



UNRISD

United Nations Research Institute for Social Development

Draft Paper

New Directions in Social Policy

Decentralization and Social Innovations in Africa

Dele Olowu

Research carried out for the UNRISD project
New Directions in Social Policy:
Alternatives for and from the Global South

December 2018



The United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) is an autonomous research institute within the UN system that undertakes multidisciplinary research and policy analysis on the social dimensions of contemporary development issues. Through our work we aim to ensure that social equity, inclusion and justice are central to development thinking, policy and practice.

UNRISD, Palais des Nations
1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland

Tel: +41 (0)22 9173020
info.unrisd@un.org
www.unrisd.org

Copyright © United Nations Research Institute for Social Development

This is not a formal UNRISD publication. The responsibility for opinions expressed in signed studies rests solely with their author(s), and availability on the UNRISD website (www.unrisd.org) does not constitute an endorsement by UNRISD of the opinions expressed in them. No publication or distribution of these papers is permitted without the prior authorization of the author(s), except for personal use.

Contents

List of Figures, Tables and Boxes	i
Acronyms	ii
Abstract/Summary	iii
Introduction	1
1. Conceptualization and Context of Decentralization	2
1.1 Review of decentralization theories: participation, fiscal decentralization and political economy	3
1.1.1 Participatory democratic theory	3
1.1.2 Fiscal decentralization theory	4
1.1.3 Political economy theory	5
1.1.4 Trends of decentralization at global and regional level with a focus on Africa	6
2. Justification for the Research	6
2.1 Analytical framework	6
2.2 Significance of the research	7
3. Case Study Analysis of Decentralization and Social Provisioning from Three African Countries	8
3.1 COMMUNITY-BASED HEALTH INSURANCE AND DECENTRALIZATION IN RWANDA	8
3.1.1 Background	8
3.1.2 The role and impact of decentralization	9
3.1.3 Institutional features: Some pertinent issues	10
3.2 DECENTRALIZATION AND UNIVERSAL PRIMARY EDUCATION IN UGANDA	12
3.2.1 Background	12
3.2.2 Decentralization and local government structure	13
3.2.3 Some pertinent institutional issues of Ugandan decentralization and UPE central government driven reform	14
3.3 DECENTRALIZATION AND UNIVERSAL PRIMARY EDUCATION SERVICE IN NIGERIA 1976-1993	19
Introduction	19
Decentralization and UPE: The federal initiative of 1976-1993	20
Explaining differential civilian performance in the pre- and post-military eras	23
Regional education policy 1955	24
4. Critical Lessons Emerging from These Experiences	26
5. Conclusion	28
References	29

List of Figures, Tables and Boxes

Figure 1: Decentralization	2
Table 1: Categories of local government councils	14
Table 2: Classification of local government revenue by percentage share (2010/11 to 2014/15)	18
Figure 2: Total number of public primary schools, 1959 to 1989	23
Table 3: Statutory revenue allocation formula (%)	24
Table 4: Recurrent education budget and regional budget, 1954-1966	25
Table 5: Enrolment in primary school in the Western region by sex, 1953-1960	25

Acronyms

AG	Action Group
CAO	Chief Administrative Officer
CBHI	Community Based Health Insurance
CG	Capitation Grant
CHW	Community Health Workers
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DES	District Executive Secretaries
DHU	District health unit
DPA	Distributable Pool Account
EAO	Education Administrative Officer
EPRC	Education Policy Review Commission
ESCC	Education Sector Consultative Committee
ESR	Education Sector Reviews
ESWG	Education Sector Working Group
FCT	Federal Capital Territory
FG	Fixed Grants
HFTWG	Health Financing Technical Working Group
HFU	Health Financing Unit
HSWG	Health Sector Working Group
JADF	Joint Action Development Forum
JBSR	Joint Budget Support Reviews
JHSR	Joint Health Sector Reviews
LG	Local government
MLG	Ministry of Local Government
MMI	Medical Military Insurance
MoES	Ministry of Education and Sports
MoH	Ministry of Health
MoLG	Ministry of Local Government
NLGCBP	National Local Government Capacity Building Policy
NPE	National Policy on Education
NRA	National Resistance Army
NRM	National Resistance Movement
OAU	Obafemi Awolowo University
OOP	Out of pocket
PAF	Poverty action fund
PBF	Performance Based Finance
RGB	Rwanda Governance Board
RHIC	Rwanda Health Insurance Council
RSSB	Rwanda Social Security Board
SFG	School Facility Grant
ToT	Training of trainers
TWG	Technical Working Group
UPE	Universal Primary Education
USAID	US Agency for International Development

Abstract/Summary

This paper presents desk research-based evidence on the relationship between social policy and the interactions between central and local institutions in three countries in Africa. Many African countries, often with donor support, have a decentralization program. After discussing three theories of decentralization, the paper examines the broad thesis that sub-national institutional capacity and institutional diversity could, under some conditions, enhance the effectiveness and impact of new social policy. The three cases include two from Eastern Africa (Community Health Insurance in Rwanda and Universal Primary Education (UPE) in Uganda) and one from Western Africa (Nigeria, UPE).

The seven main findings are instructive.

First, decentralization can and does help in the delivery of social innovation.

Second, countries adopt forms of decentralization that matches their institutional, political and economic environment in which social services are being experimented. Of these environmental forces, the most prominent is the political search for legitimacy within a changing liberal political and economic framework. It also explains why different combinations of centralization and decentralization are used for social services provisioning. The predominant trend in the three countries is de-concentration, particularly so in Rwanda. In Uganda where devolution was initially tried there has been a retreat towards recentralization as the central government sought to perpetuate its regime especially after adopting multi-party politics at the central level in 2006. In the Nigerian case, decentralization of UPE succeeded when the military promoted devolution. Even though it started to falter after they left government for civilians, great gains were made to primary school education enrolment nationally.

Devolution gives an opportunity for those in the political opposition to establish their claims to governance through social provisioning performance in their localities. The opposition used devolution powers to launch successful bids to oust the government in power in some countries throughout Africa—Zambia (Lusaka), Senegal (Dakar), Nigeria (Lagos), and presently in South African cities.

Third, even when the resources are abundant, either through domestic or donor resources, decentralized arrangements work better when several key actors (individuals and institutions) have incentives to cooperate with the program of social provisioning rather than shirk, undermine or disconnect from it. For instance, the Government of Rwanda was able to upgrade and upscale successful traditional program of community health insurance practiced in a few regions earlier with the assistance of a development partner, the USAID. Similarly, the huge success of UPE in Nigeria in the late 1970s and in an earlier period of successful UPE in one region involved several actors outside the regional government. These included the senior political and administrative elites in the regional and local governments, the citizens and most importantly the wide array of non-governmental institutions—community-based organizations, civil society and even faith-based organizations.

Fourth, successful decentralization often means a redesign of systems, processes in order to actualize policy outputs and outcomes among a variety of institutional actors.

Fifth, an effective fiscal decentralization program (incorporating local taxes and intergovernmental transfers) must be roughly proportional to decentralized functions or

social programs. Central governments must resist the temptation to use decentralization to offload responsibilities on lower level organs.

Sixth, cases of corruption have persisted after decentralized functions were transferred back to central governments. Robust upward (to the national government) and downward (to citizens) accountability arrangements help.

Seventh, development partners provide many positive inputs—finance, technical resources, training, etc.—to the success of decentralized social programs. On the other hand, donor program synchronization and lack of political clout to either understand or defend localities against partisan actions by the national government are acute problems of donor involvement.

Introduction

Social policy involves state and market, formal and informal as well as central and local institutions. This paper's objective is to provide research-based evidence on the relationship between social policy and the continuing interactions between central and local institutions in Africa. The research is based primarily on desk research using secondary sources.

Decentralization and local government revitalization have been recurring themes of governance reforms in developing countries and constituted 40% of all public-sector reform programs between 1980 and 1999 (Grindle 2002). It is a reform issue in practically all African countries (Mawhood 1983, Olowu and Wunsch 2004, Dickovick and Wunsch 2014). From the early 1990s, most of the African countries, often with the support and assistance of donors or development partners from the rich world, have had specific programs aimed at improving Africa's governance and development prospects.

In spite of some six decades or more of research on decentralization in developing countries and the pervasiveness of decentralization policies in many of these countries, the concrete results of decentralization remain in doubt. This paper reviews some of the available international evidence on the contribution of decentralized governance to social policy innovation, in some selected developing countries before a detailed case study of three social policy innovations in Eastern and Western Africa in the rest of the paper

After discussing the three theories of decentralization, namely participation, fiscal decentralization and political economy the paper examines the broad thesis that sub-national institutional capacity and institutional diversity could, under some conditions, enhance the effectiveness and impact of new social policy. We then examine the following six questions.

1. What are the drivers of decentralization, its challenges and opportunities, and how are the political dynamics played out in each country to support or undermine the implementation of a new social policy?
2. Under what conditions are local or sub-national entities effective in the collection and analysis of relevant information needed for social policy advocacy, formulation, implementation and evaluation?
3. What institutional coordination mechanisms enhance or undermine social policy formulation, implementation and evaluation between central and local entities?
4. What is the relationship between successful decentralization of social policy and the correct sequencing between fiscal and functional decentralization?
5. What is the relationship between successful decentralization and quality of human resource capacities at national and local levels?
6. How can effective accountability structures be constructed for effective social policy decentralization?


The rest of the paper is divided into four parts. In the next section, we clarify conceptual and contextual elements by defining clearly what decentralization is and the forms it takes especially as a part of reforms aimed at supporting social provisioning. The next section discusses the analytical framework including the research questions and objectives. Next, we undertake an analysis of the three cases of social provisioning that utilized a

decentralized approach. Finally, we highlight the critical lessons emerging from these experiences before the conclusion.

1. Conceptualization and Context of Decentralization

Decentralization is the assignment of public functions to subnational entities together with structures, systems, resources, and processes that support the implementation of specific public-sector goals of impacting positively on the political, social and economic context (Smoke 2015). It can come in any following three main forms: as local units of higher level governments (de-concentration); or as elected local governments with autonomous powers (devolution), or as contracts of central government functions with a public or private entity (delegation). It also has three main dimensions—administrative, fiscal, and political (World Bank 2004). Figure 1 provides a graphic representation of decentralization:

Figure 1: Decentralization



Theoretically, the degree of control or autonomy that sub-national governing institutions have on the four key elements transferred to them (*responsibility, authority, financial and human resources, and accountability*) determines the degree and form of decentralization, whether high or low. Decentralization can also be introduced comprehensively or sectorally in staggered or as a big-bang form with all reform elements planned for simultaneous take-off. There are advantages and disadvantages of these various decentralization policy choices (World Bank 2004, Olowu and Wunsch 2004).

Countries of the Global North have always treated decentralization as an intra-governmental or multi-level governance matter but difficult relations between central and local authorities led some countries of the Global South to protect the powers of local governments against national governments in their national constitutions (Shah 2006, Olowu 2012, UNDP 2013, Khulmann and Wayenberg 2016).

In spite of some six decades or more of research on decentralization in developing countries and the pervasiveness of decentralization policies in many of these countries, the concrete results of decentralization remains in doubt. In a recent article the editor of an influential development management journal, made the following observations (Smoke 2015:97):

Although decentralization has been widespread and conspicuous, its performance has been uneven, and our systematic practical knowledge of how it works is relatively modest.

He goes on to assert that earlier literature documented unsatisfactory performance while more encouraging assessments are mostly based on anecdotal instances of success or enthusiastic claims of expected benefits.

Contrary to such blanket assertions, this paper reviews some of the available international evidence on the contribution of decentralized governance to social policy innovation, in some selected developing countries before a detailed case study of three social policy innovations in Eastern and Western Africa in the rest of the paper.

1.1 Review of decentralization theories: participation, fiscal decentralization and political economy

Decentralization and local government revitalization have been recurring themes of governance reforms in developing countries and constituted 40% of all public-sector reform programs between 1980 and 1999 (Grindle 2002). It is a reform issue in practically all African countries (Mawhood 1983, Olowu and Wunsch 2004, Dickovick and Wunsch 2014). From the early 1990s, most of the African countries, often with the support and assistance of donors or development partners from the rich world, have had specific programs aimed at improving Africa's governance and development prospects. Decentralization has become a recurrent element of such development assistance and most of recipient nations have departments or ministries devoted to promoting it in their countries (Dickovick 2014, Smith 2015). In some countries this function is located at the President's or Prime Ministers' Office (Millet et al 2006).

In the search for relevance, many of these same countries began to seek for ways to make a difference to the welfare of their people through programs of social policy. This was particularly marked after the failure of structural adjustment programs and the growing feeling that governments were a part of the problem on delivering on policy. Private sector options and a wider range of social institutions including local governments, community based and faith-based organizations and a variety of civic bodies are involved in co-production of social and basic services (Ostrom et al 1991, IRAS 2016).

Three theories of decentralization are particularly relevant to our consideration of new directions in social policy. These are: the theories of democratic participation or accountability, fiscal decentralization and political economy. Each of these would be reviewed briefly below because they provide the linkage between locality and efficient and effective delivery of social innovations and services.

1.1.1 Participatory democratic theory

If all citizens must participate to make their governments accountable, representative democratic institutions at the national level would not suffice. Lower or smaller units of representation facilitate the feasibility of the participation of the maximum number of individual citizens in public decisions (Pateman 1970). Since the smallest units are likely

to also be too small to sustain themselves, natural communities' boundaries are expanded to ensure that they have the catchment for delivering crucial services (Smith 1985).

Moreover, by bringing development process close to the people, local organs of action can help to decongest government business, mobilize local energy, insights and initiative in the design and implementation of development programs. The detailed local knowledge required for the successful execution of any service is available closer to the people, as distinct from the knowledge of general scientific principles. This local indigenous knowledge is crucial to the unusual solution of complex or costly problems cheaply. Projects that involve the participation of potential users also tend to be more sustainable because they are also responsive, transparent and accountable (Uphoff and Esman 1974; Ostrom et al 1993). In these important regards, decentralization enhances social welfare—by making services more effective and efficient.

Finally, decentralization provides robust means of communication between rulers and the ruled. Local governing units constitute a training ground for the ruled in democratic decision-making for citizens and also for those prospective political leaders at the national level. In many countries, those who run for office nationally have had an exposure to governance at local or sub-national levels. A consideration that led the French aristocrat to argue that: 'local institutions are to liberty what primary schools are to science; they put it within people's reach, they teach people to appreciate a peaceful enjoyment and accustom them to make use of it. Without local institutions a nation may give itself a free government, but it has not the spirit of liberty'. (Tocqueville 1969: 62-63).

In reality, smaller governments may not have higher participation than governments with larger jurisdictions. Voter turn -out for instance at national elections is often higher than in local elections in many countries although Afrobarometer data shows that African local councilors were widely perceived as more responsive than national representatives - 31%:20% (Little and Carolyn 2009). For other arguments see Weber 1958; Smith 1985).

1.1.2 *Fiscal decentralization theory*

As economists have dominated development policy since World War II, the economic theory of decentralization has become the most influential theory on the subject. It is based on Musgrave's (1959) separation of the three major economic functions of the state into *allocation, stabilization and distribution*. While the two latter functions are better handled by central states, local organs are likely to be more effective in respect of allocation due to the nature of public goods. Through voting, community-wide demand for public services is made in the absence of a market and competitive pricing for such services. Decentralization is desirable due to preference differentiation and because expenditure decisions are tied more closely to real resource costs in smaller jurisdictions. Moreover, greater experimentation and innovation is possible in the provision of public goods.

As the issue of poverty came to the fore in developing countries, many scholars and public policy analysts argued that economic factors led to the preference for the centralization of all central government responsibilities due in part to the fact that all three functions are better organized by the national government than decentralized governments in circumstances of mass poverty (Prudhomme 1995). They argue that central governments are likely to be more efficient in collecting all taxes which may then be transferred to local communities. This has been the dominant wisdom and might be responsible in part for the continuation of fiscal centralization in most developing countries even though this

did not stop the adoption and promotion of ambitious and costly devolution reforms by many multilateral and bilateral development agencies.

The major problems of this theory as applied in Africa are as follows:

It overlooks the significance of solidarity—rich people, due to social or community affinity, are willing to pay higher taxes to raise the incomes of the poor who live in the same community with them. Indeed, the earliest local authorities even in Europe were ecclesiastical bodies, parishes or communes (Bennett 1994). The experience is aggravated in Africa where the culture of solidarity and communalism is strong.

In developing countries, the absence of clear land rights and titles makes it much more difficult to vote with one's feet. Mobility is costly economically, culturally and politically.

Central governments in developing countries are overburdened with heavy debts and even when they collect local taxes, they are unable to transfer them to the localities as expected by the law in some of the countries. Only a few countries have been able to protect transfers to their local organs and in such cases, it has been proven that local organs are effective in distribution, stabilization as well as allocation in certain circumstances (Smoke 2001).

Perhaps the most difficult challenge, however, is that a high dependency on central government funds as a decentralization strategy reinforces and sustains the paternalist attitudes of the pre-devolution era. It also has two negative incentives—transfers from the central government, especially if they are general grants without any conditions, discourages the development of local recurrent and capital incomes. Politically, it also weakens the accountability of local units of governance to the citizens, especially if the level of accountability at the national level is not so much higher than at the local level. (Guyer 1992, Olowu 2004).

1.1.3 Political economy theory

One major critique of the decentralization literature according to this latest approach is that it focuses 'more on expectations and discourse than on practice and outcomes'. The critical question to ask is to identify *the drivers of decentralization* and *those who feel threatened and therefore constrain it*. Only then can we understand why several years of supposedly devolutionary decentralization programs have led only to timid steps in the direction of de-concentration. Such findings would no doubt help us to establish whether the basic institutional infrastructures exist upon which to base the positive expectations and outcomes promised by decentralization.

The approach focuses on *actors and interests, expectations and outcomes* (Ribot 2002, Eaton et al 2013). A recent book on *Decentralization in Africa* argues that 'the impetus for decentralization will grow from the interests of those at the center (in terms of the access it gives them to state resources) rather than how effective decentralization may be as a tool for development or democracy' (Dickovick and Wunsch 2014:16). This is also true for ministries—it enables them to either gain or lose control over state resources as will be for local level officials and members of the public.

We try to make use of these three theoretical insights in this study.

1.1.4 Trends of decentralization at global and regional level with a focus on Africa

An important contrast between the Global Northern and Global Southern societies is the wide gulf that exists between the rich and poor. The absence of effective tax regimes and of robust social policy and administration systems reinforce the gap between the two groups in these Southern nations. Unfortunately, neoliberal policies of structural adjustment only aggravated matters in most cases increasing poverty and inequality at the same time in the decades of the 1980s (Adesina 2007). Attention has focused recently on the sterling efforts of national governments in the Global South to remedy the situation through innovative social provisioning.

Decentralization is one policy and management option that could theoretically help mitigate these sharp inequalities by making public services more efficient, effective, equitable and responsive. The global evidence shows that much depends on how decentralization is implemented in any national or social context.

2. Justification for the Research

2.1 Analytical framework

Decentralization is linked to political, economic and social change theories—as discussed above. Each of these theories has impact on the content and success or failure of decentralization programs to impact social innovations aimed at social protection, community solidarity and social cohesion.

To test the broad thesis that sub-national institutional capacity and institutional diversity could, under some conditions, enhance the effectiveness and impact of new social policy, the paper generated some research questions, objectives and hypotheses. Decentralized social provision is distinguished by the greater number of actors and interests that are involved in the policy process than if these services are delivered solely by the national or central government. The following questions are raised in the research, each of them underscoring a hypothesis that is tested mainly by desk research using secondary sources and a few interviews with persons that have been closely associated with these reforms in these countries as officials and/or researchers that the author has interacted with in the years he served at national and international levels as a participant observer:

What are the drivers of decentralization, its challenges and opportunities, and how are the political dynamics played out in each country to support or undermine the implementation of a new social policy? We hypothesize that actors, interests and the political dynamics determine whether or not a social policy would be successfully implemented at national or sub-national level.

Under what conditions are local or sub-national entities effective in the collection and analysis of relevant information needed for social policy advocacy, formulation, implementation and evaluation? We hypothesize that in reality it is the existence of effective human and institutional capacities at the local or sub national levels that make them effective in collecting accurate information that they feed into their own and central government social policy making processes.

What institutional coordination mechanisms enhance or undermine social policy formulation, implementation and evaluation between central and local entities? We hypothesize that intergovernmental and inter-organizational platforms are essential for

effective implementation of social policy in decentralized contexts. Such platforms incorporate both technical and political aspects of decentralization.

What is the relationship between successful decentralization of social policy and the correct sequencing between fiscal and functional decentralization? We hypothesize that effective fiscal decentralization (incorporating local taxes and intergovernmental transfers) must be roughly proportional to decentralized functions or social services, in order to underwrite the costs of social services.

What is the relationship between successful decentralization and quality of human resource capacities at national and local levels? Many decentralization programs are thought to fail due to a lack of effective capacity at local level, but we hypothesize that successful social policy decentralization would require high institutional and human capacities at national as well as at sub-national levels.

How can effective accountability structures be constructed for effective social policy decentralization? We hypothesize that social policies cannot be successfully decentralized except the principal- agent problem --of how to ensure that citizens' expectations are not short-changed by officials--is resolved.

2.2 Significance of the research

As a multidimensional and multi-institutional innovation decentralization requires time and sustained and determined actions and actors to have desired impact. For instance, Latin American countries have experienced a near doubling of fiscal decentralization, (measured in terms of the percentage of sub-national governments' share of total expenditures) from 13 % in 1985 to 25% in 2014. In the same manner, whereas only 6 countries filled their municipal positions by elections in 1980, all of them did by 2015 (IDB 2015: 14)¹

Decentralization is not as highly advanced in Africa as in developed and even other developing countries (see Olowu and Wunsch 2004, Kersting et al. 2009, Kathyola and Job 2011). There has however been some movement in the direction of fiscal and political decentralization in the region since the 1990s, with some countries more advanced than others. There was a 6% improvement over 2012 ratings in the latitude that central governments gave to the cities and local governments across Africa (United Cities and African Local Governments 2015). This was especially evident in four main areas: financial transfers from central to local governments, transparency in the management of local affairs, citizen participation and the framework for capacity building. Southern African countries made the most progress-15.08%, followed distantly by Eastern Africa (6.85%), Western Africa (4.264%), North Africa (2.52%) and Central Africa ((1.7%). Countries with the most significant improvement in enhancing the environment of decentralized governance were Zambia, Malawi, Comoros and Benin (45%, 33.3%, 25%, and 23% respectively). Paradoxically, the least progress was made in developing urban strategies. (ibid).

To highlight how social policy innovation interacts with decentralization, we identified the implementation of three specific new social policy experiments in three countries with

¹ wide variation exists in the region from federally governed countries like Argentina, Brazil and Mexico; to those with unitary but high level of decentralization (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru) and unitary with lower level decentralization (Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay etc.). (Bardhan 2002, 2010, IDB 2015).

ambitious decentralization programs in the Africa region for detailed analysis. The first two cases are from Eastern Africa (Rwanda and Uganda); and the third is from Western Africa (Nigeria, covering two periods).

3. Case Study Analysis of Decentralization and Social Provisioning from Three African Countries

3.1 COMMUNITY-BASED HEALTH INSURANCE AND DECENTRALIZATION IN RWANDA

3.1.1 Background

In 2004, the Rwanda Government launched a nation-wide Community Based Health Insurance programme (CBHI), aimed at ensuring access to affordable basic health care for those in need through collective risk pooling as a key mechanism to achieve universal coverage.

In 2010, the CBHI scheme was revised to improve equity and financial sustainability of the scheme. A sliding scale premium structure based on the traditional *Ubedehe* standard of living income and household classes was introduced. It stratified individuals into 3 groups – the high income, middle income and the low-income group and new premiums were stipulated for each group based on the ability to pay. The high-income groups and middle-income groups pay an annual fee of 7,000 RWF (approx. USD 12.00) and 2,000 RWF (approx. USD 3.00) per person respectively—including a small co-payment at health centers and the responsibility for 10 % of the cost of care at referral hospitals. However, the government grants full insurance coverage subsidy to this (low-income) category that constitutes about 25% of the population by paying the entire premium of USD3 including incurred co-payments.

CBHI coverage increased from 7% in 2003 to about 91% in 2010/2011 and afterwards dipped to about 81% in 2013. Within the same period, per capita utilization rate has increased from 31% in 2003 to 89% in 2013 (National HMIS database, 2011; Rwanda Statistical Yearbook, 2014). Several studies indicated that CBHI coverage significantly increased health care utilization (Shimeles 2010, Sekabaraga et al 2011, Binagwaho, et al 2012, Papoula 2012 and Woldemichael and Shimeles 2015).

Out of pocket (OOP) expenditure declined from its highest at 23.3% in 2005 to its lowest at 18.4% in 2013 (Global Health Expenditure database, 2014). Similarly, OOP expenditure advantage of the insured population over the uninsured population suggest that CBHI members were less likely to incur catastrophic health spending (Saksena. et al. 2010; Li, et al 2012). It seems to be generally accepted that CBHI has been successful in providing critical safety net, consequently increasing the uptake of high-value health services while reducing catastrophic household spending due to illness in Rwanda (Drobac and Naughton 2014). It has led to better health outcomes as insured households are more likely to receive medical treatment when ill than their uninsured counterparts, leading to their better health status (Papoula 2012; Binagwaho, et al (2012).

Critical to the success of CBHI, is the decentralization policy, which provided the structural administrative template for the implementation and management of the CBHIs.

3.1.2 The role and impact of decentralization

Approved in 2001, the national decentralization policy was conceived as a mechanism to achieve good governance principles, enhance local economic development and bring quality and accessible services closer to all especially those living in the rural areas. It comprises a 4-tier local government structure: districts councils (*akarere*), sectors (*umurenge*), cells councils (*akagari*) and villages (*imudungu*). The districts constitute the main local government legal entities while the sectors and cells function just as administrative units within the local government structure (MINALOC 2001). Provincial Councils (*Intara*) which are the central government de-concentrated units exercise oversight responsibilities in co-coordinating the activities of local governments within their jurisdiction.

In 2005, there was a countrywide re-delineation and reduction of administrative entities from 15 to 4 provinces (in addition to Kigali), from 106 to 30 districts, from 1545 to 416 sectors, and from 9165 to 2148 cells with almost 15,000 villages. Democratic elections of local leaders were also successfully organized during this phase (MINALOC, 2011, 2012). Importantly, former hospital districts that were independent of local administrative districts were abolished to align district hospital management and services within the structure of newly created local administrative units.

Accordingly, the structure of the CBHIs has been adapted to the decentralized administrative structure and effectively integrated into each level of the pyramidal referral system. While CBHI scheme is administered at the national and district levels, premium contributions from CBHIs members are managed at the district level. In each district, contributions are pooled from sector-level CBHI groups into the district CBHI risk pool. The district CBHI risk pool management unit is in charge of management and monitoring of health insurance activities in the district. At the sector level, there are the CBHI sections that manage the community risk pool, which is made up of premium from CBHI members, public subsidies and external funds from donors. At cell level there is also a sensitization committee, which informs people about the importance of having insurance. At the community level, there are also community CBHI committees responsible for mobilizing and registering members, collecting fees, and clearing bills from health facilities. (ODI, 2012).

Under the decentralized structure, the responsibility to provide and supervise health services lies with the district health unit (DHU), which reports to the Secretary of Social Affairs and to the district council (when necessary). Thus, the director of hospital(s) within the districts reports to the DHU who also is responsible for planning and monitoring of implementing agencies, inter-sectoral collaboration and coordination with development partners.

The district administrations are directly responsible for the overall management of hospitals and health centres within their area of jurisdiction while the central government through the Ministry of Health (MoH) provides supportive technical oversight. The autonomy of the local health facilities was strengthened within the districts with more transfer of fiscal responsibilities and financial resources from the central to local government facilities. Health care personnel are now being contracted and managed at the district and sub-district level (Sekabaraga. et al, 2011). It has boosted relative autonomy in human resources, budgeting and financial management within district health facilities.

3.1.3 Institutional features: Some pertinent issues

Central government driven with strong local feedback system

The current CBHI programme is an attempt to revive, modernise and upscale erstwhile provincial health insurance initiatives. The earliest form of CBHI in Rwanda was started at the provincial level in 1960s, when the former Kibungo province initiated the health mutual association called *Muvandimwe* and the former Butare province initiated Umubano Mu Bantu, both of which increased accessibility to health care at the community level. In order to fine-tune the policy, the government in 1998 entered into a collaborative partnership with 3 districts - Gitarama district, Gicumbi district and Butare district to develop CBHI pilot projects with the US Agency for International Development (USAID) providing required funding for the pilot projects. These pilot projects involved developing 54 CBHIs, each collaborating with a health centre. Thus, while the current CBHI programme was initiated at the central level with active support of donors, the local communities within the pilot districts provided both the initial test-bed and feedback that enabled the fine-tuning of the CBHI programme.

At the local level, the communities have continued to enable a CBHI feedback system through UBEDEHE ‘poverty mapping’ system, which provide critical living standards classification for each household, which form the basis of CBHI Data Base. The database enables premium classifications and effective targeting of subsidies for the very poor and vulnerable under the 2010-revised CBHI programme.

Creation of intergovernmental and inter-organizational platforms

In order to facilitate the effective implementation of the decentralization policy, intergovernmental and inter-organizational institutions were set up to complement the efforts of MINALOC bringing together other ministries, agencies and non-state entities. Decentralization focal points and sectoral working groups were set up at central and provincial levels as well as decentralization consultative forum at district levels. Notable among these include; the National Decentralization Stakeholders Forum, Program Steering Committee, Rwanda Governance Board (RGB), and Decentralization Cluster (MINALOC, 2012).

Within the health sector, the Rwanda Health Insurance Council (RHIC) serves as independent advisory council to the CBHI. It is made up of members from Ministry of Health (MoH), Ministry of Finance of Economic Development (MINECOFIN), MLGSA, National Bank of Rwanda (BNR), CBHI representatives, Civil Society Organization (CSO) representatives, Medical Military Insurance (MMI), Regime d’Assurance Maladie des Agents de l’état/Rwanda Medical Insurance Scheme (RAMA), private health insurance companies, health providers and citizens’ representatives. Its function include guiding CBHI system, monitoring its outcomes and providing recommendations to Government and other key stakeholders on necessary policy changes including entitlements, packages of benefits, level of premium contributions, etc.

Another relevant platform is the Health Financing Technical Working Group (HFTWG) that brings together all partners in Health Financing and staff working in the Health Financing Unit (HFU) of the Ministry of Health. The quarterly meetings of the HFTWG platform provide opportunities for CBHI management and technical support units (CTMAS) to update other stakeholders on the progress of the implementation of the CBHI policy.

Within the framework of project and budget support provided by donor partners, there are various inter-organizational platforms made up of representatives of donor agencies, districts, service providers and relevant ministries such as MoH, MINECOFIN and MINALOC. These platforms include the Joint Health Sector Reviews (JHSR), the Joint Budget Support Reviews (JBSR), Technical Working Group (TWG), and Health Sector Working Group (HSWG) service define, co-ordinate and facilitate various levels of donor and government activities within the health sector.

Notably, at the district and sector levels is the Joint Action Development Forum (JADF), which was created in 2007 by the Ministry of Local Government, Good Governance, Community Development and Social Affairs (MINALOC). JADF is made up of broad representatives from Donors, service providers, NGOs, citizen groups, producer cooperatives, Companies; Faith based organizations (FBOs), and Local government authorities. They serve as a consultative forum that coordinates activities of all development actors so as to promote efficiency and avoid duplication of efforts within their respective districts and sectors.

Fiscal decentralization and financing the CBHI

Transfer of additional fiscal responsibilities and financial resources from the central to districts and sub-districts administrations including health facilities has strengthened the devolution of more functions to districts under decentralization. For instance, the share of central government transfers increased from 1.4% in 2002 to 4.0% in 2005 and thereafter rapidly increased to as high as 37.1% in 2009/10 financial year, from where it slightly reduced to about 33.3% in 2011/12 financial year. In absolute terms, it represents a significant progressive increase from approx. USD1.83mill in 2002 to USD298.33mill in 2011/12 financial year. Fiscal transfers to districts for health care showed a corresponding increase from USD 2.17mill in 2005 to USD23.83mill in 2008 and USD36.17mill in 2011/12 financial year (MINALOC 2012, MINAFIN 2015).

Furthermore, while locally generated revenue of districts does not presently exceed 20% of the estimated potential, the health sector within the districts fare better given that CBHI premiums, which make up about 55% of the CBHI expenditure are retained and managed within the sector and district level risk pool for health care service.

Employment and staff development

Implementation of the CBHI programme, under decentralized framework necessitated massive recruitment to boost and maintain adequate qualified health personnel in the referral hospitals, district hospitals, and health centres through increase and harmonization of staff salaries within the health sector. For instance, the number of doctor to population ratio dramatically improved from 1 doctor to 75,000 in 2000 to 1 doctor to 15,806 in 2013. Similar staff improvements were also recorded for nurses, trained midwives, laboratory technicians, clinical psychologists, pharmacists, and social workers.

There was a massive recruitment of Community Health Workers (CHW) who were trained and equipped to provide timely basic health care services in their local communities boosting their numbers from about 12,000 in 1995 to 45,011 in 2005 (ibid).

Furthermore, creation of CBHI management teams at the central level, district and subsector levels necessitated the recruitment many technical and management staff in each of the districts and sectors within the country. Periodic managerial and technical training of trainers (ToT) capacity training support is also given by donor partners in conjunction with local bodies.

Accountability

Decentralization, though of the deconcentrated variety has also encouraged the establishment of enabling processes, structures and institutions to boost performance and accountability. The MoH with the support of donor partners, developed control mechanisms and standards at various levels to ensure that rules and regulations are followed, and objectives accomplished (Pose and Samuels2011).

MoH initiated a system of weekly reporting in order to monitor the income and expenses of all CBHI sections. The weekly report is prepared by the CBHI sections, compiled by CBHI districts and sent to the central level (MoH/HFU), which (CTAMS team) then analyze the information and sometimes provide feedback to the CBHI district. The reports are eventually sent to the Health Minister's office. Similarly, MoH/HFU in partnership with MSH has developed a financial modelling tool, which facilitates the elaboration of CBHI monthly, quarterly and annual financial reports.

Moreover, the revival of the traditional 'IMIHIHO' (community responsibility) and its incorporation into performance contracts which are signed by public officials and civil servants under public oath have boosted the government's Performance Based Finance (PBF) Strategy towards local governments. However, there is still the need to improve key downward accountability linkages between local government leadership and citizens. This may explain several case allegations, arrests, and investigations of district officials over fraud and embezzlement of CBHI premium and funds (Namata, 2015). Such accountability concerns have led to the current takeover of the management of the CBHI programme by the Rwanda Social Security Board (RSSB) from the MoH. The move would also centralize the financial management of the programme within RSSB as opposed to the existing structure managed by the 30 districts across the country to improve the long-term financial sustainability of the CBHI programme. The conclusion is clear that the CBHI program in Rwanda has been successful using a deconcentrated decentralization approach to deliver this social service.

3.2 DECENTRALIZATION AND UNIVERSAL PRIMARY EDUCATION IN UGANDA

3.2.1 Background

The Uganda government introduced Universal Primary Education (UPE) programme throughout Uganda in 1997. Having enacted a new Constitution in 1995 and the 1996 Children's Statute which established basic education as a fundamental human right, President Museveni in the 1996 one-party election pledged to provide 'free' primary education to four children per family if elected. That promise finally set the stage for the government to launch the Universal Primary Education (UPE) programme in January 1997 within the context of its overarching Poverty Eradication Action Plan of 1997 (MoES, 1999). The program made significant achievements in increasing access to basic education (Mwesigye, 2015) see Table 1 below.

More than 8.5 million children were enrolled in 2013 with gross enrolment rate of 111.8%. The central government subsequently committed to paying the tuition fees of all children in government –aided primary schools, which included some but not all the missions and private schools, providing them with textbooks and teaching materials; amongst others (MoES, 1999):

Box 1. Summary of Achievements of Ugandan Universal Primary Education 1993-2013

Gross enrolment 2013: 8.5 million

Of which 17.5% were orphans and 2.45% were children with disabilities

Number of primary schools: from 8,531 (1996) to 22,600 (2013)

Literacy rate (15-24 years of age group): 59% (1996) to 76% (2002)

Sources: UBoS, 2014; MoES, 2014.

The UPE programme was implemented within the context of the broader decentralization policy begun in 1986 but with active support of multinational donor agencies since 1996 (Romeo, 2003; Sasaoka and Nishimura, 2010, Smoke et al. 2014). The Uganda decentralization policy was rooted in the military campaign of the National Resistance Army (NRA) which claimed to deliver Uganda from post-colonial misrule. The NRA was led by Mr. Yoweri Museveni, who has ruled the country since 1986. During its guerrilla war against the Milton Obote (1981-85) and Tito Okello (1985-86) governments, the NRA mobilized support through the resistance councils which they had established in every captured village. These resistance councils became the basis of the governance and decentralization framework under the Museveni government. The Local Government (Resistance Council) Statute of 1993 and the Constitution of 1995 as well as the Local Government Act of 1997 gave wide statutory, fiscal powers and responsibilities to local governments.

The central government recognised the district and city councils as the main local government under which lower local government councils and non-corporate administrative units exist. Accelerated decentralization through the Local Government Act of 1997 helped to improve the management and delivery of elementary education services in Uganda, which had been implemented since 1996. It marked the shift from de-concentration to devolution. District and City councils were no longer seen as merely implementing the policies of central government, but as statutory bodies empowered to formulate, approve, and execute their own budgets, development plans and basic service delivery (GoU, 1997; MoES, 1999, 2004; 2008; Namukasa and Buye, 2007). The councils were also vested with the power to manage the environment, collect income tax, and enact laws and policies. The Ugandan decentralization framework involves three discernible aspects, namely (a) political and legislative empowerment of the people, (b) control of the administrative machinery by the local councils and (c) fiscal devolution. More on these below

3.2.2 Decentralization and local government structure

The Ugandan decentralization framework consists of five different levels and categories of local government councils as shown in Table 2. There is a distinction between local government councils and administrative unit councils in rural or urban areas .

Table 1: Categories of local government councils

	Level of Councils	Rural Local Councils	Urban Local Councils
1	Higher Local Government Council	The District Council (LC V)	The City Council (LC V)
2	Lower Local Government Council	Sub-County Council (LC III)	City Division Council (LC III) Municipal Council (LC V) Municipal Division Council (LC III) Town Council (LC III)
3	Administrative Units Council	County Council (LC IV) Parish or Ward Council (LC II) Village Council (LC I)	Parish or Ward Council (LC II) Village Council (LC I)

Source: Author

As a result, there is a hierarchy of elected representatives from the lowest level (LC1) representing a village (in the rural area) or cell/zone (in the urban area) to highest level (LC5) representing a local district council (in the rural area) or a city council (in the urban area).

While the local government council is a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal that can sue or be sued, on the contrary an administrative unit council is not a corporate body. Responsibilities of administrative units are largely restricted to resolution of problems or disputes, monitoring the delivery of services and assisting in the maintenance of law, order and security. Only the LGCs can initiate and formulate policies for implementation and monitoring by officials. They constitute the main governing body at the local level made up of the elected local council chairman and his executives, elected local council representatives from the sub-counties while the district's Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) is appointed by central government. The CAO is responsible for ensuring prompt disbursement of UPE grants to schools and proper accountability of UPE grants.

3.2.3 Some pertinent institutional issues of Ugandan decentralization and UPE central government driven reform

From inception, the President Museveni led National Resistance Movement (NRM) government was keen to implement decentralization as a way to empower the people, restore good governance and democracy within the framework of a single party system (Mugabi, E. 2004). The Resistance Councils and Committee Statute were enacted in 1987 to create a five-level tiered system of Resistance Councils that performed the duties of the defunct agents and organs of the previous government, especially in the area of policy-making and watchdog responsibilities in each community. Due to acute lack of adequate manpower and local administrators, the NRM-led government appointed prominent individuals and supporters within local communities into different levels of Resistance Councils that would later be renamed Local Councils.

From 1992 on, administrative officers at the rank of Under Secretary were posted to districts as District Executive Secretaries (DES). Staff in line ministries, field departments were seconded to districts and placed under these District Executive Secretaries, who would later be known as Chief Administrative Officers (Mugabi, 2004). This move brought both decentralization and the UPE programme under central government officials located at the local level (Naidoo, 2002; Steiner, 2006; Namukasa and Buye, 2007, Stasavage 2005)

The fervent embrace of an almost all-at-once decentralization strategy by Ugandan government (Naidoo, 2002; Steiner, 2006; Namukasa and Buye, 2007) underscored its

strong ideological enthusiasm for the programme. It has been argued that devolution of primary education was not necessitated by educational reform per se, but rather driven by central government political agenda and political will (Stasavage, 2005). Although, the initial idea of increasing access to more affordable basic education in Uganda could be directly traced to publication of the Education Policy Review Commission (EPRC) report 1989, the Government Education White Paper of 1992 and the 1993 Primary Education and Teacher Development Project report, it only gained traction when President Museveni made it a key national election promise in the 1996. After his successful 1996 re-election campaign, the presidency was reported to have told close aids “look, we won the election because of the UPE pledge, so we have to come up with the money for it” (Stasavage, 2005, p.10). That promise finally to set the stage for the government to launch the Universal Primary Education (UPE) programme in January 1997. With his re-election in 2001 and in subsequent years, the progress of the UPE was firmly tied to the overall performance of the Museveni NRM administration.

Creation of intergovernmental and inter-organizational platforms

The central government through the Ministry of Local Government (MoLG) created a range of organs for decentralization. They include: the Decentralization Management Technical Working Group (DM-TWG) and the Joint Review of Decentralization (JARD). The JARD brings together all stakeholders in the Local Government sector annually including; Parliamentary Committee on Local Government and Public Service, Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs), Development Partners, Local Governments, Local Governments Associations, Civil Society Organizations, Non-Government Organizations and the Private sector to jointly assess performance and the implementation of the policy and associated programmes (MoLG, 2014).

The Ministry of Education and Sports (MoES) was similarly re-organised and strengthened following the decentralization of former Central Government responsibilities to districts. New institutions (departments, directorates and semi-autonomous affiliate institutions) were created to enable the Ministry to handle a redefined set of responsibilities and more specialized functions in the areas of planning, policy analysis, curriculum and examination reform, national assessment, and monitoring and evaluation. Ultimately, the process strengthened centralized bureaucracies in such areas as curriculum design, teacher training and quality assurance and monitoring oversights (Namukasa and Buye, 2007), but also encouraged significant decentralization in some significant respects (teacher recruitment and management, parents and teachers associations etc.). Naidoo (2002) dubbed this phenomenon - centralized decentralization but others opine that what actually happened in Uganda was re-centralization in the sense that some of the powers earlier assigned to local governments were rescinded (Smoke et al 2014) but this only underscores the complex nature of decentralization as a policy and management option. The government had a bold program of decentralization initially, but the donors were also promoting a multitude of reforms which included SWAPs, Budget support and decentralization. Some of these contradicted each other and the government trying to please the donors who financed the projects and at the same time remain true to its own ideological commitment to devolution, which turned out to be inconsistent with one-party governance regime. This paradox was resolved in favour of de-concentration and in some cases delegation even though government’s policy rhetoric for devolution remained unchanged.

Furthermore, in the bid to consolidate domestic and international partnerships within the UPE implementation framework, MoES also created the Education Sector Consultative Committee (ESCC) to co-ordinate and monitor progress. It is made up of representatives

from MoES (heads of departments, semi-autonomous bodies under MoES, as well as secretaries of Departments and cross-cutting working groups), representatives of Education Funding Agencies Group (EFAG), NGOs, and other relevant line ministries and public agencies, thus providing a common operational platform for all relevant stakeholders. All stakeholders take part in bi-annual Education Sector Reviews (ESR) to discuss progress in the education sector. There is also the Education Sector Working Group (ESWG) that consists of the representatives of central government, education sub-sectorial representatives, EFAG, NGOs and other stakeholders, whose main function is to prepare the Medium Term, Budget Framework, upon which the actual budget is based.

Fiscal decentralization and financing the UPE

Many of the UPE achievements were made possible by increased resource flows from the central government to the district and city councils. But the decentralization of functions led to more fiscal de-concentration (not devolution as was hoped) from the central government to local districts. For instance, the total expenditure percentage of central government transfers to local districts increased from 14% in 1994/95 to 34% in 2000/01 financial year. Given the demands of the UPE programme, total education expenditure increased from 2.1% GDP in 1995 to 4.8% of GDP in 2000. With the gradual expansion of the overall national economy from US 5.98 billion dollars in 2000 to US 25.31 billion dollars in 2016, it has steadily gone down from 3.6 in 2005, 2.5 in 2011 and 2.0 in 2016 (Knoema, World Data Atlas). The primary education share of the total education expenditure increased from 11% in 1995 to 69.3% in 2002 and from 2008 to 2012 has maintained a constant share of 58% (Muhanguzi, 2012; Duclos et al, 2013). The report of Uganda Bureau of Statistics (2016) showed that grants from central government and other donors remained the largest composition of local government revenue accounting for 94 % of their total revenue. Taxes accounted for only 1.2 % while the other non-tax revenue accounted for 4.7% local government revenue.

The framework for donor agencies support emphasized a sector-wide approach (SWAp) that focuses on budget support rather than stand-alone project-funding approach. It required donor agencies channel most or all of their support funds through the Ugandan government's revenue disbursement funnel. The financial support from donor agencies has been very vital in supplementing government funding of the UPE programme accounting for about 54% and 61% of total expenditure for primary education between 1998 and 2002 (MoES, 1998; Berry et al, 2003; JICA, 2012). But this strong power of the purse also facilitated the movement towards fiscal de-concentration.

In spite of the above, more financial resources were needed to adequately fund the programme (Guloba, et al, 2011). For instance, the 2012 report of Muhanguzi Judicial Commission of Inquiry (2012) recommended amongst others an increase in annual funding per pupil from US\$2.42 to 4.53US\$ to adjust for high inflation rate in addition to sending the fund directly to schools to eliminate bureaucratic delays...

Employment and staff development

While the National Local Government Capacity Building Policy (NLGCBP) initiative introduced in 2005 has improved staff training and performance, there are still enormous human resource challenges within the local councils, at the national level and also among the civil society and citizens. More attention was given to teachers and civil servants capacity than for instance to parents and teachers associations is particularly lamentable as this could have been one of the ways to strengthen civic inputs to this largely top-down program of decentralization (MoLG, 2012, Smoke et al 2014).

Number of local governments, administrative efficiency and political economy of decentralization.

The rapid increase in the number of district and city councils has also exacerbated the problem of inadequate human resources including financial and material resources at the local level. For instance, the number of Local Governments increased from 45 districts in 1997 to 111 Districts in 2012; from 13 Municipalities in 2006 to 22 in 2012; and from 93 Urban Local Governments in 2006 to 174 in 2012. . Close analysis of the rationale for creating new local councils showed that state-centric reasons of bringing services closer to people or increasing citizen participation seem to be less important than the informal desire of the ruling government to contain the growing opposition (especially from 2006 when multiparty was introduced in Uganda's polity) and entrench the ruling party of the President to hang on to public office (Awortwi and Helmsing 2014: 784). While partisan elections were introduced from 2006 at the national level, decentralization awakened especially in the cities opposition to the government's non-partisan elections at the local level (Resnick 2014).

Furthermore, lasting administrative benefits exist. Despite increasing enrolment, the pupil-teacher ratio from 2002 to 2013 has remained in the band range of 50/60 children per teacher. With the devolution of responsibility for elementary education to the district level, teachers' salaries are now paid more promptly, and the management of the payroll has improved compared to the era before decentralization.

Accountability and transparency

Most of the funds provided by the central government to run the UPE programme are mainly in form of annual conditional grants, made up mostly of variable grants such as the Capitation Grant (CG) per child, and Fixed Grants (FG) per school, and School Inspection Grant. These grants are conditioned to very specific use; hence the district authorities have little or no power of re- allocation to other uses. There is also the School Facility Grant (SFG) that is funded from the poverty action fund (PAF), which is designed to assist most needy schools in the community in building new classrooms, supply of classroom furniture, provision of toilet facilities and housing for teachers (Muhanguzi, 2012; Duclos et al, 2013).

In order to increase accountability and transparency, the above conditional grants to districts are made available to schools and published in the national press. Similarly, district councils must display publicly the amount of UPE funds received and how they plan to allocate them. Sub-counties and schools must make open to the public their budgets and sources of funds (Gershberg 2004; Namukasa and Buye, 2007). As a result, budget leakage has been significantly reduced: the share of funds reaching schools has risen in 2002 to about 90 percent, from 28 percent in 1996 prior to the programme (World Bank 2002).

A hierarchical reporting and monitoring system from the school level to the sub-county level; from the sub-county to the district level; and from the district level to the central government level has also been put in place within the UPE implementation framework. These structures and measures to improve transparency and accountability of spending at the school level in addition to predictable flow of aid have significantly increased efficiency in the use of funds allocated to schools. The share of funds reaching schools has risen from 28 percent in 1996 prior to the programme to about 90 percent in 2013 (World Bank, 2002). Furthermore, it has been observed that the devolution of responsibility for elementary education to the district level has improved prompt payment of teachers' salaries and the management of the payroll. District administrators can

manage their funds without being slowed down by the bureaucracies of the central government (Namukasa and Buye; 2007, p.106).

In spite of these efforts to foster transparency and accountability, there still exist numerous cases of misuse and mis-allocation of funds (Mwesigye, 2015) as documented in the 2012 report of Justice Muhangizu Judicial Commission of Inquiry. The Commission estimated that the GoU lost approx. 4.23million US\$ in 2011 alone due to shoddy construction projects and incidence of ‘ghost’ and absentee pupils, teachers and head teachers from schools. It reported cases of UPE funds diversion to private and community schools, cases of illegal contracts that did not follow laid down procedures—mostly through collusion between central and school administrators (Muhangizu, 2012). This happens when the accountability is focused solely upwards to officials and not downward to citizens as well.

The tendency to rescind some of the powers earlier granted to local government by the central government in Uganda is also being extended to sectoral ministries and development partners. Local governments as a whole were once responsible for 25% of the annual national revenues but this has declined to 20% and 18% in 2005 and 2012 respectively. In addition, they have become more dependent on transfers rather than their own revenue sources. Over time the balance between conditional and unconditional transfers to local governments to finance their operations has shifted in favour of the former (Smoke et al 2014).

According to the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (2016), on the average, local governments in Uganda generate less than 2% of their total budget (see Table 3 below). The near total dependence on the central government transfers has enhanced hierarchical monitoring mechanisms that have largely boosted upward accountability and has reduced the extent to which local authorities are truly responsible for their own performance, thus weakening overall downward accountability to their constituencies.

Table 2. Classification of local government revenue by percentage share (2010/11 to 2014/15)

Revenue Items	2010/11	2011/12	2012/13	2013/14	2014/15
Total Revenue (1+2)	100	100	100	100	100.0
1. Taxes	2.3	1.2	1.3	1.1	1.2
(a) Taxes on Income, Profits ,and Capital Gains	0.5	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.5
Local Service Tax (Payable by individuals)	0.5	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.4
(b) Taxes on property	0.9	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Immovable property(Land Fees)	0.9	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
(c) Taxes on goods and services	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
(d) Taxes on permission to use goods or perform activities	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.1	0.4
(e) Other Taxes	0	0.1	0	0.3	-
2. Central Government Non-Tax revenue	97.7	98.8	98.7	98.9	98.8
(a) Grants	93.4	96.2	96	96.5	94.0
Central Government	90	90.5	89.2	92.1	89.7
Graduated Tax (Compensation)	0	0	0	0	0.0
Donors	3.4	5.7	6.7	4.5	4.3
(b) Other Revenue	4.3	2.5	2.8	2.4	4.7
(i) Property Income	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4
Rent	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.4
Other property incomes	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0
(ii) Sale of goods and services	3.7	2.1	2.3	1.9	1.8
Administrative fees	2.7	1.9	2.1	1.6	1.6
Sales by nonmarket establishments	1	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.1
(iii) Fines and Penalties	0	0	0	0	1.5
(iv) Miscellaneous and unidentified revenue	0	0	0	0	1.1

Source: Uganda Bureau of Statistics

Increasing attempt towards re-centralization by the central government is a major concern. For instance, the central government under the cover of allegations of weak capacities and corrupt attitudes of local government officials has taken over the control of Kampala city administration. Independent observers believe that the city council had successfully competed and performed better than the national government (Kebba and Ntanda 2005, Resnick 2014) and that the real reason for the take-over is political: to weaken the opposition (Awortwi, 2011; Madinah et al, 2015).

Like so many other countries in Africa and other parts of the developing world, Uganda has a hybrid political system where democratic features, such as elections, coexist with authoritarian tendencies from the central government (Lambright, 2011).

Originally, the Ministry of Local Government (MLG) was responsible for coordinating, supporting, inspecting and monitoring local governments. Increasingly, other coordinating central organs emerged, notably the Ministries of Finance, Planning and Economic Development but also the Ministry of Public Service and the National Planning Authority, besides the Ministry of Education to oversee and control aspects that were once devolved to local authorities. Moreover, the Central government serves as the main actor through its representative who serves as the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) and to whom the Education Administrative Officer (EAO) reports. Moreover, the graduated personal tax which had accounted for over 70% of the local governments' own revenues was suspended just before the hotly contested national elections in 2006. This loss of own revenue source has predictably increased the leverage of central controls on the local governments in every area of devolution, basic education inclusive. In the meantime, the national government refused to relaunch property taxation to replace the loss of major local taxation sources as done by other countries in the region--Kenya and Ethiopia (Goodfellow 2014, Olowu 2017a).

In brief, we can conclude that Uganda decentralization generally and UPE in particular has been driven by two powerful forces. The first is the government's political economy agenda to mobilize support from the public by increasing her legitimacy as the ruling power over a sustained period of time. The second is the strong support of the development partners or donor community for decentralization especially of the devolutionary form in theory but de-concentration in practice. Even if the DPs had a different agenda, they cannot afford to antagonize the central government who is their main partner. Local governments are at best indirect or secondary partners. There is substantial evidence to show that the national governments in these countries do their best to sabotage local governments when they threaten their popularity—a political fact that donors are not able to incorporate in their support for decentralization or governance (Resnick 2014). The case of Uganda is indeed of a country that has transited from centralized decentralization to recentralization or decentralized centralization.

3.3 DECENTRALIZATION AND UNIVERSAL PRIMARY EDUCATION SERVICE IN NIGERIA 1976-1993

Introduction

We analyse the decentralization and the UPE national program of the federal government from 1976 to the present period which was successful in the years that the military were in office but confronted regime and constitutional challenges under civilians. In spite of this set back, available data shows that remarkable positive changes were recorded in terms of primary school pupil enrolment throughout the country. This is important because the southern parts of the country had organized a reform program using

devolutionary strategies at the regional level some two decades earlier.. Explanations are provided for the differential outcomes pursued in the decentralization of this social service.

Decentralization and UPE: The federal initiative of 1976-1993

After being in power for ten years with minimal good governance records, declining military esprit des corps and a bloody civil war, the Nigerian federal military government embarked on a major program national devolutionary decentralization in 1976. Having accused their civilian predecessors of corruption and graft, they sought to lay new socio-economic and political foundations for civilian democratic governance first at the grassroots as the colonial masters did before political independence in 1960 and use the new units to recruit political actors to higher levels of governance at state and national levels. The time was also auspicious: the country was exporting crude oil in large commercial quantities. Local governments they argued would help wealth redistribution and reduce poverty (Nigeria 1976). As education was widely regarded as a key to upward mobility, there was popular pressure to build more schools and to train more and better teachers to reduce the widening gap between northern and southern parts of the country. Other factors were involved also.

Having been in power since 1966 the military leadership organised a series of conferences in 1969 and 1973, that eventually resulted in the National Policy on Education in 1977 (Akangbou 1985; Bello 1986; Okoroma 2000). This National Policy on Education (NPE) was incorporated in the 'Third National Development Plan' (1975-80) that aimed to improve educational facilities and equalizing opportunities between the sexes and regions, as well as improves quality in education service provision nationwide. The twin programs of decentralization and universal basic education have continued as an initiative of Nigerian governments for forty years, 1976 to 2016 –and could be seen as the military's efforts to prepare the country for democratization and development. Indeed, the pattern which emerges is one in which the military seem to have succeeded more in promoting devolutionary decentralization than heir civilian counterparts throughout their sojourn in office from 1976 to 1979 and from 1983 when they took over power again until 1993—a total of 13 years. (Olowu 2020)

Fiscal decentralization and UPE 1976-1993

Nigeria was by this time Africa's only federally governed polity with each region possessing wide constitutional powers and resources. The new military government moved to centralize authority in the Federal Government machinery after they took power in 1966. They dismantled the old regionally based political system, and steadily eroded the power of regional political leaders by creating 12 States in 1967 by decree, precipitating a 3 –year civil war. The move to greater centralization was manifested explicitly in the development of a new federal fiscal system but the struggle to reverse this has also persisted over the years (Wunsch and Olowu 1990).

The reform of nation's local government system in August 1976 fed into the effort to reduce military centralization and also to reduce growing poverty through better public service delivery. Public expenditures financed from oil revenue were perceived as ending up in the three major cities without reaching the majority who lived in the rural countryside (Nigeria 1976, Mawhood, 1983).

Four major measures were taken in order to achieve devolution. Firstly, the federal military government opted to move away from a system which functioned more like local administration in a clear preference for local governments, with own independent revenue

sources, council and professional service. For instance, each of the 301 newly created local government communities would elect own representatives and raise own revenue sources, to fulfil their obligations. Secondly, the functional powers of these local governments were spelt out (including basic education, health and sanitation) separate from those of the states and federal government, even though they could cooperate in some specific areas. Thirdly, the Technical Committee on Revenue Allocation (established in 1978) allocated 10% (set initially in 1976 by the FG at 3%) of the nation's revenue fund as general (unconditional) grant support for the local government (LG) system. Finally, these and other provisions were incorporated in the 1979 constitution to protect them from State government interference.

UPE 1976 to the present

While the local government reform was launched in August 1976, the same Federal (Military) Government initiated the Universal Primary Education (UPE) Scheme one month later in September 1976. The federal government decided to fully fund the initiative while leaving implementation to the new local governments. The exercise brought about an impressive rise in pupil population from 8.7 million in 1976/77 academic session to 12.5 million in 1979/80, reaching 15 million in 1982. The Federal Government, buoyed by revenues from oil boom, had also taken over all voluntary and mission schools and assumed full financial responsibility of running the UPE scheme nationwide through the new local government system. LGs were expected by the 1976 local government reform to have direct control over primary schools. These aforementioned provisions were fairly successful in the first few years of the reform, especially with the increase in amount of monetary resources allocated to local governments in absolute and relative terms. Before the reform local governments received no grants from the national government only from the states but the latter did not favor strong local governments after political independence in 1960. The federal government raised the proportion of federal consolidated revenue going to local governments from 10% to 20% in 1980. This had dramatic impacts on governance at the local level, UPE being one of the main beneficiaries (Adamolekun 1984, Diejomaoh and Eboh 2010). The 1976 LG reforms led to mandatory allocations from the federal and state to the local governments. This was a part of the recommendations of the Aboyade Revenue Commission of 1977. In 1981, the National Assembly, on the basis of 1979 Constitution fixed these proportions at 10% of the federation account and 10% of the total revenue of the state. These grants were distributed mainly on equity, population and geographical size. Factors that contributed to the relative success of the States in southwest Nigeria owed to the commitment of the leadership and citizens that saw education as an essential social good critical for upward social mobilization (Ekpo and Ndebbio 1998).


But despite special provisions made in the Constitution to protect LGs, the transition from the military to civilian governments in 1979 meant that state politicians and officials undermined LGs by taking over their responsibilities, cancelling or suspending local revenue sources, and hijacking/diverting grants meant for LGs by federal government, without consulting with the LGs or paying their own mandated transfers to them. The geographical boundaries of local government areas were changed resulting in about 250% increase in LG numbers from 301 to 774 by 1983, resulting in redrawing of administrative electoral boundaries to the advantage of the ruling party. Newly created LGs were headed by unelected caretaker committees appointed by State governors; and LGs by their nature attracted guaranteed proportion of federal grants, which State governors rather deployed for success at future elections rather than UPE and other social services provisioning. (Gboyega 1981).

These failings of the LG reforms also affected the implementation of the UPE in these years. Firstly, while the LG reform commenced in August 1976; constitutional protection of their new powers came in 1979 as transition from military rule to democratic governance took place in October 1979. The unintended effect was that it gave politicians at the State level the loophole to undermine both the LG and UPE policies of the federal government. It was also complicated the tackling of common challenges. For instance, 2.3 million children were estimated as against 3 million that showed up, a 30 percent underestimation, with implications for classroom spaces, teachers, and equipment (Akpan 1988, Taiwo 1980, Aluede 2006).

Furthermore, the enormous financial responsibility Federal Government of Nigeria took in respect of the UPE programme became excessive (including the takeover of schools from private voluntary organizations) as oil prices crashed from 1978 (till 1986), thus reducing government earnings. The Federal Government quickly dumped school management back on the States and LGs, on the excuse of constitutional limitations. Thus, as intergovernmental financial transfers dwindled, an outcome of falling oil prices, States and Local Governments could no longer fund primary education; with some states returning mission schools to their former owners. In other instances, subnational governments began to charge user fees, the UPE programme was no longer free, and universality dropped as parents and guardians withdrew their children from school, and prioritized spending on other aspects of family or household economy, dampening enthusiasm for educational enrolment. In addition, corruption in the handling of primary education funds in some of the northern states especially led to the failure of the UPE program (Olowu 1981; Barkan et al. 2001; Imam 2012; Eweroke 2007; Okoroma 2006,). In fact, by 1980, the Commissioners for Education in all the then ten northern states declared the UPE scheme in their part of the country as 'a disaster' due to the shortages of classroom accommodation, teachers, equipment and other teaching facilities'. According to them: 70-92% of the teachers in the primary schools were underqualified (Olowu 1981, p.254).

In spite of the above-mentioned setbacks, efforts to continue these twin reforms have continued since the late 1970s to the present time but were particularly successful in the periods of military rule especially after 1983 when the military again returned to power. The military were in power from 1976-79 and 1984-1993) after LGR and UPE was launched. The failure of basic services was one of the reasons advanced for the military return to office at the end of 1983. Even the civilian Federal Government of Obasanjo fought back the state exploitation of the UPE/LG reforms with legislations and court actions in 2005 and 2010 (Adamolekun 2016). Figure 2 shows the impact of these actions on UPE enrolment up to 1989.

Figure 2: Total number of public primary schools, 1959 to 1989



Source: Data from the Nigeria Statistics of Education, multiple years

Explaining differential civilian performance in the pre- and post-military eras

The failure of civilians in implementing UPE in the post-military period contrasts sharply with the success of their counterparts in an earlier period of the decentralized implementation of a Universal Primary Education program by regional or sub-national political and administrative actors under a different constitutional arrangement. The roots of the earlier period of decentralization can be traced to 1946 when the British colonial authority enacted the Richards Constitution for the recognition of three regions – Eastern, Western and Northern, along with the Colony of Lagos. The political parties in each region comprised mainly of the elites in each region. They sent their deputies to the federal level, making the federal level subservient to the party and the regions where ultimate political power resided. This also reflected in the constitutional and fiscal provisions. In 1954, Nigeria became a federation of three big regions which were completely autonomous in terms of population, constitutional powers and financial resources. From 1955 till the late 1960's, the new fiscal arrangements had four main elements: purely federal taxes; purely regional (later state) taxes; taxes levied and collected by the federal government, and apportioned among the states according to the principle of derivation; and taxes levied and collected by the federal government, and allocated to the states according to various other principles, notably need and population (Offensend 1976; also see Table 4). Regions (later States) received some Derived Revenues, and a share of the Distributable Pool Account (DPA), which was allocated according to a formula based on the principles of population and equality. The principle of derivation, by default, calls for a fixed proportion of revenues to be returned to the states of their origin, thus making the Federal Government effectively a tax collector for the regions. The revenue allocation system based on this principle of derivation became a symbol of the decentralized, regionally-based political situation which characterized Nigeria during this period (Offensend 1976).

Table 3: Statutory revenue allocation formula (%)

Tier	1960	1963-67	1980	1982	1997	1990	1993	1996-98
1. Federal Government	70	65	55	55	55	50	48.5	48.5
2. Regional/State	30	33	44.5	34.2	32.5	30	24	24
3. Local Government			8	10	10	15	20	20
4. Special Fund			2.5	0.5	2.5	5	7.5	7.5
i. Federal Capital Territory			2.2			1	1	1
ii Derivation						1	1	1
iii Areas Producing Minerals					1.5	1.5	3	3.0
iv General Ecology				0.5		0.5	0.5	0.5

Source: Central Bank of Nigeria, 2000

It is clear from the above that the civilian regions had much more political and administrative muscle compared with the federal government at the time and used regional political arena to create a basis to compete for appeal among the new voting population for central power. Today, the Nigerian federation comprises 36 states and a Federal Capital Territory (FCT). With 774 local government areas for the 182 million residents (PRB 2015). The current revenue formula which took effect from March 2004 is: 52.685%, 26.725% and 20.60% for the Federal, State, and Local Governments respectively (Ekumankama et al (2012).

Regional education policy 1955

Each of the three regions in Nigeria enacted and operated new education laws that resulted in extensive and intensive educational activities particularly in the Eastern and Western parts of the country from the early 1950s to further enshrine their political legitimacy as the appropriate government in these regions compared to the northern region which favored Islamic education. The priority given to education by these two southern regions in the 1950s was in response to popular demand for education and out of the leaders' conviction that education is an effective tool for achieving equity and political integration and also to establish their political legitimacy in a democratic era (Mbanefoh, 1994: 11).

For instance, in the Western Region, the Action Group (AG) Party prioritized education and drew a comprehensive educational development plan which introduced a free, universal and compulsory Primary Education (UPE) in 1955 (Taiwo, 1980). Despite initial setbacks, the success of policy implementation on UPE by the south west ruling party (Action Group) in 1955 led to a turn -around by NCNC party functionaries to adopt similar policy for the Eastern Region and Lagos Federal Territory in 1957.

As students progressed through basic primary and secondary schools, it became apparent that there would be a bottleneck for entrants at the university level. This led to the revision of the 1960-65 National Development Plan to the 1962-68 Development Plan with a provisional financial allocation of five million pounds sterling (£5,000,000) over five years for the tertiary sector and the eventual establishment of University of Ife, later renamed Obafemi Awolowo University (OAU) by the Federal Military Government in 1987.

Partnerships

The Western regional government partnered with a variety of stakeholders including communities and especially the Faith Based Organizations FBOs (Christian Missions) towards effective education service delivery. Technically, the communities and Missions sought for quality teachers and physical infrastructure and also provided the oversight through the local education authority. The regional government augmented with payment of these staff, provided policy framework and a system of inspectors as well as science laboratories in secondary schools. This arrangement of community engagement was key to the success of this scheme as these basic structures of governance have continued to

supply the backbone of the actual governance in many parts of Africa (see McNulty et al 1969).

The Eastern Nigerian government led by the NCNC saw the huge success of the AG in the west as an important basis for that government's legitimacy and followed suit. The northern region remained adamant, leading to the widening gap in educational attainment which the Federal government UPE initiative sought to tackle.

Funding UPE

The commodity revenue windfall and the timely shift in federal revenue sharing kept funds in the region and made it possible for UPE to hit the ground running in 1955. Financing of education was based on cost-sharing between the proprietary bodies, local community, parents/guardians and the government.

The ten-shilling six pence (10/6) capitation tax raised to finance the proposed Universal (free) Primary Education (UPE) freed parents of school children from paying any school fees and was widely accepted by the public within the region. In addition, education got the largest share of the Western Regional recurrent budget between 1954 and 1960, ranging from 28.9% to 41.2% representing one of the highest education budget ratios in Nigeria. Table 5 below shows the level and seriousness of financial commitment of the regional government to education services provision. Primary education got highest allocation ranging from 52% (1955) to 84% (1960) (Akinyoade et al., 2016). This policy initiative was significant and politically popular in that it ensured that every child had equal opportunity to receive quality education in public schools. The Western Regional government went to great lengths to ensure that these 'free' schools were qualitative.

Table 4: Recurrent education budget and regional budget, 1954-1966

Year	Recurrent budget £		Education as % of Regional	UPE as % of Total Education Grants
	Actual Education	Actual Regional		
1955	3,806,745	9,283,690	41.0	52
1956	3,873,305	11,366,931	34.0	60
1957	4,496,201	15,522,128	28.9	57
1958	5,506,880	14,288,000	38.5	69
1959	5,616,687	13,604,163	41.2	82
1960	7,161,303	22,152,351	32.3	84

Source: Adapted from, Some Trends in Education in the Western Region of Nigeria, 1955-1966 (Pilot Project for Rural Employment Promotion, International Labour Office Mission, Ibadan, Western Nigeria, October 1965, p.17) and Western Nigeria Annual Abstract of Education Statistics, 1955-1966 (Ibadan: Government Printer)

Table 5: Enrolment in primary school in the Western region by sex, 1953-1960

Year	Boys	Girls	Total	Increase over previous year	% change
1953	320542	109000	429542	---	--
1954	340610	115990	456600	27058	6.30
1955	536676	274756	811432	354832	77.71
1956	583688	324334	908022	96590	8.23
1957	619577	363178	982755	74733	5.56
1958	642856	394532	1037388	54644	4.14
1959	665442	414861	1080303	42915	4.12
1960	687215	437573	1124788	44485	0.59

Source: Adapted from Western Nigeria Annual Abstract of Education Statistics 1954-1966 (Ibadan, Ministry of Economic Planning and Community Development, Statistics Division)

Institutional and human capacities

The remarkable increase in primary school enrolments (Table 6) throughout the entire duration of the scheme also provided a wider base from which the secondary schools, trade schools and teacher training colleges drew their new entrants, which in turn quickened the pace of the development of middle-level manpower in the region, setting apart from other regions. The 1955 UPE implemented in Southwest Nigeria has been described as “the boldest and perhaps the most unprecedented educational scheme in Africa South of the Sahara” (Fafunwa 1974). The regionally formulated and implemented social innovation policy fits the decentralized context of this study. It could not be made possible also without the robust and qualitative public services available in the region which other regions had to copy in order to achieve their own policies and programs (see Murray 1979, Adamolekun 1986).

The Federal government program of 1976 sought to build on these positive early beginnings and was able to achieve considerable gains especially in the military period when the latter held the levers of fiscal and political purse strings throughout the federation.

4. Critical Lessons Emerging from These Experiences

We return here to the guiding questions and hypotheses. First, actors, interests and political dynamics determine whether or not a social policy would be successfully implemented at national or sub-national level.

The three cases reviewed in this paper underscore *the critical importance of politics and the quest for legitimacy by those in power at the national level in social protection experiments*. Social provisioning, whether community insurance or basic education aimed at promoting social cohesion, protection and solidarity constitutes a veritable method by which political actors seek to secure legitimacy and popular appeal. The fact that these services are costly for governments short on financing and human resources capacity compels them to search for efficiency, effectiveness gains as well as the possibility of mobilizing additional resources through decentralized policy and administrative arrangements. The exact form of decentralization preferred at the policy formulation phase is a function of the political dynamics and the administrative traditions in each country or society. However, for a variety of reasons—politics, lack of a full grasp of the complex nature and demands of different forms of decentralization—the exact form of decentralization utilized to deliver the service is usually different from what was promised in the policy documents. In all three African cases, devolution was preferred at the onset but in practically all three cases, de-concentration or delegation was utilized. The form of decentralization did not however determine the success or failure of any of these social provisioning programs—Uganda achieved success in spite of withdrawing the wide powers that were once given to districts in the light of political and administrative challenges whereas devolution to regions and local authorities achieved great success in implementation of the same social function—UPE in Nigeria in the 1950s as well as from the mid-1970s till the early 1990s when the civilians took over. In the latter period, implementing decentralization in an increasingly centralized federal system became problematic.

It emerged from the analysis that a significant problem of devolution is that it gives an opportunity for those in the political opposition to establish their claims to governance through social provisioning performance in their localities. This might explain the observed pattern whereby ruling governments tend to prefer devolution when they first take power

or start social protection program but end up recentralizing those powers in order to contain or constrain opposition political parties and actors. In fact, the opposition has used devolution powers to launch successful bids to oust the government in power in some countries throughout Africa—Zambia (Lusaka), Senegal (Dakar), Nigeria (Lagos), and the same logic seems to be playing out in the Republic of South Africa presently (Olowu forthcoming). This is therefore not a small matter. Where the Rwanda national government was effectively able to dominate the political landscape, it was able to deliver a highly sophisticated deconcentrated system of community-based health insurance with positive outcomes.

But it is not only politics that determines the form of the appropriate decentralization for social policy implementation. The three cases also confirm that even when the resources are abundant, either through domestic or donor resources, decentralized arrangements work better when several key actors (individuals and institutions) have incentives to cooperate with the program of social provisioning rather than shirk, undermine or disconnect from it. For instance, the Government of Rwanda was able to upgrade and upscale successful traditional program of community health insurance practiced in a few regions earlier. This was applied nationally with the assistance of a development partner, the USAID. Similarly, the huge success of UPE in Nigeria in its earlier years (1955-62) involved several actors with capacity within and outside the regional government. These included the senior political and administrative elites in the regional and local governments, the citizens and most importantly the wide array of non-governmental institutions—community-based organizations, civil society and even faith-based organizations. Again, a significant point considering the fact the same social provisioning program initiative ultimately failed under civilians in the more recent period even though the Nigerian federal government continued to pump substantial oil resources to finance the UPE and LG programs.

One of the keys to creating such incentives for program collaboration in decentralized social innovation is the existence of intergovernmental and inter-organizational platforms. Such platforms facilitate interactions with a diversity of individual and institutional actors within and outside the central government. Indeed, decentralization often means a redesign of systems, processes in order to actualize the outputs and outcomes as shown in Figure 1. Unfortunately, many central and local government officials fail to understand that such complex relationships within and between the ministries and also between different organs of the government—whether field or separated agencies—not to speak of non-governmental organs requires different communication tools and leadership skills. Old command and control tools and skills become outmoded and needed are tools and skills of negotiation, incentive management etc. that ensure that actors with diverse interests interact, negotiate, co-produce, compete and cooperate.

Effective fiscal decentralization (incorporating local taxes and intergovernmental transfers) must be roughly proportional to decentralized functions or social programs, in order to underwrite the costs of social services. This means that central governments resist the temptation to use decentralization as an opportunity to offload responsibilities on lower level organs.

Social experiments are bound to fail if they adopt a decentralized format without making adequate provision for financing the responsibilities devolved to lower level organs. It is instructive that each of the four social experiments examined actually made arrangements for decentralized delivery but in both the Uganda and Nigeria national UPE program, it became evident that resources made available for the program did not match the decentralized responsibilities. Uganda managed to leverage donor resources to fill this gap.

Even then as in Nigeria's National UPE additional financial resources came with greater controls on local level actors either through the fiscal instruments—greater dependency on (conditional) grants—as well as direct administrative actions such as the suspension of some districts or municipalities and/or dismissal of elected political actors and their replacement by appointed officials.

Though national governments claim that corruption or allegations of budget leakage, malfeasance is a major reason for increasing governmental controls in decentralized social experiments, cases of corruption through collusion between school administrators and the national government or with local elites have persisted after these actions were taken. The cases underscore the *importance of effective intergovernmental capacity to manage social policy at the national and subnational levels and also in the non-governmental bodies* like parent teachers associations. *More importantly, it is essential that there are robust upward (to the national government) and downward (to citizens) accountability arrangements.*

Development partners provide many positive inputs to the success of decentralized social programs. They bring financial and technical resources as well as lend support to a decentralized delivery. Some of them make this a condition for their support and provided much needed political support for the social programs and the decentralized delivery model selected. On the other hand, synchronizing the diversity of donors and the programs of administrative reforms they support especially in Uganda was difficult. These donors also did not have the political clout to either understand or defend localities against partisan actions by the national government since the latter was their primary partner.

5. Conclusion

Our analysis of new directions in social policy innovations in Africa suggests that the use of decentralized delivery is popular for a variety of reasons. Political actors drive and constrain the twin processes of social provisioning and decentralization. All three countries used the language of devolution about the time they launched their national social policy innovations to support and facilitate these social policy change, but they ended up reverting to either de-concentration or even recentralization or decentralized centralization. Other factors that drive decentralization include processes of political and economic liberalization, donor pressure, urbanization and other deep social changes taking place in the continent. Community solidarity is particularly high and runs deep in all the three countries. National governments as well as development partners and other actors need to develop the appropriate strategies and skills for engaging the complex processes and motivations behind decentralized social services provisioning. It would mean being sensitive to the politics, policy and administrative aspects of decentralized social policy experiments. It would also mean promoting different forms of decentralization for different services and also for different contexts. For instance, the cities seem capable both fiscally and politically to experiment with devolution but not many rural communities. An asymmetric decentralization approach might be more beneficial than the imposition of single forms of decentralization nationally as has been practised. It would also mean creating other incentive structures and mechanisms including own financing sources or cost-sharing arrangements for cities or some rich regions such as through property taxes for devolved bodies. These would make it feasible and attractive for a diversity of institutions to collaborate in the provision and production of social services for the masses of the people in the continent as the continent moves towards the 2030 strategic agenda.

References

- Adamolekun, L., D. Olowu and O.M. Laleye. 1984. *Local Government in West Africa Since Independence*. Lagos, Nigeria: Lagos University Press.
- Adamolekun, L. 1986. *Politics and Administration in Nigeria*. London: Hutchinson Publishers.
- Akangbou, S.D. 1985. *The economics of educational planning in Nigeria*. India: Vikas Publishing House, PVT Ltd.
- Akinyoade, A., E. Appiah and S. Asa. 2017. "Census-taking in Nigeria: The good, the technical, and the politics of numbers." *African Population Studies*, 31(1): 3383-94.
- Aluede, R.O.A. 2006. "Universal Basic Education in Nigeria: Matters Arising." *Journal of Human Ecology*, 20(2): 97-101
- Awortwi, N. 2011. "An Unbreakable Path? A Comparative Study of Decentralization and Local Government Development Trajectories in Ghana and Uganda." *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 77(2): 347-377.
- Awortwi, N. and B. Helmsing. 2014. "In the name of bringing services to the people? Explaining the Creation of Local Government Districts in Uganda." *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 80(4):766-788.
- Bardhan, P. 2002. "Decentralization of Governance and Development." *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 16:185-205.
- Bardhan, P, D. Mokherjee and P. Torrado. 2010. "Impact of Political Reservations in West Bengal local governments on anti-poverty targeting." *Journal of Globalization and Development*, 1(1):1-38.
- Barkan, J. D, A. Gboyega and M. Stevens. 2001. "State and Local Governance in Nigeria." In *World Bank Report*, edited by World Bank. Washington D.C: World Bank.
- Bello, J.Y. 1986. "The 6-3-3-4 system: another exercise in futility Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the Nigeria Association of Educational Administration and Planning. University of Port Harcourt" In Okoroma, N.S. 2006. "Educational policies and problems of implementation in Nigeria." *Australian Journal of Adult Learning*, 46(2):249.
- Berry, J. et al. 2003. *Local solutions to global challenges: towards effective partnership in basic education, country study report Uganda*. IOB: the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- Binagwaho, A. et al. 2012. "Mutual health insurance and its contribution to improving child health in Rwanda." *Passauer Diskussionspapiere - Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe, No. V-66-12*, Passau: Universität Passau, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
- Diejomaoh, I. and E. Eric. 2010. "Local Governments in Nigeria: Relevance and Effectiveness in Poverty Reduction and Economic Development." *Journal of Economic and Sustainable Development*, 1(1):12-28
- Dickovick, J. T. 2014. "Federalism in Africa: Origins, Operation and (In) Significance." *Regional & Federal Studies*, 24(5):553-570.
- Dickovick, T and J. Wunsch. 2014. *Decentralization in Africa: A Comparative Perspective*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Duclos, J.Y. et al. 2013. "Poverty and Social Impact Analysis Universal Primary Education in Uganda: Equity in opportunities and human capital investment Working Paper, Partnership for Economic Policy (PEP)" Accessed 30 November 2018. <http://portal.pep-net.org/documents/download/id/21991>
- Drobac, P. and B. Naughton. 2014. "Harvard International Review: Health Equity in Rwanda: The New Rwanda, Twenty Years Later." Accessed 30 November 2018. <http://hir.harvard.edu/archives/5732>
- Eaton, D., K. Kaiser and P. Smoke. 2010. *The Political Economy of Decentralization Reforms: Implications for Aid-Effectiveness*. Washington D.C: World Bank.
- Ekpo, A.H. and J. E.U. Ndebbio. 1998. "Local Government Fiscal Operations in Nigeria." *AERC Research Paper 73*, Nairobi: African Economic Research Consortium.
- Ekumankama, O. O., A. Ujunwa, H. Ahmad, M. Umar, and I. Adamu. 2012. "Managing Urban Cities in Nigeria Efficiently by Local Councils: The Capital Market Option." *Management Science and Engineering*. 6(4): 30-41.
- Fafunwa, A. B. 1974. *History of Education in Nigeria*. London: George Allen and Unwin.
- Federal Republic of Nigeria. 1976. *Supplement to Official Gazette, Decree 12 of 1976*. Lagos: Government Printer.
- Gboyega, A. 1981. "Intergovernmental Relations in Nigeria: Local Government and the 1979 Constitution." *Public Administration and Development*, 1(4): 281-90.
- Gershberg, A. I., and D. Winkler. 2004. "Education decentralisation in Africa: A review of recent policy and practice." *WBI Development Studies*, 323-356.
- Goodfellow, T. 2014. "Rwanda's Political Settlement and the Urban Transition and Taxation in Kigali." *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 8(2): 311-329.
- GoU. 1997. "Local Government Act 1997." Accessed 30 November 2018. www.ulii.org/ug/legislation/consolidated-act/243

- Grindle, M.S. 2002. *Good Enough Governance: Poverty Reduction and Reform in Developing Countries*. Boston MA: Harvard Kennedy School of Governance, Harvard University
- Guloba, M et al. 2011. "Public Spending in the Education Sector in Uganda: Evidence From Program Budgeting Analysis, Final Paper Submitted To The Global Development Network." Accessed 30 November 2018. http://eprc.or.ug/pdf_files/educationsector.pdf
- Guyer, J. 1992. "Representation without Taxation: An Essay on Democracy in Rural Nigeria, 1952-1990." *Working Paper in African Studies*, 152: 591-605.
- Imam, H. 2012. "Educational Policy in Nigeria from the Colonial Era to the Post-Independence Period." *Italian Journal of Sociology of Education*, 1:181-204.
- Inter-American Development Bank. 2015. *Decentralization and Sub-National Government Framework Document*. Washington D.C.: IADB.
- JICA. 2012. *Basic Education Sector Analysis Report- Uganda*. Tokyo: JICA.
- Kathyola, J and O. Job. 2010. *Decentralization in Commonwealth Africa*. London: Commonwealth Secretariat.
- Kebba, A and B. Ntanda. 2005. "Review of Implementation of the Decentralisation Policy. USAID Final Report, Management Systems International." Accessed 30 November 2018. http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnade095.pdf
- Kersting, N., J.Caulfield, R.A. Nickson, D. Olowu and H. Wollman. 2009. *Good Local Governance: Local Government Reform in Comparative Perspective*. Berlin: Verlag fur Sozial Wissenschaften.
- Knoema World Data Atlas. 2018. "Education/Expenditure." Accessed 30 November 2018. <https://knoema.com/atlas/Uganda/topics/Education/Expenditures-on-Education/Expenditure-on-education-as-a-share-of-GNI>
- Kuhlmann S and E. Weyenberg. 2016. "Institutional Impact Assessment in multi-level systems: conceptualizing decentralization effects from a comparative perspective." *International Review of Administrative Sciences*. 82(2): 233-254.
- Lambright, G. M. S. 2011. *Decentralization in Uganda: Explaining Successes and Failures in Local Governance*. Boulder.Colo.: FirstForumPress.
- Little, E. and C. Logan. 2009. "The Quality of Democracy and Governance in Africa: New Results from Afrobarometer, Round 4." *Working Paper No. 118*.
- Lu, C. et al. 2012. "Towards Universal Health Coverage: An Evaluation of Rwanda Mutuelles in Its First Eight Years. PLoS ONE. 7(6): e39282." Accessed 30 November 2018. <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0039282>
- Madinah, N. et al. 2015. "Recentralization of Kampala City Administration in Uganda: Implications for Top and Bottom Accountability. SAGE Open. 1-13." Accessed 30 November 2018. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2158244015591017>
- Mawhood, P. 1983. *Local Government in the Third World: The Experience of Tropical Africa*. Chichester: John Wiley.
- Mbanefoh, N. 1994. *Access of Girls to Primary and Basic Education in Nigeria*. Dakar: UNESCO
- McNulty, M. L. 1969. "Urban Structure and development: The Urban System of Ghana." *The Journal of Developing Areas*, 3(2):159-176.
- Millett, K. Olowu, D. and R. Cameron. 2006. *Local Governance and Poverty Reduction in Africa*. Tunis: Joint Africa Institute.
- MINALOC. 2001. *National Decentralisation Policy*. Kigali: Ministry of Local Government.
- , 2011. *Decentralisation Implementation Plan 2011-2015: He Participates, She Participates, I Participate,...We decide*. Kigali: Ministry of Local Government.
- , 2012. *National Decentralisation Policy (Revised) Consolidating Participatory Governance And Fast-Tracking Citizen-Centered Development*. Kigali: Ministry of Local Government.
- MINECOFIN. 2015. *Budget Data Table*. Kigali: Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning.
- MoES. 1998. *Guidelines on Policy, Roles, and Stakeholders in the Implementation of Universal Primary Education*. Kampala: MoES.
- , 1999. *The Ugandan experience of Universal Primary Education Ministry of Education and Sports (MoES)*. Kampala: MoES
- , 2004. *Education sector Strategic Plan 2004 – 2015*. Kampala: MoES.
- , 2008. *Education sector Strategic Plan 2007 – 2015*. Kampala: MoES.
- , 2014. *Education and Sports Sector Fact Sheet 2012 – 2013*. Kampala: MoES.
- MoLG. 2012. *National Local Government Capacity Building Policy (NLGCPB)*. Kampala: MoLG.
- , 2014. *Decentralisation and Local Development in Uganda*. Kampala: MoLG.
- Mugabi, E. 2004. "Uganda's Decentralisation Policy, Legal Framework, Local Government Structure and Service Delivery." Paper prepared for the First Conference of Regional Assemblies of Africa and Europe. Florence, Italy. 17-18 September.
- Muhanguzi, E. K. 2012. "Report of the Commission of Inquiry (Mismanagement of Funds under Universal Primary Education (UPE) And Universal Secondary Education." Accessed 30 November 2018. [http://www.i3c.co.ug/moes%20uploads/COMMISSION%20OF%20INQUIRY%20\(MISMANAGE](http://www.i3c.co.ug/moes%20uploads/COMMISSION%20OF%20INQUIRY%20(MISMANAGE)

- Murray, D. J. 1979. *Studies in Nigerian Administration*. London: Hutchinson.
- Musgrave, R.A. 1959. *A Theory of Public Finance*. New York: McGraw Hill.
- Mwesigye, A. 2015. "The Advent of universal primary education (UPE) in Uganda: challenges and possible solutions." *Journal of Educational Research and Studies*, 3(1):1-12.
- Naidoo, J. P. 2002. "Education decentralisation in sub-Saharan Africa—espoused theories and theories in use. Paper presented at CIES Annual Conference, University of Central Florida." Accessed 30 November 2018. <http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED472263.pdf>.
- Namata, B. 2015. "Rwanda to overhaul its medical insurance scheme, The East African." Accessed 30 November 2018. <http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Rwanda-to-overhaul-its-medical-insurance-scheme/-/2558/2592282/-/nqi2mkz/-/index.html>.
- Namukasa, I. and R. Buye. 2007. "Decentralization and Education in Uganda." *Canadian and International Education*, 36(1): 93-116.
- National Institute of Statistics Rwanda. 2014. "Rwanda Statistical Yearbook, 2014." Accessed 30 November 2018. <http://statistics.gov.rw/publication/statistical-yearbook-2014>
- ODI. 2012. *Delivering Maternal Health: Why Is Rwanda Doing Better Than Malawi, Niger, and Uganda?* London: Overseas Development Institute.
- Offensend, D. G. 1976. "Centralisation and Fiscal Arrangements in Nigeria." *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 14(3): 507-513.
- Okoroma, N.S. 2000. *The perspectives of educational management, planning and policy analysis*. Port Harcourt: Minson Publishers.
- , 2006. "Educational policies and problems of implementation in Nigeria." *Australian Journal of Adult Learning*, 46(2): 243-263.
- Olowu, D. 1981. *The Administration of Social Services in Nigeria: The Challenge to Local Governments*. Ile-Ife, LGTP: University of Ife.
- , 1986. "A decade of local government reform in Nigeria: 1976-1986." *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 52: 287-9.
- , 2004. "Property taxation and democratic decentralization in developing countries." *Institute of Social Studies working paper* 401. Hague: Institute of Social Studies.
- , 2012. "The Constitutionalization of Local Government in Developing Countries-Analysis of African Experiences in Global Perspective." *Beijing Law Review*, 3(2): 43-50.
- , 2017a. "African urbanisation and democratisation: Public policy, planning and public administration dilemmas." In *Routledge Companion to Planning in the Global South*, edited by B. Srinivas and W. Eds. London: Routledge.
- , forthcoming. "Governance and Policy Relevance of the Nigerian 40-Year Grassroot Revolution. 1976-2016." *International Review of Administrative Sciences*.
- Olowu, D and J. Wunsch. 2004. *Local Governance in Africa: The Challenge of Decentralization*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Ostrom, E., L. Schroeder and S. Wynne. 1993. *Institutional Incentives and Sustainable Development*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Pateman, C. 1970. *Participation and Democratic Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Papoula, E. 2012. "Evaluating the Impact of the Mutual Health Insurance Scheme in Rwanda on Health Care Utilization, Out-of-pocket Expenses and Health Outcomes." Master's Thesis. University of Amsterdam
- Population Reference Bureau. 2015. "World Population Data Sheet, with a special focus on women empowerment, USAID and PRB, USA." Accessed 30 November 2018. http://www.prb.org/pdf15/2015-world-population-data-sheet_eng.pdf
- Pose, R.R. and F. Samuels. 2011. "Rwanda's Progress in Health: Leadership, Performance and Insurance, Overseas Development Institute, 1-37." Accessed 30 November 2019. http://www.developmentprogress.org/sites/developmentprogress.org/files/rwanda_report_-_master_0.pdf
- Prudhomme, R. 1995. "The Dangers of Decentralization." *World Bank Research Observer*, 10(2):201-200.
- Resnick, D. 2014. "Urban Governance and Service Delivery: The Role of Politics and Policies." *Development Policy Review*, 32(1): 3-17.
- Ribot, J. 2002. *Local Actors, Powers and Accountability in African Decentralization: A Review of Issues*. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.
- RHMIS. 2011. *Rwanda Annual Health Statistics Booklet 2011, Rwanda Health Management Information System*. Kigali: Ministry of Health.
- Romeo, L.G. 2003. "The role of external assistance in supporting decentralisation Reform." *Public Administration and Development*, 23(1): 89-96.

- Saksena, P. et al. 2010. "Impact of Mutual Health Insurance on Access to Health Care and Financial Risk Protection in Rwanda." *Background paper for World Health Report, 2010*. Geneva: The World Health Organization.
- Sasaoka, Y and M. Nishimura. 2010. "Does universal primary education policy weaken decentralisation? Participation and accountability frameworks in East Africa." *Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education*, 40(1):79-95.
- Sekabaraga C. et al. 2011. "Can innovative health financing policies increase access to MDG-related services? Evidence from Rwanda." *Health Policy and Planning*, 26(2): 52-62.
- Shah, A. 2006. *Local Governance in Developing Countries*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- Shimeles, A. 2010. "Community Based Health Insurance Schemes in Africa: The Case of Rwanda." *African Development Bank Working Papers Series*, Tunis: African Development Bank.
- Smith, B. C. 1985. *Decentralization: The Territorial Dimension of the State*. London: Allen and Unwin.
- Smoke, P. 2001. *Fiscal Decentralization in Developing Countries: A Review of Current Concepts and Practice*. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.
- Smoke, P. 2015. "Rethinking Decentralization: Assessing Challenges to A Popular Public Sector Reform." *Public Administration and Development*, 35: 97-112.
- Smoke, P, W. Muhumuza, E. Ssewankambo. 2014. "Uganda: Decentralization Reforms, Reversals and an Uncertain Future." In *Decentralization in Africa: The Paradox of State Strength*, edited by J. Tyler Dickovick and J.S. Wunsch Eds, 229-248. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Stasavage, D. 2005. "The role of democracy in Uganda's move to universal primary Education." *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 43(1): 53-73.
- Steiner, S. 2006. "Decentralisation in Uganda: Exploring the Constraints for Poverty Reduction." Working papers of GIGA Research Programme: Transformation in the Process of Globalisation. Accessed 30 November 2018. http://www.giga-hamburg.de/content/publikationen/pdf/wp31_steiner.pdf.
- Taiwo, C.O. 1980. "The Nigerian educational system: past, present and future. Lagos: Thomas Nelson (Nig) Ltd." In R.O.A Aluede. 2006. "Universal Basic Education in Nigeria: Matters Arising." *Journal of Human Ecology*, 20(2): 97-101.
- Tocqueville, A. 1969. *Democracy in America*. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books.
- Uganda Bureau of Statistics. 2014. *2014 Statistical Abstract*. Kampala: UBOS.
- , 2016. *2016 Statistical Abstract*. Kampala: UBOS
- United Nations Development Program. 2013. *Human Development Report 2013: The Rise of the South*. New York: UNDP.
- United Cities and African Local Governments. 2015. *The Cities' Alliance Report of 2015*. Morocco: UCALG.
- Uphoff, N and M. Esman. 1974. *Local Organisations for Rural Development: Analysis of the Asian Experience*. Ithaca, NY: Rural Development Committee, Cornell University.
- Weber, M. 1958. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. New York: Schribner.
- Woldemichael, A. and A. Shimeles. 2015. "Measuring the Impact of Micro-Health Insurance on Healthcare Utilization: A Bayesian Potential Outcomes Approach." *African Development Bank Working Paper*, Tunis: African Development Bank.
- World Bank. 2002. "Achieving Universal Primary Education in Uganda: The 'Big Bang' Approach, Human Development Network Education Notes." Accessed 30 November 2019. <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EDUCATION/Resources/EducationNotes/EduNotesUganda.pdf>
- World Bank. 2004. *World Development Report*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- World Health Organization. 2014. "Global Health Expenditure Database." Accessed 30 November 2018. <http://apps.who.int/nha/database/Select/Indicators/en>
- Wunsch, J and D. Olowu. 1990. *The Failure of the Centralized State: Institutions and Self Governance in Africa*. Boulder: Westview Press.