collaboration and their own expertise in the HDP nexus approach and responses to protracted displacement, in particular: the possibility of longer-term solutions to protracted displacement; the inclusion of displaced populations into national systems; and support to governance and RoL to facilitate these processes and create greater security and stability for civilian populations. Independently, the two organizations are developing their capacity in various ways, including the appointment of senior development officers (SDOs) at UNHCR, and HDP focal points in UNDP. UNDP is developing guidelines on conflict sensitivity and social cohesion, and UNHCR is developing concepts for inclusion of refugees into national systems.

Partners in the United Nations have drafted or developed policies for addressing protracted displacement in line with the SDGs, GCR and a triple nexus approach that are useful resources for UNDP and UNHCR.

## Conclusions and Recommendations

There are ongoing challenges to collaboration between UNDP and UNHCR such as their different priorities, timelines, access to funding and resources and, depending on the context, the time-consuming coordination processes or the lack of common coordination mechanisms. However, the two organizations also provide each other with opportunities for maximizing the positive impact of their work. UNDP can provide greater access to national governments and authorities, and support their capacity development to protect the rights of displaced populations and meet their needs. UNHCR has access at the operational level, including access to remote areas where forcibly displaced populations often settle, and can mobilize staff to implement joint initiatives. The two organizations have complementary expertise to implement a triple nexus approach, as well areas of overlapping expertise in service provision and community-level interventions, including activities to promote social cohesion.

The scope of the peace pillar for UNHCR and UNDP is determined by their interventions. Examples of current and past activities suggest a broad definition of the peace pillar to include hard and soft interventions as UNDP engages in SSR and DDR, and has provided technical advice and oversight to peacekeeping missions. However, for each context, it is necessary to agree on the scope of the peace pillar so it is appropriate and relevant to the objectives.

There are joint funding opportunities for UNDP and UNHCR as well as opportunities to fund each other as has happened, for example, in Lebanon and Colombia. The two agencies need a strong understanding of their complementarities and comparative advantages to maximize funding opportunities. In addition to governments and multilateral donors, international financial institutions (IFIs), the private sector also provide financial resources. Resource streams from sources other than official development assistance (ODA), such as remittances, should also be considered for financial as well as programmatic purposes.

A triple nexus approach should be based on:

- a *shared vision* among all stakeholders from the humanitarian, development and peace sectors, national government, affected populations and donors;
- an *exit strategy* that is developed from the earliest phases of an emergency, to transition from humanitarian to development responses, with peace components to build stability to work toward long-term solutions as soon as possible;
- *ongoing context analysis* to develop a shared vision; design and plan appropriate interventions; identify appropriate implementing partners; monitor and evaluate progress of interventions; and the operating context to ensure programming interventions are responsive to changing environments, address ongoing conflicts and crises, and mitigate against others emerging in the future;
- *strong leadership and effective coordination* mechanisms that foster a positive working environment and maintain effective and efficient communication among all stakeholders; and
- *appropriate funding* that offers flexibility and the ability to plan long term.

Essential programmatic interventions include:

- implementation of the legal framework supported by capacity development of governance and RoL to ensure the protection of rights and legal identity, achieve longer-term solutions, create a stable and secure environment and prevent future crises and conflict leading to displacement; and
- provision of livelihoods and employment opportunities as well as inclusion into social protection systems to achieve longer-term sustainable solutions and to promote resilience and self-reliance among displaced and host populations.

Essential cross-cutting issues that should be mainstreamed through all interventions or, depending on the context, become distinct programme interventions are:

- Do no harm and conflict sensitivity approaches always form part of good programming but in HDP nexus approaches, social cohesion and peaceful coexistence should also be key elements of interventions along with other peace activities;

- gender and diversity, which should be mainstreamed with respect for the different needs and capacities, and the changing needs and capacities, of the different demographic and social groups. Such approaches are accepted best practice and in line with the SDGs and the GCR; and
- environmentally sensitive programming and disaster risk reduction (DRR), which are important to prevent displacement and to mitigate environmental damage caused by displacement. Environmental protection is an important element of the SDGs and the GCR.

Research and advocacy requirements include:

- ongoing qualitative and quantitative research, to understand the context, inform policy and programming, monitor and evaluate the positive and negative impacts of interventions, and identify and share lessons learned;
- advocacy with donors, to explain the rationale of an HDP approach and encourage the provision of adequate, flexible, multiyear funding and to justify potentially higher funding needs to transition from humanitarian to development assistance; and
- advocacy with host governments and populations, to explain the benefits of adopting longer-term policy toward the displaced populations.

Alignment and consultations:

- UNDP and UNHCR have the programmatic scope to operationalize the HDP nexus jointly and with partners. It is possible to develop a ToC for UNDP-UNHCR interventions into situations of protracted displacement, but these must be aligned with current policies and ongoing initiatives within the two organizations, the United Nations and the international community. High-level consultations are necessary to ensure alignment and achieve broad support for the ToC.
- Consultations with a range of national stakeholders from government are necessary to ensure that the triple nexus ToC is tailored to the operating context, aligned with other policies and initiatives, and has buy-in. Field testing of the ToC could be used to gain traction, support and funding to address situations of protracted displacement.

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## 1. Introduction

According to the latest global statistics available from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), by the end of 2020, almost 80 million people were recorded as forcibly displaced and 4.2 million as stateless (UNHCR 2020d). Many displaced populations are in protracted situations, commonly understood as five years or more in duration, and the numbers of protracted displaced persons is increasing annually. In 2018, nine refugee groups were newly classified as protracted and no protracted refugee situations were resolved that year (UNDP 2019b). In 2019, no protracted refugee situations were resolved and Burundian refugees were added to the list of protracted refugee groups (UNHCR 2020d). These groups joined others, including Afghans and Sahrawis, that have been displaced for decades, making a total of 15.7 million refugees in protracted situations of displacement by the end of 2019 (UNHCR 2020d). The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) concluded in 2017 that, in more than 50 countries, people had been internally displaced for 10 years or more (OCHA 2017).

The causes of displacement are multiple and can be the result of a single factor or a combination of two or more and include violent conflict, political unrest, economic crisis, environmental change and natural disaster. Displaced populations are not only demographically diverse, depending on the causes of the displacement and whether displaced groups move within their own country or to another; displaced persons are subject to different legal frameworks and levels of protection, which can happen even when people form part of the same population movement or are hosted in the same country. The majority of displaced persons are hosted by poor- or middle-income countries often experiencing their own economic, political and social challenges. Therefore, the act of hosting can exacerbate existing economic and political problems, lead to social tensions between host and refugee populations and increase pressure on public services. As a result of complex and chronic crises preventing people from returning to their homes, and the lack of suitable and durable alternatives to integrate displaced populations into the host country or resettle them elsewhere, more displaced groups find themselves in protracted situations. Protracted displacement was seen as undermining the achievements of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and poses the same threat to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (Lawry-White, 2017:18).

In response to increasing numbers of displaced populations, protracted displacement situations, and chronic and complex crises, a number of initiatives have emerged in recent years that are designed specifically to improve responses to displaced populations, or to facilitate the work of the international community in general, which should also improve the interventions for displaced populations. Measures include the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) and related documents which aim to share the responsibility for displaced populations by providing more international support to host countries and to improve the longer-term perspectives for displaced and host populations (UN 2018a; UN 2018c). The UN Secretary General's Reform Agenda is intended to enable the United Nations to work in a more integrated manner and therefore respond more effectively to various crises and the needs of the world's population. The Reform Agenda also encourages a triple nexus approach that combines interventions to address humanitarian, development and peace needs simultaneously. The renewed impetus for integrated approaches means greater emphasis on development, primarily through the framework of the SDGs, as well as humanitarian interventions, for both displaced and host populations. The transformative agenda of the SDGs also promotes the use of development as a means to address and prevent crises.

The peace element of the nexus can include a range of initiatives from best practice approaches such as "do no harm" and conflict sensitivity to active interventions engaging in rule of law (RoL), governance and programmes to mitigate radicalization. The peace interventions are preventative and proactive and aimed at stemming forced population movement, improving or maintaining the security and stability in host countries and preparing for return or resettlement elsewhere. The Reform Agenda aims to remove barriers within the UN structure to facilitate integrated approaches and enable different UN entities to

contribute to a joint initiative, according to their individual mandates and expertise, to avoid duplication of effort and maximize impact.

As a result of increasing numbers of protracted displacement situations and a renewed emphasis on integrated humanitarian, development and peace interventions, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the UNHCR commissioned a study to examine their joint responses and potential for joint responses to large-scale protracted displacement in low- and middle-income countries. It is focused on country-level interventions based on or illustrating the Humanitarian-Development-Peace (HDP) nexus or triple nexus. The aim of the study is to inform the development of a Theory of Change (ToC) for integrated solutions to protracted displacement, based on the triple nexus, which can be refined following field testing. The finalized ToC (UNRISD 2020) is intended to inform strategic planning and immediate, mid- and long-term UNDP-UNHCR programming, to maximize positive impacts for protracted displaced populations, host populations and host governments, as well as to identify ways of strengthening potential collaboration that integrates humanitarian, development and peace interventions. The study also highlights the practical challenges and examines best practices and guiding principles for such interventions.

The study comprises a review of HDP nexus literature relevant to protracted displacement, analysis of the legal and policy frameworks structuring and guiding UNDP and UNCHR operations, and a study of selected programmes and projects implemented by the two organizations. The literature review draws on academic and policy papers, as well as empirical studies, to provide a conceptual background to the triple nexus that also informs practical implementation. As it is important to understand the context for country-level responses, the study examines international and regional cooperation frameworks, financing mechanisms and donor policies. UNDP and UNHCR projects among protracted displaced populations that help to illustrate aspects of the triple nexus have been examined. Particular attention has been paid to four countries: Afghanistan, Colombia, Lebanon and Malawi. These countries provide a geographical spread, illustrate the different legal status of displaced populations and returnees, and show different host country contexts and host government responses. They also demonstrate the complexity of protracted displaced situations from some of the largest forced populations movements since the Second World War, including from Afghanistan, Syria and Venezuela. Programmatically, these countries are significant for UNDP and UNHCR as they include pilot countries for the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF), provide examples of interventions promoting the triple nexus, include examples of regional responses to large-scale displacement and are all countries included in UNDP's pledge to the Global Refugee Forum (GRF) in December 2019.

*Table 1. Country Context Comparison*

	Profile of Displacement	Interventions
<b>Afghanistan</b>  Over 40 years of conflict, ongoing insurgency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• One of the largest refugee populations since Second World War</li> <li>• Largest numbers of returnees in any UNHCR programme. Almost 6 million Afghans have returned since 2002 (UNHCR 2020f)</li> <li>• Ongoing insecurity created mobile population experiencing multiple displacements</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UNDP Pledge at GRF</li> <li>• CRRF Pilot</li> <li>• UNDP-UNHCR-ILO SALAM livelihoods project</li> <li>• UNDP-UNHCR qualitative research on returnee experiences</li> </ul>
<b>Colombia</b>  Fragile peace	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Large numbers of IDPs, returnees from Venezuela, refugees, forced migrants and pendular movements from Venezuela</li> <li>• Quito Declaration on Human Mobility of Venezuelan Citizens in the region</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UNDP Pledge to GRF</li> <li>• RMRP led by UNHCR and IOM and supported by UNDP</li> <li>• UNDP-UNHCR Transitional Solutions Initiatives and Human Security programmes examples of the triple nexus</li> </ul>

<b>Lebanon</b>  Political instability, divided population, severe economic problems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Largest number of refugees per capita in the world</li> <li>• Main refugee groups, Syrians, Palestinians from Syria and Palestinians in Lebanon</li> <li>• Stateless groups omitted from 1932 census</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UNDP Pledge at GRF</li> <li>• Lebanon Crisis Response Plan is an example of a triple nexus approach and includes social stability, governance, RoL and access to justice components</li> </ul>
<b>Malawi</b>  Relatively stable context	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 40,000+ refugees from Africa in a camp; restricted movement and livelihoods options</li> <li>• Provision of health and education in the camp supported by the government</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Governmental CRRF and pledges at the Global Refugee Forum</li> <li>• UNDP-UNHCR collaboration planned to register refugees legally and issue identity documents</li> </ul>

Note: CRRF–Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework; GRF–Global Refugee Forum; IDP–internally displaced person; ILO–International Labour Organization; IOM–International Organization for Migration; RMRP–Refugee and Migrant Response Plan; RoL–rule of law; SALAM–Support Afghanistan Livelihoods and Mobility.

## 1.1 Methodology

The project was managed by the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), an autonomous research institute within the UN system that undertakes interdisciplinary research and policy analysis on the social dimensions of contemporary development issues. Through its work, it aims to ensure that social equity, inclusion and justice are central to development thinking, policy and practice. The study was led by Dr Rebecca Roberts who has a PhD in protracted displacement and 20 years' practical experience of working with refugees and displaced populations affected by conflict. Sebastian Weishaupt analysed the financing modalities for the HDP nexus. UNDP and UNHCR staff formed a Steering Committee to advise on the scope and content of the study.

The study was undertaken over four months during the 2020 Covid-19 crisis, which meant that research was desk-based and discussions with respondents for this project were conducted remotely via Skype and telephone. The planned face-to-face consultations in Geneva scheduled for specific phases of the study were replaced by a video conference on 18 June attended by UNDP and UNHCR staff from headquarters and regional and country offices. It is intended that, when practicable, the ToC resulting from this study (UNRISD 2020) will be field tested and shared with country teams for their feedback.

To avoid preconceived ideas prematurely limiting the scope of the study, discussions with respondents were conducted using open-ended questions to encourage a dialogue and allow respondents to focus on issues they identified as most relevant. Initial respondents were identified by the Steering Committee and included individuals with a range of experiences on thematic areas and particular operations. In turn, initial respondents identified other colleagues with perspectives on the triple nexus, and experiences from the case study countries and specific projects or programmes.

Given the broad scope of the study and the limited time and resources available, the final report identifies areas that require further consideration by UNDP and UNHCR, or further research.

Unless otherwise stated, this report is based on information provided by respondents. No comments have been attributed to individuals without their permission.

## Theory of Change

A ToC can be used to understand how change happens and the contribution particular interventions can make to that change, or to understand how particular interventions bring about change (James 2013:3). There is no agreed definition or method for developing a ToC although, for programme design, it is generally understood as a process for articulating the final desired outcomes and working backwards

from the end goals to identify how they might be achieved. A ToC can be developed for use at any level from a single project to a global initiative. Developing a ToC, especially with the participation of stakeholders, can facilitate the development of a shared vision as well as critical thinking and contextual analysis to develop causal pathways that are assumed will lead to the achievement of that shared vision. A ToC can help to identify common goals, complementarities among different stakeholders and potential obstacles to implementation. Although increasingly requested by donors and prepared in conjunction with proposals, a ToC can be developed at any time to encourage analysis, evaluate interventions and reflect on the most effective ways to achieve desired outcomes (Vogel 2012; James 2013).

A ToC is based on assumptions and therefore must be tested and should be adapted over time. It is not a “magic bullet” (Vogel 2012:5) and requires time and resources including good contextual analysis. A ToC is both a process and a product, and can inspire and encourage innovation and provide a communication tool to use with external actors. It encourages analytical thinking about how change happens and can highlight the interaction of different interventions and their contribution to different causal pathways (James 2013).

## Limitations

The short time frame and constraints on working practices during the pandemic limited the potential for active participation in the development of the ToC. Many of the respondents identified by the Steering Committee were involved in responses to Covid-19 which limited their availability.

Respondents included UNDP and UNHCR staff as well as individuals from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) who have been working with UNDP and UNHCR on aspects of the HDP nexus. Other organizations that regularly partner with UNDP and UNHCR, and which may have had different perspectives, were not consulted.

This is not an evaluation. The study has focused on gathering examples of ongoing and potential opportunities for UNDP and UNHCR to collaborate and on interventions based on a triple nexus approach. Success and shortcomings of programmes and projects are noted where shared by respondents or included in documentation.

Consequently, this scoping study and the resulting ToC (UNRISD 2020) should be seen as the first steps in identifying areas of potential collaboration between UNDP and UNHCR in responses to protracted displacement based on the triple nexus. Further consultations and in-person workshops, as well as field testing with a broader set of stakeholders, would help to develop a deeper and more complex understanding of the potential for and applicability of HDP nexus approaches.

## 2. Protracted Displacement, Crises and Conflict

### 2.1 Causes of displacement

In recent years, crises and violent conflict have become increasingly complex and increasingly transnational in nature, involve a wider range of actors and have a wider-reaching negative impact than in the past. Violent conflict is the manifestation of underlying structural conditions such as poor governance, political instability, human rights violations, poverty, contested land rights and environmental degradation. Conflicts are becoming more protracted, sometimes exacerbated by climate change, and more difficult to resolve.<sup>1</sup> In 2016, more countries experienced violence than at any time

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<sup>1</sup> Stewart 2002; OECD 2020c; UNDP 2020.



in the past 30 years. This surge in violence affects both low- and middle-income countries with relatively strong institutions, and challenges assumptions that peace is the natural companion of social, economic and political progress (UN and World Bank 2018). If current trends continue, by 2030, more than half of the world's poor will be living in countries affected by high levels of violence (OECD 2015). Conflict causes not only immediate injuries and loss of life but destruction of infrastructure, livelihoods and social fabric, and has potentially long-term negative impacts on human development for future generations. For example, children who live through conflict are at risk of a lifetime of lower productivity because physical and cognitive health are damaged by poor nutrition, and education is interrupted or unaffordable as household assets and resources are depleted. "There are causal connections between educational access and income: lack of access to education, lack of education, or both, lead to fewer economic opportunities, which is correlated with low income" (UN and World Bank 2018:116). Reduced earning capacity can create or reinforce social and economic inequalities that threaten long-term stability and peace (UN and World Bank 2018:32). Conflict-induced displacement has generational effects and demonstrates the importance of interventions to meet immediate needs and to support longer-term developmental access to education and health care.

In addition to conflict, events such as economic collapse and poverty, currently occurring in Venezuela, also lead to forced displacement. In the Asia-Pacific Region, natural disasters have displaced more people than conflict in recent years.<sup>2</sup> Unplanned urban development, precipitated by rural to urban migration that can include refugee and internally displaced person (IDP) populations, is increasing competition in cities in Asia. In Afghanistan, large numbers of returnees are settling in urban areas, which poses a risk to public health during the Covid-19 pandemic. These dynamics highlight the need for disaster risk reduction (DRR) strategies, urban planning, access to public services and increased livelihood opportunities in rural areas as part of longer-term developmental responses.<sup>3</sup>

Increasingly, displacement occurs over multiple phases, and population movements are mixed and include refugees, returnees, IDPs and other forced or voluntary migrants. Individuals and groups can be displaced multiple times and their status can change depending on whether they cross international borders, return to their own countries but not to their place of origin, or transit to other countries. There are births and deaths during the journey and some displaced persons return home for brief periods to obtain legal documents or access medical and education services, as has been reported among Syrian refugees hosted in neighbouring countries. Some groups leaving Venezuela have been termed "pendular" as they are forced to leave the country regularly for a short period of time to work or purchase goods and then return home (RMRP 2020). Displaced populations can contain groups that have been displaced a different number of times, have reached their destination from multiple origins and that have different legal statuses. Mixed migration is increasing (UNDP 2019a). "It is no longer possible to speak of simple categories of countries of first asylum, transit countries and countries of settlement and/or resettlement. Many countries host populations across this whole spectrum" (ILO 2016a:para 15).

Funding patterns indicate that responses to crisis and displacement have been inadequate. OECD argues that aid is used as a "stop gap" that prolongs humanitarian need rather than addressing the root causes of crises to end them and promote sustainable development (OECD 2018b). International humanitarian funding reached a record USD 28.9 billion in 2018. This represents an increase of almost one-third since 2014, but growth is slowing and increased just 1 percent from 2017 to 2018. In 2018, UN-coordinated emergency appeals had a funding shortfall of USD 11.1 billion, meeting only 61 percent of required funding needs (Development Initiatives 2019). Although official development assistance (ODA) has remained relatively stable in recent years, since 2013 other funding from national governments and private investors has declined, resulting in a 12 percent drop in available funds from 2013 to 2015 and a further 30 percent drop from 2017 to 2018 (OECD 2018a:27). Funding trends are indicative of protracted crises. From 2000 to 2017, 27 countries had more than five consecutive years

<sup>2</sup> Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. "Displacement Data." Accessed 19 June 2020. [https://www.internal-displacement.org/#Internal\\_Displacement\\_Updates](https://www.internal-displacement.org/#Internal_Displacement_Updates).

<sup>3</sup> Email correspondence with Francisco Santos Jara-Padron, UNDP, Bangkok Regional Hub, 30 April 2020.



of UN-coordinated appeals. Humanitarian funding and ODA are increasingly being channelled into the same protracted crises (Development Initiatives 2019). Despite the recognized need to focus more funding on conflict prevention and peace building, in 2016 only 2 percent of ODA was allocated to conflict prevention and 10 percent to peace building (OECD 2018b).

## 2.2 Statistics for displaced populations

Between 2005 and 2016, the number of refugees nearly doubled and the number of IDPs increased more than fivefold (UNDP 2016; UNHCR 2017a). By the end of 2019, almost 80 million people were recorded as forcibly displaced, including refugees, asylum seekers, returnees and IDPs, as well as 4.2 million people recorded as stateless (UNHCR 2020d). According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), as a result of conflict and violence, the 41.3 million IDPs at the end of 2018 is the highest figure ever recorded (IOM 2019a:iii). As well as the increase in the size of displaced populations, the length of the displacement, and the numbers of people finding themselves in situations of protracted displacement are also increasing. In 2017, IDPs in more than 50 countries had been internally displaced for 10 years or more (OCHA 2017) and, by the end of 2019, 15.7 million refugees had been displaced for five years or more (UNHCR 2020d).

Almost 60 percent of refugees come from Syria, Afghanistan and South Sudan. Displaced Venezuelans abroad number 3.7 million (UNHCR 2020d:3). Where disaggregated data are available, males and females are almost equally represented among UNHCR's persons of concern, although there are significant variations depending on context (UNHCR 2019b:60). In South Sudan, for example, 2.2 million people—83 percent of whom are women and children—have been forced to flee to other countries and 2 million people are displaced inside the country (UNHCR 2020b). In 2020 there are 31 million displaced children, including over 17 million internally displaced, 12.7 million refugees and 1.1 million asylum seekers, many of whom have been separated from their families (UNICEF 2020).

Table 2 shows the statistics for populations of concern for UNHCR and their legal status at the end of 2019 (UNHCR, 2020d:76). UNHCR includes, among its populations of concern, groups that are not included in statistics of forcibly displaced populations. Figures for Palestinian refugees are not included in the table. They number 5.6 million people and come under the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Palestinian refugees may receive assistance from UNHCR if registered with UNRWA but forced out of UNRWA's area of operations (Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, West Bank and Gaza).

*Table 2. Forcibly Displaced Populations*

Status	Number (in millions)	Legal and Policy Framework	Description
Refugee	20.4	Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) Additional Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967)	People flee and cross an internationally recognized border in fear of persecution and in search of refuge
Asylum Seeker	4.2	Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) Additional Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967)	Asylum seekers have requested protection under refugee law and are awaiting a decision. Some receiving countries confer refugee status automatically to people from certain countries. These groups are called <i>prima facie</i> refugees
IDP	43.5	Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement	IDPs are forcibly displaced once or multiple times within their own country. IDPs become refugees if they cross an internationally recognized border

Returnees	5.7	Includes returned refugees and IDPs	Returnees may still be in need of support after return. They may not return to their place of origin and can face similar challenges to IDPs
Stateless	4.2	1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness	Stateless persons are not considered nationals of any state. Less than 50 percent of countries have data on stateless persons so the number is likely to be higher than the UNHCR-registered 4.2 million
Venezuelans displaced abroad	3.7	Cartagena Declaration  Declaration of Quito on Human Mobility of Venezuelan Citizens in the Region (regional governments' response to the crisis to coordinate and share best practice)	Persons of Venezuelan origin in need of international protection under the criteria contained in the Cartagena Declaration, but who have not applied for asylum. Regardless of status, Venezuelans displaced abroad require protection against forced returns, and access to basic services (UNHCR 2020d:76)
Population of concern to UNHCR	86.5 <sup>a</sup>		

Note: <sup>a</sup>This figure includes "others of concern" who do not necessarily fall into a category of displacement but to whom UNHCR has extended its protection on humanitarian grounds (UNHCR, 2020d: 76). IDP-internally displaced person; RoL-rule of law.

The quality of demographic data tends to be highest where UNHCR has a strong operational presence and is involved in primary data collection. Data on IDPs is particularly poor (UNHCR 2019b). Large-scale population movements take place in difficult, unstable environments impeding effective data collection. For a variety of reasons, sometimes those eligible choose not to register for assistance. Most displaced populations do not live in official camps and instead are self-settled among the host population and, as such, can be difficult to identify. Hosting states and states of origin may want to inflate or deflate figures to improve access to assistance from the international community or disguise the state of unrest in their country (Crisp 2001). In particular, governments can be reluctant to acknowledge IDPs, as they are usually the result of poor governance and RoL, and internal instability. Overall, statistics for displaced populations and affected host populations are an indication of the numbers involved and not an exact calculation.

Similarly, determining the size of protracted displaced populations is problematic. UNHCR applies the term "protracted" to refugee groups that have been displaced for five consecutive years and number over 25,000, but acknowledges that this definition has limitations (UNHCR 2020d). For example, Rohingya refugees have been hosted in Bangladesh in numbers above 25,000 since 2006, so qualify as protracted refugee groups, although the majority arrived in Bangladesh only in 2017 (UNHCR 2019b). Pendular movements of forced migration are ongoing in the Venezuela crisis over a protracted period of time, but the individuals involved are mobile and regularly crossing international borders (RMRP, 2020). IDP groups find themselves in protracted displaced situations and, in countries such as Afghanistan and Colombia, displacement can last for decades.

## 2.3 Legal and policy framework for forcibly displaced populations

UNHCR was established to respond to the needs of refugees in Europe displaced by the Second World War. It was mandated through the 1951 Refugee Convention which was modified by the 1967 Additional Protocol to remove the temporal and geographical constraints. Since then, UNHCR's role has expanded to include persons in refugee-like situations who are "outside their country or territory of

origin and who face protection risks similar to those of refugees, but for whom refugee status has, for practical and other reasons, not been ascertained” (UNHCR 2013). Displaced and protracted displaced populations include refugees, asylum seekers, IDPs, returnees, stateless persons and other groups. These populations form the persons of concern to UNHCR (UNHCR 2019b:60). Displaced populations including refugees, IDPs, migrants and vulnerable host communities are also of concern to UNDP (UNDP 2019a). The IOM, although not the focus of this report, is an important partner in situations of forced or involuntary displacement or migration.

## Refugees

The 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Additional Protocol provides protection to persons who, “in fear of persecution”, crossed an international border in search of refuge. A refugee has a right to asylum and the same rights as a citizen, including access to education and health care, as well as economic and social rights. Refugees cannot be forced to return to their country of origin. Host governments are responsible for the protection of refugees but UNHCR and other partners are mandated to provide support when necessary.

## IDPs

Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement were adopted in 1998 and include 30 standards for providing humanitarian assistance and protection during displacement, return and local integration. Although not legally binding, the guidelines state that IDPs should not be discriminated against because of their displacement, and that displacement should not occur because certain groups are discriminated against. National authorities are responsible for ensuring the rights of IDPs, but the international community should provide support when necessary. Return should be voluntary and dignified, and assistance should help IDPs recover their property and possessions. IDPs have the right to seek asylum in another country.

## Stateless persons

A stateless person “is not considered as a national by any State under operation of its law” (1954 Convention). The 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness provide the framework for the international protection of stateless persons who should have the same rights of freedom of religion and education as citizens, and be treated the same way as other non-nationals for other rights. Nevertheless, stateless persons are often denied rights to documentation, access to services, legal livelihoods and employment opportunities, and freedom of movement, creating multiple vulnerabilities. Statelessness can lead to forced displacement, and forced displacement can result in statelessness. Refugees can become stateless through lack of documentation. The presence of a stateless population can contribute to social and economic tensions (UNHCR 2017b).

UNHCR has a leading role in identifying, preventing and reducing statelessness, as well as promoting the protection of stateless persons. The Global Action Plan to End Statelessness by 2024 contains 10 action points designed to resolve existing situations of statelessness, prevent new situations of statelessness developing, and identify and protect stateless persons more effectively. By the end of May 2019, UNHCR had recorded 3.9 million stateless persons, but believes that there are at least 10 million stateless persons worldwide (UNHCR 2017b).

## Forced migrants

“At the international level, no universally accepted definition for ‘migrant’ exists” (IOM 2020). The International Convention on the Protection of Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families entered into force on 1 July 2003. “‘Migrant Worker’ refers to a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is not a national” (UNGA, 1990:part 1, article 1). The convention protects the human rights of migrants and guarantees them the same working conditions, freedoms and access to services as nationals. Migrants also have the right to maintain connections with their country of origin and to enjoy minimum levels of protection.

The convention applies to all migrants whether voluntary or forced, regular or irregular. According to IOM, forced migration is “a migratory movement which, although the drivers can be diverse, involves force, compulsion, or coercion.” There is “widespread recognition that a continuum of agency rather than a voluntary/forced dichotomy” often exists (IOM 2019b:77).

The Global Compact for Safe Orderly and Regular Migration is the first UN Global Agreement on a common approach to international migration (UN 2018b). It is not legally binding, as countries remain in control of their own immigration policies, but it stresses that migrants are entitled to the protection of their human rights. There are concerns that the compact removes the sovereignty of states to manage immigration. Nevertheless, on 10 December 2018, 164 countries formally adopted the compact. Its 23 objectives include:

- addressing the factors that lead to migration;
- reducing the vulnerabilities of migrants in their country of origin, in transit and in their final destination; and
- providing proof of legal identity.

### Regional refugee instruments

In addition to the international conventions, the African Union (AU) and Latin American States with Mexico and Panama have expanded the 1951 convention and 1967 protocol definition of refugee to a wider range of displaced populations. The 1969 Organization of African Unity, the forerunner of the AU, agreed that those fleeing violence such as a war or threats to civilian life including natural disasters, would be considered refugees. The 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees is similar to that of the AU but includes among refugees those who flee “generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order”.<sup>4</sup>

### Human rights and international humanitarian law

Human rights and international humanitarian law also provide legal protection and access to public services for displaced populations, stateless persons, returnees and host populations to access public services (UNHCR and UNDP 2020a).

## 2.4 Legal status

The framework provided by the various international and regional legal instruments and guidelines is designed to protect the rights of displaced populations. Their status is determined by the cause of displacement, the obligations and response of the host government and whether international boundaries were crossed. Refugees, migrants and IDPs are all likely to face similar abuses of their rights but refugee groups only are entitled to additional protection under international refugee law. Nevertheless, “persecution”, as it is understood legally in the 1951 Convention, does not necessarily include groups fleeing natural disaster, war, or political or economic turmoil (Chimni 2000:8). Despite the legal framework and international instruments to protect displaced populations, not all countries have acceded to them, and if they have, for a range of political and socioeconomic factors, not all countries fulfil their obligations or have accepted their terms in full. For example, State Parties to the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol often restrict access to “wage earning employment” and “freedom of movement”, which prevents access to services as well as employment (ILO 2016a). Conversely, countries that have not acceded to the protection mechanisms for displaced populations may adopt responses in the spirit of international protection mechanisms. For example, Pakistan and Iran, although

<sup>4</sup> African Union. 1969. “Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa.” <https://au.int/en/treaties/oau-convention-governing-specific-aspects-refugee-problems-africa>. 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees. [https://www.oas.org/dil/1984\\_cartagena\\_declaration\\_on\\_refugees.pdf](https://www.oas.org/dil/1984_cartagena_declaration_on_refugees.pdf).

not State Parties to the Refugee Conventions, cooperate with UNHCR on the Afghan refugees they are hosting and on arrangements for those who return to Afghanistan.

The United Nations applies international frameworks to determine the status of displaced populations. In the case of Syria, the United Nations accords refugee status to Syrians outside their country. However, Turkey has acceded to the 1951 Refugee Convention, but to only part of the 1967 Protocol, which means that it recognizes only Europeans within its borders as refugees and not those entering from non-European countries. Therefore, it has accorded Syrians the status of temporary protection and refers to them as Syrians under temporary protection. Lebanon is neither a signatory of the 1951 Refugee Convention nor the 1967 Protocol. It refers to Syrians who fled to Lebanon after March 2011 as temporarily displaced individuals and reserves “its sovereign right to determine their status according to Lebanese laws and regulations” (GoL and UN 2020:4). One of the requirements for Syrians in Lebanon is that, when they are 15 years old and above, they are required to pay a regular fee to maintain legal residency.<sup>5</sup> Consequently, only 22 percent of an estimated 1.5 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon have the legal right to live in the country. As a result, their mobility is severely impeded as they cannot pass through checkpoints (HRW 2020), which has a significant impact on their ability to work (which is already very restricted), access services and purchase goods.

Despite the extensive legal framework, how it is applied depends on the context, the political will of the hosting government or authority, governance capacity and ability to implement RoL. Without effective protection regimes, provision of assistance to displaced populations to ensure that they can access their rights is not possible.

## 2.5 Impact of displacement

### Negative impacts of displacement

Forcibly displaced populations are rarely welcomed by host governments and populations. Displaced groups are regarded as a threat to security, a further burden on usually already overstretched infrastructure and services, and additional competition for resources and income-generating opportunities. Displaced populations often arrive in large numbers over a short period of time, overwhelming the capacities of the local authorities to respond, particularly as the majority of displaced populations are hosted by middle- and low-income countries. Governments seldom want refugee or migrant populations within their borders, particularly if the situation has the potential to become protracted. Similarly, IDPs pose extra demands on local infrastructure and are indicative of internal insecurity or economic problems that a state would generally prefer to ignore and hide from the outside world (Zetter 2014).

Protracted displacement exacerbates the negative socioeconomic impacts over the long term, affecting host–displaced population relationships, especially in the poorer areas where displaced populations tend to settle. Consequently, host countries can be reluctant to promote the integration of displaced populations permanently, or even in a more sustainable manner (ILO 2016a). The nature of the impact of displaced populations depends on the context. For example, in the Middle East and North Africa, 31 percent of the population is between 15 and 25 years of age and unemployment is at 30 percent, meaning that any increase in population increases the competition for employment (CARE 2018).

Large-scale population movements cause serious environmental degradation including deforestation, soil erosion and water pollution, and increased demands on solid waste and sewerage management systems, all of which can create tensions between displaced and host populations. For example, refugee populations in South Sudan in 2012 cleared forests to create spaces for shelter and for firewood, leading to tensions between the refugees and host populations, in particular intimidation and sexual violence toward refugee women (Hutton 2012). Similarly, environmental degradation and competition for

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<sup>5</sup> Children under the age of 15 do not need to pay fees to maintain their legal residency status in Lebanon.

natural resources created refugee–host conflicts in Uganda and seem to have aggravated existing tensions over land rights among the Ugandan host population (IRRI 2019). The Lebanese authorities evicted Syrians informally settled by the Litani River in 2019 over accusations that their presence was exacerbating damage to the local environment, further polluting the river and interfering with irrigation systems in an important agricultural area (Vohra 2019).

### Resilience and self-reliance

Individuals and groups are able to respond to crises and chronic crisis through resilience and self-reliance. The Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) defines resilience as “the ability of individuals, households, communities and institutions to anticipate, withstand, recover and transform from shocks and crises” (3RP 2019d). UNHCR defines self-reliance as the social and economic ability of an individual, a household or a community to meet essential needs in a sustainable manner (UNHCR, 2005). However, multiple factors undermine the resilience and self-reliance of displaced populations. Self-reliance of refugees can be undermined by the “physical and psycho-social debilities” many carry with them into exile (Crawford and O’Callaghan 2019) which can be exacerbated by the need to rely on external assistance (Harrell-Bond 1999:143). Other forcibly displaced groups are similarly affected. In Rwanda, UNHCR noted that survivors of sexual and gender-based violence needed ongoing support and social protection, possibly indefinitely (UNHCR 2019d). Over time, rather than becoming more resilient, refugees can become more vulnerable as their physical, economic and psychological resources are depleted (Development Pathways 2018; UNICEF et al. 2019). The structure of assistance creates uneven power relations which can undermine resilience and self-reliance. Aid can create a dependency syndrome or the appearance that recipients of aid are expected to cooperate and possibly adopt a subservient role to access the assistance they need to survive.

Displacement destroys social networks, traditional family roles and disrupts daily life. “Domestic violence always increases in refugee situations and family breakdown is common” (Harrell-Bond 2000:7). Parental authority is undermined and the roles of men and women can be reversed as women often have to become the main or only provider. As they become central to the survival of the household, the status of men is undermined because they can no longer support their families (Christensen 1982; Harrell-Bond 2000). Displaced populations face discrimination and violence. Women and girls in particular are vulnerable to trafficking, sexual violence and being forced into sex work. Only a small minority of forcibly displaced persons gains access to the formal labour market, while the informal economy tends to expose people to abuse and exploitation, and child labour is routinely used (ILO 2016a). The experiences of displacement and subsequent discrimination can lead to engagement of criminality, violence and radicalization (Zetter 2014).

To survive, displaced populations often engage in negative coping mechanisms. Among Syrians in Lebanon, these include restricting food intake, particularly among adults so that children can eat; not accessing health care or buying medication; engaging in survival sex; or child labour. Incidents have been reported of refugees selling organs (Forsyth 2017). Forced marriage or early marriage helps to spread the economic costs of a household, to protect the young women from what is regarded as socially unacceptable attention from men, and to protect the young men from recruitment by militia or criminal gangs or from returning to Syria to join the army. Syrians are establishing polygamous households as an economic means of survival. One wife remains at home to look after the children and undertake domestic tasks while the other wives and the husband go out to work.<sup>6</sup>

No displaced group is homogenous, and individuals respond differently to crises at different times. Resilience is fluid and dynamic, and varies according to age, gender, household, disability, social group, religion, season and context (Chambers 1989). The coping mechanisms of displaced populations can be greater than those of their hosts, and failure to take these into account creates tensions between displaced and host populations, and exacerbates inequalities (Hutton 2012). Refugees are resourceful, capable of identifying opportunities and have often coped in the initial phases of displacement without

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<sup>6</sup> Author research among Syrians in Lebanon 2015, 2016 and 2019.

formal external assistance (Zetter 1996). Vulnerability assessments often fail to capture the nuances of vulnerabilities at the household and individual level, as well as the existence of positive coping mechanisms and resilience. The coping strategies of women, children and young people are often overlooked (Pearce and Lee 2018).

### Positive impacts of displacement

There is widespread recognition that refugees and other forcibly displaced persons also contribute to host societies by bringing skills, extensive social capital, know-how and talents that contribute to development in receiving countries (ILO 2016b). In Turkey, for example, the emerging Syrian business sector has provided access to trade with the Arabic-speaking world and, after Germany, Syrians are the second largest investors in Turkey (FRiT et al. 2018; 3RP 2019b). In Kenya's Turkana region, the Kakuma refugee camp had a permanent positive impact on the regional economy, as both employment and the gross regional product (GRP) increased by around 3 percent (Sanghi et al. 2016). This impact can be attributed to various factors, in particular the increased resources, capacities and skills the forcibly displaced population brought to the region. Campbell's (2006) study of urban Somali refugees in Nairobi demonstrates how the local economy flourished owing to the diverse range of business strategies pursued by displaced Somalis. They engaged various sectors including transportation, retail and cattle trading to sustain their livelihoods, thereby stimulating the local economy through competition and a diversification of available services. On the other hand, the influx of displaced persons also increases the demand for services and goods (Zetter 2014; ILO 2016a). An increased demand for shelter, for example, can benefit local industries related to construction, building materials and housing. Occasionally, displacement also has positive impacts on certain aspects of displaced people's lives, despite overwhelmingly negative consequences. For instance, there is evidence that access to education increased for IDPs in Colombia subsequent to their displacement (Ferris and Winthrop 2010:36). Such impacts can be attributed to the standards of international actors responding to displacement, which might be relatively high compared to the living standards of poor and marginalized people affected by displacement.

While livelihood and employment initiatives provided by humanitarian and/or development actors provide a promising starting point, Betts et al. (2019) suggest that the regulatory environment (people's right to move, work, acquire property, etc.) is the most important factor for the social and economic welfare of displaced people. Where labour market access is restricted, development strategies are less likely to be effective (ILO 2016a). Without government support, the potential of displaced people to expand markets, import skills, create transnational linkages and rejuvenate communities is likely to remain marginal.

## 3. Protracted Displacement and the HDP Nexus

*"We spend far more time and resources responding to crises rather than preventing them. People are paying too high a price ... We need a whole new approach".*

António Guterres, UN Secretary-General (10 January 2017, remarks to the Security Council)<sup>7</sup>

The growing numbers of displaced and protracted displaced populations caused by the increasing number of prolonged conflicts and crises has precipitated a renewed emphasis on comprehensive responses that combine humanitarian, development and peace activities. The 2016 New Ways of Working (NWoW) initiative called for greater humanitarian–development collaboration. Later that year, the UN Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions on Sustaining Peace stressed the need to prevent and address the root causes of conflict through integrating peace and security

<sup>7</sup> <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2017-01-10/secretary-generals-remarks-security-council-open-debate-maintenance> (accessed 19 June 2020).



interventions with humanitarian and development activities. This has come to be known as the HDP nexus, or the triple nexus. In protracted crises the HDP nexus aims to meet the immediate needs of the population, while pursuing longer-term solutions to facilitate sustainable development (IOM 2019a) and simultaneously addressing the root causes and drivers of conflict, to establish a stable and secure environment for the civilian population. To achieve this, the OECD stresses the need for “collaboration, coherence and complementarity across the respective mandates of humanitarian, development and peace actors... to promote simultaneous engagement and shared responsibility to reduce the likelihood and impact of current protracted crises” (OECD 2020c:6).

Although not new, integrating humanitarian, development and peace activities offers the potential of “greater and more sustained impact” (CARE 2018). Humanitarian assistance is not intended to address the root causes of crises such as violence, chronic poverty and vulnerability; ineffective and corrupt governance systems; and failing economic and development practices resulting in a need for ongoing assistance. However, linking humanitarian assistance to development potentially risks longer-term priorities overshadowing the immediate efforts to save lives. Conversely, protracted humanitarian assistance risks creating a dependency culture among recipients, and undermining local and national governance and social service systems. Development policy and practice focus on reducing poverty and inequality but do not necessarily address the root causes of problems to achieve transformative change (UNRISD 2016). While there is no consensus on the scope of the peace pillar of the nexus, there is a shared understanding that its role is to prevent conflict and promote stability, through addressing root causes and facilitating the achievement of a more just and equitable world.

Humanitarian and dual-mandate humanitarian and development organizations have expressed concerns that the triple nexus approach politicizes or securitizes humanitarian and developmental activities (Slim 2017). “Humanitarian action—as an endeavour intended solely to support human beings—cannot be so easily aligned with policies that are designed to correct political, social and economic injustices” (Castellarnau and Stoianova 2018 in Tronc et al. 2019). Humanitarian action is guided by the principle of “do no harm” and the humanitarian principles of “neutrality, impartiality, equality and humanity” and promotes international human rights law and international humanitarian law (IHL). Links with development and peace interventions may compromise humanitarian space, and politicize activities that are intended to be apolitical, even when implemented in highly politicized environments. Macrae argues that humanitarian organizations tend to “overclaim” this ability to deliver principled aid. Nevertheless, she supports humanitarian principles and suggests that their application in development interventions could help allocate resources more equitably (Macrae 2019:4). The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) also stresses the importance of humanitarian principles. It argues that humanitarian principles can be protected during triple nexus interventions if the protection of humanitarian space is prioritized from earliest stages of the analysis and planning processes (OECD 2020c).

State, non-state actors and international stakeholders (including donors) have different and sometimes incompatible agendas. Depending on the context, local populations may question the neutrality and impartiality of external actors collaborating on peace, security, humanitarian and development objectives. For example, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, HDP nexus approaches have been less contentious than in the highly politicized context of Afghanistan and Iraq (Koddenbrock and Büttner 2009). Donors can politicize funding: for example, in response to the Syria Crisis, donor foreign policy toward the Assad regime, Russia and Iran, is influencing funding allocations in Syria (DRC and Oxfam 2019; ICG 2019). Similarly, in Lebanon, some donors will fund only municipalities controlled by certain political parties and not others. Development interventions, particularly large-scale ones implemented by UNDP, other UN entities and IFIs, are typically implemented by national governments or in partnership with national governments. In situations of protracted crises and displacement, particularly of IDPs, national governments are often part of the problem and complicit in human rights abuses such as in Sudan under President al-Bashir. Alternatively, in crisis-affected states, national government and authorities can have limited capacity. Whatever the case, the role of the government of an affected state is unclear when adopting a nexus approach (IOM 2019a; NYU CIC 2019).



Despite the frenetic interest in the HDP nexus, there is limited independent and rigorous analysis of the added value of the HDP nexus approach (OECD 2019c) or of the causal relationships among the different elements. IOM describes two approaches to the nexus: the first emphasizes the need to identify complementarities between humanitarian and development action to harness the comparative advantage of both; the second stresses that humanitarian action should lead to developmental interventions, including the SDGs, arguing that “the distinction between humanitarian and development assistance [is] an obstacle to effective crisis response” (Pinnock 2018 in IOM 2019a). OECD DAC promotes a “joined-up” approach to the nexus which it describes as “coherent and complementary coordination, programming and financing of humanitarian, development and peace actions” (OECD 2020c: section I).

The definitions and scope of the three HDP nexus elements lack clarity. For example, there is no consensus on the scope and content of the “peace” pillar of the nexus (OECD 2019c). Within the OECD, some member states prefer what might be termed “soft peace” such as activities to promote good governance, RoL and access to justice. Others include “hard peace” interventions such as stabilization initiatives, intelligence gathering, defence and diplomacy. The European Union (EU), for example, interprets “peace” as covering activities from conflict prevention and early warning, through mediation and conflict response, to security and stabilization, and advocates integrated approaches with humanitarian and development interventions (EC 2017, 2018). The UN twin resolutions on sustaining peace define prevention as the avoidance of “the outbreak, escalation, recurrence, or continuation of violent conflicts” (UNGA 2016; UN Security Council 2016). Such a broad definition of conflict prevention would seem to demand a broad rather than a narrow understanding of the peace pillar. For international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), contributing to the peace part of the nexus usually means improving conflict sensitivity, supporting social cohesion and promoting peace building—although there is an understanding that these need to be linked to official processes. The World Bank, which partners with UNHCR and UNDP in situations of protracted displacement, regularly refers to peace building rather than peace, which suggests proactive interventions to promote peace in situations of conflict and more than just ensuring conflict-sensitive programming. Oxfam argues that the HDP nexus should be bottom-up from the community level to address the root causes of conflict (Fanning and Fullwood-Thomas 2019). This may be appropriate for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) but, for UN entities that engage at a higher level with governments and member states, there are opportunities to promote peace at multiple levels. This is particularly true of UNDP in its support for good governance, provision of technical expertise to governments to inform policy and strengthen national capacity, and technical support to UN peacekeeping and political missions.

The peace pillar for a UNDP-UNHCR HDP nexus ToC should include the range of interventions in which the agencies regularly engage. Box 1 describes the potential content of the peace pillar that could inform the development of a ToC.

Box 1. UNDP and UNHCR Peace Pillar	
Objective	Interventions
Good programming	Promoting a “do no harm” approach and mainstreaming conflict sensitivity throughout all programming is widely agreed best practice and contributes to the HDP nexus. Interventions must be based on thorough and ongoing context/conflict analysis to ensure that stakeholders understand the operating environment and how interventions may interact with the environment to minimize negative impacts and maximize positive impacts on conflict (Conflict Sensitivity Consortium 2012).
Conflict prevention	<p>Promoting social cohesion and peaceful coexistence are important elements of the GCR and the SDGs and have become regular features of interventions in situations of displacement, protracted displacement and fragility. In Lebanon, UNDP and UNHCR have established a Tension Task Force which uses mixed research methods to monitor tensions and develop responses to mitigate them.</p> <p>PVE initiatives are generally conducted in situations of displacement and fragility, and aim to address root causes, as well as provide alternatives to groups that may</p>

	<p>otherwise be attracted to extremist ideologies. For example, in Sudan, programmes to address radicalization and violent extremism are specifically linked to migration and displacement (UNDP 2019a).</p> <p>RoL, governance and access to justice are important interventions to strengthen national capacity to promote stability and security, and enable displaced populations to access their rights.</p> <p>UNDP regularly provides technical support to governments to develop DRR strategies, which help to mitigate the impact of disasters, reducing the risk of potential displacement and subsequent conflicts.</p>
Addressing conflict	<p>UNDP's engagement in SSR, DDR and technical support to UN missions (such as in Darfur) all contribute toward stability and the provision of a safe and secure environment for civilians. Such interventions also help to prevent the outbreak of conflict that can lead to population displacement.</p> <p>UNDP-UNHCR has projects with UNICEF and IOM in West Darfur to find durable solutions to displacement, and so to promote peace and stability, and ensure a peace dividend for communities.</p>

Note: DDR–disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; DRR–disaster risk reduction; GCR–Global Compact on Refugees; HDP–Humanitarian-Development-Peace; PVE–preventing violent extremism; RoL–rule of law; SDGs–Sustainable Development Goals; SSR–security sector reform.

Despite the ongoing debates about the nature, efficacy and ethics of a nexus approach, interventions into situations of humanitarian need and instability based on the double and triple nexus are not new. For decades, there has been an emphasis on bridging the relief–development gap through the promotion of double nexus programming, as well as interventions to establish good governance and stabilize regions that have combined military, peace-building and capacity-building interventions with humanitarian and development assistance (Macrae 2019).

Nexus approaches have been advocated to encourage longer-term and more sophisticated approaches to crises and situations of displacement that are usually perceived as temporary, and tend to elicit short-term, rapid responses with a focus on providing humanitarian assistance to save lives. The initial emergency phase is limited in its engagement of the target population and may be implemented with little consultation of the incumbent authorities other than to negotiate access. It is a form of crisis management, with little forward planning, resulting in missed opportunities for promoting longer-term development. Assessments to inform planning are basic and focus on collecting countable data. It is not a long-term solution and, although humanitarian interventions can become better planned and adopt more participatory approaches over time, they are not intended as long-term responses. The limitations of humanitarian assistance for displaced populations were recognized in the 1960s, and despite attempts since then to link short-term aid with medium-term development interventions (Krause and Schmidt 2019:25), a 2018 report by CARE stated that two-thirds of all humanitarian assistance is provided to long-term recipients facing protracted crises of a duration of eight years or more (CARE 2018).

Poorly conceived humanitarian interventions can do more harm than good (Anderson 1999). The failure to link relief and development interventions effectively is regularly blamed on the difficulty in securing funding to implement both humanitarian and development assistance simultaneously, as well as the tendency of entities providing assistance (whether part of the United Nations or an NGO) to have either a relief or development mandate and mentality (Crisp 2001). The divisions between humanitarian and development NGOs are highlighted by the Syria Crisis Response in Lebanon. At a workshop in Beirut in October 2016, participants from national and international organizations explained that, at the start of the Syria Crisis, the well-established civil society organizations in Lebanon were expected to shift from their focus on development interventions to providing humanitarian assistance, despite their lack of expertise in that area. They were required to fill the gap until the humanitarian organizations could be mobilized. Conversely, four years after the start of the crisis, the humanitarian organizations

identified that many needs had changed and they were under pressure to provide more development-oriented interventions, for which they felt they lacked expertise.<sup>8</sup>

While there was an overall shift in the needs of Syrian refugees from humanitarian to development support, there were (and are) Syrians completely dependent on humanitarian assistance, and others needing longer-term support through development activities. This example demonstrates CARE's assertion that linking relief and development interventions in situations of protracted displacement is complex, as cycles of relief and development are non-linear processes occurring simultaneously (CARE 2018). There is rarely a relief–development continuum, because refugee and host populations are diverse and in need of different types of support, and situations of displacement are often volatile and fluid (Gorman 1993). Afghanistan has experienced multiple conflicts in the last 40 years, displacing people multiple times. Colombia has a large IDP population as a result of the conflict between the Government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and now hosts large numbers of people displaced from Venezuela, as well as its own returnees following the economic crisis in Venezuela. Such fluid situations and changing needs demand flexibility among the international community and assistance organizations to meet the changing needs of the population.

Humanitarian interventions should be held to development standards, be seen as an opportunity to promote longer-term development and for host governments to strengthen their capacities to manage, in time, their own responses to protracted displacement and the needs of their own population without external assistance.<sup>9</sup> Despite the conceptual gaps, humanitarian relief, rehabilitation, early recovery, development, peace building and stabilization interventions are not sequential activities and, although they may not be explicitly designed to be complementary and to have mutually reinforcing goals, they are often implemented simultaneously (CARE 2018).

Although there are undoubtedly gaps impeding effective links between humanitarian, development and peace interventions, interventions under one element of the nexus often advance progress of the other elements. For example, vaccination, health and education programmes all have long-term, positive benefits for the participants (Payne 1996). Palestinians in receipt of health and education services from UNRWA had life expectancy and literacy rates among the top 1 percent of developing countries in 2000 (Brynen 2000). Infrastructure programmes are primarily perceived to be development-oriented but can also have positive outcomes for peace and social cohesion through engaging local communities in the processes of planning and implementation (Bachmann and Schouten 2018). Social protection can be supported through emergency cash transfers for forcibly displaced persons, as well as by capacity-building programmes targeting national systems (DEVCO, ECHO and NEAR 2019; O'Brien et al. 2018). The International Labour Organization (ILO) argues that strengthening the nexus between humanitarian and development assistance by facilitating access to the labour market for refugees and other forcibly displaced persons has not only long-term economic and development benefits, but also the potential to contribute to social cohesion (ILO 2016a).

### 3.1 UN engagement in the HDP nexus: Relevant concepts

Concepts such as human security and early recovery used by the United Nations in the past have been based on the premise that holistic approaches combining humanitarian, development and peace interventions would be more effective in situations of complex crisis and needs than sectoral approaches.

#### Human security

The concept of human security gained momentum through the 1994 United Nations Human Development Report, which defines human security as “freedom from fear, freedom from want” and

<sup>8</sup> Workshop facilitated by the author on behalf of the donor Swiss Solidarity and its partners; Beirut, Lebanon, October 2016.

<sup>9</sup> Harrell-Bond 1986; Anderson and Woodrow 1989; Anderson 1999.

later added “freedom to live in dignity” (UNDP 1994). It shifts the focus from state security “to the protection of individuals from a wider range of threats to their well-being and security, and by a wider range of measures and policies, from the local and community levels to the national and international arenas” (Jolly and Ray 2006:1). It recognizes the links between peace, development and human rights including civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights (Gómez and Gasper n.d.). The Human Development Report identifies seven dimensions of human security: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political (UNDP 1994). Human security is nationally owned and people-centred, comprehensive, context specific and promotes prevention-oriented responses based on analysis to understand the threats (Gómez and Gasper n.d.).

The core objective of human security approaches is to address the root causes of vulnerabilities, focus attention on emerging risks and promote early action. The United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS) argues that human security has a transformative impact and its application can, among other aspirational frameworks, help to achieve the SDGs, GCR and the Sustaining Peace Agenda (UNTFHS n.d.). A Japan International Cooperation Agency- (JICA)-funded project in Zambia has applied a human security approach in a multiagency partnership for sustainable resettlement, promoting transitioning from humanitarian to development interventions (UN Zambia 2018).

Its critics argue that human security is ill-defined and could include anything that is considered a threat to security. Consequently, it does not help to guide policies and interventions, which become broad and unfocused. Proponents argue that human security is about assuring priority freedoms so that “people can exercise choices safely and freely” and can be confident that the opportunities they have are protected (UNDP 1994:23). As with the triple nexus approach, there is concern that the human security concept confuses humanitarian and development approaches with military interventions. Furthermore, the use of the word “security” implicitly suggests military interventions, and could provoke the use of military where non-military interventions would be more appropriate (Jolly and Ray 2006).

## Early recovery

UNDP’s 2008 Early Recovery Policy promotes a triple nexus approach in situations of conflict and natural disasters, including forced displacement. It works across sectors, with multiple partners, advocating nationally owned and people-centred solutions (as does the human security approach). Early recovery is the “interface at which humanitarian, development and, possibly, peacekeeping partners co-exist and interact”. It applies development principles to humanitarian situations to ensure that recovery planning and development programming are initiated as early as possible to reduce the gap between “the end of relief and the start of longer-term recovery” (UNDP 2008:5). Early recovery aims to strengthen resilience, rebuild or strengthen local capacity, contribute to solving rather than exacerbating long-standing problems that have contributed to a crisis and support the development of measures to prevent, mitigate and recover from future crisis (UNDP 2008).

Early recovery interventions include the restoration of basic services, livelihoods, shelter, governance, security and RoL, environmental protection, and social dimensions, including the reintegration of displaced populations. The approach argues that relief and recovery are not a continuum, as vulnerable groups and affected areas recover at different rates. Relief and recovery efforts take place simultaneously, reinforcing each other. Flexibility and adaptability in programming are necessary to respond to dynamic situations.

UNDP chairs the Global Cluster for Early Recovery which comprises 31 UN and non-UN partners from the humanitarian and development communities. The Early Recovery Strategic Advisory Group (SAG) comprises ActionAid, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), IOM, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), UNDP (chair), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the World Food Programme (WFP) (UNDP 2020).

## Stabilization

Stabilization, as conceived in the wake of the events of 11 September 2001, is another example of a nexus approach, although there is no agreed definition, design or composition, and stabilization interventions are designed for each specific context.<sup>10</sup> They aim to create space in areas of violent conflict to bring about opportunities for peace building, state building and development. They are civilian led but have a military component and include humanitarian and development interventions alongside political agendas. The various elements of stabilization interventions are considered mutually reinforcing (USIP 2009; SU 2014). Stabilization in conflict settings can be driven by international actors such as in Afghanistan from 2001, or by national governments, as was the case in Colombia (Collinson et al. 2010). Stabilization initiatives are complicated to implement, involving many actors from different sectors with different agendas working in a dynamic and volatile environment.

Stabilization is also controversial as it blurs the lines between military and civilian interventions and combines humanitarian, development and political aims which may be incompatible or compromised by association with each other. Humanitarian and development actors may be reluctant or unable to be associated with stabilization initiatives, because of their mandates, or need to protect staff and participants. In Afghanistan, humanitarian actors have long complained that the provision of humanitarian assistance or implementation of quick-impact projects by the military has compromised humanitarian space. Several UN Peacekeeping Missions have a stabilization mandate and the UN Country Team (UNCT) can be wary of being associated too closely with them. The mandate of UN peacekeeping and political missions is usually to support the incumbent power, which may also be guilty of human rights abuses against the populations that humanitarian and development organizations are trying to protect and support. Therefore, humanitarian and development actors may prefer to maintain their distance from missions. For UN missions with a peacekeeping force whose aim is to promote a political agenda to establish RoL, stability and security, working alongside national governments and authorities and providing support for capacity development is essential to achieving their objective.

Stabilization “is an art, not a science” and it has to be tailored to each context (SU 2014). Short-term gains may have to be sacrificed for long-term impact, and vice versa. However, whatever the intervention—whether humanitarian, developmental, political or military—the aim is to contribute toward achieving stability. World Bank analysis suggests that a minimum of 15–20 years is needed for the fastest transforming states to move from fragility to stability. Given that it is an uncomfortable relationship between the stakeholders, the long-term commitment required to achieve stability presents ongoing challenges for the working relationships among the different sectors (World Bank 2011).

Many aspects of stabilization are the same as human security and early recovery approaches, in the attempt to combine multisector approaches to bring about longer-term objectives of state building, peace building and development. However, the focus on political solutions and the use of the military are important differences, and it is realistic to recognize that there are trade-offs among sectors and objectives to achieve the end goal.

## 3.2 HDP nexus principles for implementation

Despite the absence of a shared vision for the HDP nexus, and ongoing disagreement about whether it is a feasible approach, there is a strong consensus about the processes for implementing a triple nexus approach among organizations open to adopting a nexus approach.<sup>11</sup> Many of the recommendations below, although developed for an HDP nexus approach, are regarded as current best practice for all types of interventions among the international community.

<sup>10</sup> Stabilization initiatives have evolved and are not all conceived with a military component. For example, the UNDP 2019 Stabilization Programmes aimed at re-establishing basic services lost in a crisis: UNDP. Stabilizing countries in crisis. Accessed 29 April 2020. <https://stories.undp.org/stabilizing-countries-in-crisis>.

<sup>11</sup> CARE 2018; IOM 2019a; Oxfam 2019; OECD 2020c.

## Shared analysis and context-specific responses

- Conduct qualitative and quantitative research and analysis and collect data to develop in-depth understanding of the context to inform programming and policy; monitor and evaluate the positive and negative impacts of interventions; and identify and share lessons learned. Maintain ongoing research and analysis to facilitate the adaptation of interventions to changing situations. Analysis should inform conflict-sensitive programming and facilitate planning to prioritize humanitarian principles and protect humanitarian space.
- Conduct joint research (with the participation of impacted communities) with multiple stakeholders including UNDP, UNHCR and other humanitarian, development and peace actors:
  - to identify the root causes of displacement and potential conflict triggers between host and displaced populations; to understand the needs and vulnerabilities as well as capacities of affected host and displaced populations; to design interventions to reduce vulnerabilities and enhance capacities and maintain social cohesion and peaceful coexistence;
  - to assess national and local governance and RoL capacities, and to identify entry points to support and strengthen capacity and systems to respond in the immediate and longer term to hosting displaced populations;
  - to assess the legal identity and protection needs of displaced (and host) populations and design interventions to address legal identity and protection needs as required;
  - to undertake analysis to identify and facilitate opportunities for longer-term livelihoods and employment interventions that include analysis of the private sector, private financing, potential entry points/sectors for interventions, the capacity and potential of the displaced and host workforce and the needs of the marketplace; and
  - to develop interventions with maximum impact by ensuring that they are sensitive to each nexus pillar and mainstream cross-cutting issues as fully as possible, to avoid undermining other interventions or to miss opportunities to derive maximum benefit from each activity.
- Ensure that analysis is sensitive to gender and diversity as well as to evolving situations and to understand the needs and capacities of different demographic and social groups.
- Share context-specific analyses to foster a shared vision based on a common understanding of terminology and concepts. There is no standard HDP nexus design, as each context demands a different emphasis on each pillar and cross-cutting intervention at different times.
- Develop methods for effective monitoring, evaluation, accountability and learning (MEAL), standardized data collection and qualitative research methods, and share findings.

## Long-term strategies and sustainable capacity

- Engage in long-term planning and develop sustainable national capacity at the earliest stages possible of a forced displacement situation, which includes agreeing and working toward longer-term solutions and an exit strategy.
- Actively include all relevant stakeholders in planning and implementation processes. From the initial stages of an intervention, invest in and use national capacities at all levels, in both the public and private spheres, to minimize the creation of parallel systems and to enhance and maintain indigenous skills, expertise and resources.
- Prioritize working with and funding local partners including civil society; remove bureaucratic barriers to effective working partnerships and promote best practices.
- Promote respect for humanitarian principles, IHL and human rights law, which could include strengthening national capacities for good governance, RoL, security and access to justice, to improve legal identity and protection for displaced (and host) populations.

## Prevention, mediation and peace building

- Conduct ongoing conflict analysis to ensure that humanitarian, development and peace interventions are conflict sensitive and do no harm.

- Engage politically at all levels—international, regional and national—and at all administrative levels in a country to prevent displacement and resolve situations of protracted displacement.
- Develop and support indigenous capacities and mechanisms to prevent crises, resolve conflict and build peace.
- Actively include and address the needs of marginalized groups and mitigate tensions between host and displaced populations.
- Undertake advocacy with host governments and populations, and displaced populations, to explain the benefits of adopting longer-term policies toward displacement.
- Incentivize development and peace actors to address structural causes of displacement/protracted displacement so that humanitarian aid can be reduced.

### Coordination and leadership

- Use existing or establish effective and appropriate coordination mechanisms at all levels and across the nexus to facilitate joined-up programming among UNDP, UNHCR and other stakeholders. Avoid creating multiple and duplicate systems although, to protect humanitarian space, a separate coordination mechanism may be necessary.
- Plan joined-up interventions, and identify collective outcomes and the organizations that have the mandate, expertise, comparative advantage and access to funding to contribute to those collective outcomes. Actively involve national and local actors in analysis and planning.
- Recognize and support the leadership of legitimate formal and informal national authorities at all levels.
- Identify and liaise with legitimate leadership and governance structures, and RoL institutions, for the displaced populations.
- Adopt a regional approach, where appropriate, to address regional issues including triggers for and drivers of conflict and displacement, vulnerabilities and capacities for humanitarian, development and peace responses.

### Financing

- Conduct advocacy with donors to explain the rationale for adopting longer-term approaches to displacement based on an HDP nexus approach to encourage the provision of adequate, flexible and multiyear funding, and justify potentially higher funding needs to transition from humanitarian to development interventions.
- Share funding with the most appropriate implementing partners.
- Ensure that funding mechanisms are transparent and accountable.
- Identify and develop mechanisms to strengthen national budgets and national funding of services.

## 4. UNDP-UNHCR Nexus Interventions: Case Studies

This section reviews a few examples of joint UNDP-UNHCR interventions into situations of protracted displacement that are based on the HDP nexus premise. They provide insights into how a model ToC could be developed to inform UNDP-UNHCR country-level programming. They have been chosen to illustrate the range of interventions that may be found in a triple nexus approach and also to highlight different operating contexts for protracted displacement.

### 4.1 Syria Crisis Response

The ongoing Syria Crisis Response led by UNDP and UNHCR is their largest collaboration to date. Launched in 2015, the Syria 3RP has been rolled out in five countries: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. The 3RP has interventions in protection, food security, education, health, basic needs, shelter, WASH (water, sanitation and hygiene), livelihoods and social cohesion, although the exact



compositions of the sectoral interventions vary from one 3RP country to another. It links humanitarian and development assistance in each sector under what is termed refugee and resilience response. UNHCR leads the refugee response and UNDP the resilience response. In addition, there are also significant peace components including governance, RoL, access to justice and social cohesion programmes. UNDP and UNHCR respondents for this report note that the 3RP has been more effective in some countries than in others and believe that the strongest collaboration between the two agencies is found in Lebanon.

## 4.2 Lebanon

### Refugee status

Lebanon hosts an estimated 1.5 million Syrian refugees and 18,000 refugees from Ethiopia, Iraq, Sudan and other countries (UNHCR 2020c) as well as the 475,000 Palestinian refugees officially registered with UNRWA (UNRWA 2019). These Palestinians, who may number less than half the official UNRWA figure (LPDC 2018; UNRWA 2019), are Palestine Refugees in Lebanon (PRL) and differ from the approximately 29,000 Palestine Refugees from Syria (PRS) who are now in Lebanon (UNRWA, 2018). UNRWA in Lebanon has extended its services to PRS so they do not come under UNHCR's mandate.

Under Lebanese law, Syrians are not considered refugees but temporarily displaced persons. The border with Syria has been closed to civilians without visas since 2015, although people are still crossing the border illegally.<sup>12</sup> It is difficult for refugees already in the country to renew their legal stay; consequently, it is estimated that only 22 percent of the 1.5 million Syrians aged above 15 years in Lebanon have the right to remain. This means that they are at risk of arrest, detention and refoulement and cannot easily cross the checkpoints that are found throughout Lebanon. Without mobility, refugees struggle to access services, including health and education; they cannot easily complete legal processes such as registering a birth; and livelihoods opportunities are limited so they cannot meet their basic needs (Janmyr 2016; UNICEF et al. 2019; HRW 2020). The expense of residency permits means that households are forced to make choices. If a household can afford a permit, it tends to purchase one for the main income generator (often the man) so he can cross checkpoints to access paid work. Households without a legally registered member often use women and children to cross checkpoints because they are less likely to be stopped.

The Lebanese Government has forbidden the creation of official camps for refugees from Syria. Refugees are scattered throughout the country in informal tented settlements (ITS), private accommodation, official Palestinian refugee camps and Palestinian settlements. Fifty-seven percent of Syrians live in overcrowded shelters that are often in danger of collapse and below humanitarian standards (UNICEF et al. 2019:11). The ITS have limited access to water and electricity, and the tents provide little protection against the heat of summer and the cold and wet of winter. The largest number of ITS, sheltering around one-third of the Syrian refugee population, are found in the Beqa'a Valley where the weather conditions are harsh (HRW 2020). Inhabitants have, therefore, replaced the tents with more robust concrete shelters. However, this construction is prohibited, and the Lebanese authorities have forced inhabitants to destroy their dwellings (NRC 2020). Although food security has improved among Syrian refugees, one-quarter of households have a poor diet. The situation is better among households headed by a male rather than by a female (UNICEF et al. 2019 :11). Tap water in Lebanon is not drinkable so people must buy treated or bottled mineral water. Basic health care costs are subsidized by UNHCR and UNRWA, and a range of national and international NGOs and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) provide health care to vulnerable groups. Lebanese and UNRWA schools operate a double shift system to accommodate children from Syria. Usually children from Lebanon attend school in the morning and those from Syria in the afternoon: this division does not facilitate social integration. In 2019, 69 percent of Syrian children between the ages of 6 and

<sup>12</sup> Author interviews, Beirut, Lebanon, September 2019.



14 attended school, and 22 percent between the ages of 15 and 17. Sixty-six percent of youth aged between 15 and 24 were not in education, training or employment (UNICEF et al. 2019).

With the exception of refuse collection, agriculture, construction and domestic cleaning, it is illegal for refugees to work in Lebanon. Many refugees work illegally, particularly in the service sector, and accept poor wages and conditions. In 2019, around 38 percent of Syrian refugees had some form of employment (66 percent among men and 11 percent among women). In 2020, the construction and services sector was hit by restrictions aimed at controlling the spread of Covid-19. Syrian economic vulnerabilities are increasing because of the limited work opportunities. Data show that average monthly per capita expenditure decreased from USD 111 in 2018 to USD 105 in 2019. Syrians rely heavily on assistance from the WFP, borrowing from friends and using credit in shops. In 2019, the average level of debt per Syrian household was USD 1,115. The main reasons for borrowing are food, rent and health care, which shows that households cannot meet their basic needs (UNICEF et al. 2019:11–12).

### UNDP-UNHCR response

The operating environment in Lebanon is challenging for UNDP, UNHCR and other organizations providing much-needed assistance to refugee groups. Both agencies state that strong working relationships between them have facilitated their response. UNDP was already well established in Lebanon before the Syria Crisis and was able to support UNHCR until UNHCR could scale up its own response. In the meantime, UNHCR channelled funds through UNDP.

The 3RP is implemented under the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP), deliberately named to demonstrate that it is a response to the host as well as to the refugee population. Although it links humanitarian and development assistance, respondents noted that it is a medium-term rather than a long-term plan. UNHCR has appointed a senior development officer (SDO) to coordinate with the development sector and maximize the development impact of its own interventions. Both UNDP and UNHCR liaise with the Ministry of Social Affairs.

There is need for governance support and capacity building to enable municipalities to respond to the refugee populations. UNDP has been able to provide that support, as well as implement RoL projects that have provided training to the security services on human rights and the rights of refugees. UNDP is also rolling-out an “access to justice” project which has a specific component to include refugees.

The Prospect initiative set up by The Netherlands includes UNHCR as well as development actors. It aims to improve education, protection and employment opportunities for refugees and to strengthen the resilience of the host communities.<sup>13</sup>

UNDP and UNHCR are also working with the Ministry of the Environment in an effort to mitigate the impact of refugees on the environment and improve environmental management in Lebanon.

### Social stability, Lebanon

Social stability and conflict sensitivity are important elements of the LCRP and, since 2011, UNDP has implemented a parallel Lebanon host-support programme also aimed at maintaining social stability. Social development centres were established at the start of the Syria Crisis, and these provide services to host and refugee population. Both UNHCR and UNDP use these centres as a means of liaising with local officials and identifying needs and potential entry points for initiatives.

Nevertheless, there are social tensions among the Lebanese as well as between the Lebanese and the refugees, and these are exacerbated by poor economic conditions and high unemployment. In 2019 there were public protests against Syrians working and, since October 2019, there have been protests against the government. There are tensions among the different refugee groups, PRL, PRS and Syrian

<sup>13</sup> <https://www.dutchdevelopmentresults.nl/theme/prospects-for-refugees-and-migration-cooperation>.

refugees, who often live in close proximity to each other. Each of these groups is accorded a different legal status and has access to different types of assistance. The different levels of protection and access to services causes tensions among the different refugee groups and programming challenges for implementing organizations (Mahmoud and Roberts, 2018).

Through the Tension Task Force, UNDP and UNHCR conduct joint research to monitor tensions at the community level and, through programming, implement measures to mitigate against these tensions and help to promote social stability. The research is based on information collected in numerous ways including:

- perception surveys;
- social media analysis; and
- immersion research to provide more in-depth insights into tensions.

The initial assessment of tensions based on analysis of social media content was published in February 2019 (UNDP 2019b). The aim is to build a platform to monitor tensions through social media.

The responses in Lebanon demonstrate UNDP and UNHCR collaboration at the national and local levels on a range of thematic interventions. These fall under the different nexus pillars to provide a holistic response in a complex operating environment.

### 4.3 Turkey

Turkey is another 3RP country. It is referenced here to highlight inclusion of refugees into national systems; transition from assistance to self-reliance; and interventions that protect the environment as well as benefiting host and refugee populations.

#### Emergency social safety net

Under the 3RP in Turkey, and in cooperation with the Government of Turkey, the Basic Needs Sector led by UNHCR and WFP is working with the Livelihoods Sector led by UNDP to explore ways in which Syrians receiving cash payments through the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) can transition to formal employment and be in a position to support themselves. This is regarded as a move from a refugee response to a resilience response (FRiT et al. 2018). There are challenges in initiating the transition, as Syrians legally employed and in receipt of the minimum wage are not entitled to ESSN, so many would rather work informally to supplement their cash assistance and continue to access free health care to which they are entitled under the ESSN scheme. Syrians are also concerned that without the ESSN status they are less likely to be resettled in a third country, which is the long-term preference of many of them. The ESSN scheme is funded by the EU but it is administered by the Ministry of Family and Social Policy (MoFSP) with the support of the Turkish Red Crescent (TRC) and WFP (3RP 2019a).

#### Waste management, Turkey

The influx of Syrians into the municipalities of southeastern Anatolia increased the size of the population by 15–20 percent. The increased pressure on services had the potential to create tensions between the host and Syrian populations. Lack of adequate waste management capacity was a particular problem and posed a threat to public health and the environment. Under the 3RP for Turkey, municipalities wanted to adopt a development rather than a humanitarian response, benefit the host and Syrian populations simultaneously and try to contribute to social cohesion and resilience. UNDP already had strong working relationships with municipalities and, among other donors, was identified by the EU as a means to channel funds to support municipal services (3RP 2019b).

Municipalities began implementing and expediting existing long-term plans for increasing the capacity of their solid waste management services to accommodate natural population growth. UNDP provided

technical advice and supported capacity enhancement and procurement processes. Technical support included advice on the use of environmentally sustainable and sensitive waste management processes (3RP 2019b).

## 4.4 Colombia

### Regional RMRP for refugees and migrants from Venezuela

As of October 2019, there were more than 4.5 million Venezuelan refugees and migrants fleeing economic crisis, hyperinflation, political instability, a rising crime rate and food insecurity. If trends continue, it is estimated that the number of refugees and migrants from Venezuela recorded in countries across Latin America and the Caribbean will reach 5.5 million by the end of 2020, compared with 140,000 in 2015.

Colombia is one of the 17 countries in which IOM and UNHCR are leading the roll-out of the Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan (RMRP) for refugees and migrants from Venezuela. Launched in November 2019, the RMRP is designed to address the humanitarian, protection and socioeconomic integration needs of those affected by displacement from Venezuela. It is developed in the field in consultation with governments, civil society, faith-based organizations, local communities and donors. UNDP co-leads the subgroup for socioeconomic integration with IOM. By April 2020, the RMRP had received only 3 percent of requested funds (UNHCR-IOM 2020).

Colombia ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention in 1961, acceded to the 1967 Protocol in 1980, signed the regional Cartagena Declaration on Refugees on 22 November 1984 and agreed the Quito Declaration in September 2018. Colombia has received over 50 percent of the refugees and migrants from Venezuela. Some of those remain in the country and others are in transit. UNHCR planning figures for 2020 estimate that Colombia is hosting 1.4 million Venezuelan refugees and migrants, 7.9 million IDPs and 500,000 Colombian returnees from Venezuela (UNHCR 2019f). Many have settled along the border and in urban centres including those areas affected by conflict. Some Venezuelans in Colombia are described as pendular as they make temporary and repeated movements between their country of origin and a neighbouring country (RMRP 2020).

Despite the Colombian Government's recognition of the legal framework for refugees, it has responded to migrants from Venezuela, including Colombian returnees, as a single group. The government has regularized the presence of migrants from Colombia, and the registration process is free and possible even without a passport. It provides access to schools, health care and the right to work without the need for a work permit, although employment opportunities are limited. The government response has provided an operational context for innovative and comprehensive responses from UNHCR, UNDP and partners.

UNDP reports a strong working relationship with UNHCR in Colombia and is supporting all migrant groups entering from Venezuela, including Colombian returnees, host communities, victims of the conflict and former combatants by:

- strengthening national and local capacities to help the government develop a socioeconomic strategy for integration of migrants from Venezuela. UNDP is also working with the border management authorities to strengthen their capacity to respond to the influx of people through the borders;
- developing livelihood opportunities, particularly in the border areas where there are few opportunities, through entrepreneurship programmes, job creation in partnership with local businesses and temporary work opportunities; and
- promoting social cohesion through voluntary or cash for work programmes in which migrants undertake public works, and joint musical events for the different population groups.

## Transitional Solutions Initiative (TSI), Colombia

The TSI, implemented jointly in Colombia by UNDP, UNHCR and the World Bank between 2012 and 2015, was based on the conviction that “displacement is not just a humanitarian issue” as “displaced persons have developmental needs which cannot be realized with short term humanitarian assistance only” (UNDP et al. 2010). The TSI was designed to address the violence and conflict preventing civilian populations from achieving stability, peace and long-term sustainable development and to put displacement on the agenda of the Government and donors.

The areas identified for intervention had basic levels of security, and were trying to deal with processes of return, relocation and local urban integration, but had limited community organizational presence. Action plans were developed by “Promotion Committees” in which the community, municipal authorities and other entities were represented. There were three main areas of focus:

- enhancement of living conditions through access to land, housing, basic services (waterworks, electricity, sewer, education and health) and local economic development;
- strengthening community organizations and local public entities to assume leadership in the search for sustainable solutions; and
- protection of security, integrity, freedom and dignity, and rights of the victims to the truth, justice and reparations (Econometría 2016).

Although UNDP had significant funding shortfalls (discussed in chapter 6: Financing the Nexus) the initiative is regarded as a successful example of UNDP-UNHCR collaboration and of effective communication and coordination between UN entities and national and municipal authorities. The impacts of the programme were also positive. Participants saw the TSI as a process rather than a project, so communities continued to establish longer-term actions after the end of the official project period. For example, community groups and platforms were formalized, which illustrates that social infrastructure was perceived as a crucial factor regarding sustainability. There was a move toward finding sustainable solutions for displaced populations. Four characteristics were regarded as important for the success of the programme:

- the profile of communities was raised among authorities, and public and private institutions, which helped to mobilize efforts and generate commitments and concrete actions;
- community and institutional capacities were strengthened, including those of women and youth;
- legal access to land was facilitated local urban integration; and
- TSI projects were tailored to each context to respond to local needs.

## Improving durable solutions and peace building through Human Security Business Partnerships in post-Peace Agreement Colombia

“Improving durable solutions and peacebuilding through Human Security Business Partnerships in post-Peace Agreement Colombia” is a project developed jointly by UNDP and UNHCR in consultation with the Government at all levels as well as local partners and communities. It draws on the lessons learned from the TSI programme and capitalizes on the positive working relations that exist between the two agencies and with Government entities and local populations. It also attempts to leverage the private sector through the Human Security Business Framework to address a range of human security issues; work toward the SDGs; improve relationships among the private sector, government and population; address issues of stability and social cohesion; and support both victims of the conflict and the Peace Agreement.

The Human Security Programme seeks solutions for displaced populations including IDPs, refugees, asylum seekers and other persons in need of international protection. It is recognized that unresolved displacement and lack of real opportunities for those groups negatively affects stability and peace, and can reignite tensions. To generate social equity and promote reconciliation, the programme includes displaced and host populations, former combatants (to help support reintegration processes) and victims

of the conflict, and ensures that interventions are appropriate for different genders, ages and ethnic groups.

This joint intervention focuses on five municipalities that have been heavily affected by the armed conflict; host a substantial number of displaced persons; are in the process of reintegrating former combatants; have low levels of formal employment; and have high levels of insecurity, inequality and poverty (and in some areas high levels of organized crime related to the drugs trade). The programme is sensitive to ongoing peace processes and aims to consolidate peace in the prioritized areas and to promote peace in adjacent areas (UNDP and UNHCR 2018).

Specific activities include:

- working with the private sector to encourage it to support community needs, conduct local national and international value chain analysis and identify opportunities to access markets;
- strengthen links among the people, state institutions and the private sector to improve oversight and accountability;
- strengthen formal and informal institutions to improve access to justice and address sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV); and
- initiate small-scale infrastructure projects.

#### 4.5 Malawi

The Government of Malawi (GoM) operates an encampment policy for refugees. It hosts over 44,000 refugees and asylum seekers from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi and Rwanda in Dzaleka refugee camp outside the capital, Lilongwe. The camp, intended for 10,000 people only, is overcrowded. About 90 percent of the camp inhabitants rely on food assistance from WFP, and 96 percent of refugees and asylum seekers live below the moderate- to ultra-poverty line (UNHCR 2019h). As a result of the encampment policy, livelihood opportunities are limited. There are livelihood interventions that are designed for 60 percent refugee and asylum seeker participation and 40 percent host community participation. The health care centre in the camp is provided by the Ministry of Health and is open to camp inhabitants and the local host population. More than 5,500 refugees and asylum seekers are enrolled in education programmes offered by a range of organizations in Dzaleka refugee camp, including government-employed teachers, although refugees cannot access education outside the camp. The refugees follow the national curriculum and have been provided with the same remote access to education during the Covid-19 pandemic as the host population.

The Malawi Government took over registration, collection and control of refugee data from UNHCR in 2019. The National Registration Bureau (NRB) has been working with UNDP on a mass-registration project for its citizens. In collaboration with UNHCR, it has been agreed to register and provide ID cards to all refugees over the age of 16 through a similar process. It is anticipated that this will strengthen the legal framework for refugees, and improve access to banking facilities and other services, including 200 work permits to refugees with skills. UNDP is providing technical support for the registration of refugees. It anticipates that some refugees will already be registered as citizens. In these cases, there is an official adjudication process. The June 2020 elections and the Covid-19 pandemic have delayed the roll-out of this project.

Refugees are included in the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and the government's Malawi Growth and Development Strategy 2017–2022. The Government of Malawi (GoM) made pledges at the GRF in December 2019 in line with the “no one left behind” mandate of the 2030 agenda and has developed a CRRF. The aim is to reduce parallel services for education, health, water, sanitation and livelihoods. Although UNHCR has for a decade been advocating for more open policies toward refugees in Malawi, little progress has been made.

## 4.6 Afghanistan

The ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan, which span four decades, have caused waves of refugees, economic migrants and IDPs. As conflict is ongoing there are new waves of IDPs and refugees as well as large-scale return of refugees.

### Support Afghanistan livelihoods and mobility

The Support Afghanistan Livelihoods and Mobility (SALAM) project has been implemented from January 2017 and is due to end in December 2021 (UNDP 2017, 2020b, 2020c). It contributes to the UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF) and Country Development Plan (CDP) and is aligned with Government employment and migration strategies, SDG 1 to end poverty and SDG 7 to ensure access to affordable and clean energy. It is the joint initiative of UNDP, UNHCR, ILO and the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled (MoLSAMD). SALAM is designed to:

- support the Afghan Government to develop an integrated national and subnational policy and institutions for promoting livelihoods during protracted conflict and crises, and in particular is aimed to support IDPs, returnees and host communities including women and youth;
- work with the private sector to strengthen its capacity and create new employment opportunities;
- support safer and more productive international labour migration for those who choose to leave Afghanistan, through the establishment of formalized institutional structures and initiatives that help identify regular opportunities for international migration;
- provide a combination of short-term relief and promote longer-term self-sufficiency to meet the complex needs of displaced populations and those affected by chronic crises;
- raise public awareness of local and international employment opportunities; and
- strengthen Afghan labour skill sets through vocational and educational training.

### Mapping Afghan Refugees' and Returnees' Journey from Pakistan to Afghanistan

The joint UNDP-UNHCR research project, “Mapping Afghan Refugees' and Returnees' Journey from Pakistan to Afghanistan”, uses a methodology called SenseMaker®. It is intended to provide complex insights into people's lives by using narrative-based methods that allow respondents to analyse their own experiences. The project is designed to gather qualitative information that provides in-depth insights into the highly mobile populations of Afghanistan, and to understand their needs and expectations to develop more effective interventions. Such research projects providing complex analysis are rare, although many respondents stressed the need for similar initiatives to provide better understanding of the operating contexts and the needs of displaced populations and their hosts.

## 4.7 Conclusion

This handful of examples from five countries shows how UNDP-UNHCR interventions in response to protracted displacement combine elements of the different HDP nexus pillars to address basic needs, pursue longer-term solutions, improve governance and RoL, and tackle root causes of tensions. The larger-scale interventions have been developed to respond to a variety of different issues. For example, in Colombia, the Human Security Business Partnership project, while aiming to engage the private sector, includes reintegration of combatants and efforts to address SGBV.

The examples also illustrate the different operating contexts and legal frameworks for displaced populations and how UNDP and UNHCR must adapt their interventions to levels of permissiveness. The contexts illustrate that host and displaced populations can benefit from the same interventions, such as the waste management project in Turkey. This is important, because current best practice promotes the adoption of equitable approaches aimed at supporting both displaced and host populations, to help prevent tensions from developing between them. However, this is impossible when appropriate funding



is unavailable for host populations, as is the case for Palestinians in Lebanon who are effectively the hosts for refugees from Syria.

## 5. Pursuing a Nexus Approach: UN Frameworks and Strategies

The UN Secretary-General's Reform Agenda, the GCR, the CRRF and the SDGs are underpinned by the triple nexus and advocate for holistic responses that share responsibilities throughout the international community with host countries to support displaced populations. Equal weight is given, and subsequent relevant support, to the needs of the host country governments and populations. Importance is attached to preventing future displacements as well as responding effectively to and identifying solutions for current situations of displacement.

This section examines the framework for triple nexus responses to situations of displacement, and to preventing displacement, as well as UNDP and UNHCR strategies that align with the framework.

### UN reform: Structural changes

The Secretary-General's Reform Agenda aims to increase the UN's "influence, coherence and impact at country level" and decentralize decision making (UNHCR 2019a:11). Changes have been made to UN structures and procedures to break down barriers between relief, development and peace interventions. The resident coordinator system has been strengthened so that post holders lead a strategic process to which all UN agencies with programmes, both resident and non-resident, are required to contribute (UNHCR 2019a:2). The common country analysis (CCA) has been redesigned to bring together different UN entities with national and international stakeholders to inform the UNDAF or the new UNSDCF. UNHCR is committed to engaging in the UNSDCF and one of the motivations for doing this is to bridge the gap with the Humanitarian Response Plans (HRPs). The UNSDCF signals a move from the United Nations "assisting" national governments to engaging with national development plans (NDPs). Collective outcomes are being established through the UNDAF/UNSDCF. The HRPs will continue to be used in many contexts but some humanitarian work is also being incorporated into UNDAFs/UNSDCFs.

UNHCR has devolved more decision making to the regional levels by moving its regional offices from Geneva to regional centres throughout the world. It is strengthening its expertise at the regional level through technical advisors, including the recruitment of SDOs to facilitate links between humanitarian and development operations and stakeholders.

UNDP is recruiting HDP nexus advisors to work at the regional level and, together, UNDP and UNHCR are developing joint strategies for thematic and operations areas.

### SDGs

The 17 SDGs with their 169 targets are mutually reinforcing, "integrated and indivisible" and promote sustainable development through "economic, social and environmental" action. The SDGs are designed to bring transformative change to build inclusive, peaceful and just societies; eradicate poverty; and protect human rights, and to tackle global challenges including displacement (UNRISD 2016), recognizing and enhancing the contribution human mobility can make to sustainable development (UNDP 2020d). They aim to "reach the furthest behind first" and to "leave no one behind" which includes displaced and marginalized populations. The SDGs implicitly promote a nexus approach and provide an overarching framework for addressing protracted crises as well as having the potential to contribute to the prevention of crises. Both UNDP and UNHCR have committed to specific SDGs in their responses to displaced populations (UNHCR 2020a, UNDP 2019a) (see annex 8.4). The OECD

acknowledges the inextricable link between the achievement of the SDGs and ongoing crises and conflict and stresses that increased humanitarian need caused by conflict and crises could undermine the achievement of the SDGs (OECD 2020c:6).

### New York Declaration on Refugees and Migrants

In response to the increasing numbers of refugee and migrant populations, in September 2016 the United Nations General Assembly agreed on the New York Declaration on Refugees and Migrants. Member States committed:

- to adhere to the international human rights law, IHL and the international protection regime for refugees;
- to share responsibility for refugee populations with host States;
- to improve and fund emergency responses and support their transition to sustainable approaches for both refugees and host populations;
- to provide additional and predictable humanitarian and development funding and support; and
- to increase admission, including resettlement of refugees in third countries.

The remaining commitments included pledges to develop comprehensive responses to large-scale refugee movements that laid the foundations for the development of the CRRF and to adopt a GCR.

### CRRF

The CRRF, regarded as contributing to the NWoW, aims to address the needs of refugees and their hosts jointly, and to respond to immediate as well as ongoing needs by supporting host States, enhancing refugee self-reliance, expanding third-country solutions and supporting conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity. The CRRF promotes:

- engagement with multiple stakeholders including the refugees, national and local authorities, international and regional organizations, IFIs, civil society and the private sector; and
- a comprehensive approach that includes UN refugee operational plans and funding appeals, links humanitarian and development interventions, and local service provision for both refugee and host population to promote their resilience and reduce aid dependency.

### GCR

The 2018 GCR includes the CRRF (adopted in annex 1 of the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants) as an integral part, complemented by a Programme of Action (UN 2018c). Experiences made during the state-led roll-out of the CRRF in 15 countries in 2016–2018 have informed preparations for the GCR alongside broad multistakeholder consultations held in Geneva.

The GCR is not legally binding, but states that have adopted the convention commit to four key objectives:

- to ease the pressures on host countries;
- to enhance refugee self-reliance;
- to expand access to third-country solutions; and
- to support conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity.

Through the New York Declaration, UNHCR is mandated to implement the CRRF and has initiated comprehensive refugee responses (CRR) in countries with large-scale refugee populations.

## 5.1 Solutions

### Durable solutions

Traditionally, durable solutions for refugees have involved:



- return to country of origin;
- permanent settlement in the hosting country; or
- permanent resettlement in a third country.

In developed countries, resettlement opportunities have decreased. For example, in 2017, the United States agreed to take in 110,000 refugees; in 2018 this was reduced to 45,000 and in 2019 it was reduced to 30,000 (Romero 2019).

Returning refugees to their country of origin and returning IDPs to their place of origin should be led by national governments, but UNHCR, UNDP and other UN entities have important support roles. UNHCR coordinates responses and provides technical support to identify durable solutions and protection for returnees, as well as humanitarian assistance that should be linked to a development response. UNDP is responsible for developing medium- to long-term solutions and ensuring the needs of returning populations are included in development plans (UNDP, UNHCR, GCER and GPC 2016).

### Intermediate solutions: Complementary Pathways

Durable solutions for refugees are becoming elusive, so alternative solutions that provide longer-term stability are being identified. Complementary Pathways have been developed in response to the New York Declaration on Refugees and Migrants and the GCR which stated the need to identify intermediate solutions for refugees. UNHCR, in cooperation with government and non-government stakeholders, has developed the following Complementary Pathways:

- Humanitarian Admissions Programmes to provide international protection to individuals in a third country;
- Community Sponsorship of Refugees provided by individuals or groups to newly arrived refugees to support their integration into a third country;
- Humanitarian Visas for individuals in need of international protection to a third country from which they can apply for asylum;
- Family Reunification;
- Labour Mobility Schemes to provide employment opportunities with the right to either permanent or temporary residence; and
- Education Programmes including scholarships, training and apprenticeship schemes.

Using public information, refugees can identify their own Complementary Pathways and access them without the help of humanitarian actors (OECD and UNHCR 2018; UNHCR n.d.(b)).

ILO suggests that labour mobility pathways matching labour market needs with the skills of refugees and forcibly displaced groups could provide a fourth durable solution in some instances, and temporary employment opportunities in others. Such programmes should be implemented in accordance with human rights law and protection mechanisms (ILO 2016a:27).

### Inclusion into national systems: Local solutions

Local solutions are context specific and governments differ in their willingness to provide longer-term solutions for the refugees they are hosting. “Pursuing local integration and other local solutions for refugees in their country of asylum is a gradual process.” The aim is to enable refugees “to pursue sustainable livelihoods, contribute to the social and economic life of the host country, and live among the host population without discrimination or exploitation. The process may lead to permanent residence rights, long term legal stay with predictable renewal, and, in some cases, the acquisition of citizenship in the country of asylum” (GRF-UNHCR n.d.).

UNHCR is pursuing methods of transitioning displaced populations from parallel humanitarian systems to inclusion into national systems, by working with development and peace actors, to create longer-term solutions to situations of protracted displacement and ongoing waves of displacement. Once included in national systems, the international community may continue to provide full or partial

funding for the displaced populations, or the host government may assume some or all of the costs. Extensive context analysis is necessary to determine what transition from humanitarian to national systems is possible (UNHCR 2019g). Capacity strengthening of national systems to provide services, good governance and effective RoL is also necessary, to enable host governments to meet the needs of the population and guarantee their rights. Governance and RoL are essential to prevent and resolve forced displacement and statelessness (UNHCR and UNDP 2020a).

A UNHCR draft concept note describes the process for inclusion of refugees into national systems, but it could be applied to other displaced groups and various sectoral responses (UNHCR 2019g).

- *Parallel*: internationally supported humanitarian care and maintenance operations are completely parallel to the national system with no transitioning elements.
- *Alignment*: features compatible with national systems are built into humanitarian activities such as service/transfer delivery parameters and monetization of assistance, but displaced populations are not linked to the national system.
- *Harmonization*: common features and procedures cover both displaced and host families (assessment, targeting, services, delivery system, monitoring systems) leading to common programmes supported by common donor funds. However, displaced populations are not covered directly by national systems, and resourcing is covered by international actors.
- *Inclusion*: displaced populations are covered by the national system as part of a time-bound or permanent solution to displacement, partially or completely financed by the government.

As described, the transition process is aspirational. It is unlikely to be possible, or perhaps necessary, to follow the transition process across all types of interventions and the HDP nexus pillars simultaneously and at the same speed. Achieving inclusion of displaced populations into national systems will be easier in some areas than in others. The progress will be context specific, depending on the needs of the displaced and host populations, and the willingness of national and local authorities to include displaced populations into their systems.

## 5.2 UNDP and UNHCR strategic response

### UNDP-UNHCR collaboration

Collaboration between the two entities is not new and past initiatives to address forced displacement include programmes in the 1980s and 1990s, largely regarded as successful, to support refugees and IDPs in Latin America and Asia to return home. The 2010 TSI and the 2014 Solutions Alliance, in which UNDP and UNHCR were both involved, are generally perceived as less successful than earlier collaborations, although the evaluation of the TSI in Colombia presents a relatively positive picture. The ongoing Syria Crisis Response is the largest collaboration to date.<sup>14</sup>

UNDP-UNHCR collaboration can take different forms from joint programming to joint planning or developing complementary initiatives, coordination, sharing technical expertise, sharing funding or acting together in resource mobilization, engaging in joint advocacy or sharing human resources, services and logistics (for more detail see Lawry-White 2017:27–28). These different forms of collaboration should be considered when assessing potential interventions to fulfil their various commitments to addressing situations of displacement and pursuing an HDP nexus approach.

To fulfil their obligations to the GCR and CRRF, UNDP and UNHCR have agreed to address displacement, particularly that of refugees, by:

- integrating refugee issues into the implementation of the SDGs;
- focusing on early recovery and livelihoods;
- promoting RoL, justice, human rights, community security and local governance; and

<sup>14</sup> For details of other joint projects mentioned in a 2017 survey conducted among UNDP and UNHCR staff see Lawry-White, 2017:27–28.

- developing early warning and preparedness (UNDP 2019a: 25).

As a humanitarian agency, UNHCR has a development impact because good humanitarian programming is a basis for longer-term development activities. To engage with the triple nexus, UNHCR states it will work within the HDP framework to “reach millions of marginalized displaced and stateless communities” (UNHCR 2020a). In response to displacement, UNHCR has identified specific SDGs that align with its responsibilities under the GCR (UNHCR 2019a, 2020b). UNHCR recognizes that SDGs can “help to strengthen protection and solutions for persons of concern” and provide “an entry point to work on inclusion of persons of concern into national systems” (UNHCR 2020a:3).

UNDP’s migration and displacement policy is part of its 2018–2021 Strategic Plan and closely linked with the SDGs. It has four specific focus areas and aims to build on existing capacities at national and regional and global levels in partnership with organizations including UNHCR and IOM (UNDP 2019a).

- Addressing the root causes of displacement and mitigating the negative drivers of migration and factors compelling people to leave their homes.
- Supporting governments to integrate migration and displacement issues in national and local development plans, including during the localization of SDGs, and strengthening positive impacts of migrants and the diaspora.
- Supporting refugees, migrants, IDPs and host communities to cope, recover and sustain development gains in crisis and post crisis situations (“resilience-based development”).
- Supporting national and local authorities to achieve sustainable community-based (re)integration.

At the Global Refugee Forum in December 2019, UNDP specifically committed to support jobs and livelihoods, RoL and local governance, and responsibility and burden sharing in over 20 refugee hosting countries.

The table in annex 8.4 shows how key thematic interventions in support of displaced and host populations relate to the HDP nexus and to UNDP and UNHCR commitments to the GCR and the SDGs.

## Framework documents and ongoing initiatives

There are a number of finalized and draft documents and ongoing initiatives that could inform UNDP-UNHCR nexus approaches.<sup>15</sup> Some of these documents are specific to UNDP and UNHCR, and others have been generated by partner UN organizations.

- UNHCR How to Guide: SDGs and UNSDCF (draft April 2020).
- Promoting Development Approaches to Migration and Displacement: UNDP’s Four Specific Focus Areas, 2019.
- UNDP-UNHCR SDG tool for forced displacement contexts.<sup>16</sup>
- Light Guidance on Collective Outcomes: Planning and Implementing the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus in Context of Protracted Crises, OCHA February 2020 (fourth draft).
- Transitioning from Humanitarian Assistance to National Systems supported by Development Actors: Concept note, UNHCR, 2019.
- Global Action Plan to End Statelessness 2014–2024, UNHCR, 2017.
- Refugee Education 2030, UNHCR September 2019.

<sup>15</sup> Some documents are cited in draft form as final versions were not available to the author, or the drafting process was not finalized at the time of writing. They are listed, nevertheless, as they indicate important ongoing processes.

<sup>16</sup> Under development as of September 2020, added by Kaori Kwarabayashi, UNHCR, September 2020.

- Draft Global Action Plan “Promoting the health of refugees and migrants” (2019–2023), WHO, 2019.
- Guiding Principles: Access of Refugees and Other Forcibly Displaced Persons to the Labour Market, ILO, 2016.
- Local Governance and RoL contributions to prevent, address and solve forced displacement and statelessness situations, UNHCR-UNDP Programmatic Framework 2020-2023 (draft).
- UNDP is in the process of producing guidelines for conflict-sensitive programming and programming to promote social cohesion.
- Clarification of the peace pillar is ongoing, led by the OECD and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC).
- HDP Nexus Best Practice Review (forthcoming).

## Collective outcomes

Collective outcomes are a strategic tool for humanitarian, development and peace actors to identify concrete and measurable objectives in a particular context with the overall aim of reducing people’s needs, risks and vulnerability. The work on the HDP nexus is advancing, and collective outcomes are being developed that bridge the HRPs and UNDAFs/Cooperation Frameworks. Collective outcomes are part of the NWoW initiative and are overseen by the JSC which is supporting the piloting of this approach in seven countries. The collective outcomes help to achieve the aims of the GCR, which bridges the RRP and the NDPs, as well as the UNDAFs/Cooperation Frameworks that support the NDPs (UNHCR, 2019a).

## UNHCR engagement in the SDGs corporate position paper and How to Guide: SDGs and UNSDCF

The SDGs provide UNHCR with an entry point for identifying development options for displaced populations and transitioning them from humanitarian to development assistance. The guide suggests that for each country UNHCR should analyse which SDGs are relevant to the context, the protracted displaced populations and the host government, to ensure that it engages in development planning and with development actors to promote development responses to displacement.

## Transitioning from humanitarian assistance to national systems

UNHCR has developed a concept note for assessing, planning and implementing the transitioning of displaced populations from humanitarian into national systems. It works across the HDP nexus, is aligned with the GCR and the SDGs, and involves working with the host government and strengthening the capacity of its systems to include displaced populations (UNHCR 2019g; see section “Inclusion into national systems: Local solutions”, above).

## Statelessness

In line with the Global Action Plan to End Statelessness, UNHCR aims to work with UNDP, which has an important role in preventing and reducing statelessness as part of its work on governance, RoL, access to justice, electoral assistance, institutions and livelihoods (Lawry-White 2017:28).

Fourteen UN agencies are working toward SDG 16.9, “legal identity for all”, under the UN Legal Identity Agenda Task Force which is co-chaired by UNDP, UNDESA and UNICEF. UNHCR is an active member.<sup>17</sup>

## Education

UNHCR has developed an education strategy informed by the triple nexus and in line with the 2018 GCR and the 2030 Agenda. It aims:

<sup>17</sup> See also <https://www.unhcr.org/ending-statelessness.html>.

to foster the conditions, partnerships, collaboration and approaches that lead to all refugees, asylum seekers, returnees and stateless children and youth and their hosting communities, including the internally displaced in those communities, to access inclusive and equitable quality education that enables them to learn, thrive and develop their potential, build individual and collective resilience and contribute to peaceful coexistence and civil society (UNHCR 2019c:6).<sup>18</sup>

## Health<sup>19</sup>

The draft Global Action Plan to promote the health of refugees and migrants has been developed by WHO in consultation with IOM, UNHCR and other partners (WHO 2019). It is aligned with Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development and the GCR, and aims to provide short- and long-term health responses. It is based on the premise that, regardless of nationality and legal status, access to health care should be universal and equitable. The draft action plan has three priorities, to:

- promote the health of refugees and migrants through short- and long-term public health interventions;
- promote continuity and quality of essential health care, while developing, reinforcing and implementing occupational health and safety measures; and
- advocate the mainstreaming of refugee and migrant health into global, regional and country agendas, and the promotion of refugee- and migrant-sensitive health policies and legal and social protection; the health and well-being of refugee and migrant women, children and adolescents; and gender equality and empowerment of refugee and migrant women and girls.

## Livelihoods, employment and social protection

Improving livelihoods through socioeconomic inclusion involves access to labour markets, finance, entrepreneurship and economic opportunities and is a key component in achieving protection and longer-term solutions for forcibly displaced populations as well as vulnerable and underserved groups of the host community (UNHCR n.d.(a)). The UNDP 3×6 approach has found targeting displaced populations and vulnerable host communities together in livelihoods programming is essential for socioeconomic integration (UNDP 2016). Digital platforms and tools can also offer opportunities for displaced people and host community members to access livelihood opportunities (UNDP 2020a).

Although there is growing consensus that access of refugees and other forcibly displaced persons to labour markets and productive employment is of critical importance, ILO reports that member states have found providing this access challenging. Programmes facilitating access to labour markets incur initial costs, but there are long-term benefits for the economy, development and social cohesion. UNDP's 3×6 approach has found that targeting displaced populations and vulnerable host communities together in livelihoods programming is essential for socioeconomic integration (UNDP 2016). Digital platforms and tools can also offer opportunities for displaced people and host community members to access livelihood opportunities (UNDP 2020e). The ILO argues that expenditure on inclusion policies and programmes can be a form of expansionary fiscal policy in emerging and more recently emerging economies, as well as advanced economies (ILO 2016a). Livelihood and employment opportunities must be complemented by appropriate social protection mechanisms for displaced populations, providing income or in-kind transfers in the case of lifecycle or market risks. Social protection is increasingly considered as an important policy response in contexts of fragility and displacement to address poverty, vulnerability and social exclusion (Regional undg Working Group on Social Protection 2016; European Commission et al. 2018), and of high importance during the current Covid-19 pandemic (UNHCR 2020b; UNDP 2020f).

<sup>18</sup> See also <https://www.unhcr.org/education.html>.

<sup>19</sup> See also <https://www.unhcr.org/health.html> and <https://www.unhcr.org/public-health.html> for updates on relevant health initiatives.

ILO standards and norms provide guidance on including refugees and displaced groups in the labour market (see, for example, Employment and Decent Work for Peace and Resilience Recommendation No. 205; ILO 2017) and evidence suggests that states are using these to help overcome some of the challenges. Promoting a shift from humanitarian to development assistance for forcibly displaced populations, through creating livelihood and employment opportunities and access to labour markets and social protection, contributes to longer-term management of protracted displacement.<sup>20</sup>

### Local governance and RoL

Good governance and RoL are essential for the effective promotion, respect and protection of the rights of asylum seekers, refugees, IDPs, stateless persons, returnees and the local population to access public service and to finding durable solutions to displacement (UNHCR and UNDP 2020a). UNDP and UNHCR already collaborate on governance and RoL and, according to the joint draft strategy, do so across the HDP nexus. The new proposed joint framework aims to strengthen collaboration, in particular for longer-term developmental support of governance and RoL, to facilitate fulfilment of the GCR. The key objectives are:

- to provide local governance and RoL institutions with adequate tools and knowledge to work across the HDP nexus to address situations of protracted and recurrent displacement;
- to provide technical and financial support to sustain and promote successful programming in identified country or cross-border situations; and
- to share lessons and experiences from RoL and governance programming with national and local partners and practitioners to prepare, prevent and address situations of displacement (UNHCR and UNDP 2020a).

### UNDP-UNHCR joint action plan

The UNDP-UNHCR joint action plan was initiated in 2017 and is regularly updated (the latest version available for this study is dated April 2020; UNHCR and UNDP 2020b draft). This study and the development of a ToC are among the agreed activities. Programme activities include:

- collaboration on the COVID-19 response;
- operationalization of the GCR;
- implementation of the SDGs and advocacy for inclusion in national and local development programmes;
- RoL, human rights, access to justice, community security and local governance;
- livelihoods programming in areas of forced displacement;
- partnership in early warning and preparedness to crisis;
- collaboration on internal displacement;
- collaboration on environmental issues; and
- collaboration on joint regional and country approaches.

The two agencies have also identified various support services:

- UNDP-UNHCR Joint Resource Mobilization Action Plan;
- staff exchanges and secondments;
- joint trainings and workshops; and
- joint senior missions.

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<sup>20</sup> ILO 2016a:29; ILO 2017; UNHCR n.d.(a).

### Clarification of the peace pillar

When the scope of the peace element of the HDP nexus is agreed it could affect funding opportunities and coordination structures. The OECD States of Fragility Report attempts to define peace and its scope. A new edition of this report is forthcoming.

### HDP nexus Best practice review

In 2020 the OECD DAC will review ongoing HDP nexus initiatives to identify best practices and obstacles in operating the nexus.

## 5.3 UNDP and UNHCR: Challenges and opportunities

### Governance reform

Host country attitudes toward displaced populations have a profound effect on the shape of the response and the extent to which interventions can move from a humanitarian to a development focus. Early investment in longer-term solutions is considered to be a more cost-effective approach than investing in longer-term solutions at a later date (OECD 2016). More open policies toward refugees (and other displaced populations) can also yield long-term benefits. Recognition of refugee qualifications and ensuring that they are able to learn the language of their host country can have positive impacts on their ability to settle into their new country, their relationship with host populations, their ability to access services and their success in securing employment (OECD 2016).

One of the challenges in adopting longer-term approaches is that host governments tend to create an authority focused on the humanitarian needs of the displaced populations. They are often disconnected from the main government bodies, although they are frequently part of the Ministry of Interior (MoI) because of the perceived security threat posed by displaced groups. These official bodies act as a government counterpart for organizations such as UNDP and UNHCR but are relevant usually only for issues of protection and humanitarian assistance. These structures can present obstacles to adopting more development-oriented approaches, because other ministries—such as those for development, infrastructure, economy, services, and family—are more appropriate partners. In some countries, where large protracted displaced situations have developed, the government entity responsible may have achieved a certain level of power and status, and therefore be reluctant to dilute this by facilitating discussions between UNHCR and UNDP with other government bodies. It can also be difficult for UNHCR to justify to host governments why it wants to engage in interventions with longer timelines when its mandate is to protect and deliver humanitarian assistance. Similarly, governments can challenge UNDP's involvement in displacement when it can be argued that its focus is development.

However, UNDP may have leverage within government when it is working to improve governance and RoL by providing technical expertise and strengthening capacity. UNDP's access to government ministries can help to build the capacity of host countries to strengthen their adherence to human rights and international law, and improve the legal protection for displaced populations. Improving RoL and protecting the legal status of displaced populations can profoundly affect what support can be provided to the displaced and host populations, and the impact it can have.

### Inclusion

The potential to include forcibly displaced groups in national systems varies. Hosting countries are encouraged to include displaced populations in NDPs, such as the UNSDCF, and to provide access to services as has been happening in Uganda, Rwanda and Kenya. However, there is a tension between donors and host governments, because even when displaced populations are included in national systems, corruption concerns can mean that donors are reluctant to channel funds for refugees through host governments (Crawford and O'Callaghan 2019:6).



Inclusion of displaced populations into national systems is likely to create additional expense as national capacity must be developed to absorb the displaced populations. While capacity development takes place, parallel humanitarian system must often continue to operate (Crawford and O’Callaghan 2019). When new national systems are in operation, host countries will expect the funding for access to national systems to be provided by the international community, or to be paid for in some way by refugees/displaced populations. People can make financial contributions for the services only if they are able to generate an adequate income, or access employment with social protection coverage, which is not always the case for displaced populations.

Efforts to introduce longer-term initiatives can be rejected by host governments and populations and displace populations because they seem to encourage acceptance of the status quo and to precipitate a move toward permanent settlement. It is probable that moves toward inclusion of displaced populations make return home less likely and refugees can fear that greater inclusion in a host country jeopardizes the possibility of third-country resettlement.

### Livelihoods, employment and social protection

One of the key objectives of the GCR is to enhance refugees’ self-reliance, but this assumes that the host context provides the right to work, freedom of movement and access to adequate livelihoods opportunities (Crawford and O’Callaghan 2019). Displaced populations often settle in remote or marginalized areas, among neglected and poor sectors of the host population, who already have limited livelihoods opportunities and access to natural resources. Such areas, although in need of support from the national level, are not necessarily a priority for the host government.

The GCR and donors have assumed that the private sector will be able to provide employment opportunities for displaced populations. However, areas in which many displaced populations have settled do not have a vibrant private sector and it is unclear whether displaced populations can diversify their incomes successfully to become self-reliant (Easton-Calabria et al. 2017; Crawford and O’Callaghan 2019). There is also an assumption that displaced populations possess entrepreneurial skills, and can successfully establish a new business in an unfamiliar environment, despite the social and psychological trauma caused by displacement and host government restrictions. Women are less likely than men to establish businesses and to be able to attract external investments (Betts et al. 2018). Although globally the majority of refugees are self-settled, in countries operating an encampment policy, restrictions on mobility and economic interaction beyond the camp population limit income-generating opportunities.

In 2016, the ILO produced non-legally binding guiding principles for all its member states to create access to the labour market for refugees and other forcibly displaced persons (ILO 2016b). Under the 1951 Refugee Convention, certain labour rights are accorded to refugees (but not to other forcibly displaced groups) including access to employment (articles 17 and 18), but many countries that are parties to the convention either have not agreed to these articles or limit access to employment. Other obstacles such as restrictions on freedom of movement, or prejudice, also limit employment options. For example, despite government commitments on the right to work, refugees in Uganda, Rwanda, Ethiopia and Kenya struggle to access employment opportunities (Crawford and O’Callaghan 2019). Refugees and forcibly displaced groups work mainly in the informal economy (ILO 2016b) although the majority are hosted in developing countries where employment opportunities tend to be informal for host as well as for displaced populations.

Regarding social protection, the World Humanitarian Summit and the Grand Bargain (2016), the New York Declaration on Refugees and Migrants (2016) and the ILO’s Employment and Decent Work for Peace and Resilience Recommendation N°205 (ILO 2017) have committed member states to strengthen the delivery of social protection services in protracted crises, and in humanitarian and fragility contexts. Social Protection for all is a target in SDG 1 (target 1.3), and it is increasingly considered an important policy response in contexts of fragility and displacement to address poverty, vulnerability and social exclusion (Regional UNDG Working Group on Social Protection 2016; European Commission et al.

2018). Social protection services to refugees have been mainly provided through parallel humanitarian systems, such as humanitarian cash transfers or food distribution, with multiple partners involved. There are, however, opportunities to apply a triple nexus lens to improve the delivery of transfers and to achieve a better alignment between social protection/assistance responses and national social protection systems, with expected positive impacts for displaced populations' resilience, social cohesion (Valli et al. 2019) and sustainable development. While research and evaluations point to some lessons regarding design, implementation and financing modalities (see, for example, the cash transfer programme in support of education for refugee children in Lebanon: De Hoop et al. 2018 and annex 8.6), challenges exist in host countries with low coverage of social protection systems, financing and capacity constraints, or reluctance to move toward greater inclusion into national systems. Positive incentives can be created by kick-starting the expansion of national social protection systems and improved delivery systems (for example through single registries or use of digital technologies) by funding programmes that benefit both host and displaced populations (Regional UNDG Working Group on Social Protection 2016).

### Lack of accurate data and research

The literature review and discussions with respondents revealed a lack of accurate data and research about the impact of displacement, and effective responses to displacement, including responses based on the HDP nexus. The OECD stresses the need for accurate data to plan interventions and to be able to measure impact (2020c). UNICEF has noted the lack of accurate data on displaced and migrant children. Without knowing where they are and who they are, UNICEF cannot provide protection and support (UNICEF et al. 2020). IOM states that data should be standardized, and qualitative and quantitative analysis strengthened across the UN system (IOM 2019a).

The GCR (para 45) states the need for “reliable, comparable, and timely data” for evidence-based measures to:

- improve socioeconomic conditions for refugees and host communities;
- assess and address the impact of large refugee populations on host countries in emergency and protracted situations; and
- identify and plan appropriate solutions.

UNHCR, Eurostat and Statistics Norway are leading an Expert Group on Refugee and IDP Statistics. The Group will work toward mainstreaming SDG indicators for the forcibly displaced into national, regional and international statistical systems. UNHCR has advocated for the inclusion of a refugee-specific indicator in the SDG Indicator Framework.<sup>21</sup>

The International Data Alliance on Children on the Move was launched in March 2020. Led by UNICEF in collaboration with IOM, UNHCR and OECD, it aims to improve the availability of data, to strengthen local capacities to collect and analyse data, and to share the findings. The Alliance will collaborate with the UN Migration Network, the UN Expert Group on Migration Statistics (EGMS) and the Expert Group on Refugee and IDP Statistics (UNICEF et al. 2020).

In addition to the paucity of accurate data, there is a lack of understanding about what motivates populations to move and to return, and what the experience means to them. Without this knowledge, effective responses cannot be designed. Displacement is usually seen by the international community as a negative response to crises, but perhaps in some instances it is a coping mechanism, or regarded by mobile populations as a coping mechanism. The aim of the joint UNDP-UNHCR project in Afghanistan is to provide insights into the motivations behind Afghan mobility. There is little information about the economy of refugee camps, displaced populations and migrants. Informal support through remittances and in-kind support is excluded from calculations of funding needed and provided. In 2017, USD 466 billion in remittances came from migrants (OECD 2018a). Similarly, there is a lack of understanding

<sup>21</sup> Global indicator framework for the Sustainable Development Goals and targets of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, A/RES/71/313.

around the political economy of displaced populations in specific contexts, and better knowledge would improve interventions with the host government.

The document review and several respondents revealed that although the HDP nexus seems to be a rational response to complex situations, because it adopts a holistic approach, there is little research to demonstrate the success of the HDP nexus approach or to inform best practice and programming for those developing HDP responses to protracted displacement. Furthermore, there is limited guidance on how to operationalize the HDP nexus (IOM 2019a). Therefore, further research is needed to determine the efficacy of the HDP nexus and, if successful, to provide lessons learned for stakeholders.

### Collaboration: Challenges and opportunities

UNDP and UNHCR have complementary areas of expertise so collaboration provides opportunities to adopt a more holistic approach with a broader range of objectives to include humanitarian, development and peace goals. They have access to situations at different times in their evolution, at different levels and with different actors, and to different funding mechanisms.

UNHCR has more staff in the field than UNDP, providing the opportunity for UNDP to access more field-level information, for example through data collection. UNDP's access to governments and work with ministries provides UNHCR with the opportunity to advocate for greater inclusion of displaced populations into national systems. UNDP can provide the technical support and capacity building to national governments, authorities and systems to respond to displaced populations. UNDP and UNHCR have common interests in promoting RoL and local governance to ensure the protection and access to rights for displaced and host populations.

Collaboration is time consuming, and respondents noted that it is only effective when there is strong united leadership for both agencies, particularly at the country level. In addition, the context must be supportive of innovation and, longer-term, more inclusive approaches to displaced populations and the necessary funding must be available. Lack of adequate funding at the right time is an ongoing challenge. In the past, UNHCR channelled its own funding through UNDP in Colombia and Lebanon, so UNDP could implement programmes in response to displacement. Within UNHCR, the increasing relevance of the World Bank has contributed to an internal debate about UNDP's role as a partner (Lawry-White 2017:vi). UNDP's relative lack of resources for displacement situations emphasizes that it needs to explore other options to add value to collaborations with UNHCR, for example through UNDP's technical expertise. However, in Colombia, although UNDP is having difficulty in securing funding to address displacement issues, UNHCR is also reportedly having difficulty in securing funding to support IDP populations. Donor perceptions about the limits of the roles of the two agencies and lack of understanding about the complex realities on the ground is affecting how responses to displacement can be designed.

Despite efforts to improve coordination and planning, respondents reported a lack of an effective common coordination platform as an obstacle to UNDP-UNHCR collaboration. The humanitarian cluster system is inappropriate as a coordination mechanism for UNDP and UNHCR, because the two organizations are rarely required to attend the same meetings, and UNHCR's main coordination with partners occurs in the Refugee Coordination Model (RCM) outside the cluster system. A recent evaluation concluded that the RCM added to the multitude of coordination mechanisms used in situations of displacement and was not aligned with the humanitarian cluster system (Collinson and Schenkenberg 2019). UNHCR is a member of the UN Sustainable Development Group (UNSDG) at the global level, committed to promoting the SDGs, and its representatives are members of the UNCT (UNHCR 2019a). In recent years, UNHCR has become more actively involved in development planning and coordination at the country level (Lawry-White 2017). Nevertheless, respondents consistently expressed concerns about the limitations of the available coordination mechanisms in facilitating UNDP and UNHCR cooperation.

Greater collaboration between UNDP and UNHCR and among humanitarian and development actors in general can also complicate processes and increase the workload. In Colombia, for example, there are two separate planning processes for humanitarian and development interventions, and consequently two separate coordination meetings, and three parallel coordination structures. This is to accommodate the large number of actors and the country and regional response, but there is recognition that systems need to be rationalized to improve efficiency. In Cameroon, flexible bilateral funding (provided by JICA) catering for target groups with different legal statuses, such as IDPs, refugees, returnees and host populations, has facilitated UNDP-UNHCR collaboration across the triple nexus. It has a particular focus on responding to immediate humanitarian needs and interventions fostering peace building and social cohesion in a conflict-affected region in the north of the country (UNDP 2019d).

There can be significant transitional costs in collaboration which can only be justified if the outcomes exceed those that could be expected from the agencies operating independently. The UN response to the Covid-19 pandemic (see box 2), for example, demonstrates the challenges of planning and coordinating responses and has several different initiatives.

#### Box 2. Global Humanitarian Response Plan for Covid-19

The Global Humanitarian Response Plan (GHRP) for COVID-19 is an example of a joint effort of members of the IASC that includes UN agencies as well as NGOs and international organizations. The GHRP has three strategic priorities: (i) to contain the spread of the Covid-19 pandemic and decrease morbidity and mortality; (ii) to decrease the deterioration of human assets and rights, social cohesion and livelihoods; and (iii) to protect, assist and advocate for refugees, IDPs, migrants and host communities particularly vulnerable to the pandemic. Each UN agency involved in the GHRP takes steps to address these issues according to its expertise and specific mandate. UNHCR, for example, is focused on the third priority, while UNDP addresses all of them (UN 2020a).

Although the GHRP has adopted a broad approach to the Covid-19 pandemic, there are other Covid-19 response mechanisms, such as the Strategic Preparedness and Response Plan of the World Health Organization (WHO) and the UN Covid-19 Response and Recovery Fund. The implementation of these plans should be closely monitored to access synergies and friction among agencies to develop lessons learned and strengthen complementarities in future endeavours.

Finally, the two agencies need to have a shared vision and to be working toward the same objectives. As planning horizons and measurements of success between humanitarian and development interventions tend to be different, UNHCR and UNDP will have to determine how to reconcile these differences. For UNDP's Crisis Bureau and UNHCR's Division of Resilience and Solutions, this means identifying concrete governance and RoL interventions that are necessary for the work of both organizations, rather than starting with abstract concepts.

This initiative to promote UNDP-UNHCR collaboration on the HDP nexus is occurring at the headquarters level. The structures of the two organizations mean that, at the country level, the senior staff of both agencies have a lot of autonomy to design the programmes in the ways they consider most appropriate. Respondents expressed concern that there were few clear incentives for country programmes to collaborate because of transactional costs, divergent objectives and funding difficulties, on top of the challenges often presented by the operating environment. It is necessary to create buy-in for collaboration and the triple nexus at the country level if UNDP and UNHCR are to succeed in rolling-out this approach (for more detail on potential collaboration between UNHCR and UNDP see Lawry-White 2017).

## 6. Financing the Nexus

Humanitarian, development and peace funding has distinct purposes. Humanitarian funding, primarily channelled through NGOs and multilateral organizations, is disbursed quickly to save lives and respond to emergencies. This requires fast-track procedures and a tolerance for risk and inefficiencies. Development-oriented funding aims for long-term impacts, which usually implies slower procedures and less risk tolerance. In addition, the primary recipients of development funding are governments, rather than NGOs and multilateral organizations. A separation of these inherently different budget lines seems reasonable to allow for reactivity as well as long-term impact of funding, but either this has to be factored into planning of triple nexus approaches, or the structure of humanitarian and development budgets has to be revised. With regard to funding for peace-related activities, further clarification is required. To date, it is unclear whether peace in the context of the nexus refers to “soft peace” such as activities to promote good governance, RoL and access to justice, or “hard peace” interventions such as stabilization initiatives, intelligence gathering, defence and diplomacy.<sup>22</sup> The eventually framing of the “peace” activities will influence funding mechanisms.

Despite organizational, administrative and teleological differences between humanitarian and development funding, there are already various initiatives by donors, UN agencies, NGOs and other stakeholders to facilitate financing the nexus. The World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) has generated considerable momentum since its guiding framework—the Agenda for Humanity—includes commitments to transcend humanitarian–development divides and shift from funding to financing (OCHA 2019). The Grand Bargain is a joint process of governments, UN agencies, intra-governmental organizations and NGOs that was launched at the summit to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of interventions. Signatories of the Grand Bargain agreed, among other commitments, to reduce the earmarking of donor contributions and to increase collaborative humanitarian multiyear planning and funding. Greater collaboration between humanitarian and development actors is mainstreamed as a cross-cutting issue (IASC 2020a). These initiatives are promising and have had some positive implications for reducing organizational and administrative barriers concerning the alignment of funds across the nexus (Metcalf-Hough et al. 2019; OCHA 2019). Another initiative that aims to accelerate this process is the recommendation of OECD’s DAC on the HDP nexus. Its guidelines for financing are legally binding and DAC members will be held accountable for delivering on their commitments (see box 3).

### Box 3. DAC Recommendations for Financing the HDP Nexus (OECD 2020c)

1. Develop evidence-based humanitarian, development and peace financing strategies at global, regional, national and local levels, with effective layering and sequencing of the most appropriate financing flows, which may include:
  - a. working at a global level with multilateral partners, IFIs, governments, the private sector and civil society focused on countries most at risk of recurrent and protracted crises, with a view to identifying and closing financing gaps;
  - b. at a country level, working with governments, the UN Resident Coordinator/ Humanitarian Coordinator, multilateral partners, IFIs, the private sector and civil society to establish multiyear financing strategies with a view to support collective outcomes;
  - c. seeking to align resources as closely as possible to needs, risks and vulnerabilities and root causes of conflict to support prevention, preparedness and early action, and avoid significant fluctuations in funding that could destabilize communities or countries; and
  - d. using ODA as a catalyst to mobilize the full range of financial flows, including public and private international and domestic financial flows, ensuring that diverse financial flows do not contribute to conflict, inequality or instability.

<sup>22</sup> Discussion with staff from OECD revealed that the organization is currently working on a report on the peace pillar that may provide some clarification regarding the scope of funding for peace interventions.

2. Use predictable, flexible, multiyear financing wherever possible, which may involve:
- a. identifying financing mechanisms that bring together humanitarian, development and peace stakeholders where possible and appropriate, and that promote opportunities for private sector engagement;
  - b. striving to ensure that financing is informed by joint analysis and, where possible and appropriate, supports greater coherence between humanitarian, development and peace actions;
  - c. aligning financing with agreed collective outcomes where appropriate, while recognizing that humanitarian, development and peace actions may have priorities that also fall outside of collective outcomes; and
  - d. seeking the availability of flexible funding in the different pillars to ensure a better use of allocated resources in response to priority needs.

These initiatives indicate that “the widely recognized need to adapt funding frameworks to facilitate flexible multiyear programming to tackle protracted and recurrent crises is slowly leading donors to change their funding strategies” (Fanning and Fullwood-Thomas 2019). The Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2019 captures these financial trends (see also OECD 2019a). Because of the increasingly protracted nature of crises, humanitarian, development and peace funding is “progressively being channelled to the same crisis context” (DI 2019:46). For example, development-related funding for social infrastructure and services in protracted situations has increased, creating opportunities to complement humanitarian assistance focused on WASH, education and health (DI 2019:48).

Despite such trends, challenges to funding protracted displacement and the HDP nexus remain, and are outlined below. The information here is not exhaustive and does not provide a full picture of current trends, challenges, funding instruments or mechanisms. Instead, it summarizes some of the main issues identified by respondents and in the document review.<sup>23</sup>

### A lack of oversight

A major obstacle to operationalizing the nexus is the difficulty in determining the availability of funding. The challenge to identify available and accessible funding did not only become apparent in the process of compiling this report but was emphasized by a recent study commissioned by UNDP, FAO and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). This study aimed to “assess and document the availability of predictable, flexible, multi-year funding to support collectively agreed priorities across the nexus” (Poole and Culbert 2019:24).<sup>24</sup>

Three issues related to the lack of oversight are outlined. First, financial tracking is complicated, and available data are potentially inaccurate and misleading. This issue is highlighted in a joint UNHCR-UNDP report on localized resilience in the response to the Syrian crisis. According to the report, the tracking system of the LCRP, the country plan for Lebanon under the 3RP, and OCHA’s Financial Tracking Services (FTS), which monitors 3RP financing at large, provide different figures for the amount of funding in support of Lebanon’s public sector in 2016 (UNCHR and UNDP 2019). Such discrepancies prevent an accurate understanding of funding streams and highlight the need to strengthen coordination and transparency among all actors involved. While a centralized tracking system for the 3RP has already been established, the fact that data are provided by a wide variety of actors—including governments, donors, UN agencies and local NGOs—complicates oversight and compromises accuracy (see box 4). For example, certain financial streams may be counted multiple times, so compiled data should be cleaned.


<sup>23</sup> For more information on these issues see: Poole and Culbert 2019; OECD 2018c; OECD 2019a; Levine et al. 2019; Crawford and O’Callaghan 2019; Steets 2011; and *UNHCR and UNDP 2020b* (draft).

<sup>24</sup> The study is based on five country cases: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Ukraine. The findings of a complementary study of OECD on Uganda are also taken into account.

## Box 4. 3RP

The 3RP differentiates between a refugee component and a resilience component. The former addresses the protection and humanitarian needs of refugees, the latter the resilience, stabilization and development needs of impacted individuals, communities and institutions to strengthen the capacities of national actors. As such, the 3RP seeks to operationalize the nexus (3RP 2019c).

## 3RP FUNDING STATUS BY COMPONENT




In absolute terms, the refugee component required and received more funding than the resilience component, but in relative terms the funding requirements for both components are met by approximately 30 percent. Over the past five years, the resilience component has increased significantly as a result of continuous advocacy for longer-term development-oriented funding.<sup>25</sup>

The inaccuracy, or divergence, of different financial tracking systems is partially explained by the variety of flows that need to be considered to acquire a comprehensive financial overview, which points toward a second issue: a limited focus on ODA. The OECD defines ODA as “government aid designed to promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries”, which includes Official Humanitarian Assistance (OHA) but excludes loans and credits for military purposes. ODA can “be provided bilaterally, from donor to recipient, or channelled through a multilateral development agency such as the United Nations or the World Bank. Aid includes grants, “soft” loans (where the grant element is at least 25 percent of the total) and the provision of technical assistance” (OECD 2020a). Despite its indisputable relevance for financing the nexus, ODA only describes one particular type of development (or nexus) financing (figure 1). In fact, remittances, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), as well as portfolio debt and equity flows, outweigh ODA.

<sup>25</sup> Conversation, Regional Hub Amman.



Figure 1. Financial Flows to Low- and Middle-income Countries, 1990–2019



Note: Source: World Bank (2019b).

Owing to the variety of relevant financial streams, the amount of money channelled through specific projects or programmes is only a snapshot of the total funding for humanitarian, development and peace interventions in a country or region. The amount of funding captured by the 3RP, for example, is an inaccurate indicator for the overall funding going to the region, since it does not necessarily capture financial streams from remittances or the private sector. Building on the prominent limitation to ODA, a recent study by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), which examined the resources that households use to cope with crisis, calls for a more comprehensive understanding and a complementary management of resource flows (Willitts-King et al. 2019). An exclusive focus on ODA disregards realities on the ground as well as opportunities to secure funding for the nexus. Financing strategies for nexus programmes should take non-ODA resource streams into account, to explore possibilities to mobilize resources and to tailor programmes according to the financial realities of communities and households.

A third issue that undermines oversight and complicates coordination and coherence relates to the measure that donors have already taken to close gaps between humanitarian, development and peace funding. Germany's Transitional Development Assistance (TDA), France's Minka Peace and Resilience Fund, and the World Bank's IDA18 Regional Sub-Window for Refugees and Host Communities are, for example, promising financing mechanisms for protracted displacement, but the amount and variety of mechanisms, funds and instruments complicate coordination and oversight. Adding to that, Poole and Culbert (2019:28) note that some instruments "are also strictly earmarked for specific thematic concerns, notably countering violent extremism (CVE) and migration. Contrary to aid effectiveness commitments to country ownership and aspirations to work toward Collective Outcomes, vertical accountability lines and earmarking drive fragmentation and incoherence in coverage". Individual donor agendas may indicate movement in the right direction but are not an overarching solution because they complicate oversight and fragment the funding landscape. What is needed is better coordination and a strategic alignment of existing budget lines and instruments.

## Flexible multiyear funding remains the exception

For comprehensive planning and strategic alignment of funding instruments and budget lines, the timeframe is of utmost importance (see also box 5). Levine et al. (2019:28) argue that “a [multi-year] timeframe gives more opportunity to address the acute symptoms of crises in ways that may also engage with some of the underlying factors behind vulnerabilities”. Individual projects become “part of a broader strategy” which provides space for collaboration “at implementation level, by bringing separate projects under the umbrella of a single consortium”. Put differently, multiyear funding “offers ways to build strategic collaboration, where different agencies can be addressing the same problems but, for example, at different levels”. While the analysis of Levine et al. (2019) is focused on humanitarian funding, the authors argue that the labelling is irrelevant. Moreover, development funding, contrary to humanitarian funding, often already has multiyear timeframes.

Despite the positive implications of flexible, predictable and multiyear funding, it is not the norm but rather the exception. Poole and Culbert (2019:29) stress that the “vast majority of humanitarian funding at the country level...remains short-term”. Reporting on the Agenda for Humanity, FAO, UNHCR and WFP have even recorded declines in the overall proportion of unearmarked funding (OCHA 2019). With regards to earmarking, the Multi Partner Trust Fund Office (2015:1) pointed out in a fact sheet on financing the nexus that “the high level of earmarking toward specific agencies and projects deter collaboration across the sectors and actors”. However, unearmarked funding alone is not the solution, as Poole and Culbert (2019: 30) observe that even “where organisations are receiving multi-year funding, in reality programme design often remains annual and results-based rather than transformative”. Therefore, commitment to flexible multiyear funding needs to be accompanied by transformative programming that adopts longer-term perspectives.

## Flawed assumptions and little sign of additionality


The CRRF aims to encourage and facilitate transformative programming in the context of protracted displacement (UNHCR 2016).<sup>26</sup> However, the assumptions in the CRRF regarding funding requirements and the cost effectiveness of comprehensive programmes are flawed. Crawford and O’Callaghan (2019:2) point out two funding-related assumptions that undermine the applicability of the CRRF: “first, that development funding will be available in sufficient measure to incentivize hosting governments to allow greater socioeconomic inclusion of refugees and to bear the potential political risks of doing so; and second, that the provision of services to refugees through national systems will prove not just suitable but also more cost-efficient and sustainable over the long term”. The case studies (Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda) indicate that these expectations have not yet materialized. Instead, there is little sign of additional funding from donors. Meanwhile, more comprehensive programming that aims, for example, at the inclusion of refugees in national systems often requires running the costly humanitarian system parallel to capacity-building programmes, when local/national systems are ill-equipped to take full responsibility for refugee management. This implies that, in the short term, additional funding is required.

## Context matters

Another crucial issue is that the availability of funding is highly context dependent. The comparison of ODA flows to Malawi and Afghanistan between 2002 and 2018 illustrates that the funding for each pillar of the nexus varies (figure 2). In Malawi, ODA is almost exclusively dedicated to development, while funding for Afghanistan is more diverse, covering all three components of the nexus.

<sup>26</sup> The CRRF calls upon UNHCR to (i) ease pressure on host countries; (ii) enhance refugee self-reliance; and (iii) support conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity.

Figure 2. ODA Triple Nexus Funding Malawi and Afghanistan, 2001–2018



Note: Vertical axis has different scaling in the two graphs. Source: OECD (2018d).

Countries have different funding profiles for various reasons, including contextual needs and specific donor interests. Migration management, security, trade and international relations are only some of the issues that influence donor funding commitments. Curbing migration flows and containing migrants in the region are, for example, clear objectives of the EU Trust Fund for Africa (Fanning and Fullwood-Thomas 2019:16). Oxfam notes that “there is a significant risk that all EU ODA will become more closely linked with EU foreign policy in the upcoming 2021 long-term budget (the Multiannual Financial Framework, MFF)” (Fanning and Fullwood-Thomas 2019:34). Vertical funds, as well as funds earmarked for specific regions, programmes or projects, are indicators of underlying donor interests.<sup>27</sup> In comparison, UN pooled funds, thematic funds and regular resources enable more flexibility, allowing agencies to adapt to changing circumstances and set their own priorities based on contextual needs.<sup>28</sup>

Taken together, contextual needs ought to be considered alongside the priorities and interests of potential donors, which further complicates the development of financing strategies for nexus programmes. The ODA funding profiles of Malawi and Afghanistan illustrate that the type and purpose of funding varies considerably. Given the wide variety of potentially available funding sources, financing strategies for nexus programmes should be based on sound analysis, including a mapping of available funds and an assessment of underlying interests and priorities of potential donors.

#### Box 5. Covid-19 Pandemic and Health Sector Funding

The Covid-19 pandemic highlights failures and shortcomings of the health care systems that can be partially explained by a shift in health care funding priorities over the last two decades. Instead of investing in systems and infrastructure, donors have focused on specific issues, such as particular diseases (Development Aid 2020). As a result, national public health care systems, which are at the frontline of the response to pandemics, have lacked funding to develop and increase their capacities. A nexus response to the COVID-19 pandemic, therefore, needs to incorporate a long-term perspective that includes addressing funding trends and modalities which undermine the resilience of the public health sector (also see Dalrymple 2020; IASC 2020b).

<sup>27</sup> Earmarked funding refers to “bilateral or multilateral contributions to specific programmes or projects”, while vertical funds are “intended for specific development areas (e.g. health, climate change) approved through a call-for-proposals process” (UNDP 2019c:13).

<sup>28</sup> Regular resources are “unearmarked resources foundational to delivering the Strategic Plan and transformational results”; UN pooled funds are “from multiple partners for specific national, regional or global priorities” and thematic funds cover “pooled, flexible funding that allows the alignment of resources to critical country, regional and global need” (UNDP 2019c:13). There are other categories besides these types of funding, which will not be considered here.

## Donor profiles, priorities and actions

Although donor strategies and instruments can undermine oversight and contribute to the fragmentation of the funding landscape, some instruments, commitments and initiatives demonstrate the interest of donors in financing the nexus. Therefore, it is worthwhile briefly considering a few donor profiles, priorities and actions.

Switzerland has already implemented nexus programmes in the Horn of Africa, Mali and Myanmar (FDFA 2020b). An independent evaluation commissioned by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) considered these programmes a success, but highlighted unexploited potential to improve its evidence base and strengthen its institutional understanding of the nexus (FDFA 2019). Building on that, Switzerland's Strategy for International Cooperation 2021–2024 states that synergies between agencies (Human Security Division of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, HSD), SDC and the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs, SECO) and instruments, particularly in the context of protracted crisis, is to be pursued (FDFA 2020a). A “nexus fund” that collects resources from the framework credits for humanitarian, development and peace activities was discussed but not set up (FDFA 2019:23). Currently, a “learning journey” is being initiated to work toward a common institutional understanding of the nexus and to identify best practices and crucial bottlenecks.

Sweden, which was recently evaluated by the OECD, has already made structural adjustments (OECD 2019b). An interdisciplinary and cross-departmental nexus working group was established within the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) and, in mid-2019, Sida recruited nexus-focused staff members who were deployed to country or regional offices (DI 2019:16–17). The decentralized decision making “enabled country teams to direct funds to respond to the risks, longer-term causes and consequences of crises” (DI 2019:12).

The UK developed a focus on resilience and protracted crisis in its Aid Strategy in 2015 and its Humanitarian Reform Policy in 2017. The former integrated a peace perspective into development planning by focusing on conflict and stabilization (DI 2019), while the latter is more explicit about its aim to “bring together humanitarian and development funding to support education, jobs, health and social protection given the protracted nature of crisis and harness humanitarian and development responses for a bespoke response to crisis” (DFID 2017).

The EU is the largest contributor of ODA in absolute terms (EC 2020). The Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO) oversees international development cooperation, but there is a separate budget for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO). In May 2017, the Council of the EU explicitly framed its commitment to the nexus in a conclusion entitled “Operationalizing the Humanitarian-Development Nexus”.<sup>29</sup> Following that, pilot projects in six countries (Chad, Iraq, Myanmar, Nigeria, Sudan and Uganda) were initiated to implement the nexus, the success of which has been rather limited so far (Jones and Mazzara 2018). EU Trust Funds, on the other hand, have been recognized to add value in terms of flexible and coordinated financing across the nexus, despite criticism concerning political interests pursued through this mechanism, for example in terms of migration management in Africa (Jones and Mazzara 2018). The EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis, which is also called the “Madad Fund”, is a good example of a mechanism for nexus funding (see box 6).

<sup>29</sup> For a chronology of the EU policy framework related to the nexus see Voice (2020) and Council of the European Union (2017).

**Box 6. The EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis (“Madad Fund”)**

The EUTF supports non-humanitarian and long-term needs of Syrian refugees, host governments and IDPs. It aims to provide a comprehensive response to the humanitarian–development nexus through quick-impact as well as multiyear programmes. Bilateral agreements between EU member states and governments in the region are possible, although cooperation under the Madad framework is encouraged. The Madad Fund does not develop or implement projects but merely provides resources for projects upon request (Havlová and Tamchynová 2016).

By March 2020, 90 contracts with 150 implementing partners had been signed, channelling the budget through different organizations including international organizations (41.5 percent), European agencies and development banks (20.8 percent), NGOs (26.9 percent), partner governments of Jordan and Serbia (4 percent) and international finance institutions (5 percent).

Six programmatic sectors have been prioritized: Education (34 percent), Livelihoods (30 percent), Health (13 percent), WASH (11 percent), Protection (4 percent) and Social Cohesion (7 percent).

In the region, Lebanon (39 percent), Turkey (26 percent) and Jordan (23 percent) receive the most resources. Iraq (8 percent) and other countries in the region receive only a fraction of the fund’s resources (EU 2016).

Between December 2014 and March 2020 the Trust Fund mobilized EUR 1.9 billion,<sup>30</sup> including voluntary contributions from 22 member states and Turkey, and reached more than 6 million people including refugees, IDPs and host communities (EU 2016).

With its TDA, the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) established a nexus-related strategy and funding instrument several years ago. Targeting contexts of fragility and protracted crisis, TDA focuses on the reconstruction of basic social and productive infrastructure, DRR, food security and (re)integration of refugees (BMZ 2020).

Denmark’s strategy, “The World 2030”, for the first time combines humanitarian aid and development cooperation in one joint strategy (DANIDA 2020). Addressing the root causes of migration is incorporated in one of the four priorities of the strategy. Geographically, Denmark is focused on fragile contexts, such as Afghanistan and Mali, as well as on poor but more stable countries such as Uganda and Myanmar.

Gender equality is increasingly prioritized by donors. Programmes specifically focused on gender equality, however, receive little support. In fact, the OECD notes that in 2016–2017 only 4 percent of the funding provided by DAC members went to programmes with principal objectives related to gender equality and women’s empowerment (OECD 2020b). Since gender “is the single biggest determinant of a person’s agency in and out of crisis” (Fanning and Fullwood-Thomas 2019:3), it is central for nexus programmes. Consequently, advocacy for nexus financing also needs to address donors’ commitments regarding gender equality.

## 6.1 UNHCR-UNDP collaboration for financing the nexus

SDG 17 is dedicated to collaboration and aims to strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development. Sub-goals 17.1–17.5 are specifically focused on financing and should therefore function as overarching objectives and orientation points for collaboration between UNHCR and UNDP on the matter.

<sup>30</sup> At the time of writing the EUR:USD exchange rate was EUR 1: USD 1.17, but over time the rate has fluctuated.

A survey conducted as part of a study commissioned by UNHCR and UNDP to assess opportunities for collaboration revealed that 66 percent of respondents consider “credible joint solutions for displaced people that attract funding” to be essential for the success of collaborations between UNHCR and UNDP, making it the second most important criterion after mutual trust (Lawry-White 2017:20).<sup>31</sup> In addition to that, 74 percent agreed that by “working together, UNDP and UNHCR can access funds they cannot by working alone” (Lawry-White 2017:52). These findings highlight the importance of funding for collaborations, which UNHCR and UNDP can either mobilize together through joint instruments, such as the Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) and the GHRP (see box 7), or individually, but in a mutually supportive manner. The latter requires the two agencies to align financing strategies and communicate progress, for example regarding the involvement of donors. The following outlines the potential of such collaborations between UNHCR and UNDP, as well as the major organizational obstacles, taking into account previous experiences and lessons learned.

#### Box 7. GHRP for Covid-19

The GHRP for Covid-19 was launched in March 2020 and covers the nine-month period from April to December. The plan, based on a joint analysis of medical and non-medical needs related to the Covid-19 pandemic, is intended to complement existing plans and coordination mechanisms, such as the 3RP for the Syria Crisis and the RMRP for the Venezuela crisis. Importantly, funding for the GHRP should not be diverted from the existing humanitarian and refugee operations, but add to them. The financial requirements are estimated at USD 2.01 billion (UN 2020a). As of the end of April 2020, funding of more than USD 880 million had been raised, while donor announcements suggest that additional resources are to be expected (UN 2020b). Additional funding to respond to the pandemic is raised through the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and Country-Based Pooled Funds (CBPF), which have already allocated a combined USD 166 million to support at least 36 countries.

Overall, the GHRP is a good example of joint resource mobilization, but there are other Covid-19 response mechanisms, such as the Strategic preparedness and response plan of the WHO, and the UN Covid-19 Response and Recovery Fund. Their effective alignment and implementation should be monitored.

## Financial structures

In terms of resource mobilization, the Lawry-White 2017 study highlights the fact that the financial structures of UNHCR and UNDP are designed for their organizational mandates. While UNHCR country offices rely on an annual budget provided by the headquarters, UNDP country offices must raise funds for projects at the country level. This implies that UNDP country offices need to wait until promised funding has been disbursed, while UNHCR country offices are pre-financed. In comparison, UNHCR’s funding is more predictable and stable, but less flexible than UNDP’s funding (Lawry-White 2017:20). Currently, UNHCR and UNDP are in a process of restructuring their financial and organizational processes, which may have implications for potential collaboration in terms of financing nexus programmes. For instance, UNHCR is decentralizing its organizational structure, which involves “(i) the relocation of bureaux from Headquarters to new and re-profiled regional bureaux in their respective regions; (ii) the consolidation of a number of existing regional structures into the regional bureaux; and (iii) strengthening several country operations, including through the establishment of multi-country offices” (UNHCR 2019e:8). UNDP has redesigned its pooled thematic funding windows to mobilize adequate and predictable resources in line with its strategic plan (UNDP 2019c). Further exploration is needed into how these organizational adjustments, among others, bridge administrative barriers and facilitate potential complementarities between the two agencies.

<sup>31</sup> “Some 130 people were interviewed, including country offices of the two organisations in ten selected countries” (Lawry-White 2017:v).



## Differences and complementarities

The organizational differences, and particularly the limited predictability of UNDP's funding, have caused frustrations in joint initiatives. In several cases UNDP has been unable to mobilize resources for joint initiatives, and "collaboration has tended to founder" (Lawry-White 2017:19). The TSI is an illustrative example. In the initial budget (USD 26.27 million), the contributions of UNHCR and UNDP were envisioned as relatively balanced (48 percent and 52 percent, respectively). With USD 14.77 million, the executed budget was significantly smaller, primarily because UNDP was able only to raise USD 2.6 million (19 percent of what it had pledged). UNHCR, in contrast, raised 96 percent of the funds it had committed to, which was equivalent to 82 percent of the executed budget. Therefore, UNHCR also took over responsibilities that were initially supposed to be addressed by UNDP, which led to disparities between the two agencies. The unequal commitment to the TSI of the two agencies is partly explained by the fact that for UNHCR the initiative was a priority, while UNDP considered it to be "a small percentage of the total budget" of its operations (Econometría 2016:27,69,84).

UNHCR's ability to raise funds for displacement situations is a major motivation for UNDP to increase collaboration. As the TSI illustrates, "UNDP tends not to be well funded for displacement issues" (Lawry-White 2017:19) and depends on UNHCR's resources and fundraising capacities. However, UNDP is expanding its engagement and reported that it was involved in 125 displacement-related initiatives with an overall funding envelope of about USD 1.3 billion since 2011.<sup>32</sup> Until UNDP can reliably generate substantial financial resources for displacement situations, "it must add value [to collaborations] through its technical expertise and its networks" (Lawry-White 2017:36). One example emphasized by UNHCR is UNDP's "understanding of government machinery, including finance and budget processes". The importance of this expertise regarding the alignment of services and the inclusion of forcibly displaced persons into NDPs and systems highlights a valuable complementarity between UNHCR and UNDP. Furthermore, UNHCR acknowledges "that its short planning and funding horizons do not provide the basis for durable solutions in the long term" (Lawry-White 2017:17–18), which is particularly problematic in the context of protracted displacement. Therefore, UNHCR initiated Multi-Year and Multi-Partner (MYMP) strategies. Such collaborations with UNDP and other development actors are supposed to allow for a responsible operational disengagement of UNHCR. It should be noted that UNHCR's disengagement is likely to decrease the overall funding, which is problematic if needs increase rather than decrease (Lawry-White 2017:21).

## Competition

A challenge to the operationalization of the complementarities between UNHCR's and UNDP's financial systems is competition over financial resources. Since both agencies are frequently underfunded, particularly in protracted situations, competition over shares of humanitarian and pooled funds emerge. Sometimes competition is driven by donors, who fund "various agencies to undertake similar tasks without requiring coordination between the organisations concerned and without donors coordinating between themselves" (Lawry-White 2017:22). Japan is one of the few donors that attempted to address this issue by calling for joint proposals from UNHCR and UNDP in 2016. The two agencies asked their country representatives to meet and discuss "how to build upon current collaboration toward joint programming" (Lawry-White 2017:23). In most cases, the country teams were "unwilling, unable, or unsure of whether, or how, to produce a joint proposal" (Lawry-White 2017:23). This feedback from country teams emphasizes once more that inter-agency collaboration is not only a question of funding, but of organizational mandates and mentalities.

<sup>32</sup> The study also mentions that "UNDP's access to funds for displacement situations may improve in the future. For example, the objective of the OECD's Temporary Working Group on Refugees and Migration is to: 'Support the capacity of DAC members to deliver whole-of-government solutions in developing countries of origin, transit and destination, with a particular focus on delivering better quality results on the ground.'" (Lawry-White 2017:36).



## Experiences from joint initiatives

There have been various UNDP-UNHCR programme collaborations in addition to the TSI, including the Syria Crisis 3RP.<sup>33</sup> Generally, the “3RP takes advantage of a wide range of funding mechanisms, from budget support, bilateral contributions to multi-windows thematic trust funds and UN agency pass-through mechanisms in an attempt to ensure financial predictability” (Lawry-White 2017:9). There were “more than 240 Partners working through the 2017-2018 3RP framework, either appealing directly for funding, as partners of appealing agencies, or as part of the broader platform of policy, advocacy and delivery” (Lawry-White 2017:9). The diverse financing and funding landscape of the 3RP deserves further inquiry to identify what works and what does not (also see box 2). A response to the survey conducted by Lawry-White (2017:10) indicates that, in some countries, “the response and funding has remained siloed” and “UNDP and UNHCR collaboration...[has] not led yet to joint programming or coordinated alignment between programmes”. More recent evaluations may reveal a different picture. Besides that, joint initiatives such as the 3RP, the TSI and Regional Refugee Plans (RRPs) would benefit from more systematic headquarters and regional coordination of and support for resource mobilization, for instance to ensure sustainability and flexibility. For that purpose, UNHCR and UNDP are currently developing a Joint Resource Mobilization Plan (UNHCR and UNDP 2020b draft).

Although it is not a joint initiative, UNHCR’s Solutions Capital Initiative is a promising attempt to mobilize resources for comprehensive programming. Still in progress, it should be examined closely to derive lessons learned and build on in-country experience (see box 8).

### Box 8. Solutions Capital Initiative

Following the New York Declaration and the GCR, UNHCR launched the Solutions Capital Initiative, which is an attempt to mobilize funding for MYMP strategies. The initiative focuses on five countries, including Malawi, for which donors are asked to commit to contributions of at least an additional USD 3 million annually in 2019, 2020 and 2021. It is noted that “all operations benefited from softly earmarked and unearmarked contributions” (UNHCR 2018:8)

In Malawi, “UNHCR will be embarking on additional resource mobilization efforts for partners, including Government to raise the needed funds” (UNHCR 2018:17), next to its own fundraising effort. These efforts will take on various forms including joint appeals and proposal submission to donors with other partners. At regional level, a joint proposal with IOM and UNODC on mixed migration is currently in preparation. At country level, UNHCR takes every opportunity to submit funding requests and proposals to local embassies and donors in Malawi. Enhanced partnership in resource mobilization is also underway with WFP Malawi, through the issuance of joint funding appeals and collaborative strategizing. In addition, UNHCR supports efforts of the Resident Coordinator to mobilize the needed resources for the new UNDAF 2019-2022 in support of the Malawi Growth and Development Strategy III (2018-2022).

(UNHCR 2018:71)

The Solutions Capital Initiative is intended to facilitate and harness donor commitments to more comprehensive nexus programming. As such, the Initiative should be examined closely to identify lessons learned and build on in-country experience.

## The Peacebuilding Fund

The Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) was established in 2006, funds projects up to three years in duration and is relevant to triple nexus programming (UNDG 2020). It funds priorities that build lasting peace through projects that:

- respond to imminent threats to the peace process and support peace agreements and political dialogue;
- develop national capacities to promote coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflict;
- stimulate economic revitalization to generate peace dividends; and
- re-establish essential administrative services.

<sup>33</sup> Other joint initiatives, for example, are the Regional Refugee Response Plans (RRRPs) for the DRC and Nigeria.

Currently UNDP and UNHCR, in partnership with UNICEF and IOM, have a two-year programme in West Darfur in Sudan to promote durable solutions for forcibly displaced populations (including IDPs), support peace and stability, and provide tangible peace dividends for the local communities (PBF 2019).

## The World Bank

The World Bank is an important partner in situations of protracted displacement, particularly through the International Development Association (IDA), which is the largest source of concessional finance. Acknowledging fragility, conflict and violence as central obstacles to social and economic development, the World Bank doubled the resources channelled through the IDA in its eighteenth replenishment (UN and World Bank 2018:xi). The loans and grants provided by the IDA finance a range of development activities including primary education, basic health services, clean water and sanitation, agriculture, business climate improvements, infrastructure and institutional reforms. The IDA also provides a Crisis Response Window (CRW) and, most importantly, a Regional Sub-Window for Refugees and Host Communities (RSW). A progress report on the World Bank's IDA funding windows from September 2019 notes that the demand for the new sub-window has been lower than anticipated during the first two years and is not expected to be fully exhausted (World Bank 2019a). However, "as the number of eligible countries may increase slightly in the coming years, the demand for RSW financing is expected to be significant in IDA 19" (World Bank 2019a:6). Usually, a country's relative poverty determines whether it is eligible to receive support from the IDA, but there are additional criteria for specific windows.<sup>34</sup> To be eligible for the RSW, countries need to: (i) host at least 25,000 refugees, or refugees must amount to at least 0.1 percent of its population; (ii) have an adequate framework for the protection of refugees; and (iii) have an action plan or strategy with concrete steps, including possible policy reforms for long-term solutions that benefit refugees and host communities (World Bank 2020a). According to the World Bank, of the countries examined as part of this report, only Malawi is currently considered to be eligible (World Bank 2020b).

UNHCR collaboration with the World Bank primarily takes place on a strategic level, for example in terms of joint analysis. In most instances these collaborations have not followed a formalized path but evolved organically. In line with the allocation mechanisms of the IDA, the 2017 Lawry-White study explains that World Bank funds "do not generally flow to UNHCR but come as concessionary loans or grants to middle income or developing country governments" (Lawry-White 2017:13) and are typically aimed at developmental objectives such as building resilience of refugees and IDPs by creating job and livelihood opportunities. For example, in Mauritania, the World Bank funded improvements to the national health care system for refugee and hosts communities. However, the availability of development funding for health care means that humanitarian donors are reluctant to continue to provide funding for health care for refugees. As it takes time to improve the national health care system in Mauritania to be able to include the refugees as patients, there is a risk that the gap between humanitarian and development funding creates a temporary gap in health care. This illustrates the need to manage the funding transition from humanitarian to developmental budgets. In this regard, strategic collaboration between the World Bank, UNHCR and UNDP is crucial for joint UNHCR-UNDP proposals to tap into World Bank funding via governments.

## 6.2 Conclusions

Financing the nexus requires a collective effort to align "existing sources of humanitarian, development and peacebuilding funding in a more strategic manner" (OCHA 2019). Stakeholders—including donors,

<sup>34</sup> Relative poverty is defined as gross national income (GNI) per capita below an established threshold and updated annually (USD 1,175 in fiscal year 2020) (World Bank 2020b).

governments, international organizations and local NGOs—need to explore jointly “how different aid instruments can be combined most appropriately in different situations to address both short-term acute needs and the underlying constraints” to development and peace (Levine et al. 2019).<sup>35</sup> A mix of instruments that cover different timeframes and take the particularities of a context into account is most likely to be the most appropriate approach to financing the nexus. The variety of instruments, mechanisms and donor initiatives, as well as the bureaucracy and financial structures of organizations (not only UNHCR and UNDP) highlight that in practice this can be an extremely challenging task.

The draft Joint Resource Mobilization Plan (April 2020, UNHCR and UNDP 2020b draft) is intended to enable “the two organizations to speak with one voice to donors, avoid piecemeal efforts, prioritize the need to strengthen joint capacities; create a sense of ownership and accountability, support better planned, up-front pipelined resources; assist in directing resources to key joint activities; and ultimately lead to joint results and impact” (UNHCR and UNDP 2020). In delivering upon these ambitions, it is crucial to consider cross-cutting issues concerning the nexus, such as gender equality and climate change, as well as the Covid-19 pandemic that is currently evolving and will most likely accompany humanitarian, development and peace action in the years to come.

The OECD provides a step-by-step guideline for the development of financing strategies, which can be used as a practical tool (see annex 8.5).

#### Recommendations on financing the HDP nexus:

- UNDP and UNHCR should lobby donors to facilitate strategic alignment of budget lines instead of contributing to the fragmentation of the funding landscape by creating new funds, mechanisms and instruments.
- UNDP and UNHCR should lobby donors to expand their commitments to flexible and multiyear funding, particularly for humanitarian assistance in protracted situations.
- UNDP and UNHCR, along with donor governments and other stakeholders, should revisit their assumptions concerning the financial requirements for nexus programming in contexts of protracted displacement.
- Non-ODA resource streams, such as remittances and financing from IFIs, should be considered in planning, resource mobilization and financial tracking.
- Joint resource mobilization efforts, such as the GHRP for Covid-19, and the funding modalities in joint programmes (for example the 3RP) should be assessed to derive further lessons and work toward best practices.
- Map credible joint solutions for protracted displacement that attract funding and funds that are only (or primarily) accessible through joint proposals.
- Donors and other stakeholders should be included in debates about financing the nexus to tailor joint initiatives to specific mechanisms and wider financing trends.
- Lead by example to jointly develop context-specific financing strategies on the ground and invest in institutional learning to capture lessons learned and work toward best practices.
- The role of the World Bank in contexts of protracted displacement and its implications for the activities of UNHCR and UNDP deserves further inquiry.

<sup>35</sup> Levine et al. (2019) also state: “Funding instruments alone cannot achieve miracles; changing programmes’ timeframes may be sensible but is not revolutionary. The scale of the resilience challenge is huge – bringing populations sustainably out of poverty is a generational project. The Ethiopia droughts from 2014–2017 led to asset losses among pastoralists of an estimated GBP 206 million just in one studied zone (Levine, Kusnierek and Sida, 2019); there are only four DFID country programmes globally that spend more than this on an annual basis” (p. 4). At the time of writing the GBP:USD exchange rate was GBP 1: USD 1.17, but over time the rate has fluctuated.

## 7. Conclusions

In the last decade, the size of the world's forcibly displaced population has almost doubled (UNHCR 2020d) and the numbers of people in situations of protracted displacement is increasing. Displacement has become more complicated, involving multiple stages, and comprising groups that come under different legal and policy frameworks. Determining the legal status and therefore protection framework for displaced populations in a particular area is problematic. Humanitarian assistance, rather than being a short-term measure to save lives, is being provided to displaced populations for long periods of time. As such, it does not facilitate development and self-reliance among displaced populations, although many displaced people make efforts to ameliorate their own situations by seeking paid work and improving their living conditions. The conflicts and crises that cause displacement are becoming prolonged and more complicated, and often have regional impacts, such as the Syria and Venezuela crises. Consequently, it is widely recognized within the international community, including among UN entities and donors, that the traditional responses for displaced populations are no longer sufficient. More holistic, comprehensive and flexible approaches that can be adapted to specific contexts and address the multiple needs of displaced populations and host governments and authorities are needed. In some instance, responses need regional approaches and should include interventions to address root causes of displacement, as well as mitigate against potential future displacement.

As a result, the HDP nexus is being proposed as an approach for protracted displacement because it aims to address the humanitarian needs of displaced and host populations while simultaneously promoting development, strengthening governance systems in hosting countries and seeking to tackle the root causes of displacement and any tensions between host and displaced populations.

Although not new, there is no agreement about how to combine humanitarian, development and peace actions, and among many there is concern that the different activities may negatively impact on each other rather than being mutually reinforcing to achieve enhanced outcomes. There is little consensus about the content of nexus programming, how best to coordinate it or the role of governments. Particularly problematic is the lack of consensus about the scope of the peace pillar and whether it should comprise hard and soft peace interventions. If agreement is reached, it could have implications for funding and coordination mechanisms. The various stakeholders delivering assistance are guided, not only by different ideologies, but by different mindsets, areas of expertise and institutional mandates. Even if there is a will to change and work with other sectors, it could take time to develop the necessary understanding and design appropriate coordination mechanisms, etc. In addition, there is a lack of conclusive evidence that the HDP nexus yields the anticipated results. Current guidance on operationalizing the nexus closely mirrors other best practice guidelines rather than suggesting new processes. Previous incarnations of similar comprehensive approaches include human security, early recovery and stabilization interventions. There are few examples of successes from these initiatives, particularly at the national level.

Despite the lack of clarity on the substance of a triple nexus approach and evidence that it can be successful, there are significant organizational and policy shifts, particularly in the United Nations and among donors, to support a nexus approach. The NWoW, aiming to link relief and development interventions, and the UN twin resolutions on sustaining peace, which call for comprehensive approaches to conflict and crises, provide a foundation for a nexus approach that did not exist for previous comprehensive approaches. Restructuring within the United Nations and of coordination mechanisms facilitates coordination and collaboration. The SDGs, which themselves implicitly adopt a nexus approach, are being used to galvanize the efforts of the different UN entities. Specifically related to displacement is the GCR which, unlike the SDGs, explicitly promotes a nexus approach. The efforts within the United Nations to promote and support an HDP nexus have created the perception that it is

a UN initiative, whereas in fact it grew out of the WHS and the Grand Bargain, and is intended to be owned by a range of stakeholders including NGOs and civil society.

Donors and IFIs, including the World Bank, express interest in adopting a triple nexus approach to conflict and crises including forced displacement, as they are anxious to move away from cycles of humanitarian assistance to promote longer-term development, security and stability. There have been shifts in funding policy and mechanisms to provide more flexible, multiyear funding that is required for comprehensive approaches such as the triple nexus. However, at the same time, donors want to protect their own agendas and often earmark funding. Financing responses to displacement are also being advocated, as well as the engagement of the private sector. Commentators also note that the assistance community fails to capture and/or acknowledge the remittances and finance support from local business and organizations, as these fall outside ODA data. Overlooking such financial sources could mean that opportunities are being missed. It remains to be seen whether changes to donor policy and funding will facilitate nexus approaches.

In response to the increasingly protracted and complex nature of displacement, UNDP and UNHCR are seeking opportunities to collaborate and adopt a triple nexus approach. The two agencies have a history of collaboration in situations of displacement and, arguably, past and present interventions were based on a triple nexus approach. The 3RP, although presented initially as a framework linking relief and development, contains elements that would fall under peace activities in a nexus approach. The agencies are also keen to adopt longer-term approaches, and UNHCR is in the process of developing a concept for including displaced populations into national systems. While inclusion into national systems may provide more stability and regularize the situation for displaced and host populations, it may cost as much as—if not more than—operating parallel systems for host and displaced populations, which may deter donors from supporting inclusion approaches. In Mauritania, efforts to include refugees into national health care systems faced problems because the humanitarian funding for refugee health care became difficult to secure in the interim period while national systems were being upgraded to absorb additional people at an appropriate standard of service.

UNDP and UNHCR have the programmatic scope to operationalize the HDP nexus jointly and with partners. The GCR and the SDGs provide a framework within which the two agencies can develop a triple nexus approach. Definition of the scope of the peace pillar for UNHCR and UNDP can be based on their interventions, but this may not align with the scope agreed by donors and other actors. UNDP and UNHCR must be ready to respond to any changes in funding and coordination mechanisms that follow agreement on the scope of the peace pillar.

Echoing shifts in the United Nations at large, UNDP and UNHCR have also been undergoing restructuring and expanding areas of expertise, as well as initiating a joint action plan in 2017. Whether these changes are enough to overcome obvious differences in priorities, planning horizons and access to funding is unclear. An additional challenge for the two organizations in increasing collaboration in situations of displacement/protracted displacement are the perceptions of their responsibilities and scope of work by external stakeholders. The view that UNHCR focuses on protection and humanitarian assistance of refugees, and that UNDP is limited to development activities among host and other populations that are not displaced, can limit access to appropriate funding for working together, restrict which populations can be included in responses, curtail the adoption of more comprehensive approaches and prevent access to the most relevant host government authorities for developing more complex interventions.

UNDP and UNHCR staff recognize that successful collaboration is driven by leadership, particularly at the country level, and that good leadership is not enough to overcome all contextual challenges and a lack of adequate funding. The two agencies have significant organizational differences, practices and

objectives, and collaboration creates transactional costs. The agencies must determine how to manage these costs to ensure that the positive impact of the programming justifies the effort involved in collaborating and initiating a triple nexus approach. They should strive to achieve a better understanding of organizational complementarities and comparative advantages in joint/complementary programming and resource mobilization. Interventions must be based on extensive research and analysis to develop insights into the context, identify needs and entry points, and develop longer-term plans that address root causes of problems and mitigate against new ones arising.

Key areas for UNDP and UNHCR collaboration are legal identity and protection, and governance and RoL, as these issues are not only interdependent, but determine how all other initiatives can be developed for displaced and host populations and for host governments and authorities. Access to livelihoods and employment opportunities, as well as social protection, are also often limited for displaced populations by host government policy. Without the means to support themselves, displaced populations are dependent on long-term assistance. Interventions here for UNDP and UNHCR are multifaceted, as they require the creation of the necessary labour force through education and training; a demand for labour through the development of new economic sectors and employment opportunities; and advocacy with donors and host governments to support such initiatives by explaining their long-term benefits.

There will, undoubtedly, be challenges for UNDP and UNHCR as they continue to collaborate in situations of displacement and protracted displacement. However, the traditional responses to displacement are inadequate to promote long-term development and address the root causes of displacement. It is time to explore other approaches, and the United Nations has made significant organizational and policy changes to facilitate the move toward more comprehensive approaches that promote the triple nexus, while donors have also stated their intentions to support the nexus. This scoping study informs the development of a ToC for the two agencies, based on the triple nexus, for use in situations of protracted displacement. It provides the concepts, definitions, case studies and detailed analyses that underpin the ToC (UNRISD 2020) and should be read as a resource document for it.

## 8. Annexes

### Annex 8.1. Abbreviations and Acronyms

3RP	Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (in Response to the Syria Crisis)
AU	African Union
BMZ	German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
CCA	common country analysis
CAR	Central African Republic
CBPF	Country-Based Pooled Funds
CDP	Country Development Plan
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
CIC	Center on International Cooperation
CRISP	Sustainable Resettlement and Complementary Pathways Initiative
CRRF	Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework
CRW	Crisis Response Window
CVE	countering violent extremism
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DDR	disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
DFID	Department for International Development of the United Kingdom
DG DEVCO	Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development
DI	Development Initiatives
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DRR	disaster risk reduction
DPPA	United Nations Department of Political and Peacekeeping Affairs
EC	European Commission
ECHO	European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
EGMS	Expert Group on Migration Statistics
ESSN	Emergency Social Safety Net
EU	European Union
EUR	Euro (currency)
EUTF	European Trust Fund
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
FDFA	Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FriT	Facility for Refugees in Turkey
FTS	Financial Tracking Services
GBP	UK pound sterling (currency)
GCR	Global Compact on Refugees
GHRP	Global Humanitarian Response Plan
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
GNI	Gross National Income
GoL	Government of Lebanon
GoM	Government of Malawi
GRF	Global Refugee Forum
GRP	gross regional product
HDP	Humanitarian-Development-Peace
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan
HRW	Human Rights Watch
HSD	Human Security Division of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDA	International Development Association



IDP	internally displaced person
IFI	international financial institution
IHL	international humanitarian law
ILO	International Labour Organization
INGO	International non-governmental organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IRRI	International Refugee Rights Initiative
ITS	informal tented settlements
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
JSC	Joint Steering Committee to Advance Humanitarian and Development Collaboration
LCRP	Lebanon Crisis Response Plan
LPDC	Lebanese Palestinian Dialogue Committee
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MEAL	monitoring, evaluation, accountability and learning
MFF	Multiannual Financial Framework
MoI	Ministry of the Interior
MPTF	Multi-Partner Trust Fund
MoFSP	Ministry of Family and Social Policy
MoLSAMD	Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled
MSB	Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency
MYA	Multi-Year Appeal
MYMP	Multi-Year and Multi-Partner
NDP	National Development Plan
NGO	non-governmental organization
NRB	National Registration Bureau
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
NWoW	New Ways of Working
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	official development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OHA	Official Humanitarian Assistance
PBF	Peacebuilding Fund
PPMU	Programme Planning and Monitoring Unit
PRL	Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon
PRS	Palestinian Refugees from Syria
PVE	preventing violent extremism
RACE	reaching all children with education
RCM	Refugee Coordination Model
RoL	rule of law
RRP	Refugee Response Plan
RMRP	Refugee and Migrant Response Plan
RRRP	Regional Refugee Response Plan
RSHM	Recovery Solutions and Human Mobility
RSW	Regional Sub-Window for Refugees and Host Communities
SAG	Strategic Advisory Group
SALAM	Support Afghanistan Livelihoods and Mobility
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SDO	senior development officer
SECO	Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs
SGBV	sexual and gender-based violence
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SSR	security sector reform

SU	Stabilisation Unit
TDA	Transitional Development Assistance
ToC	Theory of Change
TRC	Turkish Red Crescent
TSI	Transitional Solutions Initiative
TVET	technical and vocational education and training
UN	United Nations
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDG	United Nations Development Group
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNRISD	United Nations Research Institute for Sustainable Development
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UNSDCF	United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework
UNSDG	United Nations Sustainable Development Group
UNTFHS	United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security
USD	US dollar (currency)
USIP	United States Institute of Peace
VASyR	Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon
WASH	water, sanitation and hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
WHS	World Humanitarian Summit
WFP	World Food Programme

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**Annex 8.3. Respondents and Meetings**

Date (2020)	Name	Position	Organization
30 March	Kaori Kawarabayashi	Senior Partnerships Officer	UNHCR, Geneva
1 April	Henny Ngu		UNDP, Geneva
2 April	Nabila Hameed	Senior Evaluation Officer	UNHCR
7 April	Johannes Tarvainen	Crisis Bureau	UNDP, New York
10 April	Johannes Zech	Senior Partnership Officer	UNHCR, New York
10 April	Laura Rio	Chief of Section, Livelihoods and Resilience Unit	UNDP, Afghanistan
15 April	Sakiko Yoshinami	Senior Development Officer	UNHCR, Lebanon
15 April	Carol Ann Sparks		UNHCR, Lebanon
15 April	Karel Chromy		UNHCR, Lebanon
15 April	Layal Abul Darwich		UNHCR, Lebanon
16 April	Rachel Scott		UNDP (Former OECD)
17 April	Gloria Muleba Mukama	Protection Officer	UNHCR, Malawi
17 April	Rani Mitchmael Cole		UNHCR, Malawi
19 April	Anne Landouzy-Sanders	Assistant Representative	UNHCR, Afghanistan
19 April	Mohammad Pervez Jalili		UNHCR, Afghanistan
19 April	Malang Ibrahim		UNHCR, Afghanistan
20 April	Hugh Macleman	Conflict & Fragility Advisor, Head of the International Network on Conflict and Fragility Secretariat	OECD, Paris
20 April	Yasmine Rockenfeller	Senior Policy Advisor, Crises and Fragility	OECD, Paris
20 April	Cushla Thompson	Public Finance and Development Economist	OECD, Paris
21 April	Christian Bauderer	Senior Partnerships Officer, Division of External Relations	UNHCR, Geneva
21 April	Andrew Mitchell	Social Protection Division of Resilience and Solutions	UNHCR, Geneva
22 April	Jelvas Musau	Operations Manager	UNHCR, Pretoria
22 April	Abdou Savadogo		UNHCR, Pretoria
22 April	Jenny Beth Bistoyong	Livelihoods	UNHCR, Pretoria
22 April	Helen Morris		UNHCR, Pretoria
22 April	Sanaz Jahanshahi		UNHCR, Pretoria
23 April	David Khoudour	Regional Migration Advisor	UNDP, Panama City
27 April	Thomas Liebig	Senior Migration Specialist,	OECD, Paris
28 April	Laura Buffoni	Social Cohesion	UNHCR, Pretoria
29 April	Paloma Blanch		UNDP, Colombia
30 April	Anna Vitkova	Resilience Support Officer	UNDP, Sub Regional Response Facility, Amman
30 April	Nathalie Bouche	Senior Strategic Advisor	UNDP, Sub Regional Response Facility, Amman
30 April	Rawhi Afaghani	Governance and Peacebuilding Team Leader	UNDP, Regional Hub, Amman
30 April	Miki Takahashi	Monitoring and Evaluation Officer	UNDP, Sub Regional Response Facility, Amman
30 April	Verena Vad		UNDP, Sub Regional Response Facility, Amman
30 April	Filippo Caruso		UNDP, Malawi
30 April	Tariq Malik		UNDP, Malawi

30 April	Monica Rijal	Conflict Prevention, Crisis Bureau	UNDP, New York
30 April	Aparna Baysnat	Governance and RoL, Crisis Bureau	UNDP, New York
30 April	Amit Gill	Governance and RoL, Crisis Bureau	UNDP, New York
30 April	Marije Van Kempe	Partnerships Officer, Division of Resilience and Solutions	UNHCR, Geneva
5 May	Owen Shumba	Recovery Solutions and Human Mobility, Crisis Bureau: Livelihoods	UNDP, New York
5 May	Luca Renda	Head Recovery Solutions and Human Mobility, Crisis Bureau	UNDP, New York
6 May	Ryan Marshall		UNHCR, Amman
6 May	Elina Faber Silén	Senior Inter-Agency Coordinator	UNDP, Lebanon
11 May	Fadi Abilmona	Programme Manager, Crisis Prevention and Recovery	UNDP, Lebanon
12 May	Sanny Ramos Jegillos	Regional Advisor Disaster Risk Reduction and Recovery	UNDP, Bangkok
13 May	Romano Lasker	Programme Specialist, Crisis and Fragility Policy Engagement Team Crisis Bureau	UNDP, New York
13 May	Pia Hänni		SDC (Switzerland)
14 May	Marina Lo Giudice	Senior Technical Advisor	UNDP, Lebanon

Note: RoL – rule of law.

## Steering Committee meetings

Date	Present
19 Mar 2020	Katja Hujo, Maggie Carter, Paul Ladd, Sebastian Weishaupt, Rebecca Roberts, Kaori Kawarabayashi, Johannes Tarvainen (partially) and Henny Ngu (partially)
29 April 2020	Katja Hujo, Maggie Carter, Paul Ladd, Sebastian Weishaupt, Rebecca Roberts, Kaori Kawarabayashi, Johannes Tarvainen and Henny Ngu
24 June 2020	Katja Hujo, Maggie Carter, Paul Ladd, Sebastian Weishaupt, Rebecca Roberts, Kaori Kawarabayashi, Johannes Tarvainen and Henny Ngu


# Annex 8.4. UNDP and UNHCR Commitments to the GCR and SDG

ToC: Integrated Solutions	Pillars					Cross-Cutting Issues			
	Basic Needs	Services	Livelihoods/ Employment	Governance	Hard Peace	Legal Protection	Social Cohesion	Gender & Diversity	Environmental Management
<b>GCR</b>	<b>78–79</b> Accommodation, energy & NRM <b>80–81</b> Food security & nutrition	<b>72–73</b> Health <b>68–69</b> Education	<b>70–71</b> Jobs/livelihoods Specific UNDP GCR pledge	<b>84</b> Fostering good relations & peaceful coexistence <b>97–98</b> Local integration	<b>8–9</b> Preventing & addressing root causes	<b>59–60</b> Attending specific needs <b>61–63</b> Identify protection needs <b>97–98</b> Local integration	<b>8–9</b> Preventing & addressing root causes <b>97–98</b> Local integration Specific UNDP GRF pledge	<b>74–75</b> Women/girls/PwD <b>76–77</b> Children, adolescents, youth	<b>8–9</b> Preventing & addressing root causes <b>78–79</b> Accommodation, energy & NRM
<b>SDG UNHCR</b>	<b>1</b> No poverty <b>2</b> No hunger <b>7</b> Affordable & clean energy	<b>1</b> No poverty <b>3</b> Health <b>4</b> Education <b>6</b> Clean water sanitation <b>7</b> Affordable & clean energy <b>11</b> Sustainable cities & communities	<b>8</b> Work & economic growth	<b>10</b> Reduce inequalities <b>16</b> Peace, justice & strong institutions	<b>10</b> Reduce inequalities <b>16</b> Peace, justice & strong institutions	<b>10</b> Reduce inequalities <b>16</b> Peace, justice & strong institutions	<b>10</b> Reduce inequalities <b>16</b> Peace, justice & strong institutions	<b>5</b> Gender equality	<b>7</b> Affordable & clean energy <b>13</b> Climate action
<b>SDG UNDP</b>	<b>1</b> No poverty <b>7</b> Affordable & clean energy	<b>1 (1.4)</b> No poverty <b>7</b> Affordable & clean energy <b>11</b> Sustainable cities & communities	<b>8</b> Work & economic growth	<b>10</b> Reduce inequalities <b>16</b> Peace, justice & strong institutions	<b>10</b> Reduce inequalities <b>16</b> Peace, justice & strong institutions	<b>10</b> Reduce inequalities <b>16</b> Peace, justice & strong institutions	<b>10</b> Reduce inequalities <b>16</b> Peace, justice & strong institutions	<b>5</b> Gender equality	<b>13</b> Climate action <b>15</b> Life on land

Note: UNDP has an integrator role for the SDGs and UNHCR a catalytic and supporter role for the GCR (GCR, para 101). GCR–Global Compact on Refugees; GRF–Global Refugee Forum; NRM–natural resource management; PwD–Persons with Disabilities; SDG–Sustainable Development Goal; ToC–Theory of Change.


## Annex 8.5. Guidelines for developing financing tools

Source: OECD (2018c)



## Annex 8.6. Theory of Change for Cash Transfer Programme for Displaced Syrian Children in Lebanon

Source: De Hoop et al. (2018)



Note: RACE–reaching all children with education; PPM– Programme Planning and Monitoring Unit; SMS–short message service–TVET, technical and vocational education and training.